THE QUESTION OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL HUMAN  
THE QUESTION OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL IMMANENCE

By

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SCOPE AND CONTENTS:
This thesis deals with the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. As is demanded of any exposition of Husserlian phenomenology, we have characterized phenomenology as the quest for a rigorous Science of Being. We have pushed this one step further and attempted to show how, for Husserl, a rigorous Science of Being must be characterized as a philosophy of Immanence. We have attempted to show how the nature, possibility and necessity of a rigorous Science of Being demands this characterization of phenomenology (CHAPTER ONE). We have also shown how the attainment of the sphere of phenomenological Immanence requires a special methodological access to that sphere to the extent that without this method, the authentic and central meaning of phenomenology remains hidden (CHAPTER TWO). We then characterized the method of access to phenomenology (the phenomenological reduction) as well as the matter of phenomenology (transcendental subjectivity). With regard to the method, we have attempted to show forth certain possible misrepresentations of its effect. With regard to the matter, we have attempted to give an analytic as well as synthetic description of the field of phenomenological Immanence (CHAPTER THREE). Our "critical chapter" attempts to point out an unquestioned presupposition in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. The unearthing of this presupposition decidedly effects Husserl's initial equation of phenomenology with a rigorous Science. We have shown the circularity of Husserl's Scientific project, the emergence of this circle, and the effect of this circle on phenomenology's self-interpretation. We find that this circle demands that phenomenology, in its own self-interpretation, be characterized as a philosophy of Immanence. Yet the revealing of this circle shows us that it cannot be a philosophy of Immanence. We then posed the question of Transcendence, but found that answering it required a transformation of thought whose nature remained a mystery.
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PREFACE

We have found it necessary to preface this thesis with a few comments which will hopefully help to orient the reader to its general format.

First of all, it needs to be noted that the work presented here does not follow, so to speak, the "classical style" of writing a thesis. Nowhere in the body of this thesis are critical comments of various commentators on Husserl raised and answered. This, of course, is not to say that the author does not owe a great deal to the commentaries of Fink, Carr, Ricoeur, Berger, Levinas and others. Without their insightful comments and criticisms, this thesis would not have been possible at all. We feel, however, that the central purpose of a good commentary is to lead one back to the primary source with fresh insight and new directions of thought. We feel, then, that "commenting on commentaries" can provide, if it is carried to extreme, a way of avoiding the issues at hand. The issue at hand is the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, which has not been dealt with in terms of various commentators on Husserl. We openly admit that we may be accused of taking the opposite extreme of the tendency noted above. Be that as it may, the secondary materials by means of which we returned to the work of Edmund Husserl are listed in our BIBLIOGRAPHY. The sole exception...
to this procedure in our thesis is Eugen Fink's brilliant article entitled "The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism", which we have explicitly cited several times. This, we feel, merely affirms the unique character of this article.

Secondly, because of the fact that this thesis represents an ongoing development of the author's thought, we feel that an explanation of the development of our critical comments presented here is in order:

In the process of writing our CHAPTER FOUR, we found that our criticism's of the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl were constantly curbed by Husserl's possible responses to them. The question of Transcendence herein presented is left standing as a vague possibility, because of the immensely seductive power of Husserl's criticisms of this question. We are left saying that Husserl's unquestioned faith in Reason proves to be an unquestioned presupposition in his phenomenology which denies its claim to all-encompassing self-enclosure. We ended by saying that Husserl's acceptance of the principle of Reason proves phenomenology to be "groundless", but the possibility of developing this further remained obscure. We were left with much to say, and no apparently "justified" way of saying it.

We need to point out, however, that the development of this line of thought did not end here. Our INTRO-
DUCTION, written after our CHAPTER FOUR, pushed this one step further and provided us with a new context for interpreting the movement of this thesis as a whole. We discovered that it was Husserl's faith in Reason which demanded of him the equation of the nature possibility and necessity of a rigorous Science of Being with the nature, possibility, and necessity of phenomenology as such. Moreover, it was this equation which demanded that Husserlian phenomenology be characterized as a philosophy of Immanence. Therefore, we noted that the denial of the possibility of a philosophy of Immanence (which we attempted in our CHAPTER FOUR) is not necessarily the denial of phenomenology per se, but simply the denial of Husserlian phenomenology. But this is not all. Our extended notes, themselves written after our INTRODUCTION, provided us with a further extension and development of our critical comments. We said in our INTRODUCTION that the uncritical acceptance of the goal of a rigorous Science of Being proved Husserl to be untrue to the universality and radicality of the phenomenological reduction, which showed him to be untrue to the authentic and central meaning of phenomenology. In short, Husserl's unwavering faith in Science demanded of him that the reduction not be "complete". Now we see, (especially in our note 287) that the demand for universality and radicality from the phenomenological reduction (i.e.,
the demand for a "complete reduction") could itself prove to be a demand of Science and not necessarily a demand implicit in the meaning of the reduction itself.

But this leaves us once again with many more questions to be answered and issues to be raised. Is it not true that the impossibility of a complete reduction is realized only in the attempt at a complete reduction? Does not the "unmotivated upsurge of the world" as Merleau-Ponty calls it only show forth against the background of such an attempt? Perhaps we could interpret Husserl's calling himself a "perpetual beginner" in this light.

One final issue needs to be mentioned. The denial of the possibility of a rigorous Science of Being does not quell the demand for such a Science. This denial does not, that is, quiet what one could call the "unmotivated upsurge of philosophy".

We felt that with the aid of these preliminary comments, an extensive revision of this thesis in line with the development of our criticism was not necessary. In fact, we felt that such a revision was not desirable, for it would deny the reader the opportunity of following the line of development which the author underwent.

I wish to thank Dr. C. Georgiadis, my third reader, for suffering through what so often has seemed to me to be a rather long-winded attempt on my part of saying something rather simple. I value having him as one of my
readers.

I wish also to thank Mark Franklin and Paul Mailer for patiently allowing nearly all of our private conversations over the past year to almost inevitably turn to the subject of Husserlian phenomenology. I hope that neither of them expect the completion of this thesis in any way to decrease my efforts to "convert" them!

Dr. J. Amstutz, who graciously agreed to be my second reader, provided me with my first introduction to the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, in a reading course taken in the Fall of 1974. His thoughtful and comprehensive assistance in that course, coupled with his powerful and illuminating comments as my second reader, have certainly effected a decisive influence on the present work. I cannot thank him enough for his kindness and encouragement.

For the invaluable assistance of Dr. C.B. Madison, my first reader, I hold a special gratitude. His ability to demand so much and yet to demand nothing at all, allowed me to develop my understanding of the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl far beyond that which I had initially deemed possible. His ability to allow a student to learn I take to be the sign of a true teacher. (P.S. Dr. Madison, I finally figured out the "donkey and the carrot". You were right. A picture is worth a thousand words!)

Finally, my thanks to my wife Gail are inexpressible. She alone gave me the confidence and love which I
needed so much in order to finish this work. It is to her that this work is dedicated.
INTRODUCTION

In the "Preface" to his *Phenomenology of Perception*, Maurice Merleau-Ponty asks:

What is phenomenology? It may seem strange that this question has still to be asked half a century after the first works of Husserl. The fact remains that it has by no means been answered.  

We are faced, now seventy-five years after the first edition of Edmund Husserl's *Logical Investigations* (1901) with precisely the same question: What is phenomenology? We feel that this is not merely a question raised by someone who is just commencing a study of Husserlian phenomenology. The more one studies Husserl, the more acute the question becomes and the more indefinite and obscure even the possibility of an answer becomes.

It is becoming more and more evident that this lack of an answer to the question "What is phenomenology?" is essential to the very nature of phenomenology as a radically self-critical philosophy. Eugen Fink, in an article entitled "What Does the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl Want to Accomplish?" states that:

The authentic and central meaning of Edmund Husserl's philosophy is today still unknown. The... ground for this lies not in a lack of willingness to understand on the part of our era, but rather in the essence of phenomenology itself.
The most pressing question we now face is this: Was
Husserl himself aware of the central and authentic meaning
of phenomenology? Our answer at present must be: No he
was not!

We feel that the unquestioned equation on the part
of Husserl of the nature, possibility and necessity of a
rigorous Science of Being with the nature, possibility and
necessity of phenomenology shows that the authentic and
central meaning of phenomenology remained unknown to Husserl.
His faith in the possibility of Science and, moreover,
his impassioned need for Science, demanded of him that
certain notions arising out of the insights gained by the
phenomenological reduction (e.g. Lebenswelt, historicity,
horizon, etc.) be analyzed strictly in line with his
rationalist presuppositions. Husserl did not, and perhaps
could not, allow his pre-phenomenological motivations of
faith in Reason and the possibility of Science be shaken
or questioned by the phenomenological reduction. We feel
that, by remaining true to the goal of a rigorous Science
of Being, Husserl forfeited the radicality demanded by the
reduction by allowing the goal of Science to determine
the nature and scope of questioning and thereby allowing
the goal of Science to remain itself unquestioned and
subsequently unquestionable. We feel that Husserl did not
realize (or perhaps could not accept) the fact that his
method (the phenomenological reduction) transcended his
implicit and unquestioned belief that phenomenology should be (moreover, must be) a rigorous Science, to the extent that he did not realize that his "followers" (e.g. Heidegger), to be faithful to phenomenology, had to be unfaithful to Husserlian phenomenology and its particular demands.

It is our contention that it is precisely the equation of phenomenology with rigorous Science that demanded of Husserl that he equate phenomenology with a philosophy of Immanence. That is, we feel that the equation of phenomenology with a philosophy of Immanence is a demand of Science and not necessarily a demand made by the insights gained through the phenomenological reduction. We feel that the reduction surpasses Science and transcends its limiting scope to the extent that it undermines its pretension to all-encompassing self-enclosure.

The topic of this thesis is THE QUESTION OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL IMMANENCE. Therefore, our CHAPTER ONE does not deal with the nature, possibility and necessity of phenomenology as such, for that far outruns the restricting scope which Husserl's faith in Science demands. The question of phenomenological Immanence is a question rather of the nature, possibility and necessity of a rigorous Science of Being. Herein, we see that for phenomenology to be a rigorous Science, it must be a philosophy of Immanence. In CHAPTER TWO, we see that the attainment of the sphere of phenomenological Immanence cannot be accomplished by a
smooth, continuous transition (or "ascension") from the natural attitude. The attainment of the authentic meaning of phenomenology cannot be accomplished without a "radical break" with the natural attitude, accomplished through the performance of the phenomenological reduction. We shall see that in his Ideas, Husserl runs into immense difficulties and ambiguities in attempting to "initiate" his readers by beginning his exposition of phenomenology with a preliminary psychological exposition of consciousness.

In CHAPTER THREE, the necessity of the performance of the phenomenological reduction is introduced. Herein we attempt to indicate certain misrepresentations of the effect of the phenomenological reduction. Herein also we attempt to give both a (by no means comprehensive) analytic description of the field of phenomenological Immanence, as well as a synthetic description of the unity of phenomenological Immanence under the title of transcendental subjectivity.

Our CHAPTER FOUR has an unusual character. Herein we did not attempt to raise challenges to Husserl taken from commentators who have opposed his views. Neither have we attempted to extend certain notions explicitly found within Husserl's work (e.g. Lebenswelt, historicity, horizon) in order to show how, if they are extended to their "logical conclusion", they outrun the confines of Husserlian phenomenology. We decided rather to unfold an implicit and decisive presupposition in Husserl's work, a presupposition
which decidedly effects its nature, to the extent that this presupposition alone demands the equation of phenomenology with a philosophy of Immanence: the implicit demand for and faith in the possibility of Science.

It is still not decided whether this exposing of a central and unquestioned presupposition in Husserlian phenomenology is the exposing of a central "error" in phenomenology itself. This remains to be seen. It is decided that the exposing of this presupposition of the principle of Reason as an unquestioned (and, for Science, unquestionable) presupposition undermines the possibility of phenomenology as a philosophy of Immanence. A new sense of phenomenology, unhindered by the self-defeating demands of Science stringently set down by Husserl, will hopefully emerge and shed light on its central and authentic meaning.
PHENOMENOLOGY AS A PHILOSOPHY OF IMMANENCE

If reason is divine, then, in comparison with man, the life according to it is divine in comparison with human life. But we must not follow those who advise us, being men, to think of human things, and, being mortal, of mortal things, but must, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal, and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us...

Aristotle

Introduction

Throughout the immense diversity of the published works of Edmund Husserl is maintained a fundamental unity, a unity which defines for us the programme and very spirit of Husserlian phenomenology: The "faith" on Husserl's part in the possibility and necessity of a rigorous Science of Being. To be able to grasp fully the essence of Husserlian phenomenology is to be able to gain insight into this unifying spirit and to come to understand how this "faith" displays its prospect and scope in what we shall call a philosophy of Immanence.

*We shall use "Science" to indicate the nature of phenomenology and "science" to indicate the nature of "sciences of the world". The precise difference between these terms shall hopefully emerge as we proceed.
To show how it is that Husserlian phenomenology is and must be such a philosophy will require a discussion of its nature, possibility and necessity. Yet in these discussions, we shall run up against difficulties inherent in any preliminary exposition of the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. We shall then attempt to show how these difficulties are essential to the very nature of phenomenology itself and how they in fact display phenomenology's character as a philosophy of Immanence.

Entrance into Edmund Husserl's thought poses many difficulties. By no means the least of these is that it demands of us that we not "remain where we are", but rather that a radical transformation of thought occur. In fact, Husserl tells us that:

Perhaps it will become manifest that the total phenomenological attitude and the epoch belonging to it are destined in essence to effect, at first, a complete personal transformation, comparable in the beginning to a religious conversion, which then, however, over and above this bears within itself the significance of the greatest existential transformation which is assigned as a task to mankind as such.

To be able to see the need for this "transformation" requires that we gain insight into how it is and must be that phenomenology carries within itself the source and understanding of its own nature, possibility and necessity; it requires, that is, that we see how it is that phenomenology is a philosophy of Immanence.
Philosophy -- wisdom (sagesse) -- is the philosopher's quite personal affair. It must arise as his wisdom, as his self-acquired knowledge tending toward universality, a knowledge for which he can answer from the beginning, and at each step, by virtue of his own absolute insights.

Evident in Husserl's life-long quest for the establishment of philosophy as a rigorous Science is the demand, implicit in this quest, to discover and secure the all correct beginnings. Philosophy as a rigorous Science demands full clarity and certainty. It must begin with and build upon a solid foundation established through rational insight. The achievement of full clarity with respect to the foundations of knowledge is the achievement of the fundamentum absolutum et inconcussum without which philosophy as Science is not possible at all.

Having entered philosophy by way of mathematics, Husserl tells us that he:

... was used to an intellectual neatness, but I found that contemporary philosophy, which makes so much of its scientific character, in fact falls far short of it, and so brings contempt on the ideal of philosophy, which is to be the consummation of all the sciences in the most basic sense. Nor was this true only of the philosophy of that day. All philosophy bequeathed to us by history proved a failure; marked everywhere by lack of clarity, immature vagueness and incompleteness, if not actual intellectual dishonesty. There was nothing one could take from it, no fragment one could retain as a solid beginning of more earnest inquiry, criticism, boundless and worthless, because it lacked solid foundation from which it could be fruitfully guided, was of no help.
Husserl's conception of philosophy as a rigorous Science demanded of him that this "solid foundation", this necessary ground of absolutely justified and certain knowledge be sought and secured. This becomes the first and central definition of the nature of a rigorous Science as well as its first task: to discover the justifiable basis upon which it may proceed. This radically critical demand lead Husserl, in an article entitled "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" (1911), to realize that:

"...philosophy, according to its historical purpose the loftiest and most rigorous of all Sciences, representing as it does humanity's imperishable demand for pure and absolute knowledge, ...is incapable of assuming the form of rigorous science."

Moreover, he tells us that:

I do not say that philosophy is an imperfect science; I say simply that it is not a science at all, that as science it has not yet begun.

It is Husserl's self-imposed task to make this "first beginning" at a radical and honest re-establishment and re-awakening of the Ideal of philosophy as rigorous Science, a philosophy capable of living up to its "historical purpose" of being dedicated to the quest for "pure and absolute knowledge".

As a "...science of Beginnings; a 'first philosophy'" 

Husserlian phenomenology dedicates itself in a radical manner to the searching out of the "conditions for the possibility" of all experience and knowledge...
the very "ground" of experience itself. A rigorous Science of Being is possible only if this ground is not left presupposed, but is revealed and made the object of rational insight. However, it seems that phenomenology's directing itself towards this rational securing of the indubitable foundations of experience is struck by a fundamental paradox. "Philosophy of Beginnings": This description of phenomenology's task tells us that it is not only directed toward the discovery of "the Beginning" as a goal towards which it strives, but also, it tells us that phenomenology is unable to commence and continue with the task it has set itself until that "Beginning" is rationally secured as the place from which one proceeds. For we who as yet remain "outside" of this task of "making a beginning", this stands as a paradox. We shall come to see that it stands as such precisely because we remain "outside" of this task.

This paradox defines the "pathos" of Husserlian phenomenology, if not all rational inquiry, for it is "caught", because of its demand for justification, in the question of its own possibility. Yet it is here that we find the essential distinguishing mark of Husserl's project: it distinguishes itself precisely by posing as a problem for itself its own possibility. The raising of the question of the "Beginning" in an explicit manner is the exposing of philosophy to a radical self-examination into its own
possibility as philosophy. It cannot, by its very nature, allow its own possibility to go unquestioned or remain obscure to it.

Hence, Husserl tells us in his Ideas (1913), the task and very definition of philosophy itself is marked by this demand for self-criticism and need for self-justification. He says that:

A philosophy with problematic foundations, with paradoxes which arise from the obscurity of the fundamental concepts, is not philosophy, it contradicts its very meaning as philosophy. Philosophy can take root only in radical reflexion upon the meaning and possibility of its own scheme. Through such reflexion it must in the very first place and through its own activity take possession of the absolute ground of pure pre-conceptual experience which is its own proper preserve; then, self-active again, it must create original concepts, adequately adjusted to this ground, and so generally utilize for its advance an absolutely transparent method. There can be no unclear, problematic concepts, and no paradoxes. The entire absence of this procedure, the overlooking of the immense difficulties attaching themselves to a correct beginning, of the covering up of the same through haste to have done with them, had this for its consequence, that we had and have many ever new philosophical "systems" or "directions", but not the one philosophy which as Idea, underlies all the philosophies that can be imagined. Philosophy, as it moves towards its realization, is not a relatively incomplete science improving as it goes forward. There lies embedded in its meaning as philosophy a radicalism in the matter of foundations, an absolute freedom from all presuppositions, a securing for itself an absolute basis....

The task of finding a "radical beginning" in philosophy demands that the questions "Where may we begin?" and "How may we begin?" both be answered by that philosophy. Phenomenology, as a rigorous Science, must find within itself the
the sources of justification for both its method (its "how") and its matter (its "where"), for the questions of the "how" and the "where" must both occur within the horizon of phenomenology itself, because of its radical nature and demand for self-justification. The full thrust of these questions for phenomenology and their need for an answer by means of phenomenology cannot be fully understood from "outside" of phenomenology, for phenomenology is in its very essence, the posing of these questions and the demand and source of their answers.

Phenomenology, then, for Husserl, has a distinctive goal and a distinctive claim:

It does not claim to be anything more than an attempt that has been growing through the decades of meditation exclusively directed towards this end: to discover a radical beginning of philosophy which, to repeat a Kantian phrase, "will be able to present itself as a science".

We are not yet able to understand the full thrust of this demand. The claim of an aspiration to Science has been made so often throughout the history of philosophy, that we have come to doubt its possibility, let alone its usefulness.

Husserl tells us that to seek this "radical beginning" for philosophy is to seek "... a reversion to that which is already presupposed implicitly in all presupposing and in all questioning and answering and herewith exists already immediate and persistent." Yet philosophy itself is a questioning of the ground of questioning, demand-
ing an answer. In the attempt to give a preliminary exposition of the nature of phenomenology as a rigorous Science, we have seen what it demands, but if the difficulty of making a beginning described above is not wholly spurious, we do not yet see how it is possible to fulfill this demand. We have seen, in a preliminary way, however, that the nature of phenomenology as a rigorous Science and the methodological access to that nature both fall within the scope of phenomenology. We cannot fully understand its nature if we remain "outside" of that nature; phenomenology must be understood, so to speak, "from the inside". If the understanding of the essential nature of phenomenology were not itself necessarily within the compass of phenomenology, it could not claim to be a rigorous Science, for then its own self-comprehension would remain transcendent to it and thereby it would not be able to claim its "beginning" as its own with full self-justification.

The Possibility of a Rigorous Science of Being

The aim of a rigorous Science, according to Husserl, is to inquire into and unearth, through rational insight, the ground of all experience and knowledge from which one may proceed with a clear and distinct explication of that experience. As we have seen, for philosophy as rigorous Science, the question of how one may begin such an
inquiry becomes the unavoidable first question. Through radical reflection, the question of the possibility of rigorous Science becomes the central question for rigorous Science. We shall come to see, therefore, that if we have in fact posed this question for ourselves, we have, in a sense, "already begun".

The question we now face is this: Upon what basis may this Science proceed? We have had some indication that it must, in some sense, provide itself with its own basis; its basis of inquiry must be transparent to it, for without such transparency of the ground of its own endeavours, that ground is left presupposed. With such a fundamental unclarified presupposition, rigorous Science is not possible at all.

The Science which Husserl wishes to initiate, as well, may not take as its normative guide, any other da facto science; we do not yet know what form this new Science will take, so we must not presuppose ahead of time what form it should take. The norms of "natural"* science must themselves be put into question, a questioning that

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* We shall use the terms "natural" and "naive" with respect to the "sciences of the world" in the precise sense. These terms are meant to indicate that these sciences are sciences "of the natural attitude" as defined below in our CHAPTER TWO. It should be pointed out that for phenomenology, calling these sciences "naive" or "natural" is by no means intended to be derogatory. The terms are merely meant to define these sciences in their essential nature. As we shall see below, without this "naivety", these science would not be possible at all.
Husserl felt was not initiated by Descartes, who based his philosophy on the normative ideal of mathematics and geometry. Hence, Husserl tells us that:

As beginning philosophers, we do not as yet accept any normative ideal of science; and only so far as we provide it for ourselves can we ever have such an ideal.

But this does not imply that we renounce the general aim of grounding science absolutely. That aim shall indeed continually motivate the course of our meditation...; and gradually, in our meditations it shall become determined concretely. Only we must be careful about how we make an absolute grounding of science our aim. At first, we must not presuppose even its possibility.

Thus, the question of "the Beginning" arises anew, and a circularity once again arises from the re-emergence of this question. If this Science is to "produce its own norms of justification", what is to prevent it from being completely arbitrary?

It is thus that the question of "evidence" arises. For a rigorous Science to be able to "take possession of its own ground", requires that through the activity of radical reflection (a reflection whose character we have yet to understand), we are able to gain access to this "ground of experience": access that is, to rational evidence which is given in such a manner as to exclude the possibility of uncertainty and thereby allow self-justifying possession of this evidence. This access will allow us to "break into the circle" we have described above. Husserl tells us, with reference to this access, that:
...there emerges, as the question of the beginning, the inquiry for those cognitions that are first in themselves and can support the whole storied edifice of universal knowledge. Consequently, if our presumptive aim is to be capable of becoming a practically possible one, we meditators, while destitute of all scientific knowledge, must have access to evidences that already bear the stamp of fitness for such a function, in that they are recognizable as preceding all other imaginable evidences. Moreover, in respect of this evidence of preceding, they must have a certain perfection, they must carry with them an absolute certainty, if advancing from them and constructing on their basis a science governed by the idea of a definitive system of knowledge — considering the infinity presumed to be part of this idea — is to be capable of having any sense.

As we shall see below in our discussion of the phenomenological reduction*, we need an "absolutely transparent method" which will guarantee and secure an access to these evidences, as well as a means whereby we may remain true to these evidences and only within their scope. This "absolute transparency" of method necessitates that the method of access to phenomenology's problem-sphere itself be a part of phenomenology.

Yet have we not heard Husserl say, in the above cited passage, that we need to begin this inquiry by being "destitute of all scientific knowledge"? How is a rigorous Science to be possible if reliance upon scientific knowledge is denied us? Here again the circularity arises in a new form,

* We shall use the terms "phenomenological reduction", "epoche" and simply "reduction", interchangeably. We feel that, in the present context, this simplification is warranted since the precise difference between these terms is irrelevant to our exposition.
and the difficulty of penetrating the fundamentally new sense of Husserl's phenomenology re-emerges. Let us re-formulate this difficulty, a difficulty that we shall see is inherent in the transition to an understanding of the problem-sphere of Husserlian phenomenology.

What we are seeking is knowledge of the ground of all experience — the conditions for the possibility of experience. Yet, if we seek for knowledge of the conditions of knowledge, if we seek a scientific grounding of science, are we not presupposing as possible that very discipline whose possibility we are attempting to establish, viz., science and knowledge? How can we seek to know the conditions for the possibility of knowledge, if that very seeking, as a quest for knowledge, presupposes those conditions and rests upon them?

The solving of this difficulty, in fact, the realization of its full import, is by no means simple. Yet we are able to give a preliminary indication of its solution and gravity by noting that this difficulty rests upon a basic if not necessary equivocation on the terms "knowledge" "experience" and "science".

Husserl wishes "...to found a new science." He is speaking of and requiring something wholly new, something fundamentally and essentially foreign to our "normal" intercourse with the world; an intercourse which does not, need not and cannot, by its very nature, concern
itself with the conditions for its own possibility. Our normal intercourse with the world, our "natural attitude", takes as its thematic sphere of possible knowledge the world. The problems that arise within this "natural" presupposition of the world are called by phenomenology "mundane problems". Herein lies the need for the fundamental distinction between science and experience of the natural sort and science and experience of the transcendental sort. As Husserl notes, phenomenology is directed towards "...a new kind of experience: transcendental experience." And he adds that "...where there is a new experience, a new science must arise". We must keep in mind, therefore, that Husserl wishes to seek out and utilize a whole new realm of experience. He does not mean "experience" in the ordinary sense; the precise concern of phenomenology and its essential direction of inquiry cannot be seen in reference to the "mundane" problems of natural existence, unconcerned as this "natural existence" is with its own possibility.

We shall have quite a lot more to say about this below. As we shall see below, this does not mean that phenomenology is unconcerned with natural existence; it means simply that its concern for the "natural attitude" is nor directed by the concerns found within the 'natural attitude'. Hence, Husserl tells us that:

What makes the appropiation of the essential nature of phenomenology, the understanding of the peculiar meaning of its relations to all other sciences... so extraordinarily difficult, is that in addition to
all other adjustments, a new way of looking at things is necessary, one that contrasts at every point with the natural attitude of experience and thought.

We cannot fully understand the necessity of the above mentioned equivocations and their essential source until we have attained this radically new "point of view" required by the concern for rigorous Science. The difficulty of fully elucidating these equivocations cannot be further clarified at this point, for we have not yet established the precise difference between the transcendental attitude and the natural attitude as Husserl defines them. We are now concerned with the possibility of a rigorous Science of Being only in its most general outlines. It needs to be mentioned at this preliminary stage of our exposition, however, for we need to emphasize at once the radically "strange" and "unnatural" character of the problems facing Husserl, and that when we ask after the possibility of a rigorous Science, we are asking after something wholly new, for a possibility whose nature and contour remains as yet unclear.

This leaves a preliminary exposition of the possibility of a rigorous Science of Being with a necessary "core" of unintelligibility and opacity. As Eugen Fink points out, in his brilliant article entitled "The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism":
...from the very start phenomenology carries with it a certain "unintelligibility" precisely because it cannot, in principle, be grasped with reference to the mundane problems, with reference, that is, to questions which stand within the horizon of the "natural attitude". Its basic problem is concealed in this way: it is at first not an unsettling problem which is somehow present before phenomenological theory, so that by virtue of its threatening character it can serve to provoke philosophical reflection. It first originates as a problem in and through the phenomenological reduction itself, which is already the first step to be taken in mastering it.

Thus the difficulty: we cannot enter the problem-horizon of phenomenology without first understanding "how to enter" and "where to enter", but both of these only become evident once this entrance has already occurred. Phenomenology, so to speak, creates for itself its own problem-horizon, a horizon which is not open to us unless we have already appropriated ourselves to the essential nature of phenomenology.

We must remain content with a preliminary exposition, for the full understanding of the problematic of the phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl is only seen through that philosophy, for only through the method of that philosophy is that problem-horizon opened-up. One cannot appropriate the essential nature of phenomenology until one has grasped and performed its methodological securing of its problem-horizon (i.e., until one has "done the reduction") and one cannot fully grasp the nature of this method until the nature of phenomenology has been grasped, for a "transparency of method" is part of phenomenology itself.
It remains "closed" to us if we remain outside of it, for it creates for itself its own "openness" within which its problems and solutions occur.

This once again reiterates the necessity of the equivocations mentioned above. Phenomenology, according to Husserl, must be a rigorous Science. We need to keep in mind that we must use the word "Science" here in a whole new sense. Phenomenology cannot be a science "among others" of the natural sort, for to be among them is to share in the unexplicit, hidden horizon of their problematic; it is to share in their presupposing of the ground of their endeavours (viz., the existence of the world, left unquestioned by the sciences of the world), the very ground which phenomenology is attempting to make explicit. Phenomenology must reveal and maintain an independence from science, for to be dependent upon them is to remain subject to their motivations and concerns, remain subject, that is, to their modes of "questioning and answering", the sources of which we are attempting to discover by means of phenomenology. However, we need not say that phenomenology itself has no ground, but merely that this ground of phenomenological philosophy as a rigorous Science falls within phenomenology and is revealed to it and by it. Phenomenology thus distinguishes itself from the sciences of the world for these latter sciences do not and cannot concern themselves with their own possibility (i.e., their ground falls outside of their
problem-sphere). We must say, therefore, that while the sciences of the world utilize methods which presuppose the ground of their endeavours, phenomenology must be in possession of a method which encompasses its own ground.

Phenomenology must remain independent of science and worldly experience. But we need to emphasize that this does not mean that phenomenology is concerned with something exclusive of science and worldly experience. It is, rather, radically inclusive of science and worldly experience at their very root, for it seeks to explicate the "conditions for their possibility". It seeks, as philosophy, to reveal their unitary ground, a ground for which worldly experience and science have no concern. Therefore, none of the methods or conclusions of natural science can justify the Science of phenomenology. If this did occur, phenomenology could not claim a self-justifying grasp of its own efforts and hence, could not claim, yet alone attain, the status of a rigorous Science of Being. It is in this sense and for this reason that we heard Husserl say that we must begin phenomenology by being destitute of scientific knowledge. Phenomenology as a rigorous Science, must maintain what could be called an inclusive independence of the sciences of the world.

We have seen, now, that the nature and possibility of phenomenology are very difficult to grasp. For phenomenology to be possible, a methodological access into its sphere of
problems is required. Yet the ground of the possibility of phenomenology must fall within phenomenology. We cannot understand this possibility if we remain "outside" of that possibility. If the ground for the possibility of phenomenology did not fall "inside" of phenomenology's compass, it could not claim to be a rigorous Science, for then it would not have "possession of its own absolute ground"; this ground would transcend it.

