MOORE'S INFLUENCE ON RUSSELL
MOORE'S INFLUENCE ON RUSSELL'S EARLY PHILOSOPHICAL DEVELOPMENT

By

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Section I of this essay is concerned with certain introductory issues: a statement of the main purposes of the essay; a brief discussion of certain problems involved in assessing Moore's influence on Russell; and a division of evidence regarding influence into types.

Section II of the essay is a detailed consideration of Russell's published statements regarding Moore's influence on his philosophical development. A large number of such statements exists. Examination reveals they differ considerably on the role assigned to Moore. The basic results reached include: Russell's statements concerning Moore's influence are not always reliable unless it is recalled that he may be thinking of Moore's valuable personality traits or Moore's impact on the Cambridge philosophy department as an academic institution and that Russell was characteristically "over-generous" in giving others credit for his achievements. A detailed chronological pattern of the Russell-Moore relationship is sketched. Further results of this investigation include: the change in Russell's philosophy from Hegelianism to "the new philosophy" occurred in the years 1898 through 1900 and was regarded by Russell as the major change his entire intellectual career; Moore's role in this period was greater than that of any other
living philosopher (if Peano is counted as a mathematician), yet Moore was not a necessary factor in Russell's development; Moore's influence on Russell was virtually all confined to the years 1898 through 1910 and to works of Moore published by 1903; chief among Moore's writings which influenced Russell is "The Nature of Judgment", which is perhaps itself due in significant measure to Russell; the characterization of the Russell-Moore relationship put forth by, eg, G. J. Warnock is completely untenable.

Section III is a detailed examination of Moore's essay, "The Nature of Judgment". Considerable detail is gone into here, as one result of Section II was to show that Moore's essay is, in general, a reliable guide to Russell's general philosophical position in 1898 and 1899. The basic theses of Moore's essay are stated with some precision, and Moore's arguments for them are formulated and critically evaluated. An interpretation of Moore's concept of the concept is put forward, and it is argued that this interpretation is helpful in making sense of all of Moore's basic theses in his essay.

Section IV contains a discussion of Russell's doctrine of terms in The Principles of Mathematics. The basic properties common to all terms are set forth. It is then shown how the doctrine of terms involves a rejection of Moore's doctrine of concepts in "The Nature of Judgment". Russell's views on
the nature of the proposition and on necessity are shown to also be similar to the views in Moore's essay. Finally, some of the key similarities and differences between Moore's and Russell's views are summarized.
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I

The purposes of this essay can be briefly summarized as follows.

To give a reasonably full and accurate (and only moderately critical) characterization of Moore's theses (and his arguments for them) in "The Nature of Judgement" ("NJ" hereafter)

To show that Moore's doctrine of concepts is of fundamental importance for his general position

To characterize Russell's exposition of the doctrine of terms in The Principles of Mathematics (POM hereafter) and to show its similarities to and differences from Moore's doctrine of concepts

To show that Russell's views on the nature of propositions and on necessity are similar to, and derived from, Moore's views on these topics

To show that Moore was, at the time he wrote "NJ", a materialist and that Russell, at the time he wrote POM, was not a materialist

To do all of the above in the context of a study of Moore's influence on Russell

To carefully examine Russell's published statements concerning Moore's influence on him and to assess the extent and nature of Moore's influence on Russell.¹

¹One merit claimed for this essay is the discovery and use of indexical evidence in determining Moore's influence on Russell.
As is obvious from this summary statement of purpose, some comparison of Russell and Moore's views will be made in the course of the essay. It would be a mistake to infer, however, that a purpose of this essay is to consider all and only those views of Moore which Russell explicitly accepted or rejected in *POM*. The adoption of such a goal would mean that a significant and philosophically important portion of "NJ" could not be discussed, since Russell did not even consider certain of the philosophical problems dealt with in Moore's essay when he wrote out his book. And this in turn means that a significant portion of Russell's views, views on which he was influenced by Moore, could not be discussed. (It is clear - see below - that Russell accepted the general philosophical position set out in Moore's essay. With only a few exceptions, Russell refused to discuss these views in *POM*, his reason being that he was writing a book on the philosophy of mathematics and so wanted to avoid, where possible, more general philosophical issues.) A study that compared Moore's essay and Russell's book point for point would be incompatible with a study that examined Moore's influence on Russell, since many of the issues on which Russell was influenced by Moore were not discussed in *POM*.

Before proceeding with the tasks outlined above, a brief discussion of the kinds of evidence relevant to claims of influence and of some problems affecting a study of the
Russell-Moore relationship is necessary.

One problem that, while not unique, is particularly acute for interpreting Russell's philosophy concerns a possible kind of evidence as to the nature of his views. Russell makes a number of statements which strictly imply that lots of statements made by other people about Russell's views are correct. Thus, e.g., in reply to Morris Weitz' essay in *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*, Russell says:

"In the main, his interpretations seem to me completely just ...(A few "misunderstandings" are noted, and Russell then continues) With everything else in Mr. Weitz' essay I am in agreement" (p.684, 686).² If Russell's remarks of this type are accurate, they generate a whole new (and fairly large) class of philosophical statements to be accounted for in any interpretation of Russell's philosophy. Unfortunately, Russell is widely considered to quite often misunderstand what other philosophers say. Insofar as this popular opinion is correct, it seems at least plausible to suppose that Russell misunderstood (or merely overlooked) some of these assertions he endorsed.

Another problem for study of the Russell-Moore interaction is that the Russell-Moore relationship is relatively atypical in the history of philosophy. It is, to begin with,

² Similar statements, about different essays, occur on pages 695, 698, 710, and 726.
a two-way relationship. In addition, the influence occurred not only through published books and articles and (then) unpublished letters, but also, and to a large extent, in face-to-face interaction through conversations. Both of these factors make an interaction study complicated.\footnote{The second makes it extremely difficult to decide who gets priority for a view, since the first to publish may have been influenced by conversation with the other.}

It should also be borne in mind when studying the Russell-Moore relationship that the fallacy of the common cause is likely to occur here, especially in the earliest phase of their interaction. A large number of doctrines both held were gained, not from each other, but from F. H. Bradley. (This does not rule out, however, the possibility of, say, Moore being influenced by Bradley on some point and Russell adopting the view after being persuaded by Moore.)

Assuming that it is worthwhile to study the influence of Moore and Russell on each other and that we are aware of some of the general and particular problems involved in such a study, what kinds of evidence do we have on which to base our results? I can see three distinct types of evidence, which I divide into three groups: a) Russell and Moore on Russell and Moore; b) textual; c) indexical. Class a includes any statement by either as to the influence the other had on him. (Therefore, a includes, if genuine,
any statement (on the other) attributed to either of them by a third person who came in contact with them.) Class b includes all philosophical assertions made by either (and therefore, possibly excluding class a). Just what class c contains will become clearer in Section II of this essay. ¹

¹ A fourth category that might be suggested is the interpretations of other historians of philosophy. While these do need to be considered and one measure of the adequacy of an interpretation is the author's ability to defend his disagreements with other researchers, I see no reason to call these interpretations evidence.
II

Section IV of this essay makes use of textual evidence by describing Russell's general philosophical views in POM which were derived from Moore. At this point, I want to examine what Russell himself has to say concerning Moore's influence on him, and to examine the indexical evidence concerning Moore's influence on Russell. Both of these tasks require going beyond the early period of their interaction. To begin with, what does Russell have to say about his interaction with Moore?

There are at least eight publications in which Russell discusses his interactions with Moore at any significant length. They are: "My Religious Reminiscences" (1938); "My Mental Development" (1943); Portraits From Memory (1959); an article in the Times (28 October, 1958); My Philosophical Development (1959); an item in the Listener (30 April, 1959); The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell (vol. 1, 1967); the 1902 Preface to POM.¹ I shall discuss in detail his comments in each source, beginning with the first of those listed.

In his essay "My Religious Reminiscences"², Russell makes several important statements about his early philoso-

¹ The dates given are those of first publication in sources mentioned (except for the second, which is the date it was written). The order in which they were actually composed is rather different.
² Reprinted in BWBR, pp 31-36.
The men who changed my opinions at that time were two: first McTaggart in one direction, and then, after I had become a Fellow, G. E. Moore in the opposite direction. McTaggart made me a Hegelian, and Moore caused me to revert to the opinions I had had before I went to Cambridge. (p. 33)

The sort of view that I had previously held, 'either there is a God or there is not, and probably the latter', seemed to them very crude; the correct opinion, they would say, was that from one point of view there is a God and from another there is not, but from the highest point of view there neither is nor is not. Being myself naturally 'crude', I never succeeded in reaching this pitch of mellowness. (p. 34)

I determined to study (McTaggart's philosophy) sympathetically, and for a time I more or less believed it. So, for a short time, did G. E. Moore. But he found the Hegelian philosophy inapplicable to chairs and tables, and I found it inapplicable to mathematics; so with his help I climbed out of it, and back to common sense tempered by mathematical logic. (p. 35)

From these statements it seems to follow that, (1) Moore probably abandoned Hegelianism before Russell (Russell believed it "for a time", Moore "for a short time") and "caused" and helped Russell to abandon it, (2) Russell was never a full-fledged Hegelian (he "more or less" believed it but never became fully "mellow"), and that (3) the position to which Moore "caused" Russell to turn was the position Russell held before he went to Cambridge (and hence before he met Moore). From (3) it would seem to follow that Moore's influence on Russell was minimal, consisting in influencing Russell to readopt Russell's own former views - in particular it seems to follow that Russell learned no new philosophical
views from Moore. In the light of other evidence, this last we know to be false. Hence, it seems to follow that Russell was sometimes careless in stating who influenced him in what way. (This is further suggested by Russell's saying in the above quoted remarks that Moore helped him to abandon Hegelianism and also saying there that Moore caused him to abandon Hegelianism.) Fortunately, Russell discussed Moore's influence in a sufficiently large number of places to allow us to sift the probable truth from his many remarks.

In "My Mental Development", Russell makes the following claims about his early philosophical career. Moore was "a great influence" (my italics) on his philosophy after Russell's years at Cambridge (1890-1894) (p.9-10). Russell left Cambridge as a Hegelian (p.10) and continued to be one "to 1898" (p.11). In the spring of 1898, he was still making philosophical plans as a Hegelian. "During 1898", he abandoned "both Kant and Hegel" (p.11). Four factors led to this change. He read Hegel's Greater Logic, rejected Bradley's arguments against external relations, didn't "like"

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3 One value of the indexical evidence of Moore's influence on Russell is that it is free from this sort of error yet supports the general trends found in Russell's own remarks.

