The Aporia of Essence in Aristotle's Metaphysics

Abstract

This thesis proposes a solution to the fourteenth puzzle stated in Aristotle's Metaphysics Book 3, Chapter 6. For the most part I rely on Metaphysics Books 7 and 8 to find a solution and I treat the essences of natural beings in the context of a naturalized metaphysics. I conclude that essences are at once particular and universal. What is novel about my solution is that it allows Aristotle to maintain three important theses: (1) substance is particular, (2) knowledge is of universals, (3) the law of contradiction. I claim that Aristotle is able to maintain theses 1 and 2 without contradiction by giving matter a significant role to play in the solution. As a secondary task, I evaluate Aristotle's claim that essence is primary substance in the Metaphysics. I conclude that the right to the title of primary substance belongs to the following candidates in this order: sensible substances, essences, matter.