The Necessity of a Rigorous Science of Being

After the publication of his Logical Investigations in 1901, Husserl underwent several years of self questioning concerning not only his ability as a philosopher, but even precisely what he wished to mean by this term. The precise reason for his dissatisfaction with these studies need not be investigated in the present context. More important to us is some insight into what would count for Husserl as satisfactory. He tells us that:

I am unable to live in truth and veracity. I have tasted sufficiently of the torments of obscurity and doubt where I am tossed about in every direction. I must achieve internal coherence.

In a diary entry, dating from 1906, we hear the same need voiced:

I have been through enough torments... from lack of clarity and from doubt that wavers back and forth... Only one need absorbs me: I must win
clarity, else I cannot live; I cannot bear life
unless I can believe that I shall achieve it.

In 1919, in an immensely revealing letter to Arnold Metzger, a younger contemporary of Husserl's, (who disagreed with Husserl's "shift" from the "realism" of the Logical Investigations to the "idealism" of the Ideas -- the precise "shift" which allowed Husserl to overcome the disillusion felt in the first decade of the century!), we see this personal need re-affirmed:

I can only think that you have sensed some of the sustaining ethos through the laconic sobriety and strict concentration on the matters at hand in my writings. You must have sensed that this ethos is genuine, because my writings, just as yours, are born out of need, out of an immense psychological need, out of a complete collapse in which the only hope is an entirely new life, a desperate, unyielding resolution to begin from the beginning and to go forth in radical honesty, come what may.

It is clear that if we allow the need for a rigorous Science of Being to rest upon the psychological necessity of one particular human being, that it somehow loses its force, in fact, it loses its very character as rigorous, by thus admitting its dependence on contingent psychological circumstance. The need for a rigorous Science and full clarity, reflected in Husserl's personal need and task, goes deeper than this.

We have spoken above about the ideal of philosophy as dedicating itself towards the goal of "pure and absolute knowledge". The attempt to find this knowledge is
is called by Husserl the "historical purpose" of philosophy. Yet if we survey the history of philosophy, this purpose and a dedication to it leaves us feeling somehow empty and unfulfilled. Many philosophers before Husserl have \_claimed\_ to fulfill this ideal. Is it not mere naivety to hope for such a re-awakening of the ideal of philosophy by we who are so aware of its constant failure? Here, in the present age, we are left with an historical scepticism as to the possibility and even the necessity of philosophy. We are left with it:

\textit{...if history has nothing to teach us than that all the shapes of the spiritual world, all the conditions of life, all ideals and norms upon which man relies, form and dissolve themselves like fleeting waves, that it always was and ever will be so, that again and again reason must turn into nonsense and well-being into misery. Can we console ourselves with that? Can we live in this world where historical occurrence is nothing but an unending concatenation of illusory progress and bitter dissatisfaction?

What is lost, in the face of this vague scepticism is the faith in the possibility of Reason attaining Truth, a loss of faith in the possibility of attaining meaningfulness. For it seems, by this historical-factual reflection, that every effort to attain meaningfulness is doomed to eventual failure, doomed, that is, to be turned into eventual nonsense. Yet this scepticism does not quell the "imperishable demand" for "an answer", the imperishable demand and need to raise the following questions anew and the need to attempt to answer them: Is man's life basically...}
meaningless? Is the world essentially unintelligible?

What can we do, now, in the face of this scepticism as to the possibility of attaining meaningfulness? What can we do as philosophers when faced by the possibility of the impossibility of philosophy itself as a search for meaning? Husserl asks:

Can we simply return again to the interrupted vocational work on our own "philosophical problems", that is, each to the further continuation of his own philosophy? Can we seriously do that when it seems certain that our philosophy, like that of all our fellow philosophers, past and present, will have its fleeting day of existence only among the flora of every growing and ever dying philosophies?

Precisely herein lies our plight — the plight of all of us who are not philosophical literati, but who, educated by the genuine philosophers of the great past, live for truth, who only in this way are and seek to be in our own truth. But as philosophers of the present we have fallen into a painful existential contradiction. The faith in the possibility of philosophy as a task, that is, in the possibility of universal knowledge, is something we cannot let go. We know that we are called to this task, as serious philosophers. And yet, how do we hold on to this belief, which has meaning only in relation to the single goal, which is common to us all, that is philosophy as such?

How are we to be able to hold on to this belief in the possibility of philosophy? Why is the holding of this belief so important? By asking this, we are asking: What is the necessity of a rigorous Science of Being? To answer this, let us reverse our first question and ask "What does the forfeiting of this belief in the possibility of philosophy entail?" It demands a forfeiting of the belief in the possi-
ibility of Reason attaining Truth. Yet doesn't the need
to maintain this belief carry with it a tone of a somewhat
neurotic need for omniscience and consolation in the face
of absurdity? Husserl most certainly does not wish to fall
into this category. He does not wish to devise some omniscient
"grand system" to resolve all difficulties "under the Eye
of Pure Reason", detached and unconcerned with our personal
existential needs. He asks himself:

Is it not the case that what we have presented here
is something rather inappropriate to our time, an
attempt to rescue the honour of rationalism, of
"enlightenment" of an intellectualism which loses
itself in theories alienated from the world, with
its necessary evil consequences of a superficial
lust for crudation and intellectualistic snobbism?
Does this not mean that we are being lead again into
the fateful error of believing that science can make
man wise, that it is destined to create a genuine
and contented humanity, that is master of its fate?
Who would still take such notions seriously today?

If we wish to avoid, with Husserl, such an "intellectualism",
what can we ask of ourselves as philosophers that will avoid
the embarassment and naive dishonesty of the desire for
a perfect, finished, Rational System? How is it that the
idea of philosophy as a rigorous Science of Being can
withstand the effect of an historical scepticism as to its
possibility? We need to examine more closely what is for-
feited and thereby what can be maintained in the face of
such an encounter.

Husserl gives us a clue as to what needs to be
forfeited with the giving up of one's faith in the possibility
of philosophy as Science. He tells us that:

Along with this falls the faith in "absolute reason" through which the world has its meaning, the faith in the meaning of history, of humanity, the faith in man's freedom, that is, his capacity to secure rational meaning for his individual and common human existence. If man loses this faith, it means nothing less than the loss of faith "in himself", in his own true being.

But to avoid this "faltering of faith" does not involve, for Husserl, viewing man's true being as one of a perfectly rational creature, devoid of concern, devoid of change and striving. Husserl goes on to say that:

This true being is not something he always has, with the self-evidence of the "I am", but something he only has and can have in the form of the struggle for his truth, the struggle to make himself true. True being is, everywhere an ideal goal, a task of episteme or "reason".

What is lost, through historical-factual reflection, is the possibility of maintaining faith in a final, definitive and finished system of Absolute Knowledge, fully in the grasp of "man" as Absolute Knower. Yet what is not lost is that which is evident (by means of an "historical-spiritual" as opposed to historical-factual reading of history) throughout the history of philosophy. What clearly underlies as Idea every coming to be and passing away of "philosophical systems" is the drive for Truth. That is, what need not be lost to us as philosophers is the goal of Truth and the inherent validity of the attempt to attain it as an infinite, ideal goal, to which we are blinded by an
historical-factual reading of the history of philosophy.

To maintain the possibility and necessity of the attempt to reach Truth is to maintain faith in man himself, faith in man's life as essentially a directedness towards Truth. The question of the meaningfulness of this life is not one that is capable of a final answer with which we may rest content. But it does allow for the possibility and veracity of posing this question and attempting to answer it. This, for Husserl, is the necessity of raising the question of the possibility of a rigorous Science of Being. It raises at once the question of the possibility of man's life as meaningful, a life which is a "becoming-meaningful" which lives under the norms of Reason and is lived meaningfully under these Ideals. It is in this sense that we can speak of an "ethics of phenomenology", for its task is not an empty philosophical eccentricity, but rather an "ethical-cognitive demand". It does not, thereby, remain aloof and abstract and removed from the world and our personal concerns. It is rather passionately directed towards that world and the telos inherent in its life-movement.

The function of philosophy, then, takes on a whole new character. Husserl tells us that we, as philosophers:

...are functionaries of mankind. The quite personal responsibility of our own true being as philosophers, our inner personal vocation, bears within itself at the same time the responsibility for the true being of mankind; the latter is, necessarily,
being toward a telos, and can only come to realization, if at all through philosophy -- through us, if we are philosophers in all seriousness... 47

The realization of this telos (which Husserl feels is inherent in the history of philosophy as Idea) need not be the reaching of this telos, but merely the re-awakening of it as telos. Husserl's task is more a matter of putting himself on the way to philosophy, of making a beginning toward the infinite goal of Truth. This task is, therefore, a realizing on the part of man of his true being as a "being-toward-truth". Thus:

...the philosopher must always devote himself to mastering the true and full sense of philosophy the totality of this horizon of infinity. No line of knowledge, no single truth may be absolutized and isolated. Only through this highest form of self-consciousness, which itself becomes one of the branches of the infinite task, can philosophy fulfill its function of putting itself, and thereby genuine humanity, on the real (to realization). (The awareness) that this is the case itself belongs to the domain of philosophical knowledge at the level of highest self-reflection. Only through its constant reflexivity is a philosophy universal knowledge.

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Philosophy therefore attains its true being, not by attaining the Ideals of Reason, but by directing itself towards them, and making a beginning at explicating them.

We can see more clearly now how the raising of the question of "the Beginning" takes the form of a goal to be reached through the self-criticism of philosophy as to its own possibility. Only through such a radical self-criticism can philosophy avoid the false absolutization of
Truth. Yet the necessity of this rigorous Science of Being is still one that remains unfamiliar and obscure, for the sphere of questioning it aspires to is not one that falls within the compass of our "natural attitude". We stand, in a peculiar sense, "outside" of the need for this Science, as we stand "outside" of the true understanding of its nature and possibility. It strikes us, from our natural attitude, not only as wholly new and strange, but as somehow unmotivated and unnecessary. Our view of this Science, before we have entered into the sphere of its questioning, easily becomes one of indifference if not repulsion. It seems to hold out as a mere "intellectualism" demanding that our worldly existence be "rationalized" beyond recognition. And even when it claims to be other than this, it tells us that we are unable to understand why it is different unless we accept it wholly and enter in to it!

In facing this difficulty of coming to understand the nature and need for phenomenology, Eugen Fink tells us that:

Because it is the suspension of the natural attitude it cannot appear within this attitude, and it therefore must be unfamiliar. The reduction becomes knowable in its "transcendental motivation" only with the transcending of the world. This means that the reduction is its own presupposition insofar as it alone opens up that dimension of problems with reference to which it establishes the possibility of a theoretical knowledge. This strange paradox of the beginning of philosophical reflection finds expression within the fundamental perplexity into which all attempts to explicate the phenomenological reduction fall. Unmotivated and un-
familiar with respect to its possibility, every
explanation of the phenomenological reduction is in
a unique way false. This falsity is caused by the
expositions worldly point of departure, that is,
its starting upon the basis of the natural attitude,
which the performance of the reduction is supposed
to suspend. Hence, the phenomenological reduction
appears first to be one theory among many which in
its own way answers to the philosophical problematic
within which we already stand as men philosophizing
in the face of the questionable nature of the world.
In truth, however, we do not stand within the pro-
blematic of philosophy... from the very start, but
are in a radical manner, outside of this problem-
atic.

Furthermore, he goes on to say that:

As long as we exist within the natural attitude the
problem of philosophy, insofar as it is not factually
given, is not only unfamiliar, but also is indeed
inaccessible. Being shut off from the dimension of
the transcendental belongs to the essence of the
imprisonment within the world which defines the
natural attitude. Phenomenology's problem is not
one which can be explained within the compass of the
natural attitude.

These passage from Fink carry us far beyond the present
context and will therefore need to be recalled once we have
more fully introduced and explicated Husserlian phenomenology.

They do, however, bring us "full circle", back
to the problem of "where to begin". We are told that we
are, for the most part, "outside" of phenomenology's prob-
sphere. We see that we cannot truly begin "outside" of
phenomenology and attempt to penetrate into it by some
method that is fully justified and understood before that
penetration. By being thus "shut off" from the problematic
of phenomenology, we have found analogous "circularities"
in all of our expositions as to the nature, possibility and necessity of phenomenology. Again we need say that, as with its nature and possibility, the necessity and motivation for phenomenology as a rigorous Science of Being are only understandable in and through phenomenology. If its motivation and necessity were "outside" of it (and, hence, not clear to it), it could not claim to be a rigorous Science, for it would remain dependent upon this external motivation and determined by it. The entrance into phenomenology is most assuredly taking on the character of a "religious conversion".

Many tasks now face us. We need to present an exposition of the nature, method and matter of phenomenology and how these differ from the sciences of the natural attitude. We need to see how phenomenology is consummated in a philosophy of Immanence. It is clear that the task of finding the "point of access" into the sphere of problems and solutions of phenomenology, and, moreover, the very need to enter that horizon, are problems that constantly faced Husserl himself. We can at least see that this task is not the mere presentation of a philosophy towards which we have a "natural affinity". Our "natural affinity" is to remain "outside" of this philosophy and its task. Yet, Husserl warns us that if we remain "outside of it" we will "... in the end only hear what we want to hear." We must proceed with caution and an acute sense of provisionalness.
We have seen thus far that the essence of phenomenology is difficult to grasp. We must now take the above noted considerations and show how they necessitate that phenomenology, as a rigorous Science of Being, be a philosophy of Immanence.

**Philosophy of Immanence**

Husserl bore within himself an incessant passion for phenomenology and a faith in its prospect and scope, a faith which never faltered, despite many upheavals. One could easily go as far as to say that Husserl was dogmatically convinced of the power of his phenomenology. The following passages seem to indicate this. From a lecture given in Freiburg in 1917, we hear Husserl say:

> A new fundamental science, pure phenomenology, has developed within philosophy. This is a science of a thoroughly new type and endless scope. It is inferior in methodological rigor to none of the modern sciences. All philosophical disciplines are rooted in pure phenomenology, through whose development and through it alone they obtain their force. Philosophy is possible as a rigorous science at all only through pure phenomenology.

We can see this point put even more dogmatically in Husserl's *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (1929), where he tells us that "... only a transcendentally-phenomenologically clarified world can be an ultimately understood world..." And fin-
ally, in full admission of his faith in phenomenology, Husserl says that: "Thesis to be maintained: All rationally framed questions proposed to knowledge as the work of reason are either transcendental phenomenological questions or confused and absurd questions."  

It is very difficult to not be immediately repulsed by this attitude. It is only salvaged to some extent by our realization that this faith of Husserl's in phenomenology is the product of fifty years of questioning that faith and putting it to the test.

We need now ask ourselves "What must the character of phenomenology be in order to confirm this faith?" If genuine philosophy is to be possible, it needs to be a rigorous science. Our thesis to be maintained is that if this is to be possible, it is only possible as a philosophy of Immanence. We have hardly begun our exposition of Husserl. We do not yet clearly see what he means by "natural attitude" or "transcendental attitude" etc. We shall find that the term "immanence" is an especially ambiguous term, used in many contexts and with many meanings. In line with this and what has been said above, we can stress for now only the broadest outlines of what would constitute a philosophy of Immanence.

1). Phenomenology must contain within itself an understanding of its own nature, for to leave this nature unquestioned and not fully given to it is to deny its scientific character.
Its essential nature cannot transcend its scope of understanding. This nature and an understanding of it must be immanent to it.

2). Phenomenology must contain within itself the ground of its own possibility, for to leave this ground unrevealed is to deny its Scientific character. Its ground cannot transcend it; it must be revealed by it and thus be within its grasp. Phenomenology must be self-grounding. The ground of its possibility must be immanent to it.

3). Phenomenology must contain within itself its own necessity, for to leave that necessity unquestioned or to admit its externality is to deny its Scientific character. Its necessity must not transcend its scope. Its necessity and motivation must be immanent to it.

4). Within the scope of phenomenology, there can be nothing which is radically unintelligible. Nothing can fall "outside" of its grasp, for such a "transcendence" would deny the possibility of certainty and therewith deny its Scientific character. It must, with its character of inclusive independence, carry within itself the sources of justification of all sciences and worldly experience. It must find within itself a rationally determinable cosmos; this cosmos must be immanent to it. Moreover, since phenomenology aspires to Science,
This cosmos must be wholly **immanent in Reason**.

This "philosophy of Immanence", then, allows no sources of justification to be "outside of itself". And this "Immanence" takes on a peculiar character in that it is not able to allow the possibility of a radical correlative Transcendence. It is because of the Immanent nature of phenomenology that our exposition has run into so many difficulties. We must now leave our preliminary exposition of the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl with yet another paradox: We, as standing in the natural attitude, had difficulty entering into phenomenology, for we remained "outside" of its problematic. Yet phenomenology "has no outside". **Phenomenology must be able to find within itself that very attitude which needs to be overcome in order to "enter into it".**
ASCENSION TO IMMANENCE

"You will never find the boundaries of the soul, even if you follow every road; so deep is its ground". Indeed, every "ground" that is reached points to further grounds, every horizon opened up awakens new horizons, and yet the endless whole, in its infinity of flowing movement, is oriented towards the unity of one meaning. . .

In the "Prolegomena to Pure Logic" to his Logical Investigations, Husserl notes, in accord with Kant, that the most dangerous fault in the investigations of the foundations of the sciences is a confusion of levels of investigation and a subsequent confusion of fields. In discussing the difficulties one encounters in attempting to clarify and keep separate the domains of logic and psychology, as was the aim of the Logical Investigations, Husserl tells us that:

Clarifying researches are especially needed to explain our by no means chance inclination to slip unwittingly from an objective to a psychological attitude, and to mix up two bodies of data distinguishable in principle, and to be deceived by psychological misconstructions and misrepresentations of the objects of logic.

Such a confusion of levels or spheres of investigations, he tells us, have far reaching consequences, leading to the
setting up of incorrect methods and goals for each science. In fact, it is precisely this realization of the necessity of keeping the spheres of logic and psychology separate that lead Husserl to reject the views set forth in his Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891) under the force of a critique of this work by Frege.

This difficulty has a close affinity to the difficulty we now face in attempting to discover the essential meaning of Husserlian phenomenology as a philosophy of Immanence. Many concepts in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl are used in many different contexts and with many different "shades of meaning". These differences arise because of the sphere of investigation within which these terms are used. Equivocations and inconsistencies arise when these "changes of attitude or context" are not explicitly brought forth. With reference to this difficulty, Husserl, in his Formal and Transcendental Logic, states that:

It is often said in this context, ... that the danger of equivocation must be averted. It is to be noted, however, that here it is not a matter of explicit equivocations, which are such that one should or could, merely follow up the words and the verbal significations. Rather it is a matter of internal shiftings of intentionality and its product, shiftings that are tied together, and demanded by essential interconnexions. These shiftings lead to verbal equivocations, which we cannot remove while confining our attention to the language itself and simply examining it with respect to the significations to which it points associationally. On the contrary, we can remove them, we can first formulate them as equivocations, only by the aforesaid reflective examination of the intentional aimings and of the
original constitution of the formations, with the 66
effectuation of those aimings.

In fact, Husserl goes as far as to say that "...verbal 67
equivocation, in a certain manner, is essentially necessary."

It is obvious, from even a superficial reading of the phenomenology of Husserl, that he is concerned with a description of what is found within conscious experience. Yet, taking into consideration what we have said in our CHAPTER ONE, are we not immediately faced with a paradox? We have learned from our first chapter that Husserl is directing himself towards a rigorous Science of all Being. How could this be possible if his attention is focussed "exclusively" on consciousness and an analysis of what is found within it? Herein lies the theme of our present chapter: The statement "What is found within conscious experiences", we shall find, carries in itself countless possibila equivocations, equivocations which lead us to the difficulties we have mentioned above in our first chapter. We find implied in this statement the terms "immanence", "transcendence", "consciousness", "experience", terms whose meanings vary according to the context within which they are used. We shall find that all of these terms have significance in descriptions which arise out of the natural attitude, the psychological attitude, as well as the phenomenological attitude. We have already seen, in a general way, what is required for a philosophy of Immanence. It is the
the purpose of the present chapter to make explicit these
"shiftings of attitude" and the subsequent changes in the
meanings of these terms within each context, so that the
essential meaning of phenomenology as a philosophy of Imman-
ence shall not be misunderstood.

Yet the difficulty faced is not quite this simple.
As a philosophy of Immanence, phenomenology must be able
to not eliminate, but rather incorporate into itself not only the results of each type of investigation, but the
very sphere within which each operates; it must find within
itself each level of investigation that is "overcome" in
order to reach this Immanence. Hence, as Husserl clearly
states, the definitiveness of each level always points to
further levels of investigation. He says that:

The investigations take on a painful and yet un-
avoidable relativity, a provisionalness, instead of a definitiveness for which we were striving:
Each investigation, at its own level overcomes
some naivete or other, but is still accompanied
by the naivete of its level -- which must then be
overcome by more penetrating investigations of
origins.

This once again re-affirms what we have said above regarding
phenomenology as an infinite task.

We wish to contend that it is precisely this
danger of equivocation that lead to many, if not all of the
misrepresentations of the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl.
It is now our task to avoid this danger by, at the very
least, making explicit the different senses of "immanence"
and "transcendence" in Husserl's work. Through this, we shall come to understand more clearly some of the difficulties face in our CHAPTER ONE and also, come to understand how it is that phenomenology is and needs to be a philosophy of Immanence. We have chosen a peculiar method of exposition in this chapter, in that the precise reason why Husserl felt that a rigorous Science of all Being could be based upon "descriptions of what is found within conscious experience" will not be fully or clearly understood until the precise sense of the terms used -- "consciousness", "experience" and "within" (immanence) -- is grasped. Paradoxically enough, we shall also come to see that the whole thesis of this chapter, namely, that an ascension to Immanence is possible, is patently false. The attainment of the sphere of phenomenological Immanence requires a radical break with the natural attitude. Since any exposition attempted before that "break" has been effected (in short, before the phenomenological reduction has been performed) rests on the natural attitude, a smooth or continuous transition (or "ascension") to the sphere of phenomenological Immanence is essentially and in principle impossible. Let us proceed, however, so that we may see for ourselves why it is that this ascension is impossible to accomplish. We shall begin by explicating the sense of immanence and transcendence found in Husserl's formulation of the natural attitude.
The Sense of Immanence and Transcendence in the Natural Attitude

Our purpose in presenting an exposition of the general nature of the natural attitude in the phenomenology of Husserl is to show how we may proceed from it towards an exposition of phenomenology as a philosophy of Immanence.

We need to note, at the outset, that we cannot proceed, in phenomenology, on the basis of this attitude, for it, unlike phenomenology, is not concerned for the conditions of its own possibility. Because, according to Husserl, all "natural" science and worldly experience does proceed on the basis of this attitude, its centrality and importance to phenomenology is clearly evident.

The essential nature of the natural attitude, is most clearly and concisely presented in Husserl's Ideas (1913), in a section entitled "The Thesis of the Natural Attitude and its Suspension". The passage runs as follows:

"I find continually present and standing over against me the one spatio-temporal fact-world to which I myself belong, as do all other men found in it and related in the same way to it. This fact-world, as the word already tells us, I find to be out there and also, take it just as it is gives itself to me as something that exists out there. All doubting and rejecting of the data of the natural world leaves standing the general thesis of the natural standpoint. The world is as fact-world always there; at the most it is at odd points "other" than I supposed, this or that under such names as "illusion" "hallucination" and the like, must be struck out of it, so to speak; but the "it" remains ever, in the sense of the general thesis a world that has its being out there."
In this statement of the general thesis of the natural attitude, we discover two lines of thought that need expansion.

First of all, it must be noted that in the natural attitude the "subject" is taken to be, in a certain sense, immanent to the world. Husserl tells us that:

... in that theoretical position which we shall call the "natural standpoint", the total field of possible research is indicated by a single word: that is, the World.

And we find, as a part of that world, ourselves as "subjects". Thus, in considering the "subject" by means of a natural science (in the precise sense), we consider it, as a matter of course and without question, as a part of the world in the sense that the subject is within the world, one "special object" among others within the spatio-temporal "cosmic unity" which we call "Nature". It is in this sense, from the natural standpoint, that the subject can be said to be immanent to the world, in that "the world" is taken to be the "whole" of which the subject is a "part". Attempting to consider the subject independently of that spatio-temporal/causal nexus of the world, then, would constitute seeing the subject in abstracto.

Secondly, it must also be noted that the world is seen to be, in a certain sense, transcendent to the subject from the natural standpoint. That is to say, there is maintained, in this standpoint, the possibility of a radical
separation between objects as meant and objects which are meant. By this we mean that what we suppose objects to be in our thinking about them (objects as meant) may be in error, yet this error, this possibility of "illusion" or "hallucination" does not affect the nature of the objects as such (objects which are meant). This is to say that the world, "in reality" is "out there"; it is as it is, independently of either our correct or incorrect judgements about it. In spite of the attempts on the part of the subject to know the world, "the 'it' remains". The general thesis of the natural attitude, therefore, carries in it a sense of the transcendence of the world: The world exists as it is, independently of my experience of it as thinking subject. All errors and illusions on the part of the subject do not effect the "being out there" of the world. Natural reflection, used to critically assess our knowledge of the world, provides us with the possibility of comparing the object as meant (what we think the object is) with the object which is meant (what the object is "in reality"), which leads to the correction of error and the dispelling of illusion. Yet this reflection is called "natural" for it proceeds only on the basis of the general thesis of the natural standpoint as the maintainence of the "being out there" of the world.

The general thesis of the natural standpoint, therefore, helps us define a preliminary sense of immanence
and transcendence: The subject is immanent to the world and the world is transcendent to the subject. It also shows us the peculiarly paradoxical situation in which we have found ourselves, for in explicating the natural attitude, we have, in a sense, "risen above it" or "out of it", for the thesis of the natural attitude is not a thesis within the natural attitude. As we have pointed out, the thematic sphere of investigations in the natural attitude is the world and not belief in the world. To attempt to make this belief explicit and thematic while still implicitly maintaining the general thesis of the natural attitude, demands that we presuppose that this belief itself is something in the world. To presuppose that this belief is something in the world is to once again implicitly maintain this belief and allow it to effect its own self-interpretation. As the inexplicit basis upon which all questioning and answering within the natural attitude occurs, it is not genuinely possible to make this belief explicit on its own account without once again presupposing it and taking that belief to be something worldly. This "world-belief" functions as an unvoiced horizon within which all particular, explicit acts occur. As we have said above, the searching out of the conditions for the possibility of natural knowledge and experience is not a problem that can concern the natural standpoint and the sciences that occur on its basis, living as they do always within these conditions.
The all-pervasive condition of science and worldly experience is the presupposed belief in the transcendence of the world. Because of its all-pervasiveness, it is called by Husserl an "attitude" rather than an "act".  

As Husserl states:

The general thesis according to which the real world about me is at all times known not merely in a general way as something apprehended, but as a fact-world that has being out there, does not consist of course, in an act proper, in an articulated judgment about existence. It is and remains something all the time the standpoint is adopted, that is, it endures persistently during the whole course of our life of natural endeavour.

This merely emphasizes our point above, for, in explicating this general thesis, we have, in a sense, already overcome it, for it is precisely the implicit holding to the "being out there" of the world which characterizes the natural standpoint. In explaining our world and ourselves as members of that world, we would never think to include this thesis, as part of our explanation, for all our explanations proceed from it and on its basis. We have difficulty, in fact, even calling it an "attitude" for, within that attitude (as we now can call it) the belief in the independent existence of the world is not found as a belief; all that is found, in spite of my beliefs is the world which exists "out there".

We have chosen to fully designate this general thesis of the natural attitude first, because it is upon this thesis that most studies of consciousness and its "con-
tents" occur. We can also see from it that Husserl may not proceed on the basis of this thesis, being as it is implicit and unquestioned. As we proceed, we shall see how he proposes to "overcome" this thesis (the phenomenological reduction) and why he feels that this is necessary for the establishment of a rigorous Science of Being. Let us proceed, then, as Husserl does in his Ideas "...with a series of observations within which we are not troubled with any phenomenological epoch." This will eventually allow the absolute necessity of the phenomenological reduction to show itself.

Psychologism and Logical Scanticism

Husserl was faced, in his Logical Investigations, with the task of refuting a widespread "philosophical" position a form of which he himself supported in his earlier work Philosophy of Arithmetic, namely psychologism. In the Logical Investigations, where he first formulates this refutation, we catch the first glimmerings of phenomenology. This mammoth work had as its central and explicit aim "...to put logic on the sure path of science."

The first part of this work ("Prolegomena to Pure Logic") is a defense of logical objectivity against a psychologistic interpretation which would found logic upon
the psychological acts of the subject. As Husserl tells us:

Here we encounter the disputed question as to the relation between psychology and logic, since one dominant tendency of our time has a ready answer to the question raised: The essential theoretical foundation of logic lies in psychology, in whose field those propositions belong... which give logic its characteristic pattern.

Over and over again, throughout this work, Husserl emphasizes that such an interpretation of logic as based on empirical psychology (and, as such, an empirical study of consciousness) denies its scientific character, for it denies the "ideal" meanings of logic by "reducing" them to the real psychological acts of thinking; it thereby deprives logic of the certainty which science requires. Husserl tells us, in the "Prolegomena to Pure Logic" that:

"...it is universally agreed that psychology is a factual science and therefore an empirical science. We shall also not be controverted if we add that psychology has so far lacked genuine and therefore exact laws, and that the propositions in it which are dignified with the name of laws are merely vague even if valuable generalizations from experience.

The attempt to base logic upon the empirical science of psychology tells us, then, that "If psychological laws lack exactness, the same must be true of the propositions of logic." If this results, logic, as a normative guide for science (in fact, as a normative guide for psychology itself) is controverted.
We must note, now, two points relevant to our discussion. First of all, in explicating the statement "descriptions of what is found within conscious experience" we can see that "conscious experience", for psychologism, is taken to be a series of real, factual psychic events, occurring in the spatio-temporal/causal nexus of Nature. About such conscious experiences, we can make only empirical generalizations. Husserl's central point of contention with this is that, in psychologism's analysis of consciousness, it confuses the act of judgment, which may be seen as a real psychological event with the content of judgment, i.e., what is meant in the judgement, which, as a meaning, is ideal.

We need to note, secondly, that "within conscious experience" means, for psychologism, to be a real part of consciousness, existentially dependent upon it. Logical objectivities, which purport to "transcend" the act of judgement, need to be explained by psychologism by means of a psychological theory of abstraction and generalization. "To be a content" then means "to be contained in the act of judgement as a real part of the psychic process". The only notion of "immanence in consciousness" acceptable for psychologism is a real (realen) immanence, which denotes an immanence in something real, i.e., to be "immanent in" ("to be a real part of") the real psychic process from which we can derive merely empirical generalizations.
"A description of what is found within conscious experience": This tells us that with reference to psychology, we are restricted to empirical generalizations about what is found as genuinely (real) immanent in the psychic process, a process discovered through "introspection" focussing on "inner experience". This view, according to Husserl, is an outgrowth of the naturalism of the nineteenth-century which inevitably leads to a logical scepticism as to the possibility of science. By "naturalizing consciousness" (i.e., reducing it to real psychic events) we deny the very possibility of science, by denying the theoretical content of logic as a normative guide for the sciences. By doing this, we have denied the possibility of a rigorous scientific endeavour. Husserl tells us that this whole movement is based on a naive circularity. He tells with reference to the naturalist (and thereby with reference to the empirical psychologist) that:

The naturalist is, one can safely say, idealist and objectivist in the way he acts. He is dominated by the purpose of making scientifically known (i.e., in a way that compels any rational individual) whatever is genuine truth, the genuinely beautiful and good; he wants to know how to determine what its universal essence and the method by which it is to be obtained in the particular case. He believes that through natural science and through philosophy based upon the same science, the goal has been for the most part attained, and with all the enthusiasm that such a consciousness gives, he has installed himself as teacher and practical reformer in regard to the true, the good, and the beautiful, from the standpoint of natural science. He is, however, an idealist who sets up and (so he thinks) justifies theories which deny precisely what he presupposes
in his idealistic way of acting, whether it be in constructing theories or in justifying and recommending values or practical norms as the most beautiful and the best. 