4 Unless otherwise noted, all italics in quotations in this section of the essay are mine.

5 This is suggested by the mention of his Tiergarten experience on page 11. The event is referred to as if it occurred in 1895. See The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, vol. 1, p.125.
the "subjectivity of the 'Transcendental Aesthetic'", and was influenced by Moore. Here is what he says regarding Moore. "These motives would have operated more slowly than they did, but for the influence of G. E. Moore. He also had a Hegelian period, but it was briefer than mine. He took the lead in rebellion, and I followed, with a sense of emancipation. (p.12)" Due to chance, Russell was asked to lecture on Leibniz in 1898, and "something of this point of view (i.e., of Russell and Moore's Revolutionary views) appeared in my Philosophy of Leibniz" (published in 1900). 7 (p.12) Although 1898 was a very good year, "the most important year in my intellectual life was the year 1900" (p.12).

Assuming that Russell's assessment here is accurate, there seem to be a number of conclusions of some importance that are justified by his remarks. Both he and Moore were Hegelians. Russell abandoned Hegelianism during 1898, yet the revolution continued through 1900. Two of his reasons for revolting were philosophical, one was temperamental, and the other was Moore's influence. Moore was an important influence on Russell at this time, but (a) Moore only made

6Another example of Russell's conceiving of this period as a sort of Revolution is shown here.

7 Just when the book, lectures, and thought were done is not completely clear. One could infer that the lectures were given in 1898 from the above quoted passage. Yet in PL, Russell says the lectures were delivered in the "Lent Term of 1899" (p.xiii). His major insight into Leibniz (discovery of basic premises) occurred when he read the Discours de Metaphysique (p.xiii, PL), whenever that was.
the inevitable revolution come sooner\textsuperscript{8}, and (b) Moore was not as influential as Russell's visit to the International Congress of Philosophy in Paris and his contact with Peano (p.12). And finally, Russell's \textit{The Philosophy of Leibniz} is a reliable guide to Russell and Moore's common views during this period.

Russell's remarks concerning the revolution and G. E. Moore in \textit{Portraits From Memory} can be summarized as follows.

In the essay, "Why I Took to Philosophy", Russell gives only one reason for abandoning Hegelianism. "In a rash moment, however, I turned from the disciples to the Master and found in Hegel himself a farrago of confusions and what seemed to me little better than puns. I therefore abandoned his philosophy." (p.22) Although McTaggart is given credit as the major personal influence on Russell during his Hegelian period, no mention is made of Moore's influence in the Revolutionary period. Immediately after the sentence just quoted, Russell asserts "For a time I found satisfaction in a doctrine derived, with modification, from Plato." He goes on to say that this "watered-down" Platonism was also abandoned, "in the end". Two conclusions

\textsuperscript{8}All Russell explicitly gives Moore credit for here is speeding up the process. No specific argument or doctrine is attributed to Moore. For all Russell says in this essay, Moore's influence might have consisted in the \textit{psychological} boost given by Moore's own example in rejecting Hegel.
are suggested by this last passage. (1) Russell's philosophy during the revolutionary period (and hence also Moore's) was "mildly" Platonic. 9 (2) Plato, therefore, was a major influence at this period, possibly rivalling or excelling G. E. Moore. 10

In the essay "Some Philosophical Contacts", Russell primarily discusses the influence on him of Couturat, Cantor, Frege, and L. Wittgenstein. He concludes by saying that only two people influenced him "even more" than these, Peano and "my friend, G. E. Moore" (p.29). Nothing more is said about Moore.

In "Beliefs: Discarded and Retained", Russell says that he "began to develop a philosophy of (his) own during the year 1898, when, with encouragement from my friend G. E. Moore, I threw over the doctrines of Hegel" (p.40). Here Moore gets credit for "encouraging" Russell to abandon Hegel ("Come on Bertie, you don't really believe that crap.") But the philosophy that was developed to replace Hegelianism was "my own".

9 Cp. "Philosophy in the Twentieth Century" (in Sceptical Essays), where Russell says: "The new philosophy had at first a strong tincture of Platonic and Mediaeval realism: it regarded abstracts as having the same kind of existence as concretes have" (p.73).

10 This raises a problem about the nature of influence. Probably it was not Plato, or even the study of the Platonic corpus, that influenced Russell so much as the "Platonic tradition" in philosophy, whatever that means. In measuring influence, how is the importance of a tradition or school of thought to be with that of an acquaintance or teacher?
Russell makes a number of interesting statements about Moore in "Some of My Contemporaries at Cambridge". Since, however, they are all extracted from volume 1 of the autobiography, it seems better to discuss only the longer version. Many of the important statements concerning Moore in the 1958 Times article are also from the autobiography, and nearly all of them are from either the autobiography or My Philosophical Development. Before considering these two sources, however, there are two sentences that occur (only) in the Times that should be noticed. They are: "When I first knew him (G. E. Moore) he was a disciple of Lucretius ..." and "I still think that this article ("NJ") gave conclusive proof of philosophical genius."

Moore is mentioned in only two passages in My Philosophical Development. On pages 11-12, Russell says that he (Russell) was "indoctrinated" with Kant and Hegel at Cambridge,

But Moore and I together came to reject both these philosophies. I think that, although we agreed in our revolt, we had important differences of emphasis. What I think at first chiefly interested Moore was the independence of fact from knowledge and the rejection of the whole Kantian apparatus of a priori intuitions and categories...I agreed enthusiastically with him in this respect, but I was more concerned than he was with certain purely logical matters.

11 Cp. page 10 for Kant.
Russell then elaborates a little on the "logical matters" and says he developed this view in *The Philosophy of Leibniz* (p.12). He also goes on to say that, during this period, he went to extremes and believed in the existence of whatever couldn't be proved not to exist - "Platonic universals" in particular.12

Certain of Russell's remarks on p.54 had better be quoted in full.

It was towards the end of 1898 that Moore and I rebelled against both Kant and Hegel. Moore led the way, but I followed closely in his footsteps. I think that the first published account of the new philosophy was Moore's article in *Mind* on 'The Nature of Judgement.' Although neither he nor I would now adhere to all the doctrines in this article, I, and I think he, would still agree with its negative part - ie, with the doctrine that fact is in general independent of experience. Although we were in agreement, I think that we differed as to what most interested us in our new philosophy. I think that Moore was most concerned with the rejection of idealism, while I was most interested in the rejection of monism. 13

A number of conclusions can be drawn from Russell's remarks in *My Philosophical Development*. They are as follows.

1) Much of Russell's philosophy in the Revolutionary period is contained in *The Philosophy of Leibniz*. (2) Russell believed in the existence of a platonic world of universals in

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13 All but the last two sentences of this passage are reproduced verbatim in the *Times* article.
this period. (3) "The Nature of Judgement" is the first published expression of the "new philosophy". (4) An important doctrine (the only one Russell still accepts) in "NJ" is the view that fact is (generally) independent of experience (ie, Idealism is false). (5) The revolt occurred late in 1898. (6) Although both accepted the new philosophy, and rejected Kant and Hegel, they valued and emphasized different aspects of the new philosophy. (7) Moore's main concern was with the doctrine mentioned in (4).

In one respect, the two passages seem to not be in perfect agreement. In the first, Moore and Russell "together" made the revolt, whereas in the second, Moore "led the way" (although Russell followed "closely" behind).

One of the best sources of Russell's views on Moore's interaction is Russell's autobiography. Remarks about Moore and the revolt relevant to our inquiry are made on pp. 63, 64, 73, 107, 108, 125, and 134-5 of volume one.

On page 63, Russell says: "For two or three years, under (McTaggart's) influence, I was a Hegelian. I remember the exact moment during my fourth year when I became one. I had gone out to buy a tin of tobacco, and was going back with it along Trinity Lane, when suddenly I threw it up in the air and exclaimed: 'Great God in boots! - the ontological argument is sound!'...After 1898 I no longer accepted McTaggart's
philosophy." This suggests that 1898 was the last year in which Russell was a Hegelian, and that he was only a Hegelian for two or three years. But this is hardly possible. If we count 1898 as a half year, and say Russell was a Hegelian for two and one half years, then Russell must have become a Hegelian around the beginning of 1896. Yet we know Russell was a Hegelian some years earlier. For (1) Russell's famous Tiergarten experience (i.e., making Hegelian philosophical plans) occurred in the early spring of 1895 (see The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, 1, pp.124ff), (2) his Fellowship dissertation (which later became The Foundations of Geometry) was completed around August of 1895 (see The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, 1, pp.125-6), (3) Russell was "indoctrinated" with Kant and Hegel at Cambridge (p.16, this essay) and left Cambridge as a Hegelian (p.12, this essay) (i.e., Russell was a Hegelian in 1894). The only conclusion seems to be that Russell is mistaken here about how long he was a Hegelian.

On page 64 of the Autobiography, Russell says that Moore, whom Russell met his third year at Cambridge, also

14 The first and last sentences of this passage also occur in "Some of My Contemporaries at Cambridge" in Portraits From Memory (p.67). This is unfortunate since it rules out the assumption that they were misprints.

15 Cp. also a letter to Alys written in 1894 (p.107, The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, 1).
was influenced by McTaggart and was "for a short time" a Hegelian. But Moore "emerged more quickly than I did, and it was largely his conversation that led me to abandon both Kant and Hegel... He greatly influenced my philosophical outlook." 16

Since Russell knew Moore when Moore was a freshman (and also "an ardent disciple of Lucretius") (p. 73, The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, 1), Russell must have been one of the first people at Cambridge to influence Moore.

In a letter to Alys (p. 108), Russell says Moore read a paper which "did not give any good arguments" and that in the following discussion Moore was refuted, although he "would not admit it". Yet Russell also says the paper made him "very fond" of Moore. In an earlier letter to Alys (p. 107), Russell says, "I almost worship him as if he were a god. I have never felt such an extravagant admiration for anybody." 17 All of this suggests that Russell's regard for Moore was not based on a critical estimate of Moore's

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16 This passage occurs verbatim in both the Times article and "Some of My Contemporaries at Cambridge" (p. 68).
17 In the Times article Russell says he felt a "very high degree of affectionate admiration" for Moore. He also says (both in the Times and in the Autobiography, p. 64) that Moore, "for some years", fulfilled his "ideal of genius", i.e., Moore was "beautiful and slim, with a look almost of inspiration, and with an intellect as deeply passionate as Spinoza's". Note that mere appearances define a genius - knowledge and evidence are not mentioned. (Rationality also seems to be irrelevant.)
intellect, and therefore that Moore's influence was perhaps intensely personal rather than intellectual. It also suggests that Russell had a bias regarding Moore's influence on him. Russell himself may have been concerned with Moore's affect on Russell's soul, but we are concerned more with Moore's influence on Russell's philosophical doctrines.

