Kant's Metaphysical Deduction

Abstract

<p>The thesis is, (a), that there is an important and coherently argued stage (designated 'the metaphysical deduction') in the Critique of Pure Reason which concerns certain features of the pure understanding, and (b), that this stage does not invoke Kant's doctrines of sensibility, nor does it requie support from the arguments of the Transcendental Deduction. The thesis is argued in the attempt to reconstruct the essential framework of the metaphysical deduction.</p> <p>An examination of the logical forms of judgments, a brief review of how these are conceived to relate to the pure concepts of the understanding, and an examination of the pure concepts themselves form the content of the first three Chapters. It is then argued that the pure concepts are unschematised, that is, have no sensible significance (Chapter Four). There follows a reconstruction of the argument of Kant's deduction of the pure concepts from the forms of judgments (Chapter Five). Finally, the idealist implications of the conclusions of the argument of the metaphysical deduction are exposed (Chapter Six).</p>