Moreover, Husserl goes on to say that:

The naturalist teaches, preaches, moralizes, reforms. . . . But he denies what every sermon, every demand, if it is to have meaning, presupposes. The only thing is, he does not preach in express terms that the only rational thing to do is to deny reason, as well theoretical as axiological and practical reason. He would, in fact, banish that sort of thing far from him. The absurdity is not in his case evident, but remains hidden from him because he naturalizes reason.

It is, then, not so much natural science that bothers Husserl, but rather the attempt of natural science and psychological theories based upon it, to give a foundation for Science and philosophy, without realizing that they themselves move upon and constantly presuppose their own foundations, and do not, and cannot by their very nature put these bases in question. This point needs to be stressed here, for it is often claimed that phenomenology "... starts with a rejection of science." Although this may be seen as yet another example of a perhaps necessary over-reaction to the tendency to subsume philosophy under the Objective sciences, it is not precisely true. Phenomenology does not altogether reject science. It rather "rejects" science as the basis for philosophy, for a basis for philosophy cannot carry in itself the inherent naivety of the Objective sciences.
What is implied in the "theory" of psychology is the denial of the possibility of a theory as such. By naturalizing consciousness, psychology does not merely leave itself with only empirical generalizations about the real psychic process, but it also denies the possibility of knowing in truth that that which it is dealing with is truly a real psychic process about which we may make only such statements. It wishes to hold that consciousness is in essence a real psychic process, while denying the possibility of essential insight.

Husserl tells us that the sceptical relativism of psychology can only be radically overcome by a pure phenomenology, as a science infinitely removed from psychology as the empirical science of mental attributes and states of animal realities." The aim of phenomenology as a description of what is found within conscious experience, is clearly stated by Husserl:

Its aim is not to explain knowledge in the psychological sense as a factual occurrence in objective nature, but to shed light on the Idea of knowledge in its constitutive elements and laws. It does not try to follow up the real connexions of co-existence and succession with which actual acts of knowledge are interwoven, but to understand the ideal sense of the specific connections in which the objectivity of knowledge may be documented. This clearing up takes place in the framework of a phenomenology of knowledge, as a phenomenology oriented as we say to the essential structures of pure experiences and to the structures of sense that belong to these. From the beginning as at all later stages, its scientific statements involve not the slightest reference to real existence...
What Husserl wishes, then, is essential insight into the nature of consciousness. The establishment of the possibility of essential insight, towards which a substantial part of the *Logical Investigations* is dedicated, is the first step in the establishment of the possibility of a rigorous Science of Being. To accomplish this, the "spectre of psychologism" must be definitively overcome.

We have, in explicating psychologism, arrived at another sense of "immanence", i.e., real (reelle) immanence, denoting a peculiar view of consciousness as a real (reellen) psychic process. We find also that this view of "descriptions of what is found within conscious experience" denies the possibility of a rigorous Science of Being on two fronts: (1). Through the denial of the possibility of essential analysis, it denies the possibility of Science and (2) Through the exclusive focussing on "inner experience", it cannot lay claim to the "inclusivity" demanded by a rigorous Science. Let us turn now to a psychological reflection found in Husserl's *Ideas* in which we are directed towards an essential analysis of consciousness and its objects.

The Psychological Characterization of Worldly Consciousness

A). The Context

In chapter four of his *Ideas*, entitled "Consciousness and Natural Reality", we see Husserl dealing with pre-
liminary considerations of the correlation between the notions of "immanence" and "transcendence" discovered through an essential analysis of consciousness and its objects. We are expressly given the context of these investigations. Husserl states that he will:

... start with a series of observations within which we are not yet troubled with any phenomenological epoche. We are directed to an "outer world" and, within forsaking the natural standpoint, reflect psychologically on our own Ego and its experiences (Erleben). We busy ourselves precisely as we would have done if we had never heard of the new viewpoint. ... 96

Many different senses of "immanence" and "transcendence" arise out of these ensuing investigations. Yet, as Fink notes:

In the Ideas these definitions are in no way meant to be phenomenologically definitive conceptual determinations. The intentional analysis of the givenness of the immanent over and against the givenness of the transcendent is in no way a formulation of the "criterion" for their definitive concepts, but only presents the transformation of their traditional difference... into an intentional one. Thus, after the first presentation of the phenomenological epoche, Husserl must again return to the natural attitude in order to carry out an intentional characterization of the worldly consciousness on its own terms, that is, a characterization of the relation between immanence and transcendence. This does not occur as a result of a predominately mundane interest in knowledge. Here it is neither a question of a traditional epistemological problem nor a foundation for psychology, but rather of an interpretation of the essence of consciousness preparatory to the performance of the epoche.

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The series of observations found here serve as a distinguishing between immanence and transcendence as seen in the
evident difference between the givenness of consciousness as a real (really) psychic process and the givenness of objects of which we are conscious, a difference which Husserl is to resolve (but not dissolve) under a new sense of Immanence and a new sense of Consciousness. The method of this resolve is the phenomenological reduction. Since this method of resolve is not as yet performed, it is vitally important that we keep in mind the context of these investigations and their preliminary nature.

It is also vitally important that we keep in mind the immense difficulties that arise out of Husserl's beginning these preliminary investigations within a psychological context. Husserl had discovered the method of the phenomenological reduction as early as 1907 (although he had yet to realize its full import and consequences), as revealed in a set of lectures entitled *Idea of Phenomenology*, yet he was to spend the rest of his philosophical career in searching for the correct and clearest method in which to present this method to the as yet "uninitiated" reader. As we have seen from our CHAPTER ONE, this "initiation is by no means simple or straightforward. This second section of *Ideas* presents us with a strange and difficult combination of introductions to phenomenology, the "Cartesian way" and the "psychological way". Husserl, in commenting on his *Ideas* some twenty years later in his *Crisis of European Sciences*, saw the method
and approach of that earlier work in this way:

I note in passing that the much shorter way to the transcendental epoche in my *Ideas*..., which I call the "Cartesian way" (since it is thought of as being attained merely by reflectively en-grossing oneself in the Cartesian epoche of the Meditations while critically purifying it of Descartes' prejudices and confusions), has a great shortcoming: while it leads to the transcendental ego in one leap, as it were, it brings this ego into view as apparently empty of content, since there can be no preparatory explication; so one is at a loss at first to know what has been gained by it, much less how, starting with this, a completely new sort of fundamental science, decisive for philosophy, has been attained. Hence, also, as the reception of my *Ideas* showed, it is all too easy right at the very beginning to fall back into the naive-natural attitude—something that is very tempting in any case.

We tend to disagree with Husserl's self-interpretation at this point, for the preliminary psychological exposition of the second section of *Ideas* tends, rather than "leading to the transcendental ego in one great leap", to lead to a "detouring" into psychology which, essentially demands that we fall back into the naive-natural attitude and therefore not be lead to the ego in one great leap, but rather preliminarily avoid it altogether. This leads to fundamental misrepresentations of the whole purpose of these reflections, as we shall soon see.

We have already indicated that the entrance into the problem-sphere of transcendental phenomenology from "outside" of that sphere presents us with its immediate and paradoxical self-enclosure, a self-enclosure which cannot be overcome by beginning with a *psychological expo-
We have also seen that this "breakthrough" to the sphere of phenomenology by means of the phenomenological reduction is absolutely necessary, for it alone (as we have yet to see) will establish phenomenology as a philosophy of Immanence and thereby as being capable of attaining the status of a rigorous Science.

The second section of Husserl's Ideas is set in an unusual context. He has already presented us with the general nature of the natural attitude as we have outlined it above, and has brought in the notion of the phenomenological reduction. Yet, he forfeits the insight of the reduction in favour of a preliminary psychological excursus into the nature of consciousness and thinghood. Why has he done this? What are its results? What are its difficulties? All of these questions require answering, for this section can prove to be one of the most misleading sections in Husserl's work. One should note that Husserl is directing himself towards the "uninitiated" and he must frame his preliminary excursus in language that can be readily understood. This is at once useful and dangerous, for if the context of this investigation and the essential impossibility of its task is not kept in mind, one can be mislead into thinking that it is possible to base the phenomenological analysis on a preliminary psychological exegesis. Let us expand on this before we present a general outline of the content of this section.
The section of *Ideen* under consideration, by being as Husserl readily admits a psychological reflection on the nature of consciousness and its relation to the world, shows itself to be in the midst of an incredible tension, for it is an attempt on Husserl's part to "break-through" to a realization of pure or *transcendental consciousness* by means of a starting point which, by its very nature, defies that realization. The influx of this tension into Husserl's work presents a difficulty in our exposition of it, for we cannot, in principle, proceed from a psychological exposition of consciousness to a phenomenological exposition of consciousness by means of a discursive, continuous line of development, as if the achievement of *transcendental consciousness* (and therewith the achievement of the problem-sphere of *transcendental phenomenology*) were somehow a continuation and extension of the same tendency present in descriptive psychology and its analyses.

The central difficulty with Husserl's analysis lies in the fact that he never makes, in this section, a radical break with the psychological tendency. He thereby allows us to make fundamentally incorrect assumptions as to the nature and purpose of phenomenology itself. By beginning with consciousness as *part of the world* (as is presupposed by the psychological exposition) and then attempting to "drag" consciousness back out of its real
attachement to Nature, Husserl necessarily equivocates on the meaning of consciousness and the meaning of Nature. He tells us expressly the purpose of these preliminary investigations:

We can all perform acts of reflexion to be sure and bring them within the apprehending glance of consciousness; but such reflexion is not yet phenomenological, nor is the consciousness apprehended pure consciousness. Radical discussions of the kind we have undertaken are, therefore, necessary in order to penetrate to the knowledge that there is, indeed can be, any such thing as the field of pure consciousness, which is not a portion of nature itself.

But we must recall here that the consciousness which is not a portion of nature is not psychological consciousness "cut off" from its relation to the world, although it is incredibly easy to understand what Husserl says in this manner. Psychological consciousness remains in the world; the world also remains as it was. It is not as if "nature" once meant both psychological consciousness and objects of that consciousness and now it means or includes only objects.

Phenomenology, then, is not a regional science concerned with only one abstracted portion of nature, i.e., psychological consciousness. As Husserl tells us:

... it shall become clear that the transcendental study of consciousness does not mean nature-research and may not presuppose this as a premise, since from its transcendental standpoint, Nature is in principle placed within the bracket. They are necessary in order that we should know that this detachment from the whole world in the form of a phenomenological reduction is something totally different.
from the mere abstraction of certain components of an embracing organization, whether the connexions be necessary or merely factual.

Although Husserl begins with a psychological account, what is eventually required, despite the completeness of that account, is a radical break with the psychological tendency (tending as it does to be a regional science of a portion of nature) in the form of the phenomenological reduction. This requirement itself accounts for not only, as Fink notes, the tentativeness and fluidity (if not downright ambiguity and equivocality) of the terms used by Husserl in Ideas, but also for the inability to truly begin with a psychological account and then somehow enter into phenomenology, as if the transition and the subsequent radical transformation of the meanings of the terms used were somehow to become obvious.

The exact reason for the need for phenomenology to break with the psychological tendency is based on the radical nature of the questions posed by phenomenology. It wishes to pose as a problem the very ground upon which the psychological account of consciousness itself is based, i.e., the unquestioned acceptance of the existence of the world and the existence of consciousness in the world. This "unquestioned acceptance" necessitates that the only possible type of research for psychology (as a strictly natural science) is Nature-research into the specific region of the world entitled the "psyche". The "conditions for the
possibility" of psychological research are not a question for psychology. Hence, the tension of Husserl's account in *Ideas* is not felt simply because it is psychology. Rather, because Husserl has already introduced the method whereby the ground of the psychological account of consciousness is to be "bracketed" (the reduction), the simple return to psychology leaves it in an unstable state of transition. This instability leads us into ambiguities as we shall see.

Psychology and its analyses, while always moving on the basis of the thesis of the natural attitude, can most assuredly provide us with a pedagogical device whereby we may gain some preliminary indication of the nature of phenomenology. Yet because of the essentially naive context of the psychological account (i.e., the unradical acceptance of its own possibility, a possibility the questioning of which lies outside its problem-sphere) we are more likely to run into confusing equivocations. While keeping all of this in mind, let us turn to the *Ideas* and see how this tension manifests itself. We shall soon see that the whole context of the present chapter, viz., an "ascension to Immanence" through psychology, is essentially impossible, because of the radical and essential difference between psychology and phenomenology. The method of psychology is such that it cannot encompass its own possibility; it is thus dangerous to assume that it can provide a clear-cut entrance into transcendental phenomenology.
B). The Content

Husserl, in searching for an indubitable foundation with which phenomenology, as a radically self-critical Science, may begin, commences chapter four of his Ideas by posing, within the psychological context, the following questions:

Individual consciousness is interwoven with the world in a twofold way: it is some man's consciousness, and in a large number at least of its particularizations, it is a consciousness of this world. In respect now of this intimate attachment with the real world, what is meant by saying that consciousness has an essence "of its own", that with other consciousness it constitutes a self-contained connexion determined purely through this, its own essence, the connexion, namely, of the stream of consciousness? Moreover, since we can interpret consciousness in the widest sense to cover eventually whatever the concept of experience includes, the question concerns the experience-streams own essential nature, and that of all its components. To what extent, in the first place, must the material world be fundamentally different in kind, excluded from the experience's own essential nature. And if it is this, if over against consciousness and the essential being proper to it, it is that which is "foreign" and "other" how can consciousness be interwoven with it, and consequently with the whole world that is alien to consciousness?

We are then faced with a world which exists and which has within it two regions of Being, Experience (Erlebnis) and objects. As Husserl states, we are not apt to confuse our experience with the objects of that experience; the task however, is to pinpoint the fundamental and essential difference between these two regions of Being.

The essential analyses of chapter four of Ideas leave us with the inadequate givenness of the thing over
and against the adequate givenness of experience (Erlebnis). The material thing, given to us in transcendent perception is always given "from some perspective" and only "in one of its aspects". Thus our evidence for saying that the thing we are experiencing is this way and no other way remains in principle incomplete. We are always subject, when dealing with objects, to further investigation, further acceptance of evidence as to its nature. That the thing is the way we think it is remain thereby always contingent upon future experiential confirmation or disconfirmation of what we presently take to be the case about the object in question. As Husserl tells us:

...it is, as we know, an essential feature of the thing-world, that no perception however perfect, it may be, gives us anything absolute within its domain; and with this the following is essentially connected, namely, that every experience, ...however far it extends, leaves open the possibility that what is given, despite the persistent consciousness of its bodily self-presence, does not exist. It is an essentially valid law that existence in the form of a thing is never demanded as necessary by virtue of its givenness, but in a certain way is always contingent. That means: It can always happen that the further course of experience will compel us to abandon what has already been set down and justified, in the light of empirical canons of rightness. It was, so we afterwards say, mere illusion, hallucination merely a coherent dream and the like....

We must recall, however, that this necessary inadequacy of the givenness of the transcendent object in transcendent perception does not in any way affect our belief that the object under consideration does "in reality" exist in some
way or other "out there". The distinction we naturally maintain between objects as meant (what we, with our inadequate evidence, take the object to be on the basis of that evidence) and objects which are meant (what the object is "in reality") still persists. As we saw Husserl stating above with reference to the general thesis of the natural attitude, the world and the objects in it are taken without question to be there, and illusions and hallucinations must be struck out of it, but "the 'it' remains".

This analysis of Husserl's as to the givenness of transcendent objects shows that a definitive and final confirmation of our belief in the independent existence of transcendent objects cannot in principle occur by appealing to further experiential evidence, since that evidence remains forever inadequate. Our belief in their independent existence thus remains presupposed. It also shows, paradoxically, that the confirmation of that belief (or at least the accumulation of more and more evidence tending towards that confirmation) must occur through our experience of the object. We can see then that the confirmation of the existence of objects independently of experience can only occur by appeal to that experience, for it is only in this way that we have evidential (as opposed to merely presupposed, unsupported belief) knowledge of the transcendent thing. At once we feel the tension of Husserl's analysis, for, by beginning on the basis of the thesis of the natural attitude, he has already begun to, in a sense, undermine it.
or at the very least "overcome its naivety" and has begun
to show it forth as a belief.

Experience (Erlebnis) however, does not include the
necessity of presupposing its existence. Experience of the
stream of consciousness, given through immanent perception,
does not allow for inadequate evidence for its existence.
Over and against the inadequate and contingent givenness of
the thing in transcendent perception, we have the fully
adequate and absolute givenness of experience (Erlebnis)
itself. Husserl says that:

Experience...does not present itself. This im-
plies that the perception of experience is plain
insight into something which in perception is given
(or to be given) as absolute, and not as an identity
uniting moes of appearances through perspective con-
tinua. All that we have stated concerning the given-
ness of things here loses its meaning, and we must
bring this home to ourselves in detail with full
clearness. The experience of a feeling has no per-
spectives. If I look upon it, I have before me an
absolute; it has no aspects which might present
themselves now in this way, and now in that. In
thought, I can think truly or falsely about it, but
that which is there absolutely with its qualities
its intensity, is there absolutely.

Thus, the evidence for experience itself is absolute evidence
and not subject to future disconfirmation. Husserl continues
his Cartesian description of experience by saying that:

From this important consequences follow. Every immanent
perception necessarily guarantees the existence... of its object. If reflective apprehension is directed
to my experience, I apprehend an absolute Self whose
existence...is, in principle, undeniable, that is,
the insight that it does not exist it, in principle,
impossible; it would be nonsense to maintain the poss-
ibility of an experience given in such a way not truly
existing. The stream of consciousness which is mine,
It seems, then, as a result of this securing of the primacy of the cogito, that Husserl has arrived, in a fashion similar to that of Descartes, at the sphere of indubitable evidence for which he has been seeking, the sphere within which phenomenology as a rigorous Science of Being may begin.

C). Results and Problems

We can see that the meditations Husserl has given us, although they are not carried out under the express authority of the phenomenological reduction (and are not thereby phenomenology), already involve the beginnings of a radical transformation of the traditional epistemological question, namely, "How can two real things, subject and object, "contact" one another in knowledge?" While restricting himself consistently to the givenness of the transcendent and the givenness of the immanent, Husserl is already beginning to move within the parameters of the reduction, showing as he does that the whole reality of the object and reality of psychological consciousness must be found in their givenness.
It is at this point that we may begin to run into difficulties. Husserl tells us, with a seeming reference to the "relation between" the system of experience grasped in immanent perception, and Reality, grasped in transcendent perception, that:

Between the meanings of consciousness and reality yawns a veritable abyss. Here a Being which manifests itself perspectively, never giving itself absolutely; there a necessary and absolute Being, fundamentally incapable of being given through appearances and perspective-patterns.

Moreover, he goes on to say that:

Consciousness, considered in its "purity" must be reckoned as a self-contained system of Being a system of Absolute Being, into which nothing can penetrate and from which nothing can escape; which has no spatio-temporal exterior, and can be inside no spatio-temporal system; which cannot experience causality from anything nor can it exert causality upon anything, it being presupposed that causality bears the normal sense of natural causality as a relation of dependence between realities.

It is obvious from this that Husserl has fundamentally changed the meaning of consciousness from that psychological consciousness from which he commenced. We are no longer speaking of consciousness as a real event in the world. Yet the tendency to interpret consciousness in this manner is almost unavoidable, for we have not as yet been given the express means whereby we may avoid this tendency. We have said above that the meaning-shifts found in Husserl's work
need to be placed in their respective contexts, yet we have not yet entered into the context of phenomenology and cannot as yet express fully the equivocations that are here to be avoided.

By establishing the primacy of the cogito, it seems that Husserl has found the sphere of indubitable evidence required for the establishment of a rigorous Science in the indubitable givenness of experience itself. It seems also that the dubitable givenness of transcendent objects must be completely disregarded by a rigorous Science, for to accept such inadequate evidence would be to deny and undermine its Scientific character. Does it not seem, then, from these considerations, that all of Reality must be left wholly out of consideration by Husserlian phenomenology? If between consciousness and Reality there is an abyss of meaning and if consciousness itself is a self-contained and impenetrable system of Being, an analysis of consciousness would thereby seem not to include or be able to include talk of Reality at all. To reaffirm a question we raised earlier: How can Husserl be set on the establishment of a rigorous Science of all Being if his attention is focussed exclusively on consciousness? It is probably in this sense and in light of this possible misrepresentation that Husserl felt, by the time of the Crisis of European Sciences that the procedure in the Ideas left us with an ego "...apparently empty of content". This is not, we feel, merely because
he tried to reach transcendental consciousness "all at once", but rather because he did not allow for the possibility of psychological misrepresentations of his intention. It is based on the fact that Husserl tries, in the *Ideas*, to reach the central and authentic meaning of phenomenology by means of or by way of psychology. We feel that his attempt at an "ascension to Immanence" is a failure and ends necessarily in psychological misrepresentation.

These psychological misrepresentations lead us to believe that consciousness is somehow "left over" after the elimination of that which is dubitable; as Husserl says, consciousness takes on the appearance of a "phenomenological residuum" which can withstand the process of methodical doubt. One begins to wonder whether the whole effort was worthwhile or productive, for we seem to have won access to be particular region of Being (the "Region of Pure Consciousness"), but we have had to forfeit consideration of the whole of Reality. We are told that Reality is to be considered only as a "correlate of consciousness", but we do not yet see how this correlate can enter into an impenetrable consciousness and yet at the same time remain distinguishable from consciousness. Without first considering the phenomenological reduction, we are lead into confusions and ambiguities, for we can only understand the nature of transcendental consciousness and its difference from psychological consciousness by means
of this reduction.

The Impossibility of an Ascension to Immanence

We need not reaffirm our point in full. We are not yet able to see how it is that Husserl considers consciousness and its "contents", for we have not yet performed the phenomenological reduction. This leaves us with the confusing attempt at making a transition from psychology to phenomenology, a transition which cannot be accomplished as a smooth, continuous development and ascension. A radical break is required, for the reasons mentioned above. An ascension to Immanence is essentially impossible.

Although we now negate the whole thesis of this chapter, it has not proved to be a wholly useless effort. It shows us again the difficulties faced when attempting to enter into phenomenology's problem-sphere. It has also given us preliminary sketches of the activity of phenomenology itself; the distinctions made between psychological and phenomenological consciousness and between immanent and transcendent perception, will be reconsidered and re-evaluated once we gain insight into the reduction. We have also been shown in a concrete manner the absolute necessity and centrality of the reduction to Husserl's phenomenology. Without it, we remain subject to continued equivocations.
and to the overpowering tendency to remain in the natural attitude and to interpret consciousness psychologically. This tendency shall most certainly arise anew. By beginning with preliminary psychological considerations, Husserl has only aggravated this situation.

Our exposition thereby remains quite incomplete. Yet we have centered on a difficulty which Husserl must overcome in order to re-awaken philosophy to its true spirit as rigorous Science: The specter of *transcendental psychology*. Husserl must be able to not leave us with a consciousness "cut off" from Reality. He must be able to find, Immanent in transcendental consciousness, every moment of Reality seemingly lost by the process of methodical doubt. *Transcendental consciousness* is the sphere of Immanence which we are seeking. Now the task is to find the true sense of this consciousness and the sense of the Immanence of Reality "in it".
III

THE METHOD AND MATTER OF IMMANENCE

We ourselves shall be drawn into an inner transformation through which we shall come face to face with, to direct experience of, the long felt, but constantly concealed dimension of the "transcendental". The ground of experience, opened up in its infinity, will then become the fertile soil of a methodical working philosophy, with the self-evidence furthermore, that all conceivable philosophical and scientific problems of the past are to be posed and decided by starting from this ground.

Introduction

We are now concerned with characterizing the method (the phenomenological reduction) by which phenomenology wishes to establish itself as a rigorous Science of Being, and with characterizing the matter (transcendental subjectivity) revealed by this method. This method will help us to overcome the immense difficulties we have faced thus far in unearthing the central and authentic meaning of phenomenology. Through this, we shall come to see the true sense of our characterizing phenomenology as a philosophy of Immanence. Moreover, we shall also come to see why it is that a self-consistent Scientific philosophy must be a philosophy of Immanence, thereby supporting Husserl's
claim that phenomenology shows itself to be the consummation of the Ideal of Scientific (and therefore genuine) philosophy itself.

We must emphasize, however, that the phenomenological approach is not simply a means of immediate access to a pre-disposed and closed set of problems. It is, rather, a method by which problems and how they are to be answered, is opened-up. It is not, that is, a simple matter of dispelling enigmatic areas of investigations. It is, in fact, the exact reverse. As Husserl states:

"...by carrying out the epoché the phenomenologist by no means straightway commands a horizon of obviously possible new projects; a transcendental field of work does not immediately spread before him, preformed in a set of obvious types. The world is the sole universe of what is pregiven as obvious. From the beginning the phenomenologist lives in the paradox of having to look upon the obvious as questionabale, as enigmatic, and of henceforth being unable to have any other scientific theme than that of transforming the universal obviousness of the being of the world -- for him the greatest of all enigmas -- into something intelligible."

This "making enigmatic" of that which was taken to be the most obvious (the existence of the world, taken for granted in the natural attitude) leaves us unable to presuppose that which is most familiar to us. This accounts for phenomenology's unnatural and "strange" character, as well as defining its radicality. Hence, as Fink notes:

The reduction leads us into the darkness of something unknown, something with which we have not been previously familiarized in terms of its formal style of being. The reduction is not a technical
installation of a knowledge-attitude which, once established, is finished and complete once and for all, and which one must simply accept in order to wander subsequently through a domain which lies upon one and the same level, but it is rather an unceasing and constant theme of phenomenological philosophy.

Let us now look at how Husserl speaks of this constant theme of phenomenological philosophy: the phenomenological reduction.

How Husserl Speaks of the Phenomenological Reduction

If we miss the meaning of the reduction, everything is lost. The temptation to misunderstand is almost irresistible.

We can easily allow ourselves to be thrown once again into the type of circularities encountered above in our CHAPTER ONE. That which tempts us to misunderstand the thrust of the phenomenological reduction is the tendency to interpret its movement in terms of the natural attitude. That which allows us to avert this temptation to misunderstand the reduction is the reduction itself, for it alone "sets out of action" the very thesis which lead us astray. But we have had enough of this spinning of circles. We need now to attempt to positively approach the phenomenological reduction as the method of phenomenological inquiry.

The phenomenological reduction somehow directs
itself towards the general thesis of the natural attitude with the express purpose of making explicit that which is constantly presupposed in our natural world-life, and interpretations of objects encountered in that life. It is precisely this explication which does not occur in the natural attitude and which must occur within phenomenology if it is to attain the status of a rigorous Science. For this explication on the part of phenomenology to be possible, it is necessary that some sort of "break" with the tendency to rest our investigations on the general thesis be accomplished. The method of this accomplishment is the phenomenological reduction. Let us see how Husserl speaks of the reduction in its relation to the general thesis of the natural attitude.

The method of the phenomenological reduction is not apparent in the Logical Investigations. Phenomenology is left standing, even in the revised edition of this work (1913), as a descriptive psychology. However, Husserl does speak here in such a manner as to allow for the future germination of the notion of the reduction in his later works. He realized that in order to be able to philosophically examine the conscious acts within which logical objectivities appear, it is necessary that, instead of being "...lost in the performance of acts", we should rather make these acts explicit by means of a mode of reflection which allows us to overcome our "...naive acceptance and asessment of objects". This reflection is,
however, not yet phenomenological in the full sense, but
these passages do indicate Husserl's awareness of the
necessity of philosophy to overcome the naivety of natural
thinking.

In the *Idea of Phenomenology*, where we gain the
earliest published indication of Husserl's attempts to
formulate the reduction, he tells us that the *epoche* does
not disavow the thesis of the natural attitude. He says
that the transcendent suppositions arising out of the natural
attitude (where the world is taken without question to be
"out there") are to be "bracketed" or "assigned the index
of indifference" in that we "make no use of them".

The general thesis of the natural attitude becomes an
"epistemological nullity" and cannot figure as an
unquestioned "prædatum" in the critique of cognition,
a critique which the *Idea of Phenomenology* wishes to
accomplish.

Therefore, by means of the phenomenological
reduction, we are attempting to "overcome" our natural
tendency (in the precise sense) to "take for granted"
the thesis of the natural attitude as the unquestioned basis
upon which all our natural endeavours rest. We are attempt-
ing to "put it into question". It must be immediately
pointed out that this attempt to "overcome" the tendency to
base our philosophical enterprise on the natural attitude
by means of the reduction is by no means a denial or whole-
sale doubt of the thesis. Denial itself is a "taking of
a position" towards the existence of the world, and it is
precisely this and all positing, implied in the term
"thesis" (Satz) which Husserl wishes to overcome. In this
sense, phenomenology claims not to be a "standpoint" or
"position" but rather to "... start out from that which
antedates all standpoints."

With respect to the possibility of misconstruing
phenomenology and seeing it as a method of world-denial,
Husserl, in the Ideas, tells us that:

Our phenomenological idealism does not deny the
positive existence of the real (realen) world and
of Nature -- in the first place as though it held
it to be an illusion. Its sole task and service is
to clarify the meaning of this world, the precise
sense in which everyone accepts it, and with un-
deniable right, as really existing (wirklich seienende).

In our natural thinking about the world, we take it for
granted that there is a world. Phenomenology wishes to pose
this as a problem, not in order to deny the world or make
the existence of the world somehow doubtful, but simply in
order to ask the question "What does it mean to say that
there is a world?" In asking this, it ask after the basis
of all our natural thinking, after what what is presupposed
by all of our inquires as self-evident and beyond question.

Husserl goes on to tell us in the Ideas that the
phenomenological reduction sets us into relation with the
thesis such that "we make no change in our conviction"

That is, we do not sophistically deny the worlds existence,
nor do we sceptically doubt it, but rather we simply "disconnect it", "bracket it" or "set it, as it were out of action".

With respect to this Husserl sets forth in his Cartesian Meditations a vitally important aspect of phenomenological explication. He tells us that:

...phenomenological explication does nothing but explicate the sense this world has for us prior to any philosophizing; ... -- a sense which philosophy can uncover but never alter.

This tells us that phenomenology is not, or at the very least attempts not to be the dogmatic holding of pre-established truths by means of which we interpret (and thereby alter) the world of our experience. Also we see that what may appear as doubt through the initial exposition of the reduction comes to be seen only as a device or method whereby we avert the tendency to leave the thesis of the natural attitude unquestioned.