The last passage in the Autobiography to be considered occurs on pp.134-5.

Russell says that from 1898 till 1902 he spent part of each year at Cambridge. And in 1898, he was "beginning to emerge from the bath of German idealism in which (he) had been plunged by McTaggart and Stout." Russell was "very much assisted in this process by Moore", of whom he saw "a great deal" at that time. He says it was "an intense excitement" to believe again in the reality of the sensible world. He then says that the logical aspect of the new philosophy was, for him, the most interesting. His work on Leibniz gave him "occasion to exemplify the new views on logic to which, largely under Moore's influence", he had been led. This passage suggests only a couple of new conclusions. It is again asserted that the revolt began in 1898, and that Moore was of great "assistance". Stout, however, is given credit along with McTaggart for making an idealist of Russell. Except for the last sentence referred to above, this passage gives the impression that Moore's main influence consisted in getting Russell to believe that fact is
(usually) independent of experience. The last sentence, however, gives Moore credit for influencing Russell on the "new views on logic" as well.

The last article of any (relative) length on Moore to be considered occurs in The Listener (30 April, 1959). Here Russell again says that it was Moore's personality which influenced him. "I was quickly attracted by the clarity and passion of his thinking, and by a kind of flame-like sincerity which roused in me a deep admiration. He was, at that time, slim and beautiful, and he had, what he retained throughout his life, an extraordinarily lovable smile" (p.755).

He refers again to "NJ", saying it is Moore's "first important publication" and that it is more intense than Moore's later writings. He adds, "I do not mean that what is said in that article is more true than what is said later. I am thinking only of the kind of intellectual passion that it displays" (p.755). Although Moore was much admired by Russell in the early years, Russell feels that Moore lost some of his early virtue. ("Moore had, in these early years, a quality which, in spite of all his subsequent achievements, he never entirely recovered" (p.755).) Russell says that Moore later became something of a pedant (p.755), and that verbal precision, while important, can be "overestimated" (p.756). He also says that Moore's philosophy suffered from the over-emphasis given to verbal precision and the
lack of scientific training that result from a "purely literary" education. Russell says that it was McTaggart who "caused" he and Moore to be Hegelians. Regarding priority, he says that "Moore, first, and I closely following him, climbed out of this mental (idealistic) prison..." (p.755).

The last paragraph of this article is of some importance.

Moore performed an enormous work of liberation for British philosophy. It is difficult for the present generation to realize what academic philosophy was like when he and I were young. The great figure of that time was F. H. Bradley... With Moore, British philosophy returned to the kind of work in which it had been preeminent in former centuries. Those who are too young to remember the academic reign of German idealism in English philosophy after T. H. Green can hardly appreciate what Moore achieved in the way of liberation from intellectual fetters.

All honour and gratitude are due to him for this achievement.

This almost extravagant praise of Moore comes immediately after the passage referred to above where Russell says Moore's education ruined his philosophy and made him a pedant. (Russell also says there that, "I used to say, as a joke, that Moore's philosophy had one fundamental premiss, namely that everything he was told before the age of six must be true." It is clear from the context that Russell

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18 The use of this word suggests that the "revolt" and the "new philosophy" were, perhaps, not altogether innovative.
no longer means this as a joke.) I think the explanation of this apparent discrepancy sheds great light on the nature of Moore's influence on Russell. The reason Russell thinks Moore's philosophy is of not much value and yet that Moore is a figure of some importance in British philosophy is that he accepts a distinction between philosophy as a system of beliefs or propositions or way of viewing the world and philosophy as a social institution. Notice, eg, that Russell refers twice to the state of academic philosophy before Moore. Notice also that Russell thinks awareness of the academic (institutional) state of affairs is almost a necessary condition of appreciating what Moore "achieved". Notice further the use of political words such as "liberation" and "fetters". (Here we see, I think, why Russell so often refers to this stage of his philosophical development as a "revolution" or "revolt". It is not just that the changes in his philosophy were of great importance or sudden but also that they were made inside of, and in opposition to, an established trend in institutionalized philosophy.)

Here the meaning of "influence" is crucial. On the one hand we have the sort of influence that consists in propositions and arguments. On the other, we have "personality" influence. Those who have spent any significant amount of time observing the behavior of professors and students of philosophy in universities would probably agree that,
although the exact position adopted varies, a widespread occurrence is the formation of "schools" of philosophy within a department, and the initiation of students into one of the "parties". Also not uncommon is for a given group to pretty well dominate a given department. When a student comes to philosophy through such a department, the institutionalized school of philosophy plays a major role in what philosophical views he adopts. The influence consists not so much in rational persuasion (although it is rarely totally irrational) as in what sociologists call "socialization". Something of just this sort seems to be what happened to Russell and Moore. Cambridge (as well as other leading British universities) was, at the time they matriculated, dominated by a "Hegelian" Party. Russell and Moore both were successfully assimilated into the system. But, beginning (for Russell at least) in 1898, they began to change their substantive philosophical views, and waged a "battle" to change the "policy" of the Cambridge philosophy department. And it is Moore's role in this latter part of the process that Russell so admires.\(^{19}\) Much of the influence of

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\(^{19}\) All of this is not intended to deny that Russell agreed with Moore, in the early years, on substantive philosophical issues. It does suggest, however, that the extent of Moore's influence could easily be over-rated, if his statement concerning Moore’s influence aren’t understood in this dual (doctrinal and institutional-personal) aspect. On the other hand, it should be noticed that this essay was part of a BBC symposium on Moore and was addressed to society at large. This probably led Russell to emphasize this aspect.
both McTaggart and Moore consists in the personal interaction they had with Russell within the framework of institutionalized philosophy.

What Russell has to say regarding Moore in his 1902 Preface to *POM* bears quoting.

On fundamental questions of philosophy, my position, in all its chief features, is derived from Mr. G. E. Moore. I have accepted from him the non-existential nature of propositions (except such as happen to assert existence) and their independence of any knowing mind; also the pluralism which regards the world, both that of existents and that of entities, as composed of an infinite number of mutually independent entities, with relations which are ultimate, and not reducible to adjectives of their terms or of the whole which these compose. Before learning these views from him, I found myself completely unable to construct any philosophy of arithmetic.... In the more philosophical parts of the book I owe much to Mr. G. E. Moore besides the general position which underlies the whole (p.xviii).

This is about as strong a statement concerning Moore's intellectual influence on Russell as is possible. The main points of Russell's views on basic philosophical questions are derived from Moore (and, apparently, no one else). The last sentence quoted is ambiguous. Russell could mean that Moore influenced him on specific (non-major) philosophical issues, or he could be thinking of Moore's personal influence. The specific doctrines mentioned will be discussed later. (It should be noticed, however, that the doctrine of external

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20 The footnotes on page 44, 446, and 454 of *POM* suggest the first of these alternatives.
relations is among those views Russell here says he "derived" from Moore! This claim is repeated on page 24, where Russell refers to "NJ" as a source of that doctrine, and on page 446.)

In his preface to *Problems of Philosophy* (1912), Russell says he has "derived valuable assistance" from writings of Moore on the relation of sense-data to physical objects. In "Logical Atomism" (1924), Russell says the revolt occurred "about 1898" and "largely as a result of arguments with G. E. Moore" (p. 324, *Logic and Knowledge*). He found himself unable to continue believing that knowing alters the known, and was "driven" to admit the reality of relations.

Russell discusses Moore in other places than those considered above (eg, in "Analytic and Synthetic Philosophers"). The above, however, exhaust those sources where

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21 Note the conflict with Russell's statement quoted on page 17 that the only doctrine in "NJ" accepted (in 1959) is that facts exist independently of knowledge. Since Russell regards *Philosophy of Leibniz* as embodying the logical aspect of the new philosophy, his vague acknowledgement of Moore's influence in *Philosophy of Leibniz* (p. xv) doesn't fit well either.

22 According to Moore, the writings in question are chapters 1-10 of *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*. (See p. 8 of Moore's 1953 preface to that volume.)

23 A crucial exception concerns Russell's statements regarding Moore's influence on his ethical views. (See eg, *Philosophical Essays*, pp. 7 and 13, and the note added to "The Elements of Ethics" when reprinted in *Readings in Ethical Theory*, ed. Sellars and Hapers.) Russell's philosophical development on ethical questions is usually divided into three stages, the first of which is intuitionism.
Russell discusses Moore's influence on him. In addition to these direct statements of Russell's, there is a very brief conversation between Russell and Moore reported by Alan Wood. Assuming the conversation occurred as reported, and that Wood's source was Russell himself, I include it in this section.

Once they were all (ie, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Moore) having coffee and talking together when Russell suddenly turned to Moore and said: 'You don't like me, Moore, do you?' Moore thought carefully and replied: 'No!'. (Bertrand Russell: The Passionate Sceptic, p.76)

Having examined Russell's claims about how Moore influenced him, it becomes important to raise the question of how reliable a guide Russell is on who influenced him. There seems to be little reason to doubt Russell's honesty or memory. (Although he certainly is capable of mistakes in this connection. See p.18.)

There are, however, two different (general) reasons for not placing unlimited confidence in Russell's remarks about influences on his development. The first concerns his "over-generosity", and the second concerns his awareness of influence.

Alan Wood (a very perceptive student of Russell's thought) remarks that "there is a danger that, in tracing

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One thing this examination of Russell's various statements concerning Moore's influence has revealed is that Russell can be significantly inaccurate in evaluating how he was influenced. See, eg, pp.18-19.
connections between Russell's ideas and those of his prede-
cessors and contemporaries, an impression may be given that
his thought was not so original as it was. This impression
may also be fostered by his own over-generosity in acknow-
ledging his debts to others." (My Philosophical Development,
p.273.) Examples are not hard to find.

In his review of Ayer's Philosophical Essays, Russell
remarks that, in one of the essays, Ayer "is concerned with
a thesis, advanced by W. V. Quine, to the effect that when a
word has a meaning it does not follow that there is something
it means." Russell makes no mention of the fact that this is
an extension of his treatment of definite descriptions.

