Developing a Framework: Morality's Role In The Law

Abstract

Far too often, theorists talk past one another making it difficult to compare and contrast the differing viewpoints. Described by what I term the 'problem of clarity,' much legal discourse has suffered at the hands of misunderstood views and lack of attention paid to focusing on arguing the truth or falsity of the same propositions. In this dissertation, I aim to develop a conceptual framework through which past, present and future debates may be understood. Focusing on morality's role in the law, this thesis sets out to alleviate the problem of clarity as it affects discourse in jurisprudence. Distinguishing objects from theories, I proceed to outline various 'levels' at which we may understand morality as functioning in law. Morality's role in law, I argue, can be understood as falling under one of three distinct levels: the 'practice-level,' the 'theoretical-level,' or the 'meta-theoretical-level.' In putting forth this framework, I hope to provide guidelines through which legal theorists will be able to focus concerns and debates. It is the aim of this thesis to help alleviate the difficulties arising out of the problem of clarity, for example, by providing a framework in which theorists will be able to work, specifically in matters concerning morality's role in law.