Since this issue of "denial" or "doubt" with respect to the procedure of phenomenology is one which gives rise to many misunderstandings of the reduction and, hence, of the whole project of phenomenology, we feel that the following passage, from a supplementary text to Husserl's Erste Philosophie, entitled "Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy", is worth noting in full. Here, Husserl sets the possibility of misunderstanding the reduction and taking it to be a "denial of the world" into full
relief. He tells us that:

If the thought is here suggested that this "pre-supposition" which is included in the essential form of natural life and, especially, in that of the scientific cognition of nature, could and must be "put into question", then no damage of any kind is to be supposed done by that to the proper legitimacy of this life. Nothing lies further from our intention than to play sceptical paradoxes off against natural rational activity of life -- or against natural experience and its self-confirmation in the harmonious continuation or against natural thinking (and also valuing, active striving) in its natural methods of reasoning (and therefore against natural science), and it is not intended that any of these be depreciated. The genuine transcendental philosophy -- let it be emphatically stressed at the outset -- is not like the Human and other openly or covertly a sceptical decomposition of the world-cognition and the world itself into fictions, that is to say, in modern times, a philosophy of "As-if". Least of all is it a "dissolution" of the world into "mere subjective appearances" which in some still senseful sense would have something to do with illusion. It does not occur to transcendental philosophy to dispute the world of experience in the least, to take from it the least bit of the sense which it really has in the actuality of the experience and which in its harmonious course certifies itself in its indubitable legitimacy. And again, it does not occur to it to deprive objective truth of positive science of the least bit of the meaning that it really creates in the actual employment of its naturally evident methods and bears within itself as legitimately valid.

But, let it also be noted, that Husserl immediately goes on to say that:

But of course, transcendental philosophy is of the opinion that this sense of legitimacy as it matures in such actuality, is in no way understood thereby. The "unquestionability" of what goes without question in the natural cognition of what is valid in this naive evidence is, says transcendental philosophy, not the understandablility of the insight developed through the most radical lines of inquiry and clarification, is not that highest and ultimately necessary indubitability which leaves remaining no unasked and therefore unsettled questions of that
fundamental sort which belong inseparably, because essentially, to every theme of cognition whatsoever.

The whole aim of transcendental philosophy goes back ultimately to those fundamental matters that are unquestioned. 

Therefore, phenomenology does not in any way deny natural cognition. It does not wish to change it or alter it. It wishes merely to understand it from the ground up. Natural cognition takes for granted its own ground. The questioning of this ground by phenomenology is therefore not a denial of that ground, but a revealing of it.

The reduction is described in many other ways by Husserl, in his constant attempt to grapple with its radically "unnatural sense" in terms whose natural connotations pose serious difficulties to clear and unambiguous presentation. He calls it an "abstention" where we are "no longer keeping in effect" the thesis; an "inhibiting", a "putting out of play" of the universal 'prejudice' of world-experience.

All of these, we emphasize once again, do not mean that we turn our attention "away" from the world, but rather that our "attention" has been "freed" from the naivete of presupposing the world, so that that very world (and the legitimate belief in the world) may now be seen radically, i.e. so that now a rigorous Science of Being in the sense described above may be possible. That is to say:
when I turn away from the naive exploration of
the world to the exploration of the self and its
transcendental egological consciousness, I do not turn
my back on the world to retreat into an unworldly,
and, therefore, uninteresting special field of theo-
retical study. On the contrary this alone enables me
to explore the world radically and even to under-
take a radically scientific exploration of what exists
absolutely and in an ultimate sense. Once the in-
adequacy of the naive attitude has been revealed,
this is the only possible way of establishing science
in its genuine radicality — more precisely, the way
to the only possible, radically grounded philosophy.

We "turn our backs" then merely on how the world is in-
vestigated in the naive exploration of it, where inquiries
as to the nature of the world presuppose the independent
existence of the world and then proceed on this inexplicit
basis. The naive or natural attitude and the sciences built
upon it, are thereby not, as the above passage may indicate,
wholly inadequate, but they are simply inadequate to the
task that philosophy sets itself. We wish in phenomenology,
to see the very same world seen in the natural attitude,
but "in a new way". Husserl feels that this "nuance"
springing from a mere "change of standpoint" is absolutely
necessary and decisive for the establishing of the poss-
ibility of philosophy as Science, for it alone allows
philosophy to "escape" that "prejudice" of a presupposed
world-belief, a belief which, as presupposed, denies
philosophy the possibility of a radicality, thereby denying
the possibility of rigorous Science which, for Husserl,
denies the possibility of genuine philosophy. From this
we can see why it is that Husserl constantly insists on the importance of the phenomenological reduction. "If we miss the meaning of the reduction, everything is lost."

This tells us at once that, according to Husserl, without the phenomenological reduction, genuine philosophy is impossible. But more than this. Without the possibility of philosophy, the possibility of attaining Truth is denied, and therewith, man's life as a meaningful being-towards-Truth, is doomed to absurdity.

A Mistaken Interpretation of Where the Reduction Leaves Us

Now that we have seen in a general way the relation between the phenomenological reduction and the general thesis of the natural attitude, we may now move on to the most common misrepresentation of this relation.

In a fashion similar to that of Descartes Meditations, Husserl begins the explication of the reduction in the Idea of Phenomenology as follows:

... now we recall the Cartesian doubt. Reflecting on the multifarious possibilities of error and deception, I might reach such a degree of sceptical despair that I finally say: Nothing is certain, everything is doubtful. But it is at once evident that not everything is doubtful for while I am so judging that everything is doubtful, it is indubitable that I am so judging; and it would be absurd to want to persist in a universal doubt. And in every case of a definite doubt, it is indubitably certain that I have this doubt. And likewise with every
Therefore, the existence of the cosititationes or "acts of consciousness" is indubitable. This much we learned from our CHAPTER TWO, although we have yet to understand its true sense. In order that we may remain within this indubitable sphere, Husserl formulates the phenomenological reduction in such a way as to suspend judgements on the existence of anything not given "in" the cosititationes. He tells us that:

...an epistemological reduction has to be accomplished in the case of every epistemological inquiry of whatever sort of cognition. That is, to say everything transcendent that is involved must be bracketed, or be assigned the index of indifference, of epistemological nullity, an index which indicates that the existence of all these transcendencies, whether I believe them or not, is not here my concern. ... 155

It is at this point that a mistaken interpretation, similar to the one we saw in our analysis of chapter four of Ideas, may arise anew. By allowing it to arise, we can come to more clearly formulate one sense of immanence and transcendence.

If the phenomenological reduction involves the "bracketing" of the consideration of the genuinely (real) transcendent object, an object seen to be that which is not a real part of consciousness (i.e., it is not a lived-experience but rather something which is experienced) we may be led to say the following. The exclusion of the possibility of considering transcendent objects means that our attention must focus exclusively on the lived-stream of
consciousness itself. If we exclude that which is outside of consciousness (i.e., exclude that which is not a real part of consciousness), where are we left? We are left, it seems obvious, with that which is inside of consciousness; we are left with genuine (real) immanence. All that is left for consideration after the epoché is the real (real) concrete content of the psychic process, discoverable through inner experience. It seems, then, that we are left once again with descriptive-introspective psychology.

It is precisely this misrepresentation of the sense of phenomenological Immanence that lead the interpreters of Husserl’s Logical Investigations to conclude that phenomenology was simply an elaborate descriptive psychology and therefore merely a sub-domain of empirical psychology, an interpretation, which we have already seen, would pervert the whole thrust of these investigations.

We may formulate these misrepresentative senses of immanence and transcendence as follows:

Genuine (real) immanence: the concrete content of the real psychic process, discoverable through inner experience. We shall call this immanence sense one.

Genuine (real) transcendence: indicative of the fact that the object of experience is not contained in the immanent psychic process as a real part. We shall call this transcendence sense one.
These senses remain misrepresentative of the phenomenological senses of immanence and transcendence in that their sense is based on the general thesis of the natural attitude, where "consciousness" and "objects" are taken to be, "without question", two regions of Being in the world. Taking them (more precisely, presupposing them) to be thus "separated" in a real sense, leads any epistemological critique into sceptical absurdities.

The phenomenological reduction does not restrict our consideration to the real psychic process, so that that which is not a real part of that process (i.e., transcendence sense one) is "left out". As Husserl states:

... the phenomenological reduction does not entail a limitation of the investigation to the sphere of that which is genuinely contained within the absolute this of the cogitatio. It entails no limitation to the sphere of the cogitatio. It entails rather a limitation to the sphere of those things which are not merely spoken about, meant or perceived, but instead to the sphere of those things that are given, in just exactly the sense in which they are thought of, and moreover, are self-given in the strictest sense -- in such a way that nothing which is meant fails to be given. In words, we are restricted to the sphere of pure evidence.

Herein arises the transformation to the true sense of phenomenological Immanence. Through this transformation, we are no longer restricted to a psychological description of "inner states of consciousness", but are rather "restricted" to the sphere of that which is self-evident, that which is purely self-given.
A New Sense of Immanence: Phenomenological Immanence

We can see from the preceding passage that the phenomenological reduction is not a reduction to "subjectivity" if we mean by this "that which is inside of me", i.e., psychological subjectivity. We are not restricted to what is genuinely contained in the cogitations as genuinely (really) immanent in them and as constituting a real part of them. The phenomenological reduction is rather a reduction to the proper sphere of evidence. It is a reduction to that which is given in consciousness.

In explicating the full sense of phenomenological Immanence, we must proceed in two stages. We must say for now (and with necessary reservation) that "The cogitations are the first absolute data." We must say, in a preliminary step towards understanding the full sense of phenomenological Immanence, that what is given as self-evident and indubitable are pure cogitations and what is found "in" them, and these are the pure phenomena with which phenomenology deals. However, this "containment" in pure cogitations is not a real immanence. We shall come to understand this only later, when we come to speak of the intentionality of consciousness.

Phenomenology deals with that which is given in consciousness: Pure phenomena. They are "pure" in that they have been "cleared" of all transcendencies. This clearing of
transcendencies means simply that phenomenology does not wish to explain the phenomena in terms of that which does not present itself in the phenomena, nor does it wish to explain or interpret the phenomena by some pre-conceived theory or idea. To use a very simple example, we may say in the case of visual perception that phenomenology does not wish to explain this perception in terms of its cause, e.g., in terms of light waves, atoms, and so on. These things (light waves and atoms) are not experienced in visual perception as such. We do not perceive light waves, we perceive objects (however adequate the theory of light waves is in explaining why we see objects). Light waves and atoms, therefore, transcend that which is given in visual perception. Phenomenology simply wishes to describe what is given in visual perception as experienced. No "transcendent suppositions" which go beyond the phenomena are allowed. The phenomena are to be grasped and described simply as they give themselves to what Husserl calls "pure seeing" a "seeing" or "intuiting" which restricts itself to and remains within the realm of the pure phenomena. The phenomenological reduction thereby becomes the method by which we inhibit our tendency to make transcendent suppositions about the phenomena and to interpret the phenomena in terms of something not "there" to be "seen". Therefore:

Phenomenological experience as reflection must avoid any interpretive constructions. Its descriptions must reflect accurately the concrete content of experience precisely as these are experienced.
We may thus arrive at a new sense of phenomenological Immanence. Immanence is:

... absolute and clear givenness, self-givenness in the absolute sense. This givenness, which rules out any meaningful doubt, consists of a simple immediate "seeing"...

We can therefore follow Husserl when he states: "Our phenomenological sphere, the sphere of absolute clarity, of immanence in the true sense, reaches no farther than self-givenness reaches."

The method of the phenomenological reduction has thus lead us to the indubitable sphere of pure consciousness itself, the parameters of which we have yet to examine.

We can see that now, one cannot presuppose that consciousness is a real event in the world, nor can one presuppose that "being given within consciousness" implies a real (realte) immanence. Such transcendent suppositions as to the nature of consciousness have been "suspended". We must now describe consciousness and its "contents" purely as experienced. With reference to psychological self-experience then, we may say that consciousness is experienced as an event in the world. In phenomenology, however, this is not to say that it is an event in the world or that it is not an event in the world. Such transcendent judgements which purport to make a claim which goes beyond our experience of psychological consciousness have been "suspended".

Since we have neither examined what is "contained"
in an examination of pure phenomena, nor have we examined how it is "contained"; our examination of the pure phenomena remains thus far incomplete and necessarily misleading.

For now, we must make an effort not to theorize or attempt to explain the data given in intuition. In the Idea of Phenomenology, Husserl gives an extensive account of that which is required of us in phenomenological descriptions. He states that:

...no inclination is more dangerous to the "seeing" cognition of origins and absolute data than to think too much, and from these reflections in thought to create supposed self-evident principles. Principles which for the most part are not at all explicitly formulated and hence are not subject to any critique based on "seeing" but rather implicitly determine and unjustifiably limit the direction of investigation. "Seeing" cognition is that form of reason which sets itself the task of converting the understanding into reason. The understanding is not to be allowed to interrupt and to insert its unredeemed bank notes among the certified ones; and its method of conversion and exchange, based on mere treasury bonds, is not questioned here.

Thus as little interpretation as possible, but as pure an intuition as possible (intuitio sine comprehensione). In fact, we will bark back to the speech of the mystics when they describe the intellectual seeing which is supposed not to be discursive knowledge. And the whole trick consists in this -- to give free rein to the seeing eye and to bracket the references which go beyond the seeing and are entangled with the seeing, along with the entities which are supposedly given and thought along with the "seeing" and, finally, to bracket what is read into them through the accompanying reflections...
No theoretical interpretation which goes beyond
the data as given is allowed. It is thus that Husserl
establishes the phenomenological principle of all principles,
a principle which does not entail that we remain true to
a particular theory about things themselves but rather that
we turn our gaze to the things themselves:

No theory we can conceive can mislead us in re-
gard to the principle of all principles: that every
primordial dator intuition is a source of authority
(Rechtsquelle) for knowledge, that whatever presents
itself in "intuition" in primordial form (as it
were in its bodily reality), is simply to be accept-
ed as it gives itself out to be, though only within
the limits in which it then presents itself.

And thereby, by remaining within these "limits", ensured
by the constant re-institution of the phenomenological
reduction, we see that:

Every statement which does nothing more than give
expression to such data through merely unfolding
their meaning and adjusting it accurately is thus
really, as we have put it in the introductory words
of this chapter, an absolute beginning, called in
a genuine sense to provide foundations, a principium.

We must now push our investigation further and ask "What
is given in an analysis of the pure phenomena?" We must now
take a second step at understanding the full sense of pheno-
menological Immanence, a step which shall reveal to us the
sense of "intentional transcendence" found within the sphere
of phenomenological Immanence.
An Analytic Description of the Field of Phenomenological Immanence

(A). A Second Sense of Transcendence

The sphere of phenomenological Immanence is the sphere of givenness to consciousness. Before we commence to answer the question "What is given in the analysis of the pure phenomena?", we must return and see exactly what has occurred through Husserl's phenomenological reduction. We have stressed only its "negative aspect". We must now see what it positively reveals.

Let us return to the natural mode of thinking for a moment, a mode of thinking, recall, that phenomenology wishes to radically understand, not transform or devalue. When I desire to know something about this object before me, I turn to the object for information in a straightforward manner. I also "naively" assume that this information gained by such a straightforward attending to objects is how the object exists as genuinely (réelle) transcendent to me. In the event of an error, I merely attend more closely to the object to correct this error. All of this is to say that along with a straightforward attending to objects goes a belief that these objects exist as real, independently of my consciousness of them. Herein, consciousness itself is taken as well to be a real event in the world. To push this finally to its limit, we need to say, paradoxically, that in the natural attitude, consciousness,
as a world-event, is taken to exist independently of itself! That is, if, as we have said above, from the perspective of the natural attitude, the subject is immanent in the world, and the world is transcendent to the subject, the subject, as part of the world, is "transcendent to itself".

The phenomenological reduction has as its negative aspect the suspension of the naive assumption of a genuinely transcendent object existing independently of consciousness. Yet we must emphasize again the fact that the phenomenological reduction is not a negation, not a "...transformation of the thesis into antithesis, of positive into negative", but a suspension of all thetic judgements. We do not deny what is given in the natural attitude -- it does not change, but our way of viewing it changes. We now view it with respect to its givenness in consciousness, with respect to its phenomenological Immanence. That is:

...this entire world... which is continually "there for us", "present to our hand" and which remains there, is a fact-world of which we continue to be conscious, even though it pleases us to put it in brackets. If I do this, as I am fully free to do, I do not then deny this "world"... I do not doubt that it is there... but I use the phenomenological epoché... 

And what this phenomenological epoché reveals is that we have not eliminated the world in which we straightforwardly believe or attend to in various ways, but now we finally see that it is a world in which we believe, of which we are conscious.
The phenomenological epoche, therefore, reveals to us not merely our conscious states (i.e., immanence sense one) but also it reveals that we are conscious of something, i.e., it shows that "The essence of consciousness, in which I live as my own self, is the so-called intentionality. Consciousness is always consciousness of something." By using what appeared to be the Cartesian method of doubt, Husserl seemed to lead us further and further inside of consciousness itself, which demanded the ambiguous position of our first step at explicating the full sense of phenomenological Immanence. Now, at the very heart of consciousness, we are shown that the essence of consciousness is intentionality, i.e., the essence of consciousness is to be outside of "itself". We now see that the apparent limitation to the sphere of the pure cogitationes is dispelled through the revealing of the intentionality of consciousness. Through this revelation, no longer is the epistemological critique a matter of beginning with consciousness and then by inference or deduction attempting to show how this consciousness, this "...little tag-end of the world," "reaches" the world and "knows" it. As John-Paul Sartre puts it:

Consciousness and the world are given at one stroke: essentially external to consciousness, the world is nevertheless essentially relative to consciousness. Husserl sees consciousness as an irreducible fact which no physical image can account for. Except perhaps the quick, obscure image of a burst. To know is to "burst toward", to tear oneself out of the moist
gastric intimacy, veering out there beyond oneself.

We see then that "...consciousness has no 'inside'. It is just this being beyond itself, this absolute flight, this refusal to be a substance which makes it consciousness". We must now carefully guard ourselves against viewing consciousness as something which "has" the "property" of intentionality. To reify consciousness in this manner is to deny its essential nature. We must now say, in the most literal sense, consciousness is intentionality.

The revealing of the intentionality of consciousness also has a correlative effect on how we now view objects of consciousness. We have been shown that any object must be an intentional object, i.e., an object as perceived, as known, as remembered etc. The naive supposition of the existence of an object independently of consciousness has been suspended. We now can no longer speak of the world simpliciter, but are lead to speak "only" of our consciousness of the world, i.e., the world as we are conscious of it, as it has a sense in consciousness.

We may now turn to our question "What is given in an analysis of pure consciousness?" We are not merely given "consciousness" in its manifold ways of grasping objects. The phenomenological reduction "...entails no limitation to the sphere of the cogitatio." Because of the revealing of the intentionality of consciousness, that
which is meant or intended by consciousness as something intended (i.e., as known, as perceived etc.) is also given. That is to say, the cogitatum qua cogitatum is also given "in" the act of consciousness. Therefore, for example, we are given, in phenomenological reflection on the act of consciousness called perception, not only perceiving (i.e., how the object is grasped) but also something perceived (i.e., what the perceptual object as such is). As Husserl tells us, "Each cogito, each consciousness process, we may...say, 'means' something or other, and bears in itself, in the manner peculiar to the meant its particular cogitatum." It is the objectivity of the meant qua meant which designates the cogitatum's transcendence of the momentary conscious process which intends it. So this "bearing of transcendence in itself" of the cogito is not indicative of a real (reellen) immanence of the transcendent object, nor of a real (reellen) transcendence of it, but an irreal or intentional transcendence. As Husserl puts it:

...the transcendence belonging to the real as such is a particular form of "idealism", or, better, of a psychic irreality: the irreality of something that itself, with all that belongs to it in its own essence, actually or possibly makes its appearance in the purely phenomenological sphere of consciousness, and yet, in such a manner that it is evidently no real part or moment of consciousness, no real psychic Datum.

It becomes more clear now that that which is given in consciousness need not be given as consciousness. We may
thereby may that the content of consciousness may be an ego-content of consciousness (where that of which we are conscious is part of the same stream of consciousness as that consciousness of it, e.g., perceiving as a mode of the cogito). We may also say that what is given may be a non-ego content of consciousness (where that of which we are conscious is given as other than consciousness itself, e.g., the perceived object as such as a cogitatum). We may now arrive at the possibility of clarifying our second sense of "transcendence", which, because it is equated with the givenness of the transcendent object, provides us with an extension of the field of phenomenological Immanence beyond the sphere of the cogitatio.

The transcendent object cannot be "that which is wholly outside of consciousness". This much is clear, for nothing wholly outside of consciousness (a Ding-an-sich) can mean anything in consciousness. We need to say that the transcendent object is somehow "in" consciousness, but we do not mean "in" in the sense of real (realen) immanence. "In" here means, in a sense, "within our grasp" or "given". That is "...the transcendent must needs be experienciable." Moreover, the transcendent object has a sense only in and for consciousness. It is consciousness and consciousness alone which constitutes the sense of the transcendent object.

This has four vitally important and decisive consequences for Husserlian phenomenology, which we can outline
briefly in this context:

1). First of all, we need to note that through the revealing of the intentionality of consciousness, we have seen that the transcendent object is what it is only for consciousness. This has an important consequence. As Husserl say, transcendental phenomenology:

...leaves no room for "metaphysical" substructurings of a being behind the being intentionally constituting itself in actual and possible achievements of consciousness...

This shows us that in Husserlian phenomenology, the whole reality of the object is "equated" with its sense in consciousness, for any notion of a "reality" outside of that sense is precisely nonsense. Such a reality beyond all possible givenness to consciousness (i.e., beyond the sphere of phenomenological Immanence) is and remains wholly unknown and unknowable. It is precisely this "equation" which makes rigorous Science possible, for a genuine Science is only possible if "reality" is equated with "that which is intelligible" or "that which makes sense". It may seem immediately spurious on the part of Husserl to defend this equation by simply saying "To speak of a reality outside of its sense in consciousness can make no sense". That is, it seems to immediately bias our possible questioning of Husserl's procedure by allowing him to ask us "What could one mean by a reality outside of a reality as intelligible?"

More of this difficulty in our CHAPTER FOUR below.
2). A second consequence of this revelation of the intentionality of consciousness is that the "equation" of the transcendent object with its meaning for consciousness entails that as a unity of meaning, the transcendent object necessarily displays an essence open to scientific investigation. It is this, also, that establishes the possibility of a rigorous scientific investigation of Being. This consequence as well will be delved into in our CHAPTER FOUR.

3). A third consequence of the revealing of the intentionality of consciousness, which follows from our point (2) above is that it shows us how to overcome a difficulty we face in our CHAPTER TWO. Therein we states that for a rigorous Science of Being to be established and maintained, it must remain within the parameters of that which is indubitably given. We went on to say that it seems that the dubitable givenness of transcendent objects must be completely disregarded by a rigorous Science of Being, for to accept such inadequate evidence would be to deny its Scientific character. Then we went on to ask, "Does it not seem, then, from these considerations, that all of Reality must be left wholly out of consideration by Husserl's phenomenology?" We now see that we must distinguish between the method of investigating an object and the method of clarifying the sense of an object. It is not Husserl's task to investigate parti-
cular objects of experience: this would demand that the evidence acquired by such an investigation remain forever inadequate, as necessitated by the mode of givenness of the transcendent object in question. Husserl is rather concerned with explicating the sense of an object as intended by consciousness. This "sense", as the Idea of perfect evidence or givenness is itself given with full clarity through phenomenological explication. This "sense" as Idea thereby becomes a "rule" for the adequation of evidence in our investigation of the object. As Husserl notes in the Ideas:

Where the dator intuition is of a transcending character, the objective factor cannot come to be adequately given; what can alone be given here is the Idea of such a factor, or of its meaning and "apistemological essence", and thereby an a priori rule for the well-ordered infinities of inadequate experiences.

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We may say then that our evidence for a transcendent object is necessarily inadequate; this entails that the investigation of objects does not move within the parameters of a rigorous Science of Being. However, the evidence for our consciousness of an object, i.e., the transcendent object considered qua intentional object is, as a "meaning" or "sense", grasped with full adequacy; this entails that the clarification of the sense of objects is the true domain of a rigorous Science. Thus, Reality is not left wholly out of consideration by Husserlian phenomenology. It is considered, rather from the "perspective" of phenomenological Immanence, i.e., from the
"perspective" of Reality as an intentional correlate of consciousness.

4). A fourth and final consequence of the revealing of the intentionality of consciousness is that this revelation necessitates for Husserl that his phenomenology take on the character of a transcendental idealism. If "what the object is" is equated with its "sense in consciousness", then the object is equated with that which is intelligible, that which is graspable through rational insight. Herein we grasp the "natural fulfillment of Husserl's quest for a rigorous Science.

G.B. Madison extends this by saying that:

"...the idea of an absolute science is the ultimate expression of the idealistic spirit. Idealism tends toward science as towards its natural fulfillment. Idealism postulates...the identity of the rational and the real. But if the rational is the real, then the real is the ideal. This is to say that in idealism, reality can be dealt with only under the aspect of meaning, which is to say that reality must be "idealized". This is in fact precisely what Husserl does."

We have said above that a self-consistent Scientific philosophy must be a philosophy of Immanence. We now see that a self-consistent Scientific philosophy must be an Idealism. This necessitates a further essential moment of our description of the nature of a philosophy of Immanence. Husserl's phenomenology, as a philosophy of Immanence, must be a transcendental Idealism.
We have seen that to find the sense of the transcendent object, we must call on our experience of the object, i.e., how it is intended or meant by consciousness. Posing the following question "Husserl seems to deal with objects for us, but what of objects in themselves?" is exposed as an absurdity, for this question can have a meaningful answer, this distinction can first be formulated at all, only in consciousness. That is to say, the distinction between objects as meant and objects which are meant is a manner of differentiating how the same object is viewed from two different perspectives, not a way of distinguishing between the object for us and the object in itself (which implies a phenomena/noumena distinction as in Kant).

One of these indicates the present, necessarily inadequate evidence about the object (objects as meant) while the other (objects which are meant) indicates the idea of the possible perfection of evidence with respect to the object. As Husserl tells us in the Cartesian Meditations:

The reference to harmonious infinities of further possible experience, starting from each world-experience -- where "actually existing object" can have sense only as a unity of meant and meanable in the nexus of consciousness, a unity that would be given itself in a perfect experiential evidence -- manifestly signifies that an actual object belonging to a world, or all the more so, the world itself, is an infinite idea, related to infinities of harmoniously combinable experiential evidence, a complete synthesis of possible experiences.

It is thus that the reality of the actually existing object is equated with the sense it has for consciousness (this
sense as intentional object, being equated with the idea of perfect givenness). Herein, the transcendence of the real object becomes an "irreal" or "intentional" transcendence rather than a real (realen) transcendence. It cannot be emphasized strongly enough that this procedure on the part of Husserl does not eliminate or dissolve the difference between objects as meant and objects which are meant. Neither does this realization of the "intentional transcendence" of real objects deny their transcendence. It merely defines their transcendence in a manner which avoids epistemological absurdities. In fact, one could say that Husserl's phenomenology is an defense of transcendency against a psychologistic interpretation which would leave us with self-contradictory "representational theories" of knowledge which demand, if they are carried to their logical conclusion, the denial of transcendency or its mere theoretical postulation.

It is in this context that we can see that the phrase "turn to subjectivity" with respect to Husserlian phenomenology is misleading, for it does not entail a turn to psychological subjectivity (with respect to which the question of how this experience can "contact" another part of the world, i.e., object, can be validly asked) , but rather a turn to transcendental experience, within which even psychological subjectivity and experience themselves are found given as a particular cogitatum of the particular mode
of the cogito commonly called *inner experience*. Phenomenology indicates, that is, a turn to *pure experience* (an experience "cleared" of all presupposed transcendencies, but not cleared of all transcendencies, for we find, in pure experience, *conitata*). This remains misleading only if we continue to consider (as is precisely natural to do) experience as a real part of nature and thereby do not realize that *psychological experience itself is an already constituted intentional objectivity*, which itself is given in transcendental experience. As Husserl states:

The decisive point in this confusion... is the confounding of the ego with the reality of the *I* as human psyche. One does not see that the psyche (*mero*) which is accepted as a reality already contains a sense-moment pertaining to externality (the spatial world) and that every externality... has its place from the very beginning in the pure internality of the ego — its place, namely, as an intentional pole of experience, which itself (with the whole stream of worldly experience and the existent that becomes harmoniously confirmed in worldly experience) belongs to the inside. ...

It is thus seen that psychological misrepresentations of the aims of phenomenology constitute the most overpowering stumbling block to the entrance into the transcendental problem-sphere, for it speaks of "subjectivity" and "experience" and thereby it can mislead us and turn us away from the realization of *transcendental-phenomenological subjectivity*. It is thus that Husserl states:

For (an understanding of) the true and genuine sense of transcendental philosophy it is decisively important to lay hold of the fact that human being, and not only human organism but also human psyche (no
matter how purely the human psyche may be apprehended by internal experience), are worldly concepts and, as worldly, apply only to objectivities of a transcendent apperception, which therefore are included, as constitutional problems, within the universal transcendental problem, the problem of the transcendental constitution of all transcendencies, may, all objectivities of whatever sort.

Saying that psychological experience involves a transcendent apperception says that psychological subjectivity is in fact an objectivity, i.e., a "special object" among others in the world. We need to learn, therefore, that consciousness-of-the-world is not an event in the world.

It is only from experience (now "seen" in its purity, devoid of transcendent apperception which would make it a worldly event) that we may learn of transcendency (including the transcendency inherent in the sense of psychological subjectivity, as a reality in the world); for only by the appearance of transcendency "in" experience can it have any sense for us. Husserl, in his Formal and Transcendental Logic, elaborates on this:

Experience is the performance in which for me, the experiencer, experienced being "is there" and is there as what it is, with the whole content and the mode of being that experience itself, by the performance going on in its intentionality, attributes to it. If what is experienced has the sense of "transcendent" being, then it is the experience that constitutes this sense, and does so either by itself or in the whole motivational nexus pertaining to it and helping make up its intentionality. If an experience is imperfect, if it makes the intrinsically existent object appear only one-sidedly, only in a distant perspective, or the like, then the experience itself as this current mode of consciousness, is that which, on being consulted, tells me so; it tells me: Here, in this consciousness, something is given as it itself;
but it is more than what is actually itself grasped; there is more of the same object to be experienced. Thus, the object is transcendent and also in that experience further tells me, it could have been an illusion, though it presented itself as actual and as itself seized upon.

It is thus that the intentionality of consciousness "allows" the intentional object, which is intended as being more than is actually given in the present moment, to appear. I see this coffee cup before me and I grasp it as being more than the present perspective which I am now experiencing. It thereby "goes beyond" or "transcends" the present actual experience by virtue of the intentionality of consciousness itself. Consciousness opens up a horizon of possible experiences which I can undergo in the investigation of this object, experiences which may fulfill the intention I have, or frustrate it, as the course of further experience alone will dictate.

We see now that:

Whatever I encounter as an existing object is something that has received its whole being-sense from me and from my effective intentionality; not a shadow of that sense remains excluded from my effective intentionality. Precisely this I must consult, I must explicate systematically if I intend to understand that sense and consequently to understand also what I am allowed and what I am not allowed to attribute to an object . . . .

This, however, can easily be misconstrued for it seems that the possibility of discovery, the possibility of error and the possibility of novelty have been wholly eliminated, and that the performance of the phenomenological reduction has left
us with a world emptied of the need for explication. This is an easy error to fall into with respect to Husserl's phenomenology. What is needed, in order to avoid this error, is a discussion of the notion of "Horizon" in Husserl's phenomenology. Before we begin this explication, let us summarize what we have learned from our study of Husserl thus far.