In "Philosophy in the Twentieth Century", Russell
asserts that "Frege showed that arithmetic follows from
logic, which Kant had denied" (p.72). No mention is made of
himself in this connection.

Why was Russell so "over-generous"? The answer is,
I think, fairly simple. In Religion and Science, Russell
says that "the philosopher may, it is true, sink to the
level of the stock-jobber, as when he claims priority for
a discovery" (p.233). (Compare his remarks on the Newton -

26 That Russell was aware that this doctrine is his
is clear from, eg, p.85 of My Philosophical Development.
27 To see the depravity of such claims (from Russell's
point of view), it is necessary to read the context in which
this statement is made.
Leibniz controversy on page 564 of History of Western Philosophy.) Russell had an intense lust for fame and glory, but not at any price. He wanted to be remembered as a good man, and generosity and not seeking fame at any price were among the qualities he considered good.

The second factor that limits the value of Russell on Russell is that he was not always aware of influences, or even of some of his own views. Russell himself admits this. Thus, eg, he says of Morris Weitz' essay in the Schilpp volume that the essay, in general, is accurate, "even in some cases where I was myself unconscious of my underlying beliefs and methods" (p.684). Part of this problem arises due to Russell's concept of influence. In his various discussions on his philosophical development, he seems never to consider people whom he was working hard to refute as influences. (The most notable example is Kant, who was probably the greatest negative influence on Russell.) Influence that is never noticed as such can hardly be recalled and related to others.

Given that Russell is not always entirely reliable when he assesses his own development and how he was influenced (due to generosity and simple errors of judgment)\textsuperscript{28},

\textsuperscript{28} Eg, in My Philosophical Development on first use of 'sense-data'.
how are we to regard his statements on these topics? In
general, we can only hold that his opinions have an initial­
ly high probability of being correct. If the issue (eg,
Moore's role in the revolution) is discussed in a number of
sources, over a fairly broad range of time, then whatever is
confirmed by all these utterances has a greater probability
than opinions asserted less often. (The more often a propo­
sition is asserted, the more likely it is true!) When his
claims at different times do not agree, they must be examined
together, and in the light of other information we may have.
Finally, attributions of priority of discovery to others or
of great influence of friends upon his own philosophical
development are apt to be either significantly exaggerated,
or simply false. Fortunately, there are two other types of
evidence concerning the impact of others on Russell's philo­
sophical development. Some of Russell's early doctrines will
be stated in Section IV, and some of Moore's in Section III.
Next to be considered in this section is the indexical evi­
dence concerning Moore's influence on Russell.

Russell's statements about who influenced him can be
said to be qualitative in that they represent his reasoned
conclusions as to how he came to think as he did. When the
number of references Russell makes in a given book or article
are merely counted, making no distinction(qualitatively) be­
tween occurrences of names, the result yields quantitative
evidence. Hence, it seems correct to say that we have here a measurable kind of influence. What follows is a (non-exhaustive) bibliography of Russell's published references to Moore. The references in Russell's articles are from an index in the Archives, which, however, covers only published articles and lists only the first reference to any one publication. The references to Moore in Russell's published philosophical books are taken from their prefaces, introductions, and indexes.

1897 Essay on the Foundations of Geometry. This book has no index, and there are no references to Moore in the preface.

1900 The Philosophy of Leibniz. There are no references to Moore in the index. On p.xv of the preface, Russell gives Moore credit for reading the proofs, revising the Latin translation, and "many valuable suggestions."


1901 On p.316 of "Is Position in Space and Time Absolute or Relative", Russell refers to Moore's "Necessity" (1900).

1903 The Principles of Mathematics. Seven Moore references in the index. They include this statement in the preface: "On fundamental questions of Philosophy, my position, in all its chief features, is derived from
Mr. G. E. Moore" (p.xviii in 2nd ed., p. vii in 1st ed.).

1904 On p.218 of "Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions", Russell refers to Moore's "Experience and Empiricism" (1903).

1910 Principia Mathematica. No index, no references to Moore in preface.


1912 The Problems of Philosophy. No references in index.

On p.6 of the preface, Russell says he has derived "assistance" from unpublished writings of Moore on the relation of sense-data to physical objects.

1914 Our Knowledge of the External World. No references in index or preface.

1918 On p.492 of his review of Broad's Perception, Physics and Reality, Russell refers to Moore's "The Refutation of Idealism" (1903).

1919 Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy. No references in index or preface.

1921 The Analysis of Mind. No references in index or preface.

1922 Russell's article "Analytic and Synthetic Philosophers" is a one-page review of two books, one of which is
Moore's *Philosophical Studies* (1922).

1927 *An Outline of Philosophy*. On p.238, Moore is referred to as an example of those philosophers who say that "good" is not definable.

1927 *The Analysis of Matter*. On p.210, Russell mentions Moore's remark that, for phenomenalists, trains have wheels only when they are not moving.

1931 *The Scientific Outlook*. No references in index or introduction.

1935 *Religion and Science*. No references in index. No preface or introduction.

1940 *Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth*. No references in index or preface.

1944 In his "Reply to Criticisms" in the Schilpp volume, Russell gives a one-page reply to Moore's 49-page article in this volume.

1945 *A History of Western Philosophy*. On p.631, the same train example mentioned in 1927 is referred to again.

1948 *Human Knowledge*. No references in index or preface.

1954 *Human Society in Ethics and Politics*. No index. No references in preface or introduction.

1959 *My Philosophical Development*. The references to Moore (p.11-12 and 54) are to Moore's influence on Russell around 1900.

1959 *Wisdom of the West*. No references in index or foreword.
What conclusions of interest can be drawn from this list? Considering only this information, there are four inferences that seem well-founded:

1. Moore was not a significant influence on Russell until after Russell's first philosophical book was published. (The earliest the reference to Moore occurs in 1900. This is further supported by the references to Moore in Russell's unpublished notebook, "What Shall I Read?". The first entry is dated November, 1898, and it and an entry for February, 1899, are to unpublished writings of Moore - of which some appear to be in the Archives.)

2. Moore was tremendously influential on Russell around the turn of the century. (See the entries for 1900, 1901, 1903, 1904, and the first item for 1959.)

3. Moore was not a significant factor in Russell's philosophical development after 1912. (Excluding the first item for 1959 - which is historical - there are no significant references to Moore in books after 1912, and relatively few insignificant ones. The mere brevity of the 1922 and 1944 articles is significant.)

4. Except for Moore's 1910 lectures referred to in the Preface to Russell's Problems of Philosophy,
nothing published by Moore after 1903 was of significant influence on Russell.

We are now able to sketch a temporal pattern of Moore's influence on Russell. They first met at Cambridge in 1892. Russell was already a Hegelian, and Moore was a follower of Lucretius. Russell was much impressed with Moore as a person during these early years, and influenced Moore to become a philosopher. Moore also became a Hegelian. (Just how important Russell was in Moore's conversion to Hegelianism hasn't been established.) In 1898, Russell and Moore spent a lot of time together; and also in 1898, Russell abandoned Hegelianism, in large measure due to Moore's personal and intellectual influence. Moore's role in Russell's philosophical development in the years 1898 through 1903 was extensive, and, as a positive influence, probably exceeded that of any other living philosopher. As Russell was primarily engaged in work on logic (and math) and political activities from 1903 to 1910, Moore probably had little impact on Russell's philosophical development during this period. Around 1910, Russell was influenced by Moore's writings on perception. After 1912, Moore ceased to be a positive influence on Russell's philosophical development. Russell and Moore continued friendly relations until Moore's death in 1958, although Russell was nowhere near as enamored of Moore as in the early period, and Moore didn't
Some specific conclusions are as follows. (Page references are to evidence for these assertions in this essay.)

1) Russell became a Hegelian during the academic year 1893-1894, and rejected Hegelianism in 1898 (pp. 8, 11, 12, 14-15, 17).

2) Russell worked out (partly in conjunction with Moore) a "new philosophy" in the years 1898 through 1900 (or possibly later). And this new philosophy was largely Platonic (pp. 10, 11, 13).

3) The change ("revolution") from Hegelianism to the new philosophy was the major phase of Russell's philosophical development (p. 36).

4) Moore was first a Lucretian materialist, then became a "Hegelian", and then rejected idealism (slightly before Russell did) (pp. 7, 9, 12, 16, 23).

5) Moore had no positive philosophical influence on Russell while Russell was a Hegelian, although he had a great

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29 Although Russell remained a major influence on Moore's philosophical work throughout Moore's life. See the Schilpp volume, especially pages 14-16.

30 Throughout this essay I have referred to Russell's philosophy as Hegelian. A more accurate label would probably be Russellian-McTaggartian-Stoutian-Bradleyian-Bosanquetian-Kantian-Hegelianism, which indicates why I have used the term "Hegelian". Moore objected to being called a Hegelian. T. H. Green, Bradley, Collingwood (and perhaps the whole Oxford school of "Hegelians") rejected this label. See, eg, Collingwood's *An Autobiography*, pp. 15f., p. 56.
6) Moore was the major positive intellectual influence (as compared with all other philosophers then living) on Russell during Russell's revolutionary period (pp.11, 16, 22).

7) Moore's influence was not a necessary condition of Russell's abandoning Hegelianism (pp.9-10, 11).

8) Moore's positive influence on Russell's philosophy during the revolutionary period was not as great as that of Peano (pp.10, 11).

9) Russell later broke with Moore on fundamental philosophical issues (pp.18-19).

10) Except for Moore's first ten lectures on philosophy given in 1910 (published as chapters 1-10 of Some Main Problems of Philosophy), nothing written by Moore after 1903 had a significant positive influence on Russell's philosophy (pp.31-32).

11) In the earliest years of their association, Moore's personality impressed Russell more than Moore's arguments and/or philosophical doctrines. Russell's enchantment with Moore's personality diminished over the years, although it never vanished (pp.16-19).

12) Russell's statements about Moore's influence on Russell's philosophical development may have been exaggerated due to three factors: Russell's regard for Moore's personality;
Russell's regard for Moore's effect on certain institutions; Russell's "over-generosity"\(^3\) (pp. 16-22, 24-26).

13) The Philosophy of Leibniz contains Russell's views on the new philosophy at an early stage of the revolution, and probably also Moore's (pp. 10, 13, 17).

14) "NJ" was the first published statement of the new philosophy, and is a fairly reliable guide to Russell's views at the time (pp. 13, 17-18, 32).

Needless to say, these conclusions hardly exhaust all that is to be known about Russell's early philosophical development and his interaction with other philosophers during that time. (Some of the specific philosophical theories that Russell "derived" from Moore will be mentioned in Section IV.)

