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|Title:||Moore's Influence on Russell's Early Philosophical Development|
|Authors:||Lucas, Bill J.|
|Abstract:||<p>Section I of this essay is concerned with certain introductory issues: a statement of the main purpose of the essay; a brief discussion of certain problems involved is assessing Moore's influence on Russell; and a division of evidence regarding influence into types.</p> <p>Section II of the essay is a detailed consideration of Russell's published statements regarding Moore's influence on his philisophical development. A large number of such statements exists. Examination reveals they differ considerably on the role assigned to Moore. The basic results reached include: Russell's statements concerning Moore's influence are not always reliable unless it is recalle that he may be thinking of Moore's valuable personality traits or Moore's impact on the Cambridge philosophy department as an academic institution and that Russell was characteristically "over-generous" in giving others credit for his achievements. A detailed chronological pattern of the Russell-Moore relationship is sketched. Further results of this investigation include: the change in Russell's philisophy from Hegelianism to "the new philosophy" occured in the years 1898 through 1900 and was regarded by Russell as the major change his entire intellectual career; Moore's role in this period was greater than that of any other living philosopher (if Peano is counted as a mathematician), yet Moore was not a necessary factor in Russell's development; Moore's influence on Russell was virtually all confined to the years 1898 through 1910 and to works of Moore published by 1903; chief among Moore's writings which influenced Russell is "The Nature of Judgment", which is perhaps<br />itself due in significant measure to Russell; the characterization of the Russell-Moore relationship put forth by, eg, G. J. Warnock is completely untenable.</p> <p>Section III is a detailed examination of Moore's essay, "The Nature of Judgment". Considerable detail is gone into here, as one result of Section II was to show that Moore's essay is, in general, a reliable guide to Russell's general philosophical position in 1898 and 1899. The basic theses of Moore's essay are stated witll some precision, and Moore's arguments for them are formulated and critically evaluated. An interpretation of Moore's concept of the concept is put forward, and it is argued that this interpretation is helpful in making sense of all of Eoore's basic theses in his essay.</p> <p>Section IV contains a discussion of Russell's doctrine of terms in The Principles of Mathematics. The basic properties common to all terms are set forth. It is then shown how the doctrine of terms involves a rejection of Moore's doctrine of concepts in "The Nature of Judgment". Russell's views on the nature or the proposition and on necessity are shown to also be similar to the views in Moore's essay. Finally, some of the key similarities and differences between Moore's and Russell's views are summarized.</p>|
|Appears in Collections:||Open Access Dissertations and Theses|
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