The Phenomenology of Incest Abuse

Abstract

Beginning with a brief examination of the dominant psychological perspective, I will demonstrate how the ideology espoused in the current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual insufficiently captures the reality of incest abuse. Founded upon the dogmatic assumption that there exists in each individual body an isolated psyche turned inwards, this tradition fails to recognize consciousness as an externally directed manner of relating to others. The implications of these assumptions are significant to the exploration of incest trauma, as this form of abuse is fundamentally based upon the child's relations with others. This dominant psychological and philosophical tradition influences our current understandings of trauma, yet runs counter to the experience and perspectives of those it directly impacts. For this reason, through the lens of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, I will argue that incest trauma ought be reduced to a series of causal events nor psychological reactions to external stimuli. I will explore Merleau-Ponty's theory of perception and provide reasoning as to why his theory of embodiment better captures the practical orientation we, as organisms, take up towards the world. I will address his understanding of the postural schema as primary consciousness, the specular image as a new horizon, and the way in which these affect the body’s primordial powers of perspective and habit. Using these terms, I will then better clarify the infant’s relations with others and how these relations give rise to a particular style of embodied existence. Lastly, I will describe the sense of attunement that may exists between the child and the caregiver, and demonstrate both the impact of its presence and its absence. Rather than solely relying upon co-morbid conditions to explain the impact of incest abuse, this relational trauma must be captured using language that directly reflect the experience of survivors.