(B). Our Four Definitions and the Meaning of "Transcendence Within Immanence"

We are now in a position to recapitulate the four definitions we have arrived at and to understand their significance:

Real (real) transcendence: indicative of the fact that the object of experience is not contained as a real part of the real psychic immanence of consciousness. It is "outside of" (it transcends) the experience.

Real (real) immanence: the concrete content of the real psychic process with itself is a real event in the world. Psychological subjectivity.

Immanence: that which is given in consciousness. As we have seen, the first absolute data are pure cogitationes, but on examination of these, we discover, through the revealing of the intentionality of consciousness, that within the sphere of phenomenological immanence is found "irreal" or "intentional" transcendences.

Transcendence: in the phenomenological sense it is that which is given in consciousness but given as other than consciousness. The intentional object qua intentional.
We can now see what it is that Husserl means by the seemingly contradictory statement "transcendence within immanence". "Transcendence within immanence" does not mean that within consciousness as a real mental process something outside of that process is given. This will lead eventually to a Humean scepticism as to the possibility of knowledge. It also does not mean that within the sphere of givenness, something non-given is assumed as existent but unreachable by consciousness. This will lead to the self-contradictory difficulties of a Kantian supposition of a Ding-en-sich. "Transcendence within immanence" means, rather, that within the sphere of givenness, transcendencies are given and are given as other than consciousness itself.

By thus remaining within the realm of pure phenomena, we see that "The relating-itself-to-transcendent-things, whether it is meant in this or that way, is still a feature of the phenomena."

Therefore, when we come to interpret the natural sense of transcendence (now seen from the viewpoint of phenomenological Immanence as a constituted objectivity) and immanence (seen now as a constituted psychological subjectivity) we see that they do not parallel given and not given, but are rather distinguished within givenness. That is to say, they are distinguished in so far as how they are given. The question as to whether or not transcendency is given is exposed as an absurdity through the revealing of
the intentionality of consciousness. Now we can see how it is possible even to speak of an "immanence within Immanence" (referring not to the reality of psychological subjectivity, but to the givenness of psychological subjectivity as real) as well as a "transcendence within Immanence" (referring not to the reality of objects but rather to the givenness of objects as real). It cannot be emphasized often enough that now, from the viewpoint of phenomenological Immanence, this distinction is not dissolved. The reality of psychological subjectivity and the reality of objects is not denied. They have merely been "purged" of a self-contradictory interpretation arising out of our natural attitude (i.e., our inherent tendency to presuppose the world as existent and to interpret the nature of consciousness and the nature of reality on the basis of this attitude).

Now we can see also that Husserl has moved beyond (and subsequently encompassed) any sphere of a possible mundane epistemological problematic concerning the "relation" of real psychological subjectivity to real transcendence.

As Fink notes:

Carrying out the epoche moves the phenomenological problematic out of the range of the apparent problem concerning the relation of psychical immanence and transcendence into the acceptance-relation between the world in its totality (and hence, both immanence and transcendence) and transcendental subjectivity.

As we shall see in more detail below, this is the precise point at which we can validly speak of phenomenology as being
concerned, not with merely tracing the conditions for the possibility of knowledge of the world back to a subject which is itself seen as part of the world, as could be attempted by a psychologistic epistemology. Nor is Husserl concerned, as is Kant, with tracing the world back to its "source" in the world-form (i.e., the categories). This as well stands as a mundane attempt, for the world-form is itself the form of the world and is thereby part of the world. Rather, phenomenology is concerned after the origin of the world itself including, with reference to a psychologistic epistemology, both psychic immanence and transcendence and including, with reference to Neo-Kantianism, both the world-form and that which is formed by the world-form (i.e., sensible intuition).

(C). The Phenomenological Notion of Horizon

Introduction

Through the revealing of the intentionality of consciousness, shown to us through the performance of the phenomenological reduction, we are left with a world "reduced" to its sense in consciousness. We must, however, not be misled by this revelation. This does not entail that the world now becomes one devoid of the need for explication and clarification or that phenomenological descriptions are devoid
of the possibility of novelty or error. We need to recall a passage cited above from Husserl's *Crisis of European Sciences*:

... by carrying out the epoché the phenomenologist by no means straightway commands a horizon of obviously possible new projects; a transcendental field of work does not immediately spread before him, performed in a set of obvious types...  

To fully understand this, we need to come to see how it is the the phenomenological notion of horizon figures as absolutely decisive in an understanding of the unique character of Husserlian phenomenology. As Husserl tells us in the *Cartesian Meditations*:

The horizon structure belonging to every experience intentionality... prescribes for phenomenological analysis and descriptions methods of a totally new kind, which come into action whenever consciousness and object, wherever intentionality and sense, real and ideal, actuality, possibility, necessity, illusion, truth, and on the other hand, experience, judgement, evidence and so forth present themselves as names for transcendental problems.

In order to bring this highly flexible concept of horizon into view, we need to clarify many notions of which we have already spoken. Since the phenomenological notion of horizon bears in itself so many possible applications and ramifications, many different approaches to this notion are required to bring out its full sense and its many "levels" of operation.
It seems that to begin with we must, as in all phenomenological investigations, re-cover some of the areas of which we have already spoken.

We have seen that the belief in the independent existence of the world provides the universal "presupposition" or "horizon" of all explicit acts in the natural attitude. "Horizon" in this initial sense is used to mean that all acts of the natural attitude fall "within" this inexplicit attitude and are "encompassed by it". Husserl expands on this notion in an extended passage from his *Experience and Judgement* wherein he tells us that:

It is this universal ground of belief in a world which all praxis presupposes, not only the praxis of life, but also the theoretical praxis of cognition. The being of the world in totality is that which is not first the result of an activity of judgement but which forms the presupposition of all judgement. Consciousness of the world is consciousness in the mode of certainty of belief; it is not acquired by a specific act which breaks into the continuity of life as an act which posits being or grasps the existent or even as an act of judgement which predicates existence. All of these acts already presuppose consciousness of the world in the certainty of belief. If I grasp in its particularity some object or other, in my field of perception, for example, in looking at the book resting on the table, then I grasp something which for me is an existent, something which, as already existing in advance was already "there" in my study, even though my attention was not yet directed toward it. In exactly the same way, this entire study, which now has entered my field of perception, with all its objects which perception throws into relief, was already there for me, together with the side of the room which is not in view; it was already there with its familiar things, imbued with the sense "room in my house", the later being on the familiar street, the street in my town, and so on.
Thus, all existents which affect us do so on the ground of the world; they give themselves to us as existent presumed as such, and the activity of cognition, of judgement, aims at examining whether they are truly such as they give themselves to be, as they are presumed in advance to be; whether they are truly of such and such a nature. The world as the existent world is the universal passive pregivenness of all judicative activity.

This then re-defines the nature of the natural attitude for us. It is precisely this implicit basis of all judicative activity relating to particular objects which defines the mundaneity of these objects. That is to say, all objects reveal themselves as objects in the world, by revealing themselves as "believed in" or "attended to" as being some object always within the inexplicit universal world-belief. And it is precisely this world-belief that is "put into question" by the phenomenological reduction. Thus, when we come to investigate a particular object, we must always view it in this and with respect to this "horizon" within which it occurs and which defines its very sense, its very being as an object in the world.

This questioning leads us into a paradoxical situation. Our most common and natural orientation towards the world is one which is directed towards particular objects in that world. Husserl notes that "The world as a whole is always already pregiven in passive certitude, and the orientation of cognition towards a particular existent is genetically more primordial than towards the world as a whole."
We are thus lead, as we have already pointed out, to a realm of unfamiliarity through the putting into question of this universal world-belief. Yet, in a sense, we could say that the phenomenological reduction leads us to that which is most primordial, to that which, although we ignore it in the natural attitude, is "closest to us" our "... hidden positing of the world and this bond to being".

We are lead to our most intimate bond to being, to the Protodoxic positing of the world as existent. Therefore, although the positing of and attending to particular objects is most genetically primordial and is in this sense "prior" to the orientation to the world as a whole, we could say that the explication of world-belief itself carries with it its own sense of ontological priority (in the sense that it is the occurrence of objects within the world-belief horizon that defines their very being as objects in the world); we can say, oddly enough, that this world-belief has its own sense of that which is most familiar, although it is radically unnatural and unrevealed "proximally and for the most part".

We must now extend our re-investigation of this universal world-belief in a new direction. The following passage from Husserl's Experience and Judgment will serve as a focal point for the unfolding of the phenomenological notion of horizon and for showing its centrality to Husserl's phenomenology. Herein, Husserl states that:
A cognition function bearing on individual objects of experience is never carried out as if these objects were pregiven at first as from a still completely undetermined substrate. For us, the world is always a world in which cognition in the most diverse ways has already done its work. Thus it is not open to doubt that there is no experience in the simple and primary sense of an experience of things, which, grasping a thing for the first time and bringing cognition to bear on it, does not already "know" more about the thing than is in this cognition alone. Every act of experience, whatever it may be that is experienced, in the proper sense as it comes into view has, so 'inso, necessarily, a knowledge and a potential knowledge (Mitwissen) having reference to precisely this thing, namely, to something of it which has not yet come into view. This preknowledge (Vorwissen) is indeterminate as to content, or not completely determined, but it is never completely empty, and were it not already manifest, the experience would not at all be the experience of this one particular thing. Every experience has its own horizon.

One initial point that needs to be clarified is that terms such as "bestowal of meaning" or "dispensing of meaning" with respect to the activity of consciousness are desperately misleading. We are immediately inclined to ask "What is it that 'receives' this meaning?" or "What does consciousness 'give' this meaning to?" It is this direction of thought that drove Husserl to the highly ambiguous doctrine of hyle in his Ideas.

We must beware of this direction of thought by realizing its pedagogical nature in the Ideas. We can see that the distinction between hyle and morphs which Husserl made in the Ideas is already a highly complex theoretical accomplishment. We must, however, examine more closely what it is that is grasped through transcendental reflection. First
of all, it needs to be noted that reflection is not the experiential accomplishment of a cognitive contact with the world. Neither is it such that it has before its gaze a meaningless "world" and a meaning-giving consciousness whose accomplishments of "contact" (a contact which "forms" the hyle) "gives" or "imposes" meaning on an otherwise chaotic "sense given manifold" or as Husserl calls it a "...still completely undetermined substrate". This line of thought is to take the activity of consciousness as a determination which somehow "creates" the meaningful out of the meaningless, a meaningless substrate which we must presuppose as already "there" before this conscious determination occurs. Therewith:

...transcendental idealism...is not a psychological idealism, and most certainly not such an idealism as sensualistic psychology proposes, an idealism that would derive a sensible world from senseless sensuous data.

To speak in this manner is to thoroughly ignore the decisive insight of the intentionality of consciousness. It is as erroneous as the supposition of a Ding-an-sich to which consciousness need attempt to accomplish a relationship, an attempt which leads to highly ambiguous representational theories of knowledge, wherein the idea of a representation representing something other than itself (the Ding-an-sich, from which we are subsequently "cut off" since we "receive" only its "representatives") occurs only through the presupposing of the thing in itself in the first place. Therewith
transcendental idealism is not:

...a Kantian Idealism which believes it can keep open, at least as a limiting concept, the possibility of a world of things-in-themselves.

We must come to see that transcendental reflection grasps a world in which consciousness has, so to speak, "already done its work". As Fink puts it "The phenomenological reduction first exposes a subject which already accepts the world..." It does not encounter a subject isolated from the world who must now deduce or infer a relationship to the world or remain in a solipsistic enclosure. To remain true to the insight of the intentionality of consciousness, we need to see that transcendental reflection does not have before its gaze simply consciousness (as psychological reflection would have) but consciousness of the world (or phenomenological Immanence, which includes in its scope the givenness of the concitatum). When the true nature of consciousness is thus realized, inference or deduction of the existence of the world, or any philosophy which finds its necessary in any way to prove that the world exists are proved absurdities.

The task of phenomenology, then, is to explicate or "unfold" what could be called the intentional pre-accomplishments involved in the phenomenological-descriptive analysis of a particular object. We can see then that:
Except for the fact that it remains undisclosed and "anonymous", the system of intentional achievements on the basis of which an object comes to actual givenness is at work in any simple act of knowledge. The analysis of such knowledge first presents us to encounter the bewildering fullness of those intentional bestowals of meaning that make up the "presupposition" for the direct givenness of the being which is known. In other words, intentional analysis... is an exhibiting of the "conditions for the possibility" of the givenness of an object in experience.

Hence, phenomenological-intentional analysis does not, by means of the reduction, have for itself a clear and explicit set of intentional achievements, but rather it has the implicit and as yet "indeterminate" "having of a world" which, as "already accomplished" needs unfolding and clarification. The implicit universal world-belief, as the ultimate horizon or presupposition of all sense-structures founded upon it, becomes the central thematic for phenomenological descriptions. From this extension of the task, we can easily account for the emergence of the phenomenological notion of Lebenswelt and its increasing centrality in Husserl's later works.

This section of our work, we feel, rather than being a mere repetition, has served to re-focus our attention on the explicit problems at hand. From this realization of Verwissen and the subsequent realization of reflective description as a task to be accomplished, we may unfold the multiple senses and uses of the notion of "horizon" in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl.
Through the performance of the phenomenological reduction, the task of phenomenological description immediately becomes a dual one: a description of the noematic content or the object as meant and a description of the noetic multiplicities or modes of consciousness "in" which this objectivity appears as intentionally Immanent. Husserl tells us that these two modes "... can be characterized descriptively as belonging together inseparably." This inseparability must be kept in mind due to the fact that we need to describe them separately, but we should not be mislead by this necessity.

The phenomenological notion of horizon is intimately involved in noematic descriptions. We begin, as Husserl tells us in his *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, with a "presupposed sense" or "implicit meaning" which is "vaguely floating before us". By beginning with this implicit, unclarified sense, we attempt to fill out and bring to light its implications and co-determinations. As we have seen, because of the intentionality of consciousness, the "intuitive sense", so to speak, "goes beyond" what is actually given. Yet this "going beyond" is not a random one. We see that every object is given in an indeterminate but determinable "horizon" which can be unfolded by sense-investigations or sense-explications as Husserl calls
them. In fact, this proves to be the very definition of phenomenology itself: phenomenology "...is a radically conceived original sense-explication."

Husserl, in the Cartesian Meditations, tells us that:

The horizons are "predelinated" potentialities. We say also: we can ask any horizon what "lies in it", we can explicate or unfold it. ... He goes on to say that:

Precisely thereby we uncover the objective sense meant implicitly in the actual cogito, though never with more than a certain degree of foreshadowing. This sense, the cogitatum and cogitatum is never present to actual consciousness, ...as a finished datum: it becomes "clarified" only through the explication of the given horizon and the new horizons continuously awakened. ... This predelination itself, to be sure, is at all times imperfect; yet, with its indeterminateness, it has a determinate structure.

By thus explicating the "intuitive sense" or "intentional implicates" involved in any particular cogitatum, we enter into the determining horizon of sense within which the objectivity appears, with the goal of making determinate those implicates. This explication of the noematic content of any particular intentional object takes two interconnected directions.

We may begin with a particular object and move from this to the external horizon within which it appears and which, by virtue of its appearance within this horizon, determines the particular sense of the object. We may use as
an example a pawn in a chess game. The board, the rules of
the game, the other men on the board and so on, all co-
determine the meaning of this piece in the horizon within
which it occurs. Its abstraction from this context makes
it lose its meaning as a pawn. To use another example
more relevant to our present discussion, we may say
that a psychological description of self-experience is co-
determined in its sense by its implicit reference to the
organism and its subsequent determination of psychological
subjectivity as something worldly. We see that this
"intentional implicate" "...does not enter expressly
into the conceptual content of the judging" but does have
"...its determining effect on the sense...", implied
whenever we speak of psychological subjectivity. Judgements
about psychological subjectivity must thereby always be
placed within this implicit context or "horizon", for with-
out it, psychological subjectivity loses its sense. Since
psychology presupposes this context, it is the task of pheno-
menology to explicate it in order to find the presupposed
foundations of psychology.

Each "truth" about an object, then, is such only
in the horizon within which it occurs. Through this realization,
we avoid the false absolutization of one particular mode of
Being or one particular method of investigation. Husserl
expands on this in his Formal and Transcendental Logic:
The trader in the market has his market-truth. In the relationship in which it stands, is his truth not a good one, and the best that a trader can use? Is it a pseudo-truth, merely because the scientist, involved in a different relativity and judging with other aims and ideas, looks for other truths -- with which a great many more things can be done, but not the one thing that has to be done in a market? It is high time that people got over being dazzled, particularly in philosophy and logic, by the ideal and regulative ideas and methods of the "exact" sciences -- as though the In-itself of such sciences were a usually an absolute norm for objective being and for truth. Actually, they do not see the woods for the trees. Because of a splendid cognitive performance, though only with a very restricted teleological sense, they overlook the infinitudes of life and its cognition, the infinitudes of relative and, only in its relativity, rational being, with its relative truth.

Although we may be accused, in saying this, of insinuation of the future, it is precisely the desire to avoid this confusion of horizons of truth which serves implicitly as the impetus for Husserl's Logical Investigations and his critique of psychologism. Psychologism's inability to realize the nature of logical objectivity is based on its inability to realize the fundamental and essential difference between logic and psychology. The subsequent "confusion of fields" is based on psychologism's blindness to the horizon within which logical objectivities need to be investigated and the false "absolutization" (or, at the very least "over-extension") of the psychological method into a region of Being with which, by its very nature, it is incapable of dealing.

In short, we may say generally that sciences of the natural sort are unaware of the regional character of their respective objects of investigation. It is because of this
"positivity" that the sciences are unable to serve as a foundation for philosophy. Husserl expands on this in the following passage:

The unphilosophical character of this positivity consists precisely in this: The sciences, because they do not understand their own productions as those of a productive intentionality (this intentionality remaining unthematic for them), are unable to clarify the genuine being-sense of either their provinces or the concepts that comprehend their provinces; thus they are unable to say (in a true and ultimate sense) what sense belongs to the existent of which they speak or what sense-horizons that existent presupposes—horizons of which they do not speak, but which are nevertheless co-determinant of its sense.

From this it follows that:

All wrong interpretations of being come from naive blindness to the horizons that join in determining the sense of being, and to the corresponding tasks of uncovering implicit intentionality.

The definitive result of the phenomenological reduction is the realization of the intentionality of consciousness. It is thus that this method, which gives rise to explicit intentional-horizon analyses, is able to accomplish a searching out of the foundations of the sciences by making explicit the productive intentionality involved in their respective activities. Thus the notion of horizon is fundamental to phenomenology. We must remember that in phenomenological descriptions, we must remain true to the pure phenomena as they gives themselves to us. In particular, to use yet another example, we must remember that when speaking of say visual perception, we must not move to another type of investigation (e.g. physical science) and another type of noematic content.
(e.g. atoms and light waves, which are theoretical objects and not visually perceived objects as is the noema of visual perception) in order to explain visual perception. Visual perception must be phenomenologically described on its own account, which is to say, visual perception and its noematic content must be placed within its horizon and the truth relative to this horizon must be sought. To allow physical science (which has its own truth and its own horizon, its own form of objectivity, its own mode of evidence) to intervene and posit its findings as the truth of visual perception is as misleading and philosophically incorrect as allowing visual perception to confirm or disconfirm the atomic theory of light-waves.

We may also move, in noematic descriptions, from this particular object to an internal horizon of sense co-determination. We are now involved in "anticipations of determination" which pertain directly to the particular object in question. In looking at this coffee cup, for example, I do not "actually see" the bottom of it or the back of it; I am not "actually given" or do not "actually experience" its determinable volume and so on. These aspects "go beyond" what is "actually given" into that which can actually be given if I investigate the object further. These aspects are prescribed in the intuitive sense of a "coffee cup". They are thereby "given" in a sense-explication of this intuitive sense. We may also discover new aspects of the intentional object in
question, which will serve as an "enrichment of meaning" and an extension of the sense of the object investigated. The essentially inadequate givenness of a transcendent object, then, "...contains within itself a rule for the ideal possibility of its perfection". The addition of new sense-moments, then, has a "focus" in that the arrival of new meaning is entertained within the unity of meaning which is the intentional object. From this, we can follow Husserl when he tells us that:

...with everything actually given horizons are awakened; thus, if I see the front of a motionless thing-like object, I am conscious, within the horizon, of the back of the object, which I do not see. The tendency which aims at the object then is directed toward making it equally accessible from the other side. It is only with this enrichment of the given, with the penetration into particularities and the being given "from all sides" that the tendency passes from the initial mode of aiming at something into the mode of attainment, a mode which has its own different degrees.

Saying that I see a coffee cup before me is already saying that it has a back side and a bottom. I may, I am able, to fulfill this part of the intensive sense of "coffee cup" by investigating the object further. Further as yet not "actually given" noematic moments of this object are thus co-intended along with what is actually given. The particular aspect which is "actually given" (the front of this cup) shows itself as the front of this cup only within the horizon within which it occurs (i.e., within the horizon of the intensive sense "coffee cup").
The notion of horizon is absolutely decisive for a clear understanding of the phenomenological procedure in noematic descriptions. It allows for the possibility of novelty and discovery as well as the possibility of error, since the bewildering fullness of intentional horizons involved in any particular sense-investigation may easily lead us astray and may thereby necessitate new and more radical investigations. Since, therefore "...the original clarification means shaping the sense anew, not merely filling in a deliniation that is already determinate and structurally articulated beforehand", the realization of the phenomenological notion of horizon and how it follows from the realization of the intentionality of consciousness necessitates that transcendental reflection be a task to be accomplished.

The phenomenological notion of horizon is also intimately involved in noetic descriptions. Husserl tells us in his Cartesian Meditations that:

The phenomenologist, ...does not inquire with merely a naive devotedness to the intentional object purely as such; he does not consider the intentional object only straightforwardly and explicate its meant features its meant parts and properties. If that were all he did, the intentionality, which makes up the intuitive or non-intuitive consciousness itself and the explicative considering, would remain "anonymous".

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Rather:

When the phenomenologist explores everything objective and whatever can be found in it, exclusively as a "correlate of consciousness", he does not consider and describe it only straightforwardly and only as somehow re-
lated back to the corresponding Ego and the ego cogito of which it is the cogitatum. Rather, with his reflective regard, he penetrates the anonymous "cognitive" life, he uncovers the definite synthetic courses of the manifold modes of consciousness and, further back, the modes of Ego-comportment which make understandable the objective affair's simple meantness for the Ego.

This is to say that the intentional object functions as a transcendental clue for the discovery of noetic multiplicities implied by its appearance in consciousness. We do not merely explicate what it is that appears (the cogitatum or intentional object as such), but also we are concerned with how it appears (the modes and synthetic processes of the cogito which are correlative to such an appearance). Herein the notion of horizon once again functions in two distinguishable directions, correlative to the duality in noematic descriptions indicated above.

By beginning with a particular object, we discover what could be called an external horizon of possible experiences implied by the present experience. We move from the present experience of this coffee cup to the table it rests on and so forth. Each experience of an object in this way "goes beyond" the present "actual" experience into an indeterminate horizon of further possible experiences, extending out beyond the experience of this particular thing eventually to the ultimate horizon of experience of the world. Each experience, then, is found within a horizon of an "already apprehended depth or fringe of indeterminate
This refers not only to further objects which may be apprehended, but, correlative (and necessarily, due to the intentionality of consciousness) to further experiences which may be undergone. With reference to the present "actual" experience, we may say that:

As intentional, it reaches out beyond the isolated subjective processes that are to be analyzed, by explicating their correlative horizons, it brings the highly diverse anonymous processes into the field comprising those that function "constitutively" in relation to the objective sense of the cogitatum in question -- that is to say: not only the actual but also the potential subjective processes, which, as such, are "implicit" and "predelimited" in the sense-producing intentionality of the actual ones, and which, when discovered, have the evident character of processes that explicate the implicit sense.

Although it remains difficult to discuss this notion in isolation, we see that the notion of horizon leads to an extension of the task of noetic descriptions beyond the express experience of, for example, this coffee cup, to the implicit experiencing of it as "on the table", "in the room" eventually to the implicit experiencing of it as a worldly object. That is to say, horizontal-intentional analysis with respect to noetic description is an "...uncovering of the potentialities implicit in the actualities of consciousness...". We are lead, in this way, not only beyond this thing to other things which determine its sense, but we are also lead beyond this actual experience (of this thing) to potential experiences (of other things) necessarily implied in the present experience. We may conclude then that correlative to the ultimate horizon of noematic descrip-
tion (the world in totality or the Lebenswelt) we have an ultimate horizon of noetic description (the Protodoxa or universal world-belief).

By beginning with a particular actual experience, we also discover what could be called an internal horizon of possible experiences of the same thing. When I look at this coffee cup, we say in noematic descriptions of the intuitive sense involved that I am "given" the back which I do not presently see. Having a back, a bottom, a determinable volume and so on all belong to the "intuitive" sense of this object as meant by calling it a coffee cup.

We must now realize that the intentional-horizon analysis indicates the dual task of describing not merely further noematic moments of the object, but also further potential experiences and their constituting syntheses which I am able to undergo in order to be given such noetic moments, not merely as emptily intented, but as fully given in intuition. These "potentialities" or "possibilities" of experience, therefore, are not empty of content or mere logical possibilities, but are rather "...intentionally predelimited in respect of content..." and in addition, having the character of possibilities actualizable by the Ego." Implicit in the sense of a coffee cup, is that it has a bottom, a backside, a determinable volume etc. Implicit in this sense, also, is a transcendental clue to possible experiences that I can undergo in investigating this
object. I can turn it over and see the bottom, although I
do not presently see it. I can measure its volume with a
particular degree of accuracy and so on. Each noematic
moment of the object's sense-horizon in this way points
to or indicates a possible or potential experience which
can bring this co-intended moment to givenness. Each sense-

horizon (unfolded in noematic description) has what could
be called a correlative experience-horizon (unfolded in
noetic description).

We can see now that in phenomenology, noetic-noematic
description is not merely a "reading off" of an already
explicit sense-structure. Neither is it deduction from
experience which demands that experience "conform" to pre-
established methods or procedures. It is, rather a sense-
xplication or unfolding of the implicit horizons of world-
consciousness. It therewith extends itself into all areas
of conscious life. In phenomenological descriptions of
consciousness, we need to focus on its multiple modes, e.g.,
perception, memory, imagination and so on, with an eye to
descriptive analyses of their noetic (the act of percep-
tion, the act of remembering, the act of imagining) and
noematic (the perceived as such, the remembered as such,
the imagined as such) constituents and their a priori
correlations. We are also lead to the task of differentia-
ting different levels of constitution involved in complex
acts of consciousness (e.g., aesthetic consciousness, ethical
consciousness). Also we are involved in descriptive analyses
of the "founding" of certain acts (e.g. predicative judgement) on other more primordial acts (e.g. perception). The multiple modalities of consciousness also require explication; here again we are face with a dual task of explicating noetic (certainty, possibility, probability) as well as noematic (certain being, possible being, probable being) correlations. When investigating noetic syntheses, we also become involved in a discussion of the nature of time and thereby retentional and protentional consciousness. The realization of the intentionality of consciousness and its horizontal nature leads us into all the constitutive moments of conscious life and correlative to this, we find, in phenomenological analyses, every moment of Reality which was seemingly lost in the process of methodical doubt.

We can see now that phenomenological descriptions of the noetic-noematic structures of consciousness are indesponsibly linked to the notion of horizon. It has lead us to see the significance of our discussion in CHAPTER ONE of the nature of phenomenology as an infinite task. It is this notion which serves to differentiate phenomenology from an Idealism whose quest for knowledge could be consummated in an all-embracing, finished "system" of Absolute Knowledge. The realization of the horizontal nature of truth (for each "truth" about an object is such only within some horizon) indicates that the "having of truth" is not the mere end point of some infinite task which can never in
practice be attained. Rather:

...we have continuously anew the **living** truth from
the living source which is our **absolute** life, and from
the self-examination turned toward that life, in the
**constant spirit of self-responsibility**. We have truth
then, not falsely absolutilized, but rather in each case
as within its **horizons** -- which do not remain over-
looked or veiled from sight, but are systematically
explicated.

To **pursue** the unfolding of these ever-extending horizons
by systematic Scientific explication is then to **live in the**
truth and thereby **have the truth** in its essentially horizon-
al nature. This leads us straightway to two very important
points regarding Husserlian phenomenology and its position
regarding the nature of truth and its relation to man.
We see that (1). The truth is not that which has to be **attained** and (2). Phenomenology shows us that truth is
both **relative** and **absolute**. These conclusions can by no
means be dealt with in detail, so let us merely roughly
outline what is involved in them.

(1). To expand on the notion of the attainment of truth,
we see that Martin Heidegger, in his major early work,
*Being and Time* extends the notion of **living in the truth**
(i.e., Being-in-the-truth) in an interesting manner.
He states:

'We' presuppose the truth because 'we' being the kind
of Being which Dasein possesses, are 'in the truth'.
We do not presuppose it as something 'outside' us and
'above' us, towards which, along with other "values",
we comport ourselves. It is not we who presuppose
'truth'; but it is **truth** that makes it at all possi-
ible ontologically for us to be able to be such that we "presuppose" anything at all. Truth is what first makes possible anything like presupposing.

Let us see how this passage from Heidegger sheds light on the phenomenology of Husserl.

Husserl tells us in the Cartesian Meditations that "...as an Ego in the natural attitude, I am likewise and at all times a transcendental Ego". This tells us that in spite of our ignorance of our true nature as transcendental Ego's in the natural attitude, that Ego "is there" and is functioning inconstituting the world. In the natural attitude, we have as our thematic sphere of possible investigation the world. We take for granted that there is a world (which is precisely natural to do) and then proceed on the basis of this presupposition with our theoretical and practical vocations. Husserl would say then that only because of the concealed intentional functionings of the transcendental Ego is there a world which can be "presupposed" (by ignoring these transcendental functions and taking the world to be there "without question") by we, living in the natural attitude.

This can be expanded in two directions. We could say first of all that we in the natural attitude presuppose the truth in that we presuppose consciousness-of-the-world (which for Husserl is the seat of evidence and truth) to the extent that this consciousness-of-the-world is overlooked in favour of the world as such, now naively believed
to exist independently of our consciousness of it. This is precisely the general thesis of the natural attitude. We can also say secondly that it is truth (consciousness-of-the-world) which makes presupposing possible (i.e., presupposing that there is a world). In the end, we can say that truth makes presupposing possible precisely because we presuppose the truth.

With regard to the notion of attaining the truth, we may say the following. If, while remaining in the natural attitude, we attempt to find the world-ground that is, if we proceed with a mundane philosophical enterprise, since it is taken for granted that the thematic sphere of possible knowledge is the world (which is precisely the definition of the mundaneity of this procedure) the world-origin must be speculatively postulated as transcendent to the world. The truth, then is taken to be "outside" us or "above" us, in short, outside of the world. We need, then, in philosophical enterprises, to attain the truth, to accomplish a relation to it.

By exposing this presupposition of mundane philosophy (i.e., that there is a world and that the world is the thematic sphere of all possible knowledge) phenomenology also exposes the source of the necessity of mundane philosophy proceeding with and being limited to a speculative (as opposed to Scientific) postulation (as opposed to intuitive givenness) of the transcendent world-origin (e.g. God, things-in-themselves, infinite substances etc.).
This exposition, accomplished through the phenomenological reduction, shows us that for phenomenology "In place of a transcendent relation between man and the world-ground, we must posit a transcendental relation." 257

For phenomenology, man lives in the truth (man lives, that is, in a consciousness-of-the-world) but that truth remains concealed, for as men, we are constantly turned towards the world, and not towards that consciousness-of-the-world. Herein, truth is not speculatively postulated. Neither is truth transcendent to man, a transcendent to which he must attain a relationship. Rather, truth is transcendental to man and as such is "already attained" but remaining for the most part concealed and presupposed by man in his dealings which are exclusively directed towards the world. The truth must now be recovered rather than attained. The method of this recovery is the phenomenological reduction.

