Liberalism, Hermeneutics, and the Other

Abstract

<p>For hermeneutics, liberal universality—the belief that rights for being humans <em>as such</em> are universally true—is a sort of <em>subjective</em> universality. Subjectivity is just another way of saying that universality is historically situated, and whoever claims universality cannot objectify herself from her own history; accordingly, universality is not universality-as-the-thing-is (a sort of “objective” universality), but universality-for-person P -in-her-historical-situation, even if the claimer is totally unaware of the restrictions imposed by her own tradition and historicity.</p> <p>Subjective universality reveals the fact that the content of universality is affected by the <em>personal dimension</em> of its claimer. That is, the claimer’s personal background, including culture, language, tradition, education, social-economical aspects, even gender and race, are reflected, consciously or unconsciously, explicitly or implicitly, directly or indirectly, in her view of what universality ought to be.</p> <p>How to treat the <em>other­</em>— a political and metaphysical category of existence that is radically different from oneself—reveals the subjective nature of liberal universality. In history, this subjectivity worked negatively, for liberals, to select and exclude some groups e.g. women, the propertyless, and the colonized subjects. But in light of our contemporary understanding of what is truly free and equal, this subjectivity can function positively to assure respect for the other and avoid producing new types of alienated other. The advocated liberal approach is a hermeneutic approach, which asserts the practices of being humble, dialogical, non-violent, and voluntarily self-dislocated, in dealing with the other.</p>