Reid and Perceptual Acquaintance
| dc.contributor.advisor | Sassen, Brigitte | |
| dc.contributor.author | Sopuck, Forrest | |
| dc.contributor.department | Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2015-09-29T18:38:58Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2015-09-29T18:38:58Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2015-11-20 | |
| dc.description.abstract | In the recent literature, there is some debate over Reid’s theory of perception. Commentators are divided on whether or not Reid’s theory is consistent with an acquaintance model of perception. I will show that Reid’s views are not consistent with an acquaintance model, but that he nevertheless had good reasons to subscribe to this model. There is, therefore, an interesting tension in Reid’s theory of perception. I then develop a modified Reidian acquaintance model of perception as a way of resolving these tensions in light of an argument contained in Reid’s Philosophical Orations, and defuse recent objections to the acquaintance interpretation in the process. | en_US |
| dc.description.degree | Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) | en_US |
| dc.description.degreetype | Thesis | en_US |
| dc.description.layabstract | In this dissertation I examine an ongoing debate in the contemporary literature on Thomas Reid over the nature of his account of perception. I argue that one interpretation of Reid’s theory of perception that has been entertained fails, and that this does not, for various reasons, bode well for the viability of his account. I argue that Reid had available a straightforward way to revise his theory in order to avoid this difficulty, and I explicate this simple revision. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11375/18305 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.subject | Perception; Representation; Acquaintance; Common Sense; Sensation; Idea Theory; Epistemology; History of Philosophy; Metaphysics | en_US |
| dc.title | Reid and Perceptual Acquaintance | en_US |
| dc.type | Thesis | en_US |