The Fallacy of Equivocation

Abstract

<p>The central question of this thesis is when, if ever, the verdict that an argument commits the fallacy of equivocation is warranted, where a verdict is a final decision about whether or not an argument should be rejected. In order to answer this question, I develop five conditions under which such a verdict would be warranted. A verdict of equivocation is warranted only if (1) someone has drawn a conclusion from one or more premises; (2) the argument contains at least two tokens, x and y, of the same expression and x and y mean different things; (3) if x and y had the same meaning at each occurrence, then the conclusion would follow from the premises (unless there was some other reason for the argument to be invalid); (4) Given that x and y mean different things, then the conclusion does not follow from the premises; (5) The presence of a meaning shift between x and y (condition 2) is not open to serious debate. If these individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions are met, then a verdict of equivocation is warranted. The argument should be rejected.</p> <p>These conditions are developed only after a discussion of the concept of the fallacy of equivocation in chapter one and a discussion of several serious problems With the modem treatment of the fallacy of equivocation in chapter two. The third chapter is the development of the above conditions together With their justification, their application to the problems of chapter two and a discussion of possible objections to these conditions.</p>