The question of Phenomenological Immanence

Abstract

<p>This thesis deals with the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. As is demanded of any exposition of Husserlian phenomenology, we have characterized phenomenology as the quest for a rigorous Science of Being. We have pushed this one step further and attempted to show how, for Husserl, a rigorous Science of Being must be characterized as a philosophy of Immanence. We have attempted to show how the nature, possibility and necessity of a rigorous Science of Being demands this characterization of phenomenology (CHAPTER ONE). We have also shown how he attainment of the sphere of phenomenological Immanence requires a special methodological access to that sphere to the extent that without this method, the authentic and central meaning of phenomenology remains hidden (CHAPTER TWO). We then characterized the method of access to phenomenology (the phenomenological reduction) as well as the matter of phenomenology (transcendental subjectivity). With regard to the method, we have attempted to show forth certain possible misrepresenations of its effect. With regard to the matter, we have attempted to give an analytic as well as synthetic description of the field of phenomenological Immanence (CHAPTER THREE). Our "critical chapter" attempts to point out an unquestiond presupposition in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. The unearthing of this presupposition decidedly effects Husserl's initial equation of phenomenology with a rigorous Science. We have shown the circularity of Husserl's Scientific project, the emergence of this circle, and the effect of this circle on phenomenology's self-interpretation. We find that this circle demands that phenomenology, in its own self-interpretation, be characterized as a philosophy of Immanence. Yet the revealing of this circle shows us that it cannot be a philosophy of Immanence. We then posed the question of Transcendence, but found that answering it required a transformation of thought whose nature remained a mystery.</p>