Frege's Theory of Judgement

Abstract

<p>This thesis attempts to examine and evaluate the contribution made by the German mathematician and philosopher Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) to the solution of certain epistemological problems which centre round the notion of a judgement. It is argued that it is in terms of such Fregean concepts as those of assertion, sense, reference, object and concept that an adequate account of the nature of human judgement is to be formulated, but that Frege's theory must undergo substantial modification before it is finally acceptable. The conclusion herein reached is that a judgement is an assertion that a given object falls under a certain concept (or that a given concept falls within a certain concept of higher order). Just this was, indeed, Frege's claim; but it is argued that certain key terms here cannot be understood as Frege originally intended; and an alternative interpretation is propounded and defended. This interpretation is specifically directed towards the notions of a sense-function and the unsaturatedness of concepts.</p>