Are You There God? It's Me, Margaret Cavendish.

Abstract

This thesis examines how Margaret Cavendish, a 17th-century English philosopher, incorporates the concept of God into her materialist metaphysics without conflicting with her commitment to natural philosophy. Cavendish famously holds that all things are made of matter, including thought, soul, and perception. This raises a tension in that if nature is entirely self-sufficient and self-moving, what role does God play in her philosophical system? I argue that Cavendish operates with two distinct concepts of God, a metaphysical God and a biblical God, and that distinguishing between them helps resolve apparent contradictions in her work. The metaphysical God serves a foundational role in explaining the existence and unity of nature but does not intervene in its workings. The biblical God on the other hand, belongs to theology and personal faith and is kept separate from the concerns of philosophy. This dual concept allows Cavendish to acknowledge religious belief while maintaining the autonomy of her natural philosophy. By adopting this two God interpretive model, I demonstrate how Cavendish’s references to divine unknowability, non-intervention, and the Trinity can be understood without threatening the coherence of her metaphysical views. I also engage with prominent scholars in the field to show how my interpretation differs from existing readings, particularly those that treat Cavendish’s invocation of God as either merely rhetorical or deeply inconsistent. This thesis contributes to the growing body of literature on early modern women philosophers by offering a new perspective on how Cavendish navigated the relationship between science, metaphysics, and religion. It also sheds light on how Cavendish navigated the limits of reason and faith, and how she made room for religious belief within a consistently materialist system.