Phenomenology as Intuitive Science

Abstract

<p>This paper proposes to examine Husserl's claim to have initiated a genuinely scientific philosophy. For this purpose we have focused our attention on the method devised to realize this age-old ideal. In our investigation of the phenomenological method we have discussed almost exclusively that aspect which is most crucial, namely, the appeal to intuition. The thesis is, therefore, primarily a discourse on method and more specifically on the phenomenological method as a form of intuitionism.</p> <p>In his attempt to make philosophy assume the role of a genuine science: Husserl seeks to lay the foundation for philosophy as a rigorous science. His appeal to intuition is precisely this laying of the foundation, and must, therefore, be the starting point for any discussion of phenomenology as rigorous science. More precisely, our examination aims at exploiting the basic relation Husserl finds between intuition and science. It is essentially a relation of dependence in that apart from a form of intuition, as the object-giving source, science, of whatever kind, could not get started. This being the case, Husserl's own genuine science of essential being depends on the recognition of a corresponding form of essential intuition. We shall attempt, largely through interpretative exposition, to examine this relation of dependence and its implications for phenomenology. In so doing we hope to put to the test Husserl's phenomenolcgy as genuine science at its most crucial point. Hopefully, this will both clarify the way in which phenomenology is genuine science, and reaffirm Husserl's claim to have made first beginnings in this directi on.</p>