Intention and Human Action

Abstract

<p>An examination of intention relative to human action is undertaken. A theory of human action is briefly sketched, based on the notion of rule-governed behavior, in order to give a framework for the discussion. It is argued that the notion intentional is not indigenous to the concept of human action; there are unintentional actions. One important point is that only actions of the agent are the proper objects of his intentions. The nature of intention, a mental state, is examined by studying how intention is connected with deliberating, deciding, trying, choice and belief. The close connection of intention, intentional action and the reasons the agent might have for doing the action necessitate a discussion of reason explanations of actions. It is decided that most often the link is a causal one; explanations in terms of reasons are of the causal sort. When they are not, the link might be seen as a logical one.</p>