Contributions to Reverse Logistics with Game theoretic Applications

Abstract

<p>The last two decades witnessed an increasing emphasis on reverse logistics (RL). Our thesis attempts to investigate two research problems in RL and explore game theoretic applications in this field.</p> <p>In Chapter 1, we introduce SCM, RL, relevant game theoretic applications, and the organizational structure of this thesis.</p> <p>In Chapter 2, we address a newsvendor problem with resalable returns. We develop a basic model with order quantity as the single decision variable and conduct concavity analysis. We also develop a general model in which the retailer determines both order quantity and two inter-period inventory thresholds. We use simulation to investigate the timing effect of both customer demands and returns on the retailer's decision making.</p> <p>In Chapter 3, we explore the application of game theoretic models with incomplete information in inventory management. Games with incomplete information may provide a more realistic modeling framework. We hope this exposition be helpful to researchers interested in applying game theoretic models and computing equilibriums in their specific problems in SCM and RL.</p> <p>In Chapter 4 we consider a remanufacturing competition problem between an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a pure remanufacturer (REM) with the OEM's incomplete information on the REM's unit cost. We apply the type-III model in Chapter 3 for formulation and derive the closed-form Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We use sensitivity analysis to investigate the effect of such incomplete information on both competitors' decision making.</p> <p>We summarize in Chapter 5 and provide a general direction for future research on game theoretic applications in RL.</p>