(2). Phenomenology shows us that truth is both relative and absolute. We may expand on this as follows.

Every truth about an object is necessarily a "relative truth", that is, a truth relative to a particular horizon. This realization prevents the dogmatic absolutization of one particular sphere of truth and one particular type of investigation.
However, every truth about our consciousness of an object is an "absolute truth", that is, a truth which is not itself relative to a horizon -- for in speaking of our consciousness of an object, the horizon is herein already implied.

Let us use our example of a pawn in a chess game to illustrate this. When one comes to realize that the intuitive sense "pawn" necessarily occurs within the horizon of a chess game, one can then not say that this pawn is in reality a piece of wood composed of various atoms and that calling it a pawn is merely "subjective" and in no sense "objectively true". Within the horizon of the chess game, this piece is a pawn. Within the horizon of "chemical analysis" this piece is a collection of atoms. In this way, every truth about the object is relative to its horizon of sense-determination. We cannot ask, therefore, "What is the object in-itself, independent of any horizon?" for this essentially asks "What is the object wholly and completely independent of our consciousness of it?" As we have shown, this question is for Husserl pure nonsense, for it asks for what the object is while at the same time denying it any relation to the possible sphere of meaning (consciousness). Yet, in line with Husserl, we may say that the pawn in the game is absolutely a pawn, with such and such moves etc. Hence, statements about our consciousness of an object (i.e., statements about objects
within their respective horizons) can claim to absolute validity. The horizons of truth in this way are absolutized. Hence, our statements about the game of chess, our statements about the procedure of chemical analysis, are non-relative, for we may say in truth and beyond doubt what the rules of chess are (the rules, as part of the horizon, which determine the sense of a pawn) and what the procedure of chemical analysis is. This horizon, so to speak, becomes in this way a "norm" for judging the sense of an object considered under those norms.

Here we must note in passing a major difficulty which blocks us from fully accepting and understanding this part of Husserl. We tend quite naturally to say that what is "there" is one object and calling it a pawn or a piece of wood are merely two ways of speaking about the same thing. This, of course, is a resurgence of the natural attitude and a resurgence of the distinction between objects as meant and objects which are meant. However, if we pursue this path, we will eventually ask "What is the object itself, that thing which is seen in two different ways?" We can thus be lead to a form of scepticism by saying that we can never reach the thing itself, for we always see it from some viewpoint. We can be lead further to say that the object is not really a pawn, nor is it really a composition of atoms (for we still presuppose that "to be really" means to be such and such a way independent of all consciousness). We are only lead
this way if we continue to presuppose the general thesis of the natural attitude which tells us that the object is there as it is independently of all consciousness. By suspending this belief, we do not forfeit the possibility of attaining absolute truth. It seems as if this must be forfeited for we seem to not be able to contact the thing in itself. Once this belief is suspended, we no longer look to objects for absolute truth, for the truth of objects is only relative. We look, as Husserl has shown us, to consciousness itself which carries in itself the possibility of absolute insight into our consciousness of objects.

To conclude, we may say that since Husserl characterizes man essentially as a Being-toward-truth, phenomenological activity takes on the character of an ethical self-responsibility, for in pursuing the horizons of truth, we are manifesting our true nature. For Husserl, as we have said above, philosophy becomes not merely an intellectual vocation but an ethical demand for self-discovery.

(3). Activity and Passivity

We seem to be left, now, with a view of phenomenological descriptions which goes as follows: by beginning with a particular intentional object as a "transcendental clue", we search out the pre-accomplished and implicit
noetic-noematic multiplicities involved in the constitution of this object. We begin with a passively pregiven world with "sedimented layers of sense" with need explanation. This view of the passive pregivenness of the world (and the view of already accomplished noetic phases) needs to be pushed another step, which will lead us to the transcendental Ego and its active constitution of the world.

Husserl, in his Experience and Judgement tells us that this step involves a:

By means of this additional step, we finally move from the view of "ourselves" as psychological subjects to the first glimpse of transcendental subjectivity in the full sense. We now see also the danger of psychology in the realization of our true nature. As Fink notes: "... the intramundane psychical life is in fact none other than the transcendental world-preceding life, but is such in being concealed from itself in a form of constitutedness."

And as Husserl states in his Experience and Judgement:
We then understand ourselves, **not as subjectivity which finds itself in a world ready-made, as in simple psychological reflection, but as subjectivity bearing within itself, and achieving, all of the possible operations to which this world owes its becoming.** In other words, we understand ourselves in this revaluation of intentional implications, in the interrogation of the origin of the sedimentations of sense from intentional operations, as **transcendental subjectivity.**

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So now we realize that the passive pre-givenness of the world must be traced back to its **active constitutional source:** the absolute life of the transcendental Ego.

We have been lead by our analytic description of the field of phenomenological Immanence to an uncovering of the multiple moments involved in such descriptions. It is now our concern to speak of this field of Immanence in a "synthetic" manner, under the title of **transcendental subjectivity.** This will expose a certain "falsity" in our previous exposition of the noetic-noematic structures of pure consciousness, beginning as we did with passive pre-givenness. Be that as it may, let us now see how Husserl speaks of the transcendental Ego.
A Synthetically Description of the Field of Phenomenological Immanence

Introduction

We have now reached a level of investigation which requires a by no means comprehensive discussion of transcendental subjectivity, a subjectivity in no way in the world, but an absolute subjectivity for which there is a world. Just as the Ego is not a part of the world, so too the world is not a real (geuell) part of the Ego. The world maintains its transcendence, within the horizon of phenomenological Immanence. We must now see how Husserl develops the notion of the transcendental Ego and its relation to the notion of phenomenological Immanence.

(a). Husserl's View of the Ego in the "Logical Investigations"

In Investigation V of the Logical Investigations, we find Husserl disagreeing with Natorp as regards the notion of the pure or transcendental Ego. Natorp, a Neo-Kantian, held to the existence of a pure Ego, but he also held, in accord with Kant, that this Ego is not and cannot be a content of consciousness, for to be a content would demand that the Ego become an object for itself. As Natorp states:

It cannot be itself a content, and resembles nothing that could be a content of consciousness. For this
reason, it can be no further described, since all descriptive terms we might seek to employ, could be drawn only from the content of consciousness. Otherwise put: each idea we could make of the ego would turn it into an object...  262

Yet Natorp goes on to say that "The fact that things are in consciousness... is the basic fact of psychology... but it can neither be defined nor deduced..." To this, Husserl counters:

How can we assert such a 'basic fact of psychology' if we are unable to think it, and how can we think it if not by making the ego and consciousness, both subject-matter of our assertion, into 'objects'?  263

And furthermore, he states that Natorp:

... in fact tells us that it 'can be acknowledged and specially emphasized'. Surely what is acknowledged or emphasized will be a content? Surely it will be made into an object?  264

And finally, Husserl states that:

I must frankly confess... that I am quite unable to find this ego, this primitive necessary centre of relations. The only thing I can take note of, and therefore perceive, are the empirical ego and its empirical relations to its own experiences.  265

Although Husserl adds in a footnote to the revised edition of the Logical Investigations to the effect that he has 'finally managed to find' this ego, he does not in any way tell us or give us any clue as to how this was accomplished.  266
(b). An Apparent Confirmation in the "Ideas"

In the Ideas, Husserl seems to have come to agree with certain aspects of Katorp's notion of the Ego against which he argued in the Logical Investigations. It seems that he has "managed to find it", but it remains unassailable: "...this Ego, is the pure Ego, and no reduction can get any grip on it". Moreover, he tells us that:

"...notwithstanding these peculiar complications with all "its" experiences, the experiencing Ego is still nothing that might be taken for itself and made into an object of inquiry on its own account. Apart from its "ways of being related", or "ways of behaving" it is completely empty of essential components, it has no content that could be unravelled, it is in and for itself indescribable: pure Ego and nothing further."

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Have we not shown above, however, that the phenomenological reduction opens up and circumscribes the total sphere of of phenomenological explication? If "no reduction can get a grip on the Ego", if it thereby remains indescribable does this not entail that it be left wholly out of consideration on its own account? Or does this simply mean that it is impossible to "reduce" the Ego, that is, does this merely indicate that the Ego remains as a "phenomenological residuum" unaffected by reduction? Both of these lines of thought seem evidence in this rather opaque paragraph 90 of Ideas.
Phenomenology as Self-Explication

In the Ideas we are told that the ego remains indescribable on its own account. We are told in Experience and Judgment that the Ego is such that "...it is not capable of being exhibited as present... but can only be indicated by the sedimentations left by its activity...". This latter possibility of "indicating" the Ego seems to parallel what Husserl says in the Ideas with regards to the Ego's "ways of being related". Our difficulty now is understanding how this can possibly be accepted and understood in light of the following passages.

In his Formal and Transcendental Logic, Husserl tells us that "The whole of phenomenology is nothing other than scientific self-examination on the part of transcendental subjectivity." In the Paris Lectures, Husserl tells us that the task of phenomenology is to explore the a priori intentional constitution of objects, and that "...this a priori...is nothing other than the essence of the ego qua ego and...is disclosed...by means of my own self-examination." He calls this the "...transcendental self-examination of phenomenology..." which overcomes the naivety and exposes the absurdity of the traditional epistemological problematic.

He also tells us in the Paris Lectures that "Our idealism
is nothing other than a consistently carried through self-disclosure" and also that "One must first lose the world through epoché so as to regain it in universal self-examination." Finally, in the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl says that "... I, the meditating phenomenologist, set myself the all-embracing task of uncovering myself in my full concreteness."

We seem to be left with a paradoxical situation. Self-examination demands that the Ego become an object for itself, but phenomenology is nothing other than self-examination. To resolve this seeming paradox between the possibility and impossibility of genuine self-examination, we need to note the following.

Phenomenology is concerned with a Scientific sense-explication of world-belief in its bewildering fulness of intentional achievements. To "put into question" this universal pre-givenness of the world is to demand that the "subject" no longer be construed as man, for this involves the circularity of attempting to question the worlds pregivenness on the basis of and with reference to a questioning subject (man) which is himself apperceived as part of the world (and therefore part of that which we are putting into question by the reduction). As Fink notes: "... every explication of the a priori givenness of the world remains upon the basis of the natural attitude as long as man remains defined as that subjectivity with
reference to which this problem is to be answered."

This thereby further radicalizes our view of the phenomenological reduction. Fink tells us that:

The epoche is not a mundane inhibiting of the ontic and intramundane belief in the being of the world. As the persistent and radical deactivation of the belief in the world, the epoche is the disconnecting of the belief in the human performer of beliefs, that is, the bracketing of the world-belief's self interpretation by which it apperceives itself as being in the world. Now...the true subject of belief can be uncovered for the first time: the transcendental ego, for whom the world (the intramundane subject and the totality of its objects) is a universe of transcendental acceptances.

The uncovering of the true subject of belief, the transcendental Ego, provides a clue for the unraveling of our paradox. Since these beliefs are all "mine" (qua transcendental Ego) to explicate the universal world-belief is to do nothing other than uncover myself. Within this horizon of self-examination, we find the world as intentionally Immanent (and, paradoxically, as intentionally transcendent). In phenomenological descriptions of objects, therefore, I am not, so to speak, describing something radically other than myself, for each noematic analysis demands a correlative noetic analysis which traces the appearance of an object back into its givenness "in" transcendental subjectivity.

The field of phenomenological Immanence is the sphere of givenness to consciousness. Transcendental subjectivity is nothing other than the total sphere of givenness. We may say then that the sphere of phenomenological Immanence is
transcendental subjectivity. Therefore, all phenomenological descriptions are eo inso self-examination on the part of transcendental subjectivity. This resolves our difficulty, for we see that we may agree with "both sides of the argument". It is obvious that the Ego is not a particular content of consciousness among others. It is not given along with and distinct from the givenness of objects. It is not one particular given, but rather the total sphere of givenness itself.

Before we conclude this section, we are forced to make explicit a basic ambiguity that has run through this entire chapter. We have inconsistently used two different phrases to speak of the field of phenomenological Immanence. We have used the phrase "givenness in consciousness" as well as the phrase "givenness to consciousness". This ambiguity has a peculiar effect when one comes to speak of transcendental subjectivity.

Is transcendental subjectivity that subjectivity to which the pure phenomena are given (which could perhaps imply that this Ego is something "outside" of that sphere of givenness)? Or is transcendental subjectivity that subjectivity in which the pure phenomena are given (which could imply that this Ego is the sphere of givenness)?

It seems that the phrase "givenness in consciousness" is preferable. However, it is preferable only if we keep in mind that, because of the revealing of the inten-
tionality of consciousness, to be given "in" consciousness is not necessarily to be given as consciousness. This total sphere of givenness represents both noetic (given in consciousness and given as consciousness) and noematic (given in consciousness and given as other than consciousness) moments as its constituents. Thus we have said that transcendental subjectivity is the sphere of givenness. We must therefore distinguish with Husserl between the "... Ego as identical pole" and the "... ego taken in its full concreteness...". The Ego as identical pole is the ego to which phenomena are given, the ego for which there is a world. The fully concrete ego is the sphere of givenness; and this sphere now includes the Ego as identical subject-pole as well as including the world as noematic correlate of that identical Ego (i.e., as identical object-pole).

Conclusion: Infinite Telos and the Impossibility of Transcendence

We need to conclude this chapter (and our exposition of Husserl's phenomenology) by noting the paradoxical combination of openness and closure in Husserlian phenomenology.

Husserl's phenomenology is "closed" in that he has exposed the absurdity of raising the question of a
Transcendence somehow "correlative" to the field of phenomenological Immanence. He notes in his Formal and Transcendental Logic that "... experience is not an opening through which a world existing prior to all experience, shines into a room of consciousness...". In this text, he goes on to say that:

There is no conceivable place where the life of consciousness is broken through or could be broken through and we might come upon a transcendency that possibly had any sense other than that of an intentional unity making its appearance in the subjectivity itself of consciousness.

And, he also says that:

Neither a world nor any other existent of any conceivable sort comes "from outdoors"... into my ego, my life of consciousness. Everything outside is what it is in this inside, and gets its true being from the givings of it itself, and from the verification within this inside -- its true being, which for that very reason is something that itself belongs to this inside.

The sphere of phenomenological Immanence, both opened up and circumscribed (if circumscription now has any sense) by the phenomenological reduction defines the total sphere of possible sense: "Transcendental subjectivity is the universe of possible meanings; any exteriority to it is meaningless." Because the phenomenological reduction, through its rational activity, denies the possibility of externality, philosophy as a rigorous Science of Being (wherein all sources of justification need to be found within this Science) is only possible as transcendental
phenomenology. This again re-affirms what we said in our

CHAPTER TWO: "A self-consistent Scientific philosophy
must be a philosophy of Immanence".

However, Husserl's phenomenology is also "open"
in that by the revealing of the intentionality of consc-
iousness, and its horizontal nature, phenomenology has be-
fore it an open-ended task of sense-explication. Its
task is in this way an infinite task. This "openness" of
phenomenology according to Husserl, is the realization
of the infinite telos inherent in genuine philosophical
activity, wherein the telos of Science provides the
normative Ideal for the quest of truth and therewith the
realization of genuine humanity. As a self-disclosure,
phenomenology takes on the character of a cognitive-
ethical demand.
IV

THE QUESTION OF TRANSCENDENCE

Introduction

As soon as one attempts to critically analyze the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, one becomes immediately aware of its seductive and compelling character. Husserlian phenomenology seems to be able to "consume" any criticism leveled against it, always with (at least) the semblence of justification and resolve; it seems to be able to incorporate any criticism while at the same time seemingly recognizing it and doing justice to it. This character seems not only to be in line with, but also to confirm our viewing Husserl's phenomenology as a philosophy of Immanence. In view of this, we saw in our CHAPTER ONE that the problems encountered in attempting to enter Husserl's thought "from outside" were immense. But, as we have yet to see, these problems are nowhere near as definitive and powerful as the difficulties one faces when attempting to "escape", when one attempts to "break out" of the self-enclosed sphere which Husserl's phenomenology opens up. It is extremely difficult to
question its basic character while at the same time attempting to maintain the "distance" required so that one's questions and possible answers are not "drawn in" to Husserl's sphere and consumed under the guise of resolve.

In writing this concluding chapter, I find myself caught in this "inward pull" of Husserl's thought, yet also with the need to say more and to speak of something unvoiced in Husserl's efforts. Because of this ambiguity on my part, these "critical comments" are not unilateral or especially coherent, for I am always drawn by the seeming unavoidability of Husserl's responses to them.

What we wish to maintain in this chapter is that the circularities we encountered in our CHAPTER ONE are far more revealing of the character of Husserl's thought than we had expected in writing that chapter. Not only this. We feel that these circularities indicate an unvoiced circularity in Husserl's thought itself. In this chapter, we wish to show the circularity of Husserl's Scientific project and how it rests on an unquestioned presupposition. Then we wish to give some indication in a general way as to how this circle is spun. Finally, we hope to be able to give some clue as to how (or perhaps whether!) this circularity can be escaped.

At the outset, we need to note that our critical comments are by no means directed towards giving reasons
for why one should opt for a philosophical position or system other than Husserl's phenomenology. For this reason no "opposing views" of other philosophers will be entertained. To extend this one step further, we wish to maintain that Husserl's phenomenology does in fact represent the consummation of the ideal of scientific philosophy. In fact, we feel that his method, the phenomenological reduction, is the most decisive and effective philosophical method ever devised. As far as that goes, we need to say now that philosophically speaking, we find Husserl's conclusions unavoidable. However, what we are concerned with in the present chapter is philosophical speaking as such and the silent presupposition not merely of Husserl's philosophy but of philosophy itself.

The Circle

The history of philosophy (with notable but infrequent and often ignored exceptions) is the history of Rationalism. Rationalism is no here to be taken in the usual sense as the means whereby we distinguish, for example, the philosophy of Continental Rationalism from that of British Empiricism. We mean simply that philosophy is "based upon" the implicit "faith" that the world "has an order" (i.e., that it is a cosmos and not a chaos) and that that order is rationally determinable by Reason. As Husserl
constantly repeats, "... philosophy is nothing other than rationalism through and through...", a rationalism in search of "... the pure Ratio of the world..." wherein the task of "... the systematic unfolding of the universal logos of all conceivable being" is set forth. Philosophy, then, as a fulfillment of its historical purpose, aims to be a rigorous Science of all Being. Philosophy, as the vocation of the "ethical cognitive demand" of Reason, is in this sense Rationalism.

Husserl had attempted many different approaches to his phenomenology throughout his philosophical career. On the basis of his published and translated works alone, we can see that he found it necessary to write no less than four introductions to his phenomenology (the Cartesian Meditations, Idea of Phenomenology, Ideas and the Crisis of European Sciences are all subtitled as such). His constant need to reformulate and reassess his writings, coupled with the fact that even in his lifetime, his project for phenomenology was either ignored or radically transformed by even his most promising student, Martin Heidegger, probably lead him to realize more and more explicitly the overwhelmingly enigmatic character of philosophy itself. In an article written in 1934, he admits that:

I know of course what I am striving for under the title of philosophy, as the goal and field of my work. And yet I do not know. What autonomous thinker has every been satisfied with this, his "knowledge? For what autonomous thinker, in his philosophizing life,
has "philosophy" ever ceased to be an enigma?

Husserl had come to the point where he realized once again the constant and persistent threat of "...scepticism, irrationalism and mysticism" to the establishment of a rigorous Science of Being. However, the constant emergence of the enigmatic character of philosophy provided for Husserl a resurgence of the demand for a more comprehensive and more radical critique. Yet here we see that in all of Husserl's work, critique inevitably had a prescribed and unquestioned goal: to establish Science. That Science should be established (which, if it is not to be absurd, must include some faith that it can be established) is determined ahead of time. All of the questioning which Husserl undertook fell within the unquestioned necessity and possibility of the goal to be reached. Husserl's faith in the possibility of Science rests on a faith in the ultimate intelligibility of the cosmos. Husserl constantly questioned how to make his Rationalism (his grasp of the cosmos by Reason) more radical. The rational faith (that there is a cosmos) which lends credence to the possibility of this radicality was itself never questioned.

We can notice this tendency in a passage already cited from the Cartesian Meditations. In searching for an absolute grounding of Science, Husserl admits that "...at first we must not presuppose even its possibility". Yet he immediately goes on to say that "...this does not mean
that we renounce the general aim of grounding science absolutely. That shall indeed continually motivate the course of our meditations. ..." After these meditations have run their course, he once again re-affirms this.

He states that:

...we have lost sight of the demand, so seriously made at the beginning --- namely that an anecdotic knowledge, as the only "genuinely scientific knowledge" be achieved; but we have by no means dropped it.

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In spite of all difficulties, in spite of the complexity of the task, the demand for Science remains intact!

The question of the present section is to ask whether this shows itself as an unquestioned presupposition in Husserl's phenomenology, and moreover, whether it shows itself as an unquestionable presupposition within the realm in which Husserlian phenomenology operates. Further, we need to ask whether what is thus shown undermines Husserl's philosophy as a philosophy of Immanence and therefore as a rigorous Science, for we have held thus far and still hold that a self-consistent Scientific philosophy must be a philosophy of Immanence. We now ask: What is presupposed in the goal of philosophy as Science?

We wish to maintain that what is presuppose in the goal of philosophy as Science is what could be called the principle of Reason. We may roughly define it as follows:

All Being can be made the object of rational insight. Under
transcendental reflection, all Being forms an intelligible unity given within the phenomenological Immanence of transcendental subjectivity. In short, the cosmos is intelligible (i.e., it is a cosmos and not a chaos, and it is Immanent in consciousness and thereby totally determinable by Reason). The totality of Being can therefore be identified with the totality of intelligible Being.

This "principle" of Reason is the definition and prerequisite of the possibility of a rigorous Science of Being. This necessitates that one hold that there is no essential "opaqueness" in Being and that Being is infinitely clarifiable. This gives expression to what we feel is an irreducible faith in Reason, a faith from which Husserl never wavered.

If we can find no "ground" for the principle of Reason (and must thereby admit its necessary opaqueness in the face of phenomenological grounding) Husserl's phenomenology cannot lay claim to the radicalness and rigor to which it aspires. It cannot be Science in the full and genuine sense. What is entailed in a grounding of the principle of Reason? We see that the principle itself already contains within its scope the notion of a grounding, i.e., "to give reasons" or "to seek evidence". Yet this notion of a grounding is only legitimate (i.e., ground-
ed) if the principle itself is grounded. To ground the
principle of Reason by giving reasons for its adoption
is to adopt the principle and accept its validity ahead
of time. Need we say then that Husserl's project rests
on an unquestioned presupposition? That is, that it rests
on the principle of Reason which itself is not questioned?
Need we say, counter to this, that the principle of Reason
cannot be questioned because of its incontestably evidential
nature? Only if "to question" can only mean "to seek
reasons and evidence". "Incontestable evidence" presuppo-
ses that principle to such an extent that questioning it
(a questioning now defined as seeking evidence) becomes
senseless. To question the principle of Reason becomes
senseless only if we allow the principle to define its
own self-questioning as a seeking reasons.

Husserl definitely feels that his faith in the
nature, possibility and necessity of a rigorous Science
of Being itself "has good reason", a reason which can be
shown via the phenomenological method. Yet "to show" here
already means "to seek evidence or reasons". Can we leg-
itmize or justify the faith Husserl has in Science if
his phenomenological procedure already and ahead of time
restricts "to justify" and "to legitimize" to "giving
reasons"? It seems that once we enter into the circle of
phenomenology, once we are, so to speak "of the faith", the
questioning of the principle of Reason becomes impossible, for the principle already prescribes the possibilities of questioning (and the scope and nature of that which will count as a "legitimate" answer to the questions posed). Husserl's self-criticism always and necessarily falls "within the faith", for this faith, rather than being questioned, prescribes the nature and extent of critique itself. To question this faith is to submit to it, for "questioning" is now always "seeking evidence". Herein we see the clearest example of Husserl's seductive nature, for we are embarrassed by the fact that in the face of the self-enclosed sphere within which phenomenology operates, our questions are, in the precise sense, nonsense. This voracious and compulsive consumption of any possible criticism defines the difficulties we have in criticizing Husserlian phenomenology, for we are faced with a faith which is, it seems, impossible to question. And therefore, our questions are immediately and easily "ruled out of court".

With regard to this unquestioned faith, may we say now that this faith in Reason is more fundamental than Reason itself? It is not quite this simple, for here we are faced with the initial unintelligibility of what could be "meant" by a fundamentum in this case? Here again, Husserl's seductive circularity arises, for we are left wondering
how or even whether we can validly ask "What do we mean by calling faith more fundamental than Reason?"

If some "validity" can be attributed to our questioning, this circularity defies all four of the essential characteristics of a philosophy of Immanence outlined in our CHAPTER ONE. Let us follow this up:

(1). We have said that "Phenomenology must contain within itself an understanding of its own nature. ... for to leave this nature unquestioned... is to deny its Scientific character." If phenomenology does not radically question its own nature, it is not rigorously Scientific. But if "to question" means "to give reasons or evidence" that Science which is to be established by this questioning is presupposed as valid (i.e., as "established") in the nature of the questioning itself.

(2). We have said that "Phenomenology must contain within itself the ground of its own possibility, for to leave that ground unrevealed is to deny its Scientific character". If it does not reveal its own ground, it is not rigorously Scientific. But if "to reveal" means "to bring to absolute evidence", that Science which is to be established by this "revealing of its ground" is presupposed as valid (i.e., as "established") in the nature
of that revealing itself (a revealing which demands Scientific evidence).

(3). We have said that "Phenomenology must contain within itself its own necessity, for to leave that necessity unquestioned is to deny its Scientific character."

This questioning has the same character as in point (1) above. We will have more to say below about the motivation which leads to phenomenology and how it necessarily falls outside of its scope. If its motivation does in this way "fall outside", then the very source of phenomenology is transcendent to it.

(4). We have said above that "There can be nothing which is radically unintelligible within the scope of Husserlian phenomenology". With this we still agree. Yet we also said that "Nothing may fall 'outside' of its grasp, for such a 'transcendence' would deny the possibility of certainty and therewith deny its Scientific character."

We shall have more to say about this below as well, for we now hold that its prime motivation, Faith in Reason and the possibility of Science necessarily falls outside of its scope.

All of this merely provides us with an incredibly vacuous piece of information. It seems that we are left with a mere "logical circularity". This remains the
case unless we can open up this tightly knit circle and show its ramifications and contours. Let us look now at how this circle is spun and how it influences phenomenology's self-interpretation.

How the Circle is Spun

... philosophy. Correctly translated, in the original sense, that means nothing other than universal science, science of the universe, of the all-encompassing unity of all that is.

Nowhere is Edmund Husserl's faith in the power of his phenomenology, as a radically self-critical Rationalism, more evident than in the Crisis of European Sciences and in the various manuscripts from the same period. Herein he says that "Precisely this lack of genuine rationality on all sides is the source of man's now unbearable lack of clarity about his own existence...". This unclarity and lack of rationality has for Husserl, as he calls it in the Vienna Lecture, the character of a "...destructive blaze of lack of faith" a lack of faith in "...the one philosophy to which our life seeks to be and ought to be devoted." It is precisely this burning, unquestioned faith in Reason that leads to the "spinning of the circle" we encountered above.
We wish now to give a perhaps oversimplified indication of how we feel that this is accomplished and what effects it has on phenomenology's self-interpretation.

We wish to parallel the "spinning of the circle" of Reason to a peculiar form of consciousness evident in the discovery of an error. Subsequent to the discovery of an error, there is effected what we shall call a retroactive movement of consciousness which effects a "canceling out" of previous beliefs formerly held "about the object". These past beliefs are now held to have been "in error". Correlative to this, the "true" nature of the object which we have now discovered is then retroactively posited as "always having been there", which demands that previous opinion be branded "error" and be branded as always having been in error. To put this another way, we now retroactively posit the object as "transcending" previous opinion and also as always having transcended it (we now believe that "It was always there and was always this was" and that "we always were in error"). Moreover, the object discovered is retroactively posited as transcending the process of discovery which lead to the realization of its "true nature". Its nature was merely "uncovered by investigation of it" and was not affected "in reality" by either the error in judgement or the discovery and "correction" of this error.
We wish to hold that a similar form of consciousness occurs in the "spinning of the circle of Reason". Yet this form of consciousness carries within itself an added and essential moment. It is not merely a **retroactive consciousness**, but what we shall call a **progressive-retroactive consciousness**. What we mean here is this.

Husserl's unwavering demand for Science and his faith in its possibility and necessity lead him to "uncritically" posit the goal of a rigorous Science of Being as the telos of his life work; moreover, as the telos of philosophy, as the telos of consciousness itself. As we have seen, the nature and scope of all critique for Husserl is guided by and defined by this telos. Since the telos (Science) defines the nature of critique (i.e., it demands that critique must be a Scientific critique), the telos itself cannot be legitimately criticized (which now means Scientifically criticized) without presupposing it; it is in this sense that we call this positition "uncritical". By what we shall call a **progressive movement of consciousness** (one that "sets a goal" towards which it aims) the goal of Science is posited as the guiding motivation for all phenomenological descriptions and critiques; all phenomenological description has as its goal **Scientific, essential insight into the structures of consciousness**
and therewith insight into the essential structures of Being as intentionally grasped by that consciousness.

The "setting of the goal" is in this way progressive. This progressive consciousness, which posits the goal of Science which is to be reached, displays itself as a faith (or belief) that the matters at stake in phenomenological descriptions (the universe of all conceivable Being) not only "is there", but also that it "has" a certain essential nature discoverable through Rational insight. Without this faith, the positing of the goal becomes absurd, for it would mean that we wish to reach the goal of Scientific knowledge about a "universe" which we believe is not Scientifically knowable. From this belief in a cosmos, this belief in the matters at stake, is derived the legitimacy and necessity of the method required in the discovery of this cosmos (Science as the search for Rational insight).

This faith in Reason, therefore, is also a retro-active consciousness. The positing of the goal of Science (the "progressive movement") retroactively demands a specific methodological procedure correlative to the posited goal: It demands Science. We could say, then, that the progressive positing of the goal of a rigorous Science of Being is at once the retroactive positing of the possibility, necessity and legitimacy of the pursual of Science and the
possibility, necessity and legitimacy of a particular
type of pursuit (Scientific explication).

This possibility and necessity of Science takes on the appearance of being self-justifying only by means of a self-forgetfulness whereby the "original" need for Science and the original faith in Science becomes forgotten. That is, the progressive movement of consciousness which posits the goal of Science in the first place is overlook in favour of the goal itself and its retroactive prescription for Scientific explication. The demand and need for Scientific explication is then seen to be "issuing forth" from the goal itself, not from the need for Science which progressively posited that goal. We could perhaps go as far as to say that Husserl's faith in Reason is itself "guilty" of a precisely parallel naivety which he ascribes to the natural attitude. In the natural attitude, we overlook our consciousness of the world in favour of the world itself, now naively believed to be "already there". In phenomenology, it seems that we overlook the need for Science and the positing of the goal of Science in favour of the goal itself. In self-forgetfulness, in naive devotedness to the goal of Science, one overlooks the immense intentional achievements involved in the consciousness of that goal and the positing of it.

