Agency, Responsibility, and the Self

Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to determine whether having an ability to choose otherwise aids our understanding of the kind of balanced autonomy that is required in order to claim that people should be held responsible for their actions. By looking to the theories of three historical philosophers (Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Jean Paul Sartre), I find evidence that suggests having an ability to choose otherwise should not be the ground on which we base responsibility for an agent’s actions; actions involve ‘choosing one’s self’ and there is a relationship one has to one’s self which is often overlooked. My investigation reveals evidence that existential authenticity is an inherent quality of autonomy and that the ‘genuine self’ which grounds an agent’s actions ought to be viewed as a ‘dependence’ rather than a ‘cause’. My investigation also reveals a concept of a ‘genuine self’ as distinct from the concept of a narratively structured ‘ego’; the self and the ego appear to be distinct entities which are existentially interdependent. This thesis raises questions which should be addressed in future investigations. First, how is, and how should responsibility be related to the dependences from which actions arise and second, is the objective world best understood as causally structured, in accordance with the doctrine of determinism, or rather, should we seek an understanding of the objective world as dependently structured.