Augustine Re-Encountered

Abstract

The problem of how one can reconcile the omnipotence and omniscience of God with human freedom has penetrated a good deal of philosophical and theological thought. On occasion it has even been reduced to a unsolvable problem unworthy of consideration. Saint Augustine, however, clearly did not think this was the case. Augustine defends human freedom as a good which must be preserved even if it does allow for the possibility of evil. David R. Griffin, on the other hand, maintains that men cannot exert their own will, when they are considered to be subject to the will of an omnipotent.God and that the occurence of evil in the world must ultimately be allowed by God. William L. Rowe also maintains that there is a problem in claiming that human beings are free, but this time, because of God's omniscience rather than His omnipotence. Rowe argues that since whatever God foreknows must necessarily happen and He knows that evil will happen, man's decision to sin is not one of freedom but of necessity. These are generally considered the two main arguments for opposing Augustine's Free Will Defense, and although Rowe eventually shows the inadequacies of the 'omniscience argument', his presentation of the traditional view is most valuable. It is the contention of this paper that neither divine omnipotence nor omniscience, when considered independently, present sufficient evidence to seriously jeopardize Augustine's position, and this, can only partially be achieved by combining these divine attributes and pitting them against the possibility of human freedom. This thesis is defended by a demonstration of the weaknesses of the independent arguments which are overcome, or at least strengthened, when combined.