The Identity of Sensations and Physiological Occurrences
| dc.contributor.advisor | Radner, Michael | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | Jones, Kenneth | en_US |
| dc.contributor.department | Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2014-06-18T16:52:22Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2014-06-18T16:52:22Z | |
| dc.date.created | 2011-08-08 | en_US |
| dc.date.issued | 1969-11 | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | <p>Perhaps the most puzzling of the mind-body issues is the problem about the nature of the felt qualities or "raw-feels" of experience. Most philosophic positions on the mind-body problem - materialism, mind-body interactionism, evalutionary energent theories, epiphernomenalism, neutral monism - are positions taken in answer to this problem. The scope and content of this thesis is limited to examining one such position - the current identity theory that raw-feels are identical with physiological occurrences.</p> | en_US |
| dc.description.degree | Master of Arts (MA) | en_US |
| dc.identifier.other | opendissertations/5745 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.other | 6769 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.other | 2137918 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11375/10717 | |
| dc.subject | Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.subject | Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.title | The Identity of Sensations and Physiological Occurrences | en_US |
| dc.type | thesis | en_US |
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