Legitimate Authority and Raz

Abstract

The major emphasis of this thesis follows the broader survey in Chapter 1 about consent. Really, the attempt is to pull apart Raz’s theory from two particular points: (1) The three-thesis service conception and (2) the noninstrumental grounds argument. In both points, we have to contend with Raz’s claim that there is no general obligation to obey the law. We have to manage that claim against Raz’s insistence that legal authorities claim that there is not only a general obligation, but a wholly comprehensive obligation to obey. My first major contribution is to show that this represents a real descriptive problem for Raz’s account of authority. I acknowledge his attempt to argue in normative terms, and to forgo certain descriptive accuracy in the effort to vouch for what ought to be. My most pointed claim is that he strays too far from a reasonable description of authority in pursuing his justifiable version. My second major point is to argue that abstract judicial review can reconcile Raz’s theory with the central case, while also providing a more ethically justified alternative to the ‘case or controversy’ requirement that plagues so much of Western legal practice.