In Defense of the Aesthetic Attitude

Abstract

<p>The enormous and seemingly insurmountable difficulties encountered in the attempt to think clearly about the centra 1 prob 1 ems in aesthet i cs has 1 ed many recent aesthet i c i ans to redef i ne the i r obj ect of study, and to examine the methods appropriate to aesthetics. Liberalminded theories in aesthetics are often too ambitious, however, and in their attempt to better account for aesthetic experience, they lose philosophical integrity. Th; s thes is rev i ews the 1 i bera 1 aesthet i c theory of Arno 1 d Berleant, and recommends the restitution of the notoriously conservative aesthetic attitude. The defense of the aesthetic attitude comes in two parts. The first concerns the conceptual necessity of the aesthetic attitude for saying anything at all intelligible in aesthetics. The second is a defense of the aesthetic attitude from a decidedly un-conservative point of view. Here it is maintained that the aesthetic attitude underl ies the d i st i nct i on we rout i ne 1 y make in ou r aesthet i c exper i ence between the practical world and the world of the text, a distinction which Berleant seeks to collapse. It is demonstrated that a hermeneutical analysis of aesthetic experience upholds the importance of a traditional form of the aesthetic attitude in theory and experience alike.</p>