Now that we have some knowledge of the Russell-Moore interaction, and particularly of Moore's influence on Russell, it might be worthwhile to point out its significance.

Russell has often been referred to as the most influential philosopher of the 20th century.\(^3\) And even philosophers who seem to think they have little in common with Russell speak with pride of the "revolution in philosophy" (meaning the change in British and American academic philosophy from

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\(^3\) The first two factors gain in significance when it is recalled that "influence" is a vague and ambiguous term, and that Russell doesn't seem to have made any verbal distinctions here. Cf. Russell's referring to Moore as a Hegelian (although Moore doesn't).

\(^3\) See, eg, Alston's remarks on p. 239 of his Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on Russell.
Hegelianism, or what Russell calls "the classical tradition", to analytic philosophy. In short, Russell has been the dominant figure in the development of analytic philosophy. Hence Russell's own development from Hegelianism to analytic philosophy becomes more significant, as does Moore's role in this change. And since Russell himself divides his philosophy into two major stages (before and after the "revolution") his philosophy in this early period assumes a greater significance than may be warranted by its intrinsic value. Russell's philosophy cannot be fully understood unless seen in its philosophical context, and Moore provides, for the early period, much of that context.

Before going on to consider some of the textual evidence regarding Moore's influence on Russell, something should be said concerning the difference of the Russell-Moore relationship as I have described it and the view of that relationship held by many contemporary philosophers, G. J. Warnock chief among them. According to Warnock, Moore is a level-headed, naive defender of Common Sense and other virtues. Russell, by contrast, is a "passionate sceptic"

33 See Our Knowledge of the External World, chapter 1.
34 See, eg, The Revolution in Philosophy, "edited" by G. Ryle.
35 By Philosophical Development, p.11. Cp. the title of chapter Five of By Philosophical Development.
who delights in advocating monstrous paradoxes. Thus, eg, Warnock says, "unlike Moore, Russell was willing and indeed markedly eager to emphasize that his findings would be very curious and surprising. He would never have dreamed of defending Common Sense; he would almost have judged it a denial of philosophy to do so." (English Philosophy Since 1900, p. 32-33.)

Given the characterization of Moore and Russell in Warnock's English Philosophy Since 1900, it is not clear how either can have had much positive influence on the other, since they seem to have nothing philosophical in common. Yet they did have a significant impact on each other, as I have shown. Therefore Warnock's account is grossly inaccurate. There are at least two factors that produce this result. They are: the Warnockian image of Moore is inaccurate, and the Warnockian image of Russell is inaccurate. The reason Warnock's account of Moore is inaccurate is that he completely ignores Moore's early philosophy (of which there are at least two phases - the Hegelian-Kantian-Bradleyian phase, and the "NJ" phase). In this he is not

36 L. Susan Stebbing is another prominent proponent of this interpretation. See her essay on Moore ("Moore's Influence") in the Schilpp volume, esp. p.529. There she says, among other things, that Moore's philosophical development does not show "any fundamental change of standpoint". Cp. G. A. Paul's chapter on Moore in The Revolution in Philosophy and, to a lesser extent, Pears' chapter on Russell.

37 And as will become even clearer in Sections III and IV of this essay.
Thus, eg, J. D. Nelson, in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on Moore, says, "It is therefore with some justice that these writings have been generally ignored by succeeding generations of philosophers, as they were ignored by Moore himself in his subsequent summations and compilations of his work." Warnock's account of Russell is even more distorted than his account of Moore, if only for the reason that the views of Russell he discusses form such a small part of Russell's philosophy. (In addition to being distorted by the selection, Warnock's account of Russell is further vitiated by his false interpretation of those few topics he deigns to discuss.) In short, one result of a study of Moore and Russell's philosophy in this early period is that we are forced to reject the (or a) popular image of the Moore-Russell relationship.

38 Implicit here is the assumption that a major change occurred in Moore's philosophy after 1900 - the change from the sort of philosophy expounded in "NJ" to the philosophy of Moore's later years.

39 Nelson is simply wrong when he says Moore's philosophy at this period is not important. It is important, if for no other reason than that it was his philosophy at this early period that so significantly influenced Russell. Russell "scholarship" has centered on a few of Russell's contributions to logic and his "Logical Atomism", thereby ignoring that part of his philosophy derived largely from Moore.
III

Having established some conclusions about Moore's influence on Russell in general, it is the purpose of this section of the essay to interpret Moore's "NJ". As has just been argued, Russell regarded "NJ" as "the first published account of the new philosophy" and as bordering on being a joint product of his and Moore's discussions. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to assume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that any view expressed by Moore in "NJ" can be regarded as a view Russell also held in this period. This seems especially true for those theses of "NJ" that can be said to be central to the essay.

The argument of this section is rather complicated. The main reason for this is the obscurity of Moore's essay. I consider it no insignificant achievement merely to have discovered what Moore seems to have regarded as the major theses of his article. Lest the reader get lost in the detail of my discussion of Moore's article, I have divided this section of my essay into parts:

Subsection A - Identification of two main theses of Moore's article

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1 See, eg, page 35 of this essay.
2 Exceptions might be Moore's remarks when he discusses Kant.
Subsection B - Preliminary interpretation of Moore's two theses and of Moore's concept of concept

Subsection C - Identification of additional theses of Moore's article

Subsection D - Further discussion of Moore's rejection of the correspondence theory of truth

Subsection E - Discussion of Moore's view of the relation of concepts to the mind

Subsection F - Discussion of the remainder of Moore's theses

Subsection G - Summary and conclusions

Subsection A.

To begin at the end, and perhaps the logical beginning, I wish to examine the last paragraph of the essay. It begins:

"Our result then is as follows: That a judgment is universally a necessary combination of concepts, equally necessary whether it be true or false. That it must be either true or false, but that its truth or falsehood cannot depend on its relation to anything else whatever, reality, for instance, or the world in space and time. For..." (p.192, italics mine).

Since what "follows" is precisely what Moore took to be the result(s) of the whole essay, it seems worthwhile to get as clear as possible on just what "follows". Gramatically, it would seem that what follows is what comes after the colon.

All page number references in Section III are to "NJ", unless otherwise noted.
and before the first period after the colon. It seems clear, however, that the sentence beginning with "That" is also part of what "follows". And it also seems that what "follows" (i.e., what is the "result" of the essay) ends with the sentence beginning with "That", since that sentence is followed by a "For", which is itself followed by a long argument supporting the second of these two contentions (results). Given that we know just what sentences Moore took to sum up the results of the essay, what exactly do these sentences assert?

Consider the following break down.\(^4\)

(1A) A judgement is universally a combination of concepts.
(1B) This combination of concepts is necessary.
(1C) This combination of concepts is necessary whether the judgement be true or false.
(2A) A judgement must be either true or false.
(2B) The truth-value of a judgement cannot depend on its relation to anything else.

Subsection B.

Just what do these statements mean? A preliminary explanation is as follows.

In (1A), 'universally' seems to function as a

\(^4\)(1A) - (1C) are possible parts of what the first sentence quoted above as a "result" asserts. (2A) and (2B) are possible parts of what the second sentence quoted above as a "result" asserts.
universal quantifier. If this is so, (1A) can be restated:
All judgements are combinations of concepts. This being so, it seems pertinent to ask: what is a concept? Moore "clears this up" by saying that he uses 'concept' "for what Mr. Bradley calls a 'universal meaning'" (p.177). Moore also says that he thinks Bradley is correct in his (Bradley's) view that "the idea in judgement is the universal meaning" (italics mine, p.177). So, (1A) can now be paraphrased: All judgements are combinations of ideas in judgements. What is an "idea in judgement"? An obvious hypothesis is that an idea in judgement is the thing about which a judgement is made (the subject of some possible judgement). Thus (1A) becomes: All judgements are combinations of (certain types of) things. Judgements are combinations of things! In short, a judgement seems to be nothing less than an actual or possible fact (state-of-affairs). Yet this interpretation of what judgements are seems absurd. For, a consequence of this interpretation of (1A) is that our (true) judgement that so and so just is the fact that so and so. Yet it seems glaringly obvious - and therefore

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5See "NJ", p.179.
6Provided I'm not putting too strong an interpretation on "is".
7Strictly, a "certain type" of fact. (Possibly: Judgements are those things about which psychological judgements have been or will be (or could be) made.) This includes logically impossible facts, since the "type of things" involved are Russell's terms (more or less).
Moore probably saw this - that there is a difference between my judging something to be the case and its being the case. Therefore, probably either my interpretation of (1A) has gone astray somewhere, or Moore distinguished several senses of "judgement", and is here talking about judgement not as a psychological phenomenon. This latter is confirmed in "Experience and Empiricism" (p. 82). (See also below on it not being "our" ideas that are true or false.) The sense of "judgement" in which judgements can be "mine" is not the sense in which Moore uses "judgement" in this essay.

As the interpretation of Moore's concept of judgement is important ("NJ" is concerned with the nature of judgements, as both the title and the nature of the "results" indicate), this interpretation of (1A) needs to be examined in more detail. Since judgements are (always) combinations of concepts, the crucial concepts to be understood if we are to know the nature of judgements are concept and combination. To begin with, what is a concept?

It has already been noted that a concept is a "universal meaning" and an "idea used in judgement" (p. 177). It is also a "logical idea" (p. 177, 193). If we understood

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8 A case where there is, perhaps, no difference is the (possibly pseudo) judgement that I am now judging.

9 These terms seem to be Bradley's, although Moore accepts them.
Bradley's philosophy, these usages might be of help. As it is, they get us nowhere. What are the other properties Moore ascribes to concepts? Concepts are: not an abstraction from ideas (p.177); non-mental (p.177, 179); not changed by being known or ceasing to be known (p.179); incapable of change (p.179); "possible objects of thought" (p.179); neither words nor thoughts (p.179); the entities of which propositions are "composed" (p.179, twice); "the only objects of knowledge" (p.182); "the data of knowledge" (p.181, 183). These properties can probably be reduced to the following. Concepts are neither mental nor linguistic in nature, are unchangeable, and are what propositions are made of. Further, they are possible objects of thought, the data of knowledge, and the only objects of knowledge (and yet have no truth-value, p.179). In short, concepts are entities or things (in the broadest possible sense of these terms). This lends credence to the interpretation of the nature of judgements I gave above. For, if judgements are combined concepts and concepts are things, then judgements are (or include) (possible)¹⁰ facts. Let us look more carefully at what Moore has to say relevant to the hypothesis that concepts are things.

