Brentano's Conception of Self

Abstract

<p>This thesis examines various interpretations of the self in the works of Franz Brentano. Although a clear, well-formulated concept of the self is not part of Brentano' s writings, there exists a thread of consistency between what he considers the self to be for, practically, and what it actually is of- structurally. Thus somewhere between the way we know a self empirically in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, and metaphysically in The Theory of Categories, Brentano provides his conception of the self. In examining Brentano's conception of the self and of selfhood, William James' theories provide interesting contrasts and similarities. The two philosophers embarked on a similar path towards a phenomenological concept of the self. The most important difference between Brentano and James revolves around the notion of the self as a substance. Between James' 'how-to know-the-self via experience, and Brentano's 'what-is-the-self-made-of via structure, important philosophical questions about epistemology and metaphysics arise. Can we have an empirical conception of the self while it remains a substantial entity? Today's philosophy has pushed the notion of an empirical self far beyond Brentano's and James' imagination. The question has extended not only to the self as a 'knowable' as a result of its empirical nature as an experiencing thing, but to how it is empirically known. How and with what methods do we interpret experiencing selves today?</p>