To conclude, we may now see "the circle" more clearly. The method of Husserlian phenomenology (Scientific
explication) derives its legitimacy from the matter at stake (the goal of Science). The matter at stake (the goal of Science) is legitimately investigated by the method of Husserlian phenomenology (Science). The method and the matter are the same, both demanding that it is from the other that it gains its legitimacy. By positing the goal of Science as an infinite telos, the circle spun itself has an "infinite diameter", prescribing "infinite tasks" for philosophy. By positing the goal as a rigorous Science of all Being, a universal ontology, it "consumes" all possible alternatives and makes the demand that it has and can have no "outside". By an unvoiced progressive-retroactive movement of consciousness phenomenology becomes, in its own self-interpretation, a philosophy of Immanence. It spins a web out of which it cannot escape and in which it cannot be caught.

We shall now see that what appeared in our first section of this chapter to be a mere "logical circle, has an overwhelming effect on phenomenology's self-interpretation.

The Effect of the Circle on Phenomenology's Self-Interpretation

The faith in the possibility of philosophy as a task, that is, in the possibility of universal knowledge, is something we cannot let go.

We feel that the influence of Husserl's faith
in Reason, which is correlative to his burning faith in the possibility of philosophy, has an enormous impact on phenomenology's self-interpretation. We can, by no means, expect to cover all of these or the full ramification of any of these influences on the present context. We wish, merely, to list a few of these effects.

(1). Husserl's faith in Reason is all-pervasive to the extent that in phenomenology's self-interpretation, Reason shows itself to be a universal and necessary "element" in all consciousness and all conscious life. Husserl says, in the Cartesian Meditations, that:

"Reason is not an accidental de facto ability... but rather a title for an all-embracing essentially necessary structural form belonging to all transcendental subjectivity."

Moreover, in his Formal and Transcendental Logic, Husserl goes as far as to say that:

"... the life of consciousness has an all-pervasive teleological structure, a pointedness towards "reason" and even a pervasive tendency toward it..."

Each conscious process, then, has an essential form and a mode of rational evidence proper to it. Since it has an essential, rational form, this "essence" can be brought to self-givenness by Reason's self-reflection.
Therefore, since all conscious processes are essentially "reason", Science becomes retroactively the mode of Reason's self-reflection. In short, "Reality" is taken to be determinate (since conscious processes "have" an essence), and since Reality is so determined by Reason, it has a rationally determinable, essential structure.

(2). Seen from "within the circle" (which is now the only rigorous and Scientifically legitimate way "to see") the motivation or "source" of Huxterl's phenomenology is not the need for Science, but the goal of Science, a goal which retroactively posits "essences" as the basis (the Scientific basis) of all cognition. The question of the "Beginning" is then oo ipso and without question a question of the Scientifically graspable basis or "beginning" of cognition. Until we reach an apodictic (i.e., truly Scientific) beginning, we have not yet begun. The circle thereby has a definite effect on phenomenology's goal and its subsequent self-interpretation as a rigorous Science of Being. In fact, the circle defines the essential nature of "rigor", "Ground", "basis", "source", "fundamentum", "beginning", "origin": All of these have a prescribed meaning within phenomenology's self-interpretation.
(3). Following this, from "within the circle", phenomenology must say that the fundamentum is not the process of discovery but the essence discovered. The procedure of phenomenological explication is thereby necessarily a Scientific explication (as a search for essences or meanings) and this explication in no way "influences" the essence discovered. That is, since Reality is determinate, the need for a method which merely shows forth this determination and in no way "interpretes it", is required.

(4). That the procedure of phenomenological explication is based upon a previous, unvoiced phenomenological implication (the progressive movement of consciousness which posits the goal of Science and thereby implicitly believes in a Scientifically determinable cosmos which demands Scientific explication) is totally ruled out. Even if this were the case, Husserl would maintain that the implicit belief in Science can be (Scientifically) explicated within phenomenology itself; Hence, a "phenomenology of phenomenology" is already prescribed as a "higher level" problem within phenomenology.

(5). Since the "essences" are posited as being "already there" to be discovered and described, Husserl says that
the essence is:

... prior to all "concepts" in the sense of verbal significations: indeed, as pure concepts, these must be made to fit the eidos.

In phenomenology's self-interpretation is presupposed a definite role of language as subservient to that which language is to describe. In this role is also prescribed a certain view as to the possible usage and nature of language.

(6). In a similar way, the process of imaginative variation which is utilized in the discovery of essences is totally subservient to and guided by the implicit essence to be discovered by this variation. In phenomenology's self-interpretation, then, is effected a relegation of imagination to Reason.

(7). Since, by the progressive movement of faith in Science, the essential structures of consciousness are posited as being "already there", the process of phenomenological explication has to be deemed a process of discovery. The notions of "creativity" and "interpretation" in phenomenology's procedure are wholly dismissed. The "creativity" of the progressive movement of consciousness (which, when presupposed and thereby overlooked,
retroactively demands that phenomenology be seen as a process of discovery) itself becomes one item among others to be discovered and Scientifically explicated.

(8). To expand on this, we may say that in phenomenology's self-interpretation, since faith in Science and faith in Reason are themselves moments of conscious life, they too have an essential nature. We may say also that the Scientifically discoverable "essence" of faith in Reason is the "basis of that faith itself", since it is Science which defines the nature of a basis. That is, for Science faith in Reason is not the basis of Reason, for the basis of that faith in Reason is the reason ("essence") of that faith. Faith cannot be the basis of Reason, for "to be a basis" has a meaning prescribed by Reason. To follow this line and to say that Reason is based on faith is to be committed to a self-contradictory (and very non-Scientific!) scepticism. The sphere of Reason in phenomenology's self-interpretation thus becomes "autonomous" and "self-justifying" because it carries within itself its own (Scientific) source of justification, which subsequently becomes the only (Scientifically) justifiable notion of a "source". In this way, phenomenology believes that it, so to speak, "cuts itself loose" from what could be called "mundane" and mere de facto sources or motivations.
(a psychological need for certainty, anxiety, faith in Reason, faith in Science) by positing its own (Scientifically revealed) "sources" as the "ground" upon which even these mundane motivations are (Scientifically) grounded. Now, anxiety, psychological needs, and faith all become structural moments of transcendental life, open to "essential insight". Since phenomenology demands that its own ground be a Scientific ground, as Science, it encompasses its own ground, and becomes self-enclosed and no longer in need of, moreover, no longer able to see or understand the sense of, any external justification. It becomes a philosophy of Immanence.

(9). Since all consciousness is taken to work essentially under the norms of Reason, man is seen to be essentially rational, and philosophy, as the re-establishment of Reason becomes the vocation through which man comes to a true self-responsibility and self-understanding.

(10). In the fact of a Scientific critique, and its progressive-retroactive positing of Reason as the primordial form of all conscious life, that which shows itself as the most primordial mode of belief inherent in conscious life is the Protodoxa which is taken to be believing in...
the mode of certainty with its noematic correlate of the most primordial type of being, i.e., simple being. Therefore, we can see that Husserl would say that "Non-being is merely a modality of simple being of certain being (which is the primal mode). . .". In view of this, we see that that which is "primal" is prescribed ahead of time by Husserl's faith in Reason. That which is primal is certainty, sense, rationality, knowledge. In view of this, the following passages come as no surprise. With reference to the (Scientific) precedence of "sense", Husserl states that "...even nonsense is always a mode of sense and has its non-sensicalness within the sphere of possible insight." With reference to the (Scientific) precedence of "essences" and "rationality", he also says that "...the 'fact' with its 'irrationality' is itself a structural concept within the system of the concrete Apriori". And again, Husserl states that "...what we call unknown...has a known structural form". In phenomenology, since "precedence" is prescribed in its sense by the faith Husserl has in Reason, essence precedes fact, possibility precedes actuality, sense precedes nonsense, Being precedes non-being, Reason precedes faith. For phenomenology, the latter in each case is merely a modality of the former and can be "truly" (i.e., Scientifically) understood only as such.
(11). Since all conscious life is progressively-retroactively posited as working under the norms of Reason, and, hence, every conceivable element of consciousness is open to Scientific explanation, no external critique of phenomenology is possible. Moreover, no possible moment of consciousness is outside of the scope of transcendental phenomenology. Phenomenology, as a Science of the total sphere of conscious life, in its own self-interpretation has no outside. Phenomenology is the Science of the sphere of phenomenological Immanence.

Therefore, in an obvious reference to Martin Heidegger and what was seen as the "threat of irrationalism", Husserl says that within the scope of his transcendental phenomenology:

... the meaning all the problems of accidental factuality, of death, of fate, of the possibility of a "genuine" human life demanded as "meaningful" in a particular case -- among them, therefore, the problem of the "meaning" of history -- and all the further and still higher problems.

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In the face of phenomenology as Science, even death is merely a constituted meaning to be explicated!

(12). Eugen Fink provides us with a final consummation of Husserl's self-interpretation:

Is man therefore absolute? Not at all. But neither is the absolute a "transcendent" reality beyond man and not encompassing him. Separating and distinguish-
ing them is as false as their direct equation. In
place of a "transcendent" relation between man and
the world-ground, we must posit a "transcendental"
relation which does not overlook man's worldly
finitude, frailty and impotence, but which com-
prehends it as a constituted meaning, thereby
taking it back into the infinite essence of spirit.

Throughout, Husserl maintains the faith that it is poss-
able, in an act of self-fulfillment and not self-denial,
for man to "attain" the Absolute and realize his "true"
nature as transcendental subjectivity, for which human
finitude and human limitations are mere constituted mean-
ings.

The Escape

We wish now to speak of several things that
arise out of our investigation of the "groundlessness"
of Husserl's faith in Reason. We wish to speak of how
Husserl's faith in Reason "transcends" the scope of
his phenomenology as a philosophy of Immanence. We wish
also to show how this faith proves to be a "basis" for
Reason and therefore undermines Reason's pretence to all-
pervasive self-enclosure and self-justification. We wish
also to speak of the need for Science and the need for
certainty as the prime "motivation" for the performance
of the phenomenological reduction and how the methodical
doubt evident in the reduction is carried out by Husserl for the sake of the establishment of certainty and the elimination of doubt. We wish therefore, to speak of how Husserl himself was untrue to the insights of the reduction by his "uncritical" re-instigation of the goal of Science once the reduction had been performed. Husserl's faith in Reason was the sole pre-phenomenological motivation which he did not, and its seems could not, allow the reduction to effect. We wish, therefore, to speak of how or whether Husserl's method (the reduction) can be "separated" from his motivation (the need for Science) such that the method escapes the criticisms leveled against the motivation. Finally, we wish to speak of how Husserl's basing of the Scientific project on his unvoiced faith in Reason shows transcendental phenomenology to be a form of transcendental psychologism.

(I wish to speak of many things at this point in my study of Husserl's phenomenology, yet, because of my present ambivalent attitude towards Husserl's project, I feel incapable of doing so. In attempting to explain this ambivalence, I hope that the reader shall see more clearly the seductive nature of Husserl's phenomenology and perhaps gain some insight into the possibility of escaping the compelling circularity that Husserl sets up).
In our first three chapters, we spoke of the question of phenomenological Immanence. Husserl's phenomenology, by being solidly based upon his faith in reason, prescribed the nature possibility and necessity of such questioning. Moreover, (and this is the source of ambivalence) Husserl's phenomenology is such that it will not allow the questions we wish to pose in this our CHAPTER FOUR, to even be formulated in such a way as to pose any "real threat".

We have seen that in the face of Husserlian phenomenology, THE QUESTION OF TRANSCENDENCE is precisely absurd. To speak of "something outside" of the field of phenomenological Immanence demands that our speaking be branded nonsense. It is here that we gain a clue to the seductiveness of Husserl's project. For we see that even in speaking what is in this way "nonsense", we find that "...even nonsense is always a mode of sense and has its non-sensicalness within the sphere of possible insight." In allowing Husserl to brand our questions nonsense (which seems quite reasonable to do!) we are "drawn back into the fold". To talk of Husserl's rigorous Science as being based upon his faith in reason, a faith which itself escapes that Science and transcends it is for Husserl to be committed to a form of irrationalism. And once again, Husserl seductively embarrasses such attempts at undermining
the possibility of Science, to the extent that he tells us that we are merely doing what he is doing, but not quite as well, not quite as honestly and responsibly. He tells us that:

... what of the rationality of that irrationalism which is so much vaunted and expected of us? Does it not have to convince us, if we are expected to listen to it with rational considerations and reasons? Is its irrationality not finally rather a narrow-minded and bad rationality, worse than that of the old rationalism? Is it not rather the rationality of "lazy reason" which evades the struggle to clarify the ultimate data... and the goals and directions which they alone can rationally and truthfully prescribe?

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To speak against Husserl, one must "give reasons" for why he is "incorrect", one must "make sense" out of what Husserl has overlooked in order to convince the reader of the "validity" of the questions raised. And, finally, one must hold that what one says in answer to this question somehow is "true". "Giving reasons", "correctness", "validity", "truth": it seems that in speaking against Husserl, we somehow speak for him. To allow Husserl to brand what we say as irrationalism (which again is quite reasonable to do!) we are again "drawn in" and "consumed".

This situation merely voices once again the author's ambivalent feeling towards Husserl. It shows that the situation present in the question of Transcendence is not merely one of a transition to new matters, but a
transformation of questioning. That is, we need now not merely speak of different things, but speak differently, and perhaps in a manner which transcends the dualities (rationalism and irrationalism, sense and nonsense) which Husserl himself can set up, can define, and can encompass.

Is it possible to escape the circularity which Husserl's faith in Reason sets up? For this to be possible, what is demanded of us is not a mere transition to irrationalism. This in fact is not an escape at all. Irrationalism stands in too close a proximity to Husserl's project, being defined by it as its opposite (and therefore as a mere modality), and therefore it is constantly under the threat of being "drawn in" by a phenomenology directed towards, as Husserl readily admits, to "...overcoming all resistance and stupidity".

Something more is required, a new way of thinking. Perhaps if this is fulfilled, one need not speak dogmatically against Husserl (with an irrationalism which denies Reason) or dogmatically for him (by the wholesale acceptance of the definitiveness of Reason). Perhaps then this new way of thinking will demand only a limitation and not an elimination of Husserl's project. Perhaps it will allow the re-institution of phenomenology in a new light and
with a new sense.

The Escape?

Is it not Husserl that felt that "an escape" was possible by believing in the possibility of grounding Reason with full self-justification? Is it not precisely a belief in the possibility of escape which defines Husserl's faith in the power of Reason? Husserl escapes the circle (or so it seems) by establishing Reason as self-grounding. We escape the circle (or so it seems) by attempting to show that Reason is not self-grounding. Perhaps the circle is the ground. Perhaps it is true that we are the circle and cannot escape it, for through the attempt to escape, we are drawn back in to the circle which we had never left.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations shall be utilized in the notes to follow, with paginations indicated. The full citations for the works listed below will be found in our BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Works by Husserl

LI.1 Logical Investigations, volume one.
LI.2 Logical Investigations, volume two.
IP Idea of Phenomenology.
PRS "Philosophy as Rigorous Science".
I Ideas.
Freiburg "Husserl's Inagural Lecture at Freiburg im Briesgau (1917)".
Letter "Edmund Husserl: A Letter to Arnold Metzger".
Syllabus "Syllabus of a Course of Four Lectures on "Phenomenological Method and Phenomenological Philosophy" (1922)".
KITP "Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy".
PL Paris Lectures.
FTL Formal and Transcendental Logic.
CM Cartesian Meditations.
PA "Phenomenology and Anthropology".
CES The Crisis of European Sciences.
EJ Experience and Judgement.
Eugen Fink, "What Does the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl Want to Accomplish? (The Phenomenological Idea of Laying-A-Ground)".

Eugen Fink, "The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism".

Martin Heidegger, "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking".

Martin Heidegger, Being and Time.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Preface" to his Phenomenology of Perception.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Visible and Invisible.

Jean-Paul Sartre, "Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea in Husserl's Phenomenology".

Paul Ricoeur, "Phenomenology".
NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1 Preface, pp. vii.

2 cf. Preface, pp. xiv, CES., pp. 394. See also our CHAPTER ONE, section one.

3 PN12., pp. 6. We certainly agree with Fink when he supports this statement by saying that the obscurity of the central and authentic meaning of phenomenology is due to its radically unnatural character. He says that "The appropriation of its true meaning cannot at all come about within the horizon of our natural deportment of knowledge." (Ibid., pp. 6). He also points out that "Access to phenomenology demands a radical reversal of our total existence ...." (Ibid., pp. 6). We do not wish to argue with these comments. However, we wish to stress that this enigmatic character of Husserlian phenomenology is not one that can be overcome. That is, we feel that the enigmatic character of phenomenology is not simply a product of an "incorrect attitude" towards phenomenology which may lead to misrepresentations of its authentic meaning (although this most certainly and most commonly does occur). Rather, it is phenomenology itself which is in essence enigmatic. This arises because of the infinite and ever-receding sources of insight gained through the phenomenological reduction. cf. CES., pp. 394.

4 Husserl, in an appendix to his Crisis of European Sciences entitled "The Life-World and the World of Science" asks:

Can one not turn to the life-world, the world of which we are all conscious in life as the world of us all, without in any way making it into a subject of universal investigations, being always given over, rather, to our everyday momentary individual or universal vocational ends and interests—can one not survey it universally in a changed attitude, and can one not seek to get to know it, as what it is and how it is in its own mobility and relativity, make it the subject matter of universal science, but one which has by no means the goal of universal theory in the sense in which this was sought by historical philosophy and the sciences? (CES., pp. 383).
If phenomenology as a rigorous Science of Being is to be possible at all, Husserl realized that the answer to this must be affirmative. Husserl realized, by the time of the Crisis that it is precisely the Lebenswelt which serves as the "foundation" for all theory and for all natural sciences. In attempting to "ground" the sciences, if the Lebenswelt cannot be made subject to a universal Science and cannot be open to scientific explication, Husserl's project would be doomed to failure. This demanded of Husserl that he hold that a Science of the life-world is possible. This, as we shall see, further demands that the Science of phenomenology, unlike natural science, not be founded upon the Lebenswelt. A method which puts out of play the tendency to base one's science on the Lebenswelt is in order.

It is difficult to imagine how Husserl would have continued his phenomenological project after the Crisis had he lived. Would he have remained true to his life-long goal of Science or would he have allowed the insights that emerge in the Crisis to carry his investigations beyond this goal into the realm of existential phenomenology? It is our conviction that he would not do so.

5 An extension of this notion of history and the problems it poses for transcendental phenomenology is dealt with in a clear and compelling manner by David Carr in his book entitled Phenomenology and the Problem of History.

6 cf. CHAPTER FOUR below. Evidence for this tendency in Husserl is clearly indicated in the passage cited above in note 4.

7 Husserl reveals, in a letter to Arnold Metzger (1917) that his faith in Science extended back as far as 1882, definitely before his discovery of the phenomenological reduction. cf. note 269. See also Letter., pp. 54-56.

8 cf. Our PREFACE and also note 269.
CHAPTER ONE: Phenomenology as a Philosophy of Immanence

9 CES., pp. 137. cf. CES., pp. 150 and our note .

10 CM., pp. 2. It is of interest to compare this passage from Husserl's Cartesian Meditations with a passage from his article "Philosophy as Rigorous Science". Therein he states:

Profundity is a mark of the chaos that genuine science wants to transform into a cosmos, into a simple, completely clear, lucid order. Genuine science, so far as its real doctrine extends, knows no profundity. (PRS., pp. 14).

But then Husserl goes on to say:

Profundity is an affair of wisdom; conceptual distinctness and clarity is an affair of rigorous theory. (PRS., pp. 14).

In the Cartesian Meditations, we hear that wisdom is the goal of philosophy, whereas now, in "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" wisdom is contrasted to true philosophy as science. Herein, Husserl is contrasting the "wisdom" of Weltanschauung philosophy (PRS., pp. 133) to the quest for science which seeks, not wisdom, but rigorous Scientific knowledge.

11 cf. I., pp. 23-9, CM., pp. 4-6 and PRS., pp. 140-7.

See also our CHAPTER FOUR below, where we discuss how the quest for a rigorous Science of Being in fact defines and delimits the scope of that which will count as a "genuine" beginning. If a radically self-critical philosophy is dedicated toward finding the "Beginning" but in fact uncritically defines ahead of time that which will count as such a "beginning", it loses its claim to radicality.

12 Letter., pp. 56.

13 PRS., pp. 72-3.

14 Ibid., pp. 73.

15 I., pp. 28.

16 PILG., pp. 11-12.

17 I., pp. 27-28.

18 For Husserl, we could have said "philosophy" instead of "phenomenology". Husserl firmly believed that his phenomenology was the consummation of the Ideal of philosophy itself.
Therefore, the goal of phenomenology is said to be the goal of philosophy -- its inherent telos -- which had been "forgotten" in the naturalism and objectivism of the nineteenth-century. The issues raised by this equation of phenomenology with philosophy are so immense that we are unable to do them justice in the present context.

19 I., pp. 27. cf. also CM., Meditation One.

20 I., pp. 19.

21 This perhaps accounts for an annoying tendency that some phenomenologist have when attempting to explain phenomenology to the as yet "uninitiated". Often a "phenomenologist" will claim that one's questions are asked simply because one hasn't "done the reduction" yet; and too often this is proposed as an answer to the initial question! It is certain that Husserl would be appalled by such "exclusivity" as is evident by his infinite patience and constant formulation and re-formulation of introductions to his phenomenology.

22 CM., pp. 7.

23 Ibid., pp. 8. cf. CHAPTER FOUR below where the relevance of this passage is discussed.


25 This is why Husserl says with reference to Kant, that "The ultimate presuppositions of the possibility and actuality of objective knowledge cannot be objectively knowable". (GES., pp. 95.) cf. GES., pp. 93-97.

26 I., pp. 11.

27 Ibid., pp. 51.

28 CM., pp. 27.

29 Footnote to Ibid., pp. 27.

30 I., pp. 43.

31 GES., pp. 101.

32 cf. our INTRODUCTION and our CHAPTER FOUR.

33 As Husserl says in his "Syllabus of a Course of Four Lectures";
There cannot be independent sciences side by side and as one amongst them philosophy, but only a sole universal science on a single absolute foundation. (Syllabus, pp. 23)

cf note and note 34 below.

34 Eugen Fink sets phenomenology in relation to the "mundane sciences" in the following manner:

Since phenomenology, through knowledge of the world in terms of its origin, realizes a knowing which in principle transcends all forms of mundane knowledge ..., it develops a new concept of science. While the traditional "universal" concept of science is basically related to "world-immanent knowledge", phenomenology, so to speak, "extends" the concept of science by developing a knowing which is world-transcendent. (HCC, pp. 98).

Phenomenology thereby distinguishes itself from the mundane sciences and remains independent of them. Yet, since it is directed towards "grounding" the mundane sciences, it is inclusive of worldly science and experience. Fink continues:

Phenomenological knowledge of origins does not take its place next to the mundane sciences, thereby falling under a common "higher concept" of "science in general" with them, but is in a definite sense prior to all worldly knowledge. ... the rigorous Science of phenomenology "grounds" all worldly science in a radical sense which cannot be viewed in terms of the mundane relationships of establishing one science by means of another. (HCC, pp. 98).

An objection could be raised at this point however. If the thematic sphere of all possible knowledge is the world (cf. I., pp. 51), how can one establish a world-transcendent science without entering into the realm of unsubstantiated speculation? We see that phenomenology cannot maintain its claim to a science (and therefore its claim to knowledge) unless it can also establish a method whereby knowledge of the world in terms of its origin can be had. In extending the notion of science, it at once must extend the scope of possible knowledge. Fink asks:

How can its questioning meaningfully transcend the world and how can it give an answer to the concern for a nongiven origin, this traditional theme of theology and speculation, in terms of a theoretical knowledge? In radical opposition to all metaphysics of faith and speculation, phenomenology develops a method of knowing which leads to the origin of the world itself and makes it the thematic object of a possible knowledge. This method and way of knowing ... is the "phenomenological reduction". (HCC, pp. 98-99).
Hence, we can see that the essentially new and radical nature of phenomenology as a rigorous Science of Being cannot be fully grasped as a possibility until the method which establishes this possibility (the phenomenological reduction) is introduced and understood. Once again, we are faced with the difficulties of understanding phenomenology "from the outside", cf. notes and cf. also our CHAPTER FOUR wherein we come to the conclusion that the phenomenological reduction as it is characterized by Husserl does not establish this possibility, but rather presupposes this possibility.


37 Latter., pp. 54. These three passages become extremely relevant when re-read in light of our CHAPTER FOUR.

38 The inclusion of the word "need" here is a absolutely decisive, as we shall see below in our CHAPTER FOUR. We agree, in spite of the arguments presented in that chapter, that "The need for a rigorous Science and full clarity, reflected in Husserl's personal need and task, goes deeper than this". (pp. 24) We feel that Husserl is merely voicing, in an honest and fully explicit manner, a need and faith inherent in philosophy itself as rationalism.

39 For an extremely clear presentation of the various forms that this historical scepticism can take, cf. PPH., pp. 246-252. Herein, Carr deals with and does full justice to the type of circularity which arises from the arguments of historical scepticism. Historical factual reflection tells us that philosophical systems have failed to stand the "test of time". There are, however, two possible extensions of this realisation. One is that we could be lead to say that the present attempt at philosophizing must be tempered and delimited by such knowledge. The other is that the present attempt at philosophizing is intellectually dishonest and foolish. That is, historical scepticism can lead one to disown the validity of even attempting to philosophize.

Carr's exposition of historicism and scepticism are very close to Husserl's arguments against irrationalism as presented in our CHAPTER FOUR (cf. PPH., pp. 250).
49 It is in this sense that the term "natural attitude" and the "naivety" attributed to it may take on a disparaging sense, for if man is not concerned with this question, he is not concerned with his true being. In the words of Martin Heidegger, man, "proximally and for the most part" is "fallen". That is, man is, for the most part "lost in the world of his concern" and is unaware and indifferent to the phenomenological question. This can easily take on an ethical tone, as it obviously does in Heidegger's terminology (dispite his protests to the contrary).

50 Ibid., pp. 105.

51 Ibid.

52 cf. our CHAPTER FOUR and our INTRODUCTION.

53 Although it may be of "mere" biographical interest, we find an interesting description of Husserl's personal motivations and attitude as regards the "source" of his belief in the scope and power of a rigorous Science of Being and the possibility of such a Science, in the follow-in passage. This is taken from a letter written to Arnold Metzger, wherein Husserl tells us of his personal philosophical convictions at the end of the nineteenth-century:

I still lived in an almost exclusive dedication to my theoretical work -- even though the decisive influences, which drove me from mathematics to philosophy as my vocation may lie in overpowering religious experiences and complete transformations. Indeed, the powerful effect of the New Testament on a 23-year old gave rise to an impetus to discover the
way to God and to a true life through a rigorous philosophical inquiry. (Letter., pp. 56)

It is on the basis of this and other passages that we make the claim in our INTRODUCTION and in our CHAPTER FOUR that Husserl's pre-phenomenological motivations directed the course of his study to the extent that they directed the scope of that which the phenomenological reduction would question. This passionate need for Science, clearly evident as early as 1882, was never forfeited by Husserl.

It is interesting to note in passing that the tone of this letter as well as the passages cited above (pp. 23-4) is one of a passionate, driving necessity. Such a tone is never revealed in Husserl's "official" works until Part One of the Crisis of European Sciences (1935).

54 CES., pp. 136.

55 We tend to think, therefore, that when Husserl states "Philosophy as a science, as serious, rigorous, indeed, apodictically rigorous science -- the dream is over." (CES., pp. 389), that he is not speaking of himself, but of his "followers" and the possibility of his life-work being continued along the lines he had set down.

56 Freiburg., pp. 59.

57 ETL., pp. 16.

58 Syllabus., pp. 21.

59 Did Husserl in fact radically put this faith to the test? Was not "the test" rather defined by this faith? That is, Husserl's constant critical spirit was defined beforehand as a Scientific critique. Thus, as we maintain in our CHAPTER FOUR, Science itself was never criticized in a radical manner.
CHAPTER TWO: Ascension to Immanence

60 CES., pp. 170.
61 L.L., pp. 55.
62 This, as we shall see below, can be taken as the begin-
nings of the notion of "Horizon" in Husserl's phenomenology.
63 L.L., pp. 255.
64 Ibid.

The following passage, in a letter from Frege to Husserl, is especially revealing:
One even now always takes it to be the task of logic to study certain psychic processes. Logic has in reality as little to do with this as with the movement of heavenly bodies. Logic, in no way, is part of psychology. The pythagorean theorem expresses the same thought for all men, while each person has his own representations, feeling, resolution which are different from those of every other person. Thoughts are not psychic structures, and thinking is not an inner producing and forming, but an apprehension of thoughts which are already objectively given. (pp. 88).
66 FFL., pp. 177.
67 Ibid., pp. 179.
68 Ibid., pp. 270-271.
69 I., pp. 106.
70 Ibid., pp. 51.
71 Ibid.
72 L.L., pp. 578.
73 cf. FFF., pp. 24-5. For a comparison of natural reflection and transcendental reflection, see CM., pp. 33-37 and KITP., pp. 32-41.
74 FFF., pp. 20-22.
75 I., pp. 107. It is interesting to compare this description
of the natural attitude with Husserl's description of the universal world-belief in EJ., pp. 28-39. Also, we should note a peculiar structure of the Ideas relevant here. Much later in the Ideas, Husserl comes to speak of the Protodoxa, which can be seen as a post-reduction description of the general thesis of the natural attitude. cf. I., pp. 298-300. As is so often the case with the Ideas, Husserl will re-formulate that which is described pre-reduction in line with the insights gained through the reduction.

76 I., pp. 114.
77 LI1., pp. 54.
78 Ibid., pp. 90.
79 Ibid., pp. 98.
80 Ibid., pp. 98-99.
81 Ibid., pp. 102.
82 Ibid., pp. 102.
83 Ibid., pp. 536, 540-41.
84 Ibid., pp. 557-58.
85 FRS., pp. 93.
86 I., pp. 43.
87 FTH., pp. 154.
88 FRS., pp. 80.
89 Ibid., pp. 80-81.
90 Ibid.
92 LI1., pp. 136.
93 See Ibid., pp. 135-155.
94 Ibid., pp. 253.
95 Ibid., pp. 265. This task is re-affirmed in the Idea of Phenomenology wherein Husserl states:
lack of clarity with regard to the meaning or essence of cognition requires a science of cognition; a science whose sole end is to clarify the essential nature of cognition. It is not to explain cognition as a psychological fact; it is not to inquire into the natural causes and laws of development and occurrence of cognitions. Rather, the task of the critique of cognition is to clarify, to cast light upon, the essence of cognition and the legitimacy of its claim to validity that belongs to its essence; and what else can this mean but to make the essence of cognition directly self-given. (IP., pp. 25).

96 1., pp. 114-115.
97 HCC., pp. 121.
98 IP., pp. 22 ff.
99 CES., pp. 155.