¹⁰ "Possible" here is broader than "logically possible".
On page 176, Moore criticizes Bradley's use of the "logical idea" (concept) as "the idea of something. As such, indeed, it is only the psychological idea, related to it."
The implicit contrast is to the concept as not an idea (non-mental) and not related to what an idea "signifies", but being what an idea signifies (ie, an entity).

In arguing against truth as correspondence, Moore says: "If the judgement is false, that is not because my ideas do not correspond to reality, but because such a conjunction of concepts is not to be found among existents" (p.179, my italics). Implicit here is that true judgements are (or are true because of) conjunctions of concepts which are to be found among existents, ie, concepts are things (entities), some of which exist, and some of which do not.

With regard to existence, there seem to be three modes of being for Moore's concepts. Some concepts exist. Some concepts are merely real (ie, do not exist, but are logically possible). (See, eg, Moore's article on "Real" in Baldwin.) And some concepts are impossible (unreal, do not exist).

On page 181, Moore says: "All that exists is thus composed of concepts..." This seems to be capable of only one meaning: concepts are the ultimate stuff (entities) of which things are made. Moore's remarks concerning concepts on pp.192-3, confirm this interpretation and deserve quotation here. "A concept is not in any intelligible sense an
'adjective', as if there were something substantive, more ultimate than it. For we must, if we are to be consistent, describe what appears to be more substantive as no more than a collection of such supposed adjectives: and thus, in the end, the concept turns out to be the only substantive or subject, and no one concept either more or less an adjective than any other." Concepts are the ultimate constituents of the world. Hence they are entities (things), although entities of a (metaphysically) special sort.

It seems clear then that, odd as it seems at first, judgements are combinations of (metaphysically ultimate) things (entities). Before leaving, for the moment, our examination of (1A), we should say something concerning the role of the word "combination". Judgements are concepts that are combined. What does Moore mean by "combination"? On page 179, he says: "It is of such entities as these (concepts) that a proposition is composed. In it certain concepts stand in specific relations (my italics) with one

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11 Cp. page 178-9, where Moore says the concept is "a genus per se, irreducible to anything else."
12 See page 182, where Moore says "things...(and)ideas...if anything is to be true of them, (can) be composed of nothing but concepts."
13 The word "connexion" is also used. See, eg, p.179.
14 Here and in the following quote I use assertions Moore makes about propositions as evidence for his views about judgements. Moore seems to use the two (in the sense of "judgement" used in (1A) through (2C)) synonymously. See, eg, p.179. (Cp. Russell in Philosophy of Leibniz.)
another." Hence, propositions seem to be combinations of concepts and relations. Further, propositions (or judgments) are themselves concepts. Moore says:

It would seem...that a proposition is nothing other than a complex concept. The difference between a concept and a proposition...would seem to lie merely in the simplicity of the former. A proposition is a synthesis of concepts; and, just as concepts are themselves immutably what they are, so they stand in infinite relations to one another equally immutable. A proposition is constituted by any number of concepts, together with a specific relation between them... (p.180).

In summary, all judgements are combinations of concepts, i.e., complex concepts composed of simple concepts plus relations which relate the other concepts. And, since concepts are the stuff of the world, judgements are complex things, including such things as facts and possible facts.

Assuming that the meaning of (1A) is now somewhat clear, let us look at (1B). (1B) merely adds to (1A) the notion of necessity. It is not at all clear what Moore means by necessity in this essay. On p.188, he says: "The test of its necessity lies merely (my italics) in the fact that it must be either true or untrue, and cannot be true now and untrue the next moment..." This passage suggests a non-modal concept of necessity. Yet Moore says on p.190,

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15 Relations here are not abstractions, but rather relations as relating their terms. (E.g., 'p', 'q', and '⊃' do not form a proposition, unless they are related in one of two ways: p ⊃ q or q ⊃ p.)
that the proposition "Red exists" is necessary and that "if it is true, its contradictory is as fully not possible as the contradictory of 2 plus 2 equals 4." This seems to involve a modal concept of necessity, but may not since Moore may have felt (at this time) that mathematical propositions were not necessary in any modal sense (not logically true). A brief of Moore's concept of necessity (in "Necessity", published in 1900) will clarify the issue somewhat.

Before giving the meaning of necessity (which Moore distinguishes from a definition of "necessity"), Moore considers several likely marks of necessity which he then rejects. Among these is what he calls "eternity". By calling a proposition eternally true, Moore means to say that if the proposition "is once true, (it) is always true" (p.296, "Necessity"). This concept corresponds exactly with that given in the above quote from "NJ" as a "test" of necessity. But in "Necessity", Moore rejects this criterion, as it "cannot be a mark which distinguishes necessary from any other kind of truths" (p.296). Apparently, Moore's concept of necessity changed in the year (more or less) between "NJ" and "Necessity".

The criterion of necessity Moore comes up with is interesting. He says:

Any truth which is logically prior to some other true proposition is so far necessary; but... as you get more and more true propositions to which a
given truth is logically prior, so you approach that region within which the given truth will be said to be absolutely necessary... There will, then, be only a difference of degree between necessary truths and many others, namely, a difference in the number of propositions to which they bear a certain logical relation... (p.300). 16

Propositions are, then, "necessary when they are implied in a large number of other propositions" (p.303).

Several points should be noticed. To begin with, this concept is not the same as either of the two concepts (the non-modal or "eternal" concept and the modal concept17) used in "NJ" and mentioned above. This does not, however, rule out this later concept of necessity as also being what Moore had (vaguely) in mind in 1899. Secondly, it is now easy to see how judgements such as "Red exists" can be necessary. For, the existence of red is logically prior to (presupposed by) a very large class of true propositions - namely, all propositions of the forms "x is red" and "ν red". A final point concerns a difference in the two quotations. In the first, Moore gives a criterion for necessary truths, whereas in the second he gives a criterion for necessary propositions, irrespective of their truth-value. This last is relevant to the meaning of (1C), and explains how a false

16 Moore also asserts that necessary means the same as a priori.
17 So called since Moore says "its contradictory is ... not possible."
proposition can be necessary. Consider, eg, the false proposition: God exists. This proposition is presupposed by a large number of propositions, and is therefore necessary, "equally necessary whether true or false."

That Moore did not intend the passage quoted above from "NJ" to be a modal concept of necessity is clear from his belief, as expressed in "Necessity", that mathematics is synthetic.

So much by way of a preliminary exposition of (1B) and (1C).

(2A) seems to be simply an innocuous affirmation of the law of excluded middle. But there is more here than meets the (unwary) eye. To begin with, (2A) renders explicit what seems to be implicit in (1B) and (1C)—namely, that judgments have a truth-value. This is not startling if we think of a judgment as an act of judging (or something similar). But if "judgment" here is some sort of "logical" notion, and in fact includes possible facts (as was suggested in the discussion of (1A)), (2A) becomes: all "possible" facts have a truth-value. (True "possible" facts are actual facts.)

(2B) is the most puzzling of Moore's "results". For, it seems to be a straightforward rejection of the corres-

18 All propositions of the forms "¬ God" and "x is God".
pondence theory of truth— not only as a general theory, but even in all specific cases. Thus, eg, the truth-value of the proposition "G. E. Moore exists" "can't depend on its relation to anything else whatever, reality, for instance, or the world in space and time." This seems absurd.

Further, (2B) seems to contradict Moore's apparent admission that correspondence with reality is a sufficient condition of a proposition being true (p. 180).

Moore does reject the correspondence theory of truth as a complete account of truth. (See p. 181.) This is not, however, the point of (2B). If we regard beliefs or sentences (or classes of sentences) or propositions (defined as abstract entities) as truth-vehicles (as the things which are true), then to speak of a correspondence with fact makes sense. Moore, however, rejects this approach. For, it is propositions (judgments) which are true or false, and propositions, whatever they are, are not "composed...of words (as are sentences), nor yet of thoughts (as are beliefs), but of concepts" (p. 179). Among what exists (what is fact) are certain propositions (complex concepts). Truth is a property of these facts, and not of some linguistic or mental object which stands in some "relation" to these facts.

Truth and being are one. 19

19 See Moore's article "Truth and Falsity", especially p. 717 where he says: "A truth differs in no respect from the reality to which it was supposed merely to correspond."
Here it becomes apparent how the interpretation of (1A) given above affects the interpretation of (2B), and vice-versa.

Having identified and given a preliminary exposition and interpretation of Moore's "results" in "NJ", I now proceed to a more detailed examination of the essay. In what follows I will point out other theses of the essay (eg, that perception is the cognition of an existential proposition), show how my interpretation of Moore's concept of concept helps to explain them, consider his arguments for these theories, and examine some passages that seem to contradict the hypothesis that concepts are things.

Subsection C.

Other than (1A) through (2B), what are the theses Moore asserts in "NJ"? The following claims seem to be explicitly put forward.

(3) "Truth and falsehood are not dependent on the relation of our ideas to reality." (p. 177) (Cp. p. 179.)

(4) Concepts are not produced by the mind. (See, eg, p. 177, where Moore asserts: "It will be our endeavor to show...that the 'idea used in judgement' is not...produced by any action of our minds...") (Cp. p. 179.)

(5) Concepts are not abstractions from ideas. (Thus he says, p. 177: "Our object (is) to protest...concepts as abstraction(s) from ideas".)
(5) Concepts are not abstractions from ideas. (Thus he says (p.177): "our object (is) to protest...concept(s) as abstraction(s) from ideas.")

(6) Concepts are not part of the content of our ideas.
"It will be our endeavor to show...that the 'idea used in judgement' is not a part of the content of our ideas..." (p.177). Cp. also: "the 'idea used in judgement' must be something other than a part of the content of any idea of mine" and "'the idea used in Judgement'...cannot...be described as part of the content of any psychological idea whatever" (p.178).)

(7) Concepts are not mental, nor part of anything mental.
(Thus, eg, Moore's claim that "the concept is not a mental fact, nor any part of a mental fact" (p.179).)

(8) (3) follows from (4) and (6). (See p.177.)

(9) Existence is a concept. (Explicitly asserted on p.180.)

(10) "All that exists is...composed of concepts necessarily related to one another in specific manners, and likewise to the concept of existence" (p.181, cp. p.182.).

(11) "The concept is necessary to truth and falsehood" (p.181).

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20 On page 177, Moore says that he uses the term "concept" for what Bradley calls a "universal meaning", and that he accepts Bradley's argument that an idea used in judgement is a universal meaning. Hence the above substitution of "concept" for "idea used in judgement".
(12) "The concept can consistently be described neither as an existent, nor as part of an existent..." (p.181).

