Human Dignity: In (pragmatistic) defence of a (purportedly) useless concept

Abstract

Is human dignity as critics deride it: a useless concept that is as devoid of philosophical substance as a slogan on a bumper sticker? Or are philosophico-methodological expectations to blame for its critical demise? The latter possibility—left unexplored until now—raises three related questions. First, is dignity too vague (or metaphorical) to be meaningful? Chapter I provides voluminous evidence to the contrary. Second, is dignity the basis of moral equality? Chapter II examines the unexpected complications of operating on that noble-seeming assumption. Third, is the very idea of human dignity symptomatic of species snobbery? Possibly, but it’s been said that dignitarians—worse than being species snobs—are full-blown human supremacists. Chapter 3 probes that polemical charge and finds it wanting.