100 One of Husserl's most common and confusing traits is to include within what he is saying, an interpretation of what and how he is saying it, and an interpretation of what he has said in the past. It is sometimes very difficult to make congruous what Husserl says and what Husserl says he is doing. Paul Ricouer points out a particular example of this tendency. He notes that:

... the more I read Husserl, the more I become convinced that the method as practiced draws the philosopher in a direction that is less and less compatible with the method as philosophically interpreted. The method as practiced tends toward "the deepening of the consecration of the original attitude" of engagement in the world. The interpreted method tends towards a solipsistic idealism which definitely unballasts the "thing" of its relative alterity and does not succeed in accounting for the absolute alterity of the other, i.e., of the second person. (IP., pp. 155).

As we have said in our INTRODUCTION, that which Husserl's explicit procedure (the reduction) reveals was constantly interpreted and held to be encompassed by his implicit procedure (Science).

101 In fact, Ideas as a whole can easily prove to be one of Husserl's most misleading works. Again, the letter to Arnold Metzger gives us a biographical source of this unclarity. It also shows that Husserl himself felt that there was no "radical break" in inner motivation between the Logical Investigations and the Ideas. He says:
The Ideas have grown out of pure inner motivations, a working out of a continuous, unanswerable inner will and growth, just as the Logische Untersuchungen. I do not think there has been a development more straight and more certain of its goal, more predetermined, more "daemonic". When I published the Logische Untersuchungen, I had only a painfully divided logical consciousness, so much so that those near me had almost to wrest the manuscript from my hands. I felt, though I did not know why, that I had as yet neither fully clear philosophical foundation nor pure method, a clear general perspective on the work involved. When however, I wrote the Ideas -- in six weeks, without even a rough draft to use as a foundation, as in a trance -- read them over, and printed them right away, I humbly thanked God that I had been allowed to write this book, and could do no other than to stand by it, in spite of the many shortcomings of the work in detail. (Letter, pp. 62.)

We note in passing that those who would "salvage" Husserl from an "existentialist reading" (e.g. Robert Sokolowski) by interpreting the later Husserl in terms of the Logical Investigations must necessarily deny any real significant transformation or expansion of insight to Husserl. It is clear and evident that many of the directions of thought to come later can be found in germination in the Logical Investigations. But to demand of Husserl that his whole corpus be subsumed under the ideas implicit in his pre-phenomenological works does a great disservice to his development as a philosopher. Although this statement is somewhat extreme, it is nevertheless evident in Robert Sokolowski, Husserlian Meditations, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974).

102 It becomes more and more difficult to understand why Husserl chose this procedure, especially when he admits in the Introduction to the Ideas that:

...most emphatically... the pure phenomenology, to which in what follows we would prepare the way of approach, the same which emerged for the first time in the Logical Studies, and has revealed an even richer and deeper meaning to me as my thought has dwelled on it through the last ten years, is not psychology, and that it is not accidental delimitations and considerations of terminology but on grounds of principle, which forbids its being counted as psychology... It is itself as little identifiable with psychology as is geometry with natural science. (I., pp. 42).

Because of this, the pedagogical nature of chapter four of Ideas must be kept in mind, and cannot be too strongly emphasized.
103 **EFS.**, pp. 6.

104 **I.**, pp. 155.

105 **Ibid.**, pp. 156.


107 **I.**, pp. 126.

108 **Ibid.**, pp. 118.


110 **Ibid.**, pp. 144.

111 We feel that Husserl's work is hard enough to understand without such an oversight on the part of the translator such that he did not in all cases insert the German terms *Erlebnis* and *Erfahrung* in the text. This would have helped avoid many confusions. Boyce-Gibson consistently translated both *Erlebnis* and *Erfahrung* as "experience" and *real* and *real* as "real" without in all cases including the German equivalent.

112 **I.**, pp. 139.

113 **Ibid.**, pp. 143.

114 **Ibid.**, pp. 155.

115 **Ibid.**


117 **I.**, pp. 150 ff. cf. also **Ibid.**, pp. 154. It seems that Husserl insists on aggravating this tendency by calling the sphere of pure consciousness a "limited field" (**I.**, pp. 178). We feel that it takes on the appearance of a limited field or of a region among others, only if one allows the remanants of a psychological view of consciousness to interceed. Yet it is precisely this intercession that the phenomenological reduction is supposed to avert! We must point out that this does not result in a mere textual difficulty. Far more than this, it leads to a very common accusation against Husserl, the accusation, that is, of "subjectivism". Husserl says that he is going to analyze subjectivity. Now if that subjectivity is a region among others, a limited field, that region must be kept distinct from other regions.
A study of subjectivity becomes a "subjectivism" when the region or sphere is overextended into other regions and becomes the manner in which those other regions are interpreted. Therefore, when Husserl begins to speak of objects in the Ideas, he can easily be accused of subjectivism, for it seems that he has overextended the limited field or region of subjectivity and interpreted another region in terms of it. Thus the preliminary psychological exposition of consciousness is not only misleading; it is, more strongly, almost irreparably detrimental to the authentic and central meaning of phenomenology.
CHAPTER THREE: The Matter and Method of Immanence

118 CES., pp. 100.
119 Ibid., pp. 180.
120 HCP., pp. 127.
121 Fa., pp. 136.
122 Li., pp. 260-263.
123 Ibid., pp. 255.
124 Ibid., pp. 256.
125 IP., pp. 3.
126 Ibid., pp. 35.
127 Ibid., pp. 31.
128 PRS., pp. 35.
129 IP., pp. 2.
130 I., pp. 33.
131 Ibid., pp. 21.
132 Ibid., pp. 108.
133 Ibid., pp. 110.
134 Ibid., pp. 108.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid. As is so often the case in the Ideas, Husserl returns to certain issues that are raised before the reduction has been performed, after the reduction has been effected. We have already seen this evidenced in our note 75 with respect to the natural attitude. Now we can the same procedure followed with respect to the reduction itself; in Ideas, Husserl speaks of the "neutrality-modification" in the following manner:

Among the modifications which relate to the sphere of Belief, we have still to indicate one of the highest importance which occupies a position all by itself,
and should therefore in no way be placed on a line with those so far discussed. (I., pp. 306).
He goes on to say that:
We are dealing now with a modification which in a certain sense completely removes and renders powerless every doxic modality to which it is related, but in a totally different way from that of negation, which, in addition, as we saw, shows in the negated a positive effect, a non-being which is itself once more being. It cancels nothing, it "performs" nothing, it is the conscious counterpart of all performance: its neutralization. (I., pp. 306).
This then is a post-reduction, phenomenological description of the reduction itself and here it is set into relief against the various other forms of doxic modalities (e.g. negation, affirmation etc.).

137 CM., pp. 151. Perhaps Husserl should have said "...a sense which honest and genuine philosophy can uncover but never alter", for some philosophies most certainly alter the sense of the world through their efforts. We have only to look at philosophers who speak of "sense data" and "color patches" when referring to visual perception, which I personally have never experienced in perception.

138 I., pp. 107.
139 Kffe., pp. 22-3.
140 Ibid., pp. 23.
141 CM., pp. 19.
142 Ibid., pp. 19-20.
143 Ibid., pp. 20.
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid., pp. 35.
146 Again Fink gives us a clear outline of that which is involved in the performance of the reduction. He states that:
The transcending of the world which takes place in performing the phenomenological reduction does not lead outside of or away from the world to an origin which is separate from the world (and to which the world is connected only by some relation) as if leading us to some other world; the phenomenological
transcending of the world, as the disclosure of transcendental subjectivity, is at the same time the revelation of the world within the universe of absolute "being" that has been exposed. The world remains immanent to the absolute and is discovered as lying within it. In this way, the phenomenological reduction does not purely transcend the world but only the limitedness of the natural attitude ..., from which mundane philosophies originate and to which they remain related when the speculatively postulate a "transcendent" world origin. (H.E., pp. 99).

This passage will not become fully clear until our CHAPTER THREE has run its course. However, we may say for now that instead of positing a transcendent world origin, phenomenology wishes to show for a transcendental world-origin, cf. pp. 132-135 below.

147 H.E., pp. 20.
148 PA., pp. 141.
149 I., pp. 4.
150 Ibid., pp. 43.
151 cf. note 237 below.
152 PA., pp. 136.

153 We come to the position in our CHAPTER FOUR that (most certainly not according to Husserl) with the reduction, philosophy as a rigorous Science of Being is not possible. The uncritical re-instigation of the goal of Science after the performance of the reduction we take to be a denial of the insights of the reduction. cf. our CHAPTER FOUR, INTRODUCTION and note 237.

154 II., pp. 23.
155 Ibid., pp. 31.

156 Husserl did maintain, in the second edition of the Logical Investigations that phenomenology was left standing as a descriptive psychology, although he would never allow it to be seen as a sub-domain of empirical psychology. (cf. II I., pp. 261-264, wherein one can compare the aims and methods of the first (1901) and second (1913) editions of the Logical Investigations). We can see that the precise reason for this equation of phenomenology with descriptive psychology in this context is that in these in-
vestigations, Husserl deals solely with the real (reelle) elements of experience and has not yet concerned himself with intentional objectivity. This is clearly revealed in I., pp. 576, fn. 1. cf. also II., pp. 231.

157 I., pp. 41.
158 I., pp. 30.
159 Ibid., pp. 48-9.


161 I., pp. 2.
162 cf. I., pp. 82-84 and I., pp. 24-5.
164 I., pp. 63.
165 Ibid., pp. 8. Italics are mine.
166 Ibid., pp. 50.
167 I., pp. 260.
168 Ibid., pp. 92.
169 Ibid.
170 Ibid., pp. 108.
171 Ibid., pp. 110-111.
172 PL. pp. 12-3.

173 As Husserl stresses in the Ideas:

...no attempt is made to carry out systematically the transcendental knowledge that can be obtained through logical deduction. (I., pp. 12).
...in the transcendental sphere we have an infinitude of knowledge previous to all deduction, knowledge whose mediated connexions...have nothing to do with deduction... (I., pp. 12).

cf. also Ibid., pp. 204-205.

174 CM., pp. 24.

175 FIIHP., pp. 2.
Compare:

When Dasein directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but its primary kind of Being is such that it is always 'outside' alongside entities which it encounters and which belong to a world already discovered. Nor is any inner sphere abandoned when Dasein dwells alongside the entity to be known, and determines its character; but even in the 'Being-outside' alongside the object, Dasein is still 'inside', if we understand this in the correct sense; that is to say, it is itself 'inside' as a Being-in-the-world which knows. And furthermore, the perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning with one's booty to the 'cabinet' of consciousness after one has gone out and grasped it; even in perceiving, retaining and preserving, the Dasein which knows remains outside and it does so as Dasein. (AT; pp. 39, 152).

178 IP., pp. 48.
179 CM., pp. 33.
180 FTL., pp. 166.
181 I., pp. 150.
183 EM., pp. 59.
184 I., pp. 398.
185 G.B. Madison, "Phenomenology and Existentialism: Husserl and the End of Idealism" in Husserl: Expositions and Approaches, P. McCormick and F. Elleston, eds. (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, forthcoming) pp. 2. (Pagination cited here is from an unpublished version of this text presented at McMaster University, 1974).

186 I., pp. 413 and 148.
187 CM., pp. 62.
188 cf. IP., pp. 28.
Yet the validity of this question itself must be questioned. We see here the traditional epistemological question being asked:

...how can this game, which takes place in the purely immanent life of consciousness, acquire objective significance? How is it possible for evidence...to claim to be more than a more aspect of my own consciousness? (PL, pp. 31).

This essentially asks "...how can I get outside of my island of consciousness...?" (PL, pp. 32). How can two real things in the world (subject and object) contact one another in knowledge if one is outside of and distinct from the other?

The formulation of the epistemological question in this manner necessitates that, in a sense, the question has already been answered or, more precisely that an answer has already been presupposed in the formulation of the question itself. Husserl states:

To the extent that I apprehend myself as a natural human being, I presuppose having apprehended a spatial reality...I have conceived of myself as a being in space, in which I consequently have an outside of myself! Is it not true that the meaning of the question presupposes the validity of the perception of the world whereas in fact, and conversely, this objective validity should appear as the reply to the question? (PL, pp. 32).

This is to say that the world-apperception involved in the formulation of the traditional epistemological question is supposed as valid ahead of time and it "colors" this very formulation. I suppose ahead of time that I am a human being in the world and that objects are separate from me in the real sense. By presupposing this, I also presuppose that the question of the possibility of knowledge is a question of how these two real things, my real psychic process and the object, can contact one another. This presupposition is taken as valid, whereas it is precisely this presupposition which should be put into question by a radical epistemological critique. Rather than being questioned radically, this world-apperception is taken for granted to the extent that it "...has already entered into the sense assumed in the asking of the question." (WM, pp. 83).

All of this shows us that the posing of the traditional formulation of the epistemological question is assuming that which it is attempting to question. This shows forth the novelty of phenomenology. In fact, Husserl goes as far as to say the following:

...of what relevance here is the transcendental self-examination of phenomenology? Nothing other than that it shows the entire problem to be contradictory! (PL, pp. 31-32).
It is of interest here to compare what we have said in this context with Fink's definition of the radicality of the reduction in [*], pp. 110. This also throws light on Fink's statement:

... every explication of the a priori pregivenness of the world remains upon the basis of the natural attitude as long as man remains defined as that subjectivity with reference to which this problem is to be answered. ([*], pp. 141).

Man is the subject with reference to which the traditional epistemological question is asked, in that it asks how I this human being existing in the world, can reach other things in the world, i.e., objects. Man cannot be the subject with reference to which the phenomenological question is posed, for, seen in a radical manner, man himself (as a "special object" in the world) is part of that very world-pregivenness which is put into question.

190 [*], pp. 230.
191 Ibid., pp. 252.
192 Ibid., pp. 252.
193 Ibid., pp. 233.

194 I find Husserl's terminology on this point desperately misleading if not simply incorrect. The use of the world "actual" in phrases such as "actually given" or "actually experienced" could lead one to say that if I am actually given a mere perspective, and, if phenomenology deals with that which is actually given, I cannot go beyond this and speak of that which is not actually given i.e., that thing of which this is a perspective. One could go as far as to say "What I am actually given now in perception is a side or perspective (an "appearance") and even when I say that I perceive a side of something (when I attempt to speak of that which is appearing), I am going beyond what I actually perceive".

We must emphasize, because of the possibility of misconstruing Husserl on this point, that what I am actually given in this perception is, e.g., this coffee cup and not merely a side of this coffee cup. Saying as Husserl does that what we are "actually" given is only a side of this cup I would take to be a pedagogical device or abstraction by means of which he accomplishes two things. First of all, it allows him to indicate the inadequate givenness of transcendent objects (which is implicit in saying "I perceive this coffee cup" and is made explicit
in saying "I perceive a side of this coffee cup"). Secondly, this also allows Husserl to show the intentionality of consciousness which "goes beyond" what is "actually given". His use of terms in this case remains confusing, for we are not actually given a "side" or "perspective" in perception to which an intentional "going beyond" is superadded (as if the intentionality of consciousness in perception were somehow avoidable). The notion of "actually given" must therefore be used with caution.

195 ETL, pp. 234.
196 Ib., pp. 178.
197 JIP., pp. 30.
198 Ibid., pp. 36.

199 We can see from this that naturalism is a pure expression of the natural attitude which is concealed from itself. That is, naturalism is that philosophical system which is most clearly representative of a system based upon and expressive of the natural attitude. The unquestioned presuppositions of the natural attitude emerge as the "first principles" of naturalism in this manner. Naturalism takes for granted the validity of the world-apperception and poses its questions solely on this basis. The immediate obviousness of these first principles and our natural inclination towards them gives us a clue as to why Husserl was so concerned with exposing the absurdities of naturalism in his article "Philosophy as Rigorous Science". This also shows us a natural progression in Husserl's thought. His concern with salvaging logical objectivity from a psychologistic interpretation in the Logical Investigations lead him to unearth the philosophical presuppositions of the psychologistic tendency. This philosophical presupposition is precisely naturalism.

In the Logical Investigations, Husserl undermined psychologism by showing the sceptical absurdities which follow from it. In "Philosophy as Rigorous Science", Husserl implicitly undermines psychologism once again by undermining its philosophical underpinning, i.e., naturalism. We should also note in passing that the "anti-naturalism" of the "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" article is implicitly directed towards the "realism" of the Logical Investigations; for herein, in this latter work, Husserl still maintained a belief in the real distinction between the intentional object and the real object which exists "out there". This realistic doctrine is the last and most powerful vestige of naturalism; it is, essentially, the natural attitude.
This last point shows us yet another development in Husserl's thought. We see that, by beginning with a critique of psychology, Husserl naturally moved to its philosophical underpinning, evident in his later critique of naturalism. This eventually developed into a concise formulation of the essence of the naturalistic tendency — the general thesis of the natural attitude, formulated in the Ideas (1913). Through the suspension of this thesis by means of the phenomenological reduction, we see the natural fruition of a continuous line of development. With the reduction is suspended the tendency of naturalism as thereby is suspended the tendency of psychology.

Through this, we are lead away from naturalism's naive belief in the existence of a world independent of our experience. We are in this way lead to the world as it is experienced. One could say, therefore, that we are lead (and this indicates a further development of Husserl's thought) to the Lebenswelt.

200 EGS., pp. 121.
201 Ibid., pp. 96-97.
202 cf. note 34.
203 EGS., pp. 130.
204 GM., pp. 48-9.
205 ET., pp. 33.
206 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
207 cf. EGS., pp. 110.
208 It is for this reason that the phenomenological reduction must be a universal reduction. It is not enough to merely abstain from performing individual thetic positionings with respect to individual objects, for in this case, the world is still presupposed in that we still suppose that it is an object in the world with reference to which we are performing this abstention. We see rather that:

Instead of this universal abstention in individual steps, a completely different sort of universal epoche is possible, namely, one which puts out of action, with one blow, the total performance running through the whole of natural world-life and through the whole network of validities — precisely that total performance which, as the coherent "natural attitude", makes up "simple" straightforward life. (EGS., pp. 150).
The total world-belief must be put out of play. We shall come to see the full relevance of this below when we see that the notion of horizon leads us to understand that every particular object is "believed in" within the horizon of the world. If we do not put out of play this world-belief (which in fact defines the mundanity of the particular object in question) a particular abstention with respect to an object will always rest upon this world-belief and presuppose it.

We can now easily see why it is that Husserl believed that his phenomenology require an existential transformation of ourselves. We have put out of play that world-belief which served as the definition (however implicit) of what we have always and naturally taken ourselves to be, i.e., men in the world. We see now that:

Through the abstention which inhibits this whole hitherto unbroken way of life a complete transformation of all life is attained, a thoroughly new way of life. (EBE, pp. 150).

The ethical connotations of this are immense. They show us that, according to Husserl, phenomenology reveals the true being of humanity, a way of being that is not "fallen" or "lost in the world" but rather one which realizes its true spiritual being. Most certainly, as we noted in our CHAPTER ONE, philosophers here are "functionaries of mankind" (EBE, pp. 17). Most certainly philosophy becomes an "ethical cognitive demand" (Syllabus, pp. 23).

209 B.E., pp. 31.
210 Compare B.E., pp.
211 B.E., pp. 351.
212 Ibid., pp. 31-2.
213 cf. I., pp. 21, 168 and esp., 247 ff.
214 B.E., pp. 32.
216 Ibid.
217 HCC., pp. 131.
218 Ibid., pp. 36.
219 Thus we must distinguish between an indeterminate substrate, a substrate which "has" no determinations (e.g. a sense given manifold) and the indeterminate
"having of a world" which implies that this world has determinations, but these have not as yet been "explicitly" brought forth or shown.

220 CM., pp. 36
221 Ibid., pp. 36.
222 Ibid., pp. 39.
223 FTL., pp. 9.
224 Ibid.
225 Ibid.
226 Ibid.
227 CM., pp. 45.
228 Ibid.
229 FTL., pp. 200.
230 Ibid., pp. 254-55.
231 Ibid.
232 Ibid., pp. 278.
233 Ibid., pp. 13.
234 CM., pp. 85.
235 EJ., pp. 33.
236 Ibid.
237 I., pp. 413.
238 EJ., pp. 82-3.
239 FTL., pp. 10.
240 CM., pp. 47.
241 Ibid.
242 Ibid., pp. 50.
243 EJ., pp. 33.
244 I., pp. 102.
245 CH., pp. 43.
246 Ibid., pp. 49.
247 ET., pp. 33.
248 cf. ET., pp. 32, 84-85.
249 CH., pp. 44.
250 Ibid.
251 TTL., pp. 279.
252 ET., pp. 270.
253 CH., pp. 37.
254 I., pp. 51.
255 cf. CHS., pp. 110 and esp., 176 and also I., pp. 105-106.
256 L.C., pp. 93-99, 145.
257 Ibid., pp. 144-145.
258 ET., pp. 48.
259 L.C., pp. 134.
260 ET., pp. 49.
261 CHS., pp. 178-134.
262 L.L.2., pp. 549.
263 Ibid.
264 Ibid.
265 Ibid.
266 Ibid.
267 cf. Ibid., pp. 549, fint. 1.
268 I., pp. 233.
269 Ibid.
270 Ibid.

271 FL., pp. 48.


274 Ibid., pp. 31.

275 Ibid., pp. 31-32.

276 FL., pp. 33.

277 Ibid., pp. 39.

278 FL., pp. 38.

279 FL., pp. 111.

280 Ibid., pp. 110.

281 CM., pp. 67.

282 Ibid., pp. 68.

283 FL., pp. 232.

284 Ibid., pp. 236.

285 Ibid., pp. 250.

286 FL., pp. 32-3.
CHAPTER FOUR: The Question of Transcendence

287 I feel, in fact that Husserl's method (the reduction) outruns his self-interpretation (Science) to the extent that his method escapes the criticisms leveled against his presuppositions of Science. In fact, we feel that his method makes possible the decisiveness of those criticism's.

We have said in our INTRODUCTION that it is precisely a demand of Science that requires of phenomenology that it be a philosophy of Immanence. As we said, any self-consistent scientific philosophy must be a philosophy of Immanence. Herein we noted that Husserl's equation of the nature possibility and necessity of a rigorous Science with the nature possibility and necessity of phenomenology as such shows us that the authentic and central meaning of phenomenology remained unknown to Husserl. Perhaps we should have tempered that comment and said rather that because of Husserl's demands for Science, insights which transcended that demand remained unknown to Husserl.

We maintained in our INTRODUCTION that Husserl's reinstatement of the goal of Science once the reduction had been effected was a denial of the universality and radicality necessitated by the phenomenological reduction. The goal of Science and the impassioned faith in Reason held by Husserl necessitated that these not be effectively changed or "bracketed" by the reduction. Husserl forfeited the radicality of the reduction in favour of Science.

Perhaps it will be discovered through further study that even the phenomenological reduction as we have characterized it, runs into difficulties. I can foresee the possibility of saying that only in view of a faith in the possibility of Science can one maintain that a complete reduction is possible. Perhaps even holding to the necessity of a complete reduction (i.e., feeling that one must have a complete reduction), is itself a demand of Science. We have said in our INTRODUCTION that Husserl did not remain true to the radicality of the reduction, because of his faith in Science. Perhaps it is just this faith in science that demands a radical, complete reduction.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in the "Preface" to his Phenomenology of Perception says "The most important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction" (Preface, pp. xiv). The realization of the Lebenswelt in Husserl's Crisis is nothing other than the realization of "...the unmotivated upsurge of the world" (Ibid, pp. xiv). It is thus that, when "freed" from the overriding demands of Science, the reduction becomes self-limiting by revealing the limits of reflective thought. That is, it is thus that the reduction becomes the central and decisive factor in the realization of its own
limitations. Merleau-Ponty goes on to say that:

"Far from being, as has been thought, a procedure of idealistic philosophy, phenomenological reduction belongs to existential philosophy. . . ." (Ibid., pp. xiv).

I am sure that at this point, Husserl would strongly react. If a complete reduction is in principle not possible the attainment of the sphere of phenomenological Immanence is not possible, for through such an admission, phenomenology must also admit a "dependence" on that which falls outside its scope; as Merleau-Ponty puts it "...radical reflection amounts to a consciousness of its own dependence on an unreflective life. . . ." (Ibid.). Science cannot allow such a dependence; it must be an independent and autonomous sphere, which perhaps draws on prerelative life as the "source" of thema for Scientific explication, but these explications carry within themselves their own "sources" of justification. Merleau-Ponty takes Husserl's viewing of himself as a "perpetual beginner" to show that Husserl implicitly believed in the impossibility of a complete reduction (Ibid.). We believe that if this were the case, we would have to say that Husserl implicitly believed in the impossibility of Science.

288 Herein we imply our acceptance of Husserl's viewing phenomenology as the consummation of the Idea of philosophy as such. Husserl truly represented Rationalism carried to its logical conclusion (in fact, we show in our INTRODUCTION that Husserl carried it beyond its logical conclusion into its self-destruction, although we feel that he was unaware that this had occurred — perhaps, to do more justice to Husserl insight, we could say that he was aware that this was occurring and simply did not want it to occur). Husserl therefore sets his phenomenology in a distinctive relation to the history of Rationalism. Herbert Spiegelberg, in the text The Phenomenological Movement (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970, vol. I) cites a revealing passage in a letter written by Husserl in 1935. He sees his phenomenology as:

"...a method by which I want to establish against mysticism and irrationalism a kind of super-rationalism (Überrationalsismus) which transcends the old rationalism as inadequate and yet vindicates its inmost objectives. (pp. 34).

Husserl therefore views his phenomenology as the "salvation" of rationalism as Idea. cf. note 289 below.

289 Husserl wishes to salvage Rationalism as Idea from its inadequate manifestations and naive self-interpretations in the 18th and 19th centuries. The objections raised against his phenomenology being a mere resurgance of
"intellectual snobbism" (ES., pp. 289-290) give rise to Husserl's claim that it is not rationalism as such which is at fault, but rather a misguided rationalism. He states:

I too am certain that the European crisis has its roots in a misguided rationalism. But we must not take this to mean that rationality as such is evil or that it is of only subordinate significance for mankind's existence as a whole. Rationality in that high and genuine sense of which alone we are speaking the primordial Greek sense which in the classical period of Greek philosophy had become an ideal, still requires to be sure, much clarification, through self-reflection; but it is called in its mature form to guide our development. (ES., pp. 290).

The crisis of Europeans Science is not therefore a crisis which has its roots in rationalism per se, but it rather has its roots in rationalism misrepresentations of itself in naturalism and objectivism which both naturalize consciousness and therewith, according to Husserl, deny the possibility of attaining meaningfulness (ES., pp. 297).

290 ES., pp. 338.
291 PA., pp. 131.
292 CM., pp. 155.
293 ES., pp. 394. For a comparison of how Husserl's attitude towards his phenomenology changed through the years, it moved from his dogmatic statements in the Freiburg Lecture, wherein he states that phenomenology will easily "... overcome all resistance and stupidity" (pp. 18), to many of the statements in the Crisis where he speaks of his passioned need for phenomenology and his desire to believe in its possibility (cf. ES., pp. 17. 296, 394).
294 ES., pp. 3.
295 CM., pp. 8.
296 Ibid. Italics mine.
297 Ibid., pp. 151.

298 Through the revaluation of transcendental subjectivity, Husserl felt that the sciences gained a universal and unitary grounding. "All the sciences, in fact, all moments of conscious life, are ultimately grounded in transcendental subjectivity. Husserl, in his *Formal and Transcendental*
states:

The emancipated special sciences fail to understand the essential one-sidedness of their productions; they fail to understand that they will not encompass in their theories the full being-sense of their respective provinces until they lay aside the blinders imposed by their method, as an inevitable consequence of the exclusive focusing of each on its own particular province; in other words until they relate their combined researches to ... the universality of being and its fundamental essential unity. (p. 14.)

Therefore, with reference to phenomenology and its relation to the sciences, Husserl states:

The original grounding of all the sciences ... gives all of them unity, as branches of a constituted production from the one transcendental subjectivity.

In other words, there is only one philosophy, one actual and genuine science; and particular ... sciences are only non-selfsufficient members within it. (p. 272).

The special sciences are blinded to the horizons of their activities, for they are exclusively directed towards objects within that horizon. Because of this, there is an "exclusivity" to the special sciences which denies the possibility of any one special science finding a unified meaning in the sciences (and this is precisely the definition of the crisis of European Science). The special scientist, in his scientific work, lives in a self-forgetfulness, being directed towards objects in his province and not that province as such. Husserl states that the phenomenologist:

... must rise above the self-forgetfulness of the theorizer who, in his theoretical producing, devotes himself to the subject-matter, the theories and the methods, and accordingly knows nothing of the inwardness of that producing -- who lives in producing but does not have this productive life itself as a theme within his field of vision. (p. 15).

We could say then that this self-forgetfulness is essential to the possibility of the special sciences. This self-forgetfulness should not therefore be taken as a criticism of special science (as if it could do anything else and remain science). It is rather a definition of science.

299 One may accuse Husserl of "logicism" at this point very easily. A passage from Merleau-Ponty's Visible and Invisible might help us to understand this better and to understand how Husserl would defend himself against certain accusations.
In speaking of what he calls the "perceptual faith", Merleau-Ponty states:

... to identify it with the reasons which we have to restore it some value once it has been shaken is to postulate that the perceptual faith has always been a resistance to doubt. ... (VI., pp. 50).

To find the Ratio of a certain conscious act, to find its essence, in this manner is to suppose first of all and beforehand that that which is investigated is and has always been reasonable, essentially and has a reason which is forthwith discoverable. That this necessarily consists in a transformation or change of what is "really there" is an agreement countered by Husserl in his *Ideas* when he argues against Wattle's denial of the possibility of pure reflection (cf. I., pp. 223-232).

Husserl would say that this process is inevitable and absolutely legitimate (VI., pp. 50). Husserl might say the following: In the postulation of some pre-reflective life that is inaccessible to reflection are we not committed to saying that on this view we have some "insight" into the essential nature of the pre-reflective to the extent that we can say (A) that it is such that it has no discoverable essence or reason and (B) that a transformation (and hence a "fallaciousness") need necessarily occur if rational insight comes to bear on it? This is similar to Husserl's argument against psychologism wherein he would say that psychologism says that consciousness is essentially a real psychic process, while at the same time (and as a consequence of this insight) denying the possibility of essential insight.

Could Husserl not also say the following: I do no wish to change or transform what is essentially vague and opaque or obscure into something else. This is accusing me of a naive and offensive rationalism or logicism. For example, the inadequate givenness of the real object and its reticence is not one that is overcome or dissolved by phenomenology or superceded by a theoretical method which transcends this essential characteristic. My phenomenology, rather than doing violence to the perceptually given thing (as does a mathematical method), wishes rather to maintain and preserve the perceptually given thing as given (i.e., as reticently).

300 See above, pp. 35-6.
301 See above, pp. 36.
302 See above, pp. 36.
303 See above, pp. 36-7.
This can be easily compared to what Martin Heidegger says in his essay "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking". In one section of this work, he compares the method and matter of Husserlian phenomenology. He tells us that "...what concerns philosophy as its matter is established from the outset" (EPTL, pp. 64). Philosophy deals with that which is present, that which is given; in Husserl's case, transcendental subjectivity. Moreover, with specific reference to Husserl, Heidegger states:

The method is not only directed toward the matter of philosophy. It does not just belong to the matter as a key belongs to a lock. Rather, it belongs to the matter because it is "the matter itself". If one wanted to ask: Where does "the principle of all principles" get its unshakable right, the answer would have to be: from transcendental subjectivity which is already presupposed as the matter of philosophy. (EPTL, pp. 83).

Therefore we see that that which is revealed by the reduction is that which gives legitimacy to the reduction and thereby legitimizes that revelation.
Primary Sources


Secondary Materials