(13) "Perception is...the cognition of an existential proposition" (p.183).

These thirteen (or sixteen) claims hardly exhaust Moore's assertions in "NJ", since every sentence in the essay contains at least one assertion. They are not even all of the claims Moore makes that are relevant to the present inquiry. They are, however, some of the more important of Moore's assertions. And it should be noticed that all of them (except for (3)) have a common property: their truth-value depends on the nature of concepts. (For (8) and (13) this may not be obvious. Note that (8) can't be evaluated, however, unless we know what is asserted by (3), (5), and (7),21 which in turn depend, among other things, on the nature of concepts for their truth-value. In regard to (13), it should be remembered that a proposition is composed of concepts.)

This raises once again the question: what is a concept? Before reconsidering this fundamental question, it might prove fruitful to examine Moore's arguments for some of these

21 If (3), (5), and (7) are taken as they stand and the argument is formalized, it is clearly invalid, and no consideration of the content of (3), (5), or (7) is necessary. The point is that, in order to interpret (8) so that it is at least plausible, consideration of the content of (3), (5), and (7) is necessary.
claims and to examine the meaning of some other important concepts. To begin with, let us look at what Moore has to say regarding the correspondence theory of truth.

Subsection D.

As I indicated above, one of what Moore takes to be the main results of "NJ" is his rejection of the correspondence theory of truth. (See (2B).) I now wish to discuss Moore's views on this issue in more detail.

To begin with, it should be pointed out that there is no doubt that, as formulated, (2B) is false. (Moore's actual words are: "(A judgement's) truth or falsehood cannot depend on its relation to anything else whatever...".) For, let A be the class of all true judgements and let J_t be any true judgement, J_f be any false judgement, and J_n be any judgement whatever. Thus, J_t ∈ A and J_f ∉ A. Also, "J_n is true" entails and is entailed by "J_n ∈ A", and "J_n is false" entails and is entailed by "J_n ∉ A". Hence, there is a relation (being a member of a class) and an object (the class of true judgements) such that the truth or falsehood of any judgement depends on the judgement having that relation to that object. Hence, (2B), as formulated by Moore on page 192, is false. It would, however, be a mistake to cease our examination of Moore's views concerning the correspondence theory of truth at this point, in spite of the fact that the
refutation given is conclusive and rigorous. 22

Page 192 (from which (2B) is extracted) is not the only place where Moore discusses the correspondence theory of truth. The passage from which proposition (3) is extracted seems to be another. Just how is (3) related to (2B)? Let's look at the context in which (3) is asserted.

On page 177, Moore says:

If indeed (the concept) 23 were thus simply a part of the content of our own ideas, as mental states, and that too, a part 'cut off' by our own minds, it would be intelligible that 'truth and falsehood should still be said to 'depend on the relation of our ideas to reality'. It will be our endeavor to show, on the contrary, that (the concept) 23 is not a part of the content of our ideas, nor produced by any action of our minds, and that hence truth and falsehood are not dependent on the relation of our ideas to reality.

This passage is the one from which proposition (8) above was extracted. (More than (8) is asserted here, of course. Thus eg, Moore is also claiming that the claim that truth and falsehood depend on the relation of our ideas to reality is not intelligible due to (6) and (4).) How does Moore 22 Moore contradicts (2B) himself. Thus he says: "Existence is itself a concept...and the great body of propositions, in which existence is joined to other concepts or syntheses of concepts, are simply true or false according to the relation in which it stands to them." (p. 180) The "refutation" of (2B) given above is preferable on two grounds: It depends less on the nature of Moore's philosophy and it is more general since it includes among propositions whose truth-value is dependent on having some relation those propositions which do not assert or deny existence.

23 See the footnote on page 53. I have here substituted 'concept' for Moore's longer expressions.
"endeavor to show" that (8) is true?

Moore begins by arguing that (6) and (4) are true. (See the discussion of this argument below.) After concluding that argument, he says:

When, therefore, I say... 'The chimera has three heads', the chimera is not an idea in my mind, nor any part of such an idea. What I mean to assert is nothing about my mental states, but a specific connection of concepts. If the judgment is false, that is not because my ideas do not correspond to reality, but because such a conjunction of concepts is not to be found among existents (p. 179).

The following is, I think, an accurate paraphrase of Moore's argument in support of (3). 25

If, in fact, propositions (or judgments) were the bearers of truth and falsehood, and if, in fact, judgments were composed of ideas (concepts) as mental states, then the truth-value of a judgment would depend on how our ideas (concepts), ie, our states of mind, were related to reality (ie, (3) would be false). Or, at least it would make sense to make such a claim. And, in fact, propositions (judgments) are the bearers of truth and falsehood. (This is proposition (2A).) But, propositions (judgments) are not composed of our (mental) ideas (concepts). Judgments are composed of con-

24 We know from Moore's earlier remarks (see proposition (8)) that (3) is to be proved from (4) and (6). Even without this information, however, the context of this quote makes it perfectly clear that the word 'therefore' refers to (3)'s following from (4) and (6).

25 This is the argument that proposition (8) claims to be valid.
cepts (proposition (1A)) and concepts are not part of the content of our ideas (as mental states) (propositions (4) through (7). Hence, proposition (3) is true, and further, it makes no sense to assert its denial.

This argument is obviously fallacious, as it commits the fallacy of denying the antecedent. So much then, for proposition (8) and Moore's defence of proposition (3).

Now that we have seen the context in which (3) is asserted, we can better understand its meaning. The general line of thought expressed in (and underlying) proposition (3) seems to be as follows. Our ideas (as mental states, i.e., as our ideas) are neither true nor false, i.e., our thoughts are not truth-vehicles. (This is implicit in (2A) and (2B).) The objects of judgments (concepts) are not part of the content of our ideas (proposition (6)). Hence, judgments are not about our ideas. Hence, the truth-value of judgments (even assuming the correspondence theory of truth) is not dependent on our ideas at all, neither in and of themselves, nor in their relation to reality. What is true or false is true or false independently of what we think about the matter. The extent to which our beliefs correspond to reality does not affect what is real.

In short, (3) seems to deny that the truth-value of a judgment is dependent on our ideas (as mental states),
rather than to deny that the truth-value of a judgment is dependent on reality.

Before considering Moore's arguments against the correspondence theory of truth, three points regarding proposition (3) should be made. To begin with, it should now be apparent that (3), unlike (2B), is not a denial of the correspondence theory of truth, in spite of seeming to be so when viewed out of context. (And, hence, Moore's defence of (3) is not an argument against the correspondence theory of truth.) More importantly, (3) turns out to be an expression of what Russell regarded as the major thesis of the essay, namely, the independence of fact from mind (or, alternatively, of truth and reality from mental states). And finally, (3) is a logical consequence of (2A) and (2B). For, since judgments are what is true or false, and since their truth or falsehood are not dependent on their relation to anything, their truth-values are not dependent on how they are related to our mental ideas, nor on any relation between judgments, our ideas, and the relation of our ideas to reality.

To avoid confusion, let's summarize some of the preceding discussion of Moore's position on the correspondence theory of truth. In the preliminary remarks on (2A) and (2B) on pages 50-51, it was mentioned that Moore seems to accept correspondence with reality as a sufficient condition of
truth, but rejects the theory as a necessary condition or complete account of truth. One argument for (2B) was re­ferred to but not discussed, and the prima facie absurdity of (2B) was pointed out. Finally, it was suggested that (2B) denies the correspondence theory of truth in the sense that it denies a presupposition of that theory, namely, a distinction between truth (or what is true) and reality.

The present discussion (pp 55ff) began with a proof that (2B), as formulated, cannot be true. Then, in an effort to examine other formulations of Moore's position on this issue and his defence of those formulations, proposition (3), which seemed to involve a denial of the correspondence theory of truth, and the argument used to support it, were examined. It was found that the argument was fallacious, and that (3), while a consequence of (2B) (and other of our numbered propositions), does not involve a denial of the correspondence theory of truth. I now propose to move on to a consideration of some of Moore's statements concerning the correspondence theory of truth, other than (2B) and (3).

To begin with, let's look at the argument of Moore's that was hinted at on page 51 of this essay. The argument occurs on page 181 and can be expanded as follows. Let's state the correspondence theory of truth: a proposition is true if and only if it corresponds to reality. Further,
let's call the proposition (or judgment) which states this theory proposition "P₁". Now, P₁ must itself be true. But the truth of P₁ cannot be established by showing its correspondence with reality "without a vicious circle". Moore's point can be made by trying to justify P₁ by showing its correspondence with reality. We could argue as follows. P₁ asserts that no true proposition does not correspond with reality, and that no proposition which corresponds with reality is not true. And, when we survey propositions which we know to be true, we do find both of these conditions to hold. Hence, it is highly probable that the equivalence holds in unobserved conditions, and therefore P₁ is true. Further, we are entitled to assert (with probability) that we know P₁ is true.26 P₁ asserts a correspondence between true propositions and reality, and that correspondence is found to obtain in all (examined) cases. Finally, since P₁ is in the form of an equivalence, P₁ will serve as an adequate criterion of truth. Moore's point here is that, even if we grant all of these claims (except the last), the last does not follow. For, the establishment of the truth of P₁ assumes we are already able to tell true from false propo-

26 This argument ignores some crucial problems (most notably the case of mathematical truths and the meaning of 'correspondence'). The point here of course is to make a strong case for P₁, hence no mention of these problems. The objection of Moore's under examination here does not depend on these complications.
sitions. If at that stage of the argument we appeal to the correspondence theory of truth, the argument is circular. Yet, if we do not appeal to the correspondence theory of truth in the process of proving it correct, we admit that $P_1$ is not the fundamental criterion of truth. (Moore's ultimate point here is that no criterion of truth is ultimate, that truth "cannot be defined, but must be immediately recognized", p. 180.)

In addition to the (expanded) argument just discussed (from p. 181 of "NJ"), Moore has four arguments against the correspondence theory of truth. Two of them occur on p. 180, one on p. 181, and one on p. 192 (immediately following Moore's assertion of (2B)). As this latter argument is somewhat similar to the one just given, let's consider it first.

After asserting (2B), Moore immediately goes on to say:

For both of these (i.e., reality and the world in space and time) must be supposed to exist, in some sense, if the truth of our judgment is to depend upon them; and then it turns out that the truth of our judgment depends not on them, but on the judgment that they, being such and such, exist. But this judgment cannot, in its turn depend on anything else, for its truth or falsehood: its truth or its falsehood must be immediate properties of its own, not dependent upon any relation it may have to something else. And, if this be so, we have removed all reason for the supposition that the truth and falsehood of other judgments are not equally independent.
This argument is, I think, much more complicated and subtle than it might seem. A full understanding of it presupposes some Bradley and Kant, so it will not be gone into here. The following is a simple argument suggested by Moore's argument here, and is somewhat like Moore's argument. Suppose that the truth-value of some judgment, say $\phi x$, depends on its relation to reality, i.e., on reality being such that $\phi x$. But here we have only another judgment (namely, reality is such that $\phi x$). This regress is inescapable unless we arbitrarily stop at some point and say that some given judgment is true (or false) immediately and independently of its relation to any other judgment. But since which judgment we make this unavoidable move with is arbitrary, there is no reason to not make this move with all judgments.

It is, I think, sufficiently obvious in what respects this argument is similar to the previous one: truth by correspondence involves a vicious circle (or endless regress) and truth must, therefore, be an immediately recognizable property of judgments.

The argument on p. 181 is also similar to these two. It might seem that we could appeal to facts and argue for the truth of a proposition solely on the basis of what is fact. Appearances, however, are deceptive. "For, in order that a fact may be made the basis of an argument, it must
first be put in the form of a proposition, and, moreover, this proposition must be supposed true." Here again we get an endless regress or vicious circle, or else we make an immediate appeal to the proposition itself. "An appeal to the facts is useless... The nature of a true proposition is the ultimate datum."

Moore's two arguments on p. 180 are considerably easier to understand. He begins by admitting that propositions which correspond to reality are true, yet goes on to argue that correspondence with reality is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition of truth. A proposition is true "which consists of a combination of concepts that is actually to be found among existents". Being actually found among existents is not, however, a sufficient condition of truth, since (simple) concepts do not have a truth-value, yet are found among existents. ("Red would be a true concept because there actually are red things...") And being found among existents is hardly a necessary condition of truth, since many propositions (eg, that 2 plus 2 equals 4) are true that are true independently of whatever does or does not exist.

27 Moore's usage here literally taken implies a distinction between fact and proposition (truth and being). Contrast his remarks in the following paragraph, where concepts (and thus propositions) are said to be among existents. 28 He does not put the matter this way, and my statement is somewhat misleading.
Having briefly examined Moore's arguments for (2B) and seen some of the context in which the theory (or set of related theories) occurs, what can we say it means? There seem to be at least ten distinct claims that may be involved in (2B). They are as follows.

1) The truth-value of a judgment does not depend on any relation it might have to anything.

2) The truth-value of a judgment does not depend on its relation to facts (reality, the world in space and time).

3) The truth-value of a judgment does not depend on its relation to any mind or its contents.

4) Truth is a monadic property, and not a relation.

5) Truth and reality are one.

6) It is necessary that the truth-value of a judgment does not depend on any relation it might have to anything. 29

7) It is necessary that the truth-value of a judgment does not depend on its relation to facts (reality, the world in space and time).

8) It is necessary that the truth-value of a judgment does not depend on its relation to any mind or its contents.

9) It is necessary that truth is a monadic property, and not a relation.

10) It is necessary that truth and reality are one.

Claims 6 through 10 are simply claims 1 through 5, with the addition that each is said to be necessary. See (2B) and p. 192, where words such as "must be" are used.
A great deal remains to be said concerning Moore's views on the correspondence theory of truth and the meaning of (2B). As these additional issues are, however, of subsidiary importance for the purposes of this essay, I propose to move on to a consideration of some of Moore's other theses in "NJ". Propositions (1A), (1B), (1C), and (2A) have already been discussed. Proposition (2B) has been discussed at some length, although hardly in an exhaustive manner. Propositions (3) and (8) have also been discussed. Let's now take a look at propositions (4) through (7) and Moore's justification of them.

Subsection E.

Propositions (4) through (7) are obviously similar. I am not sure that Moore regarded them as distinct claims. I have separated them only because they do seem distinct, and this may turn out to be important (although, as yet, I do not see any massive consequences). Moore seems to not always distinguish (4) through (6), since he says (p. 177) that (4) and (5) are to be proved, and then gives an argument for (6). Let's examine this argument.

The argument is rather obscure, and occurs on pp. 177-178. I think the following is a fair statement of Moore's argument.

1) According to Bradley's theory of judgment, making a
judgment presupposes "cutting off" and "fixing" by the mind a part of the character of our ideas.

2) We cannot "cut off" and "fix" a part of the character of an idea of ours unless we first make a judgment regarding the character of that idea.

3) Hence, making a judgment \( J_1 \) presupposes a cutting off operation. And this cutting off operation presupposes making another judgment \( J_2 \).

4) But, before we can make the judgment \( J_2 \), we must perform a cutting off operation, and hence make still another judgment, \( J_3 \).

5) This process must go on without end, for each judgment we try to make. But this is impossible.

6) "It follows, therefore, if we are to avoid this absurdity, that the (concept) must be something other than a part of the content of any idea of mine (p. 178)."

What are we to make of this argument? To begin with, I should point out that step two is not put forward explicitly as a premise by Moore. It occurs in the form of the (presumed) only possible answer to a rhetorical question. What Moore actually says: "But my question is, whether we can thus cut off a part of the character of our ideas, and attribute that part to something else, unless we already know, in part at least, what is the character of the idea from
which we are to cut off the part in question. If not, then we have already made a judgment with regard to the character of our ideas." Moore gives no evidence that Bradley thought (or should have thought to be consistent) that this question could not be answered differently from the way in which Moore answers it. Further, Moore gives no reason whatever for thinking all cutting off operations presuppose making a new judgment. If we treat this (semi-concealed) assertion of Moore's as it perhaps ought to be treated, namely, as an assumed and unsupported premise, the argument changes from a putative proof of 6 to a putative proof of the claim that 2 entails 6. This latter is, of course, not at all what Moore wants to prove. On the other hand, if we regard this argument as a proof of 6, it can only be (at best) as good as Moore's defence of 2. And, as was just mentioned, Moore's defence of 2 is non-existent. In connection with the status of 2, it should be pointed out that 3 renders explicit an implicit assumption of Moore's regarding the content of 2, which is: for any judgment $J_n$, the cutting off operation presupposed in making $J_n$ requires the making of a judgment $J_m$ such that $J_m$ is not identical with $J_n$.\(^{30}\) Whether 2 and 3 are true, and whether 2 and 3 are explicit or implicit in

\(^{30}\) More accurately: $J$ is not identical with $J_n$ and $J_m$ is not identical with any previous judgment. To get the infinite regress, each judgment must be a new judgment.
Bradley's theory of judgment, are questions I do not want to pursue at present. What is clear at this point is that 2 and 3 are implicit assumptions of Moore's and that he gives us no explicit reason for accepting them.

Granting that these considerations cripple Moore's proof, what more can be said concerning this argument? Perhaps the most important point to notice is that the argument is valid, but only because its premisses are inconsistent. Consider the following schematization of the argument. Let x be any (human) individual who judges, \( J_n \) be any specific judgment, and \( J_m \) (\( m < n \)) be any judgment x may have made previous to making \( J_n \).\(^{31}\)

1) "X makes \( J_n \)" materially implies \(^{32}\)"x performs a cutting off operation with respect to \( J_n \)". (This is assumed provisionally, as a part of Bradley's theory of judgment.)

2) "X performs a cutting off operation with respect to \( J_n \)" materially implies \(^{32}\)"x makes \( J_r \), and \( J_r \) is not identical with \( J_n \) or \( J_m \)". (This is assumed without argument by Moore.)

\(^{31}\) This assumes an ordering of x's judgments. The most obvious way of doing this would be to order them in the chronological order in which they were in fact made (assuming no two judgments are ever made simultaneously).

\(^{32}\) Moore does not use the expression "materially implies" (and could not have, since Russell hadn't yet invented the concept). "Materially implies" may lose some of Moore's meaning, but not in such a way as to falsify the conclusions I draw.
3) X cannot make an infinite number of judgments. (An obvious empirical truth.)

4) X can make judgments. (True by the definition of "x").

Therefore,

5) Concepts are "something other than" a part of the content of my ideas. (This is Moore's conclusion, numbered 6 on p. 67.)

By the law of hypothetical syllogism, from 1 and 2 we get:
"x makes Jₙ" materially implies "x makes Jᵢ, and Jᵢ is not identical with Jₙ or Jᵢ". Let J be the class of judgments made by x. Let J₁ be a member of J. (Premise 4 allows this move.) Thus we have that x makes J₁. From this it follows that x makes Jᵢ. Let this Jᵢ be J₂. From this it follows that x makes Jᵢ, where Jᵢ is neither J₁ nor J₂. Let this Jᵢ be J₃. It is obvious that this move is infinitely repeatable, and hence that J is an infinite class. But, we also have that J is a finite class (by premise 3). Hence, we have a contradiction. Hence, we can infer 5.

It should now be clear why I said earlier that Moore's moves in connection with the first two premisses of this argument (the first four premisses in the version on p. 67) "cripple" the argument. A proof of a conclusion that depends on adopting inconsistent premisses is hardly impressive. What this argument does show is that at least one
of the first two premisses is false. 33

A final point concerning this argument is that the conclusion is ambiguous. It can be construed in either of two ways: "Concepts are part of the content of my ideas as well as being $\phi$" and "Concepts are not part of the content of my ideas". Now, when he put forward the above argument, Moore said that he was, for the present, going to assume that concepts are part of the content of my ideas, and inquire only whether they also must be something else ($\phi$) as well. (See p. 177.) Hence, if Moore thought his argument was sound (and we can only assume that he did think this), and explicitly admitted that he was assuming that, whatever else they were, concepts were part of the content of ideas (which admission he did make), then he couldn't consistently claim that the conclusion was to be taken in the second of the two senses given above. Yet this is in fact what the argument was intended to prove. 34 Rather than attribute such a blatant inconsistency to Moore, I prefer to interpret his proof of (6) as follows. Assume that (6) is false, i.e., that concepts are part of the content of our ideas. Then assume premisses 1 through 4 (on page 67) (i.e., premisses 1 and 2 on page 70). 35 A contradiction ("absurdity")

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33 All the remarks in this paragraph presupposes the truth of premisses 3 and 4 on page 70.

34 The second rendering of the conclusion of Moore's argument is proposition (6).

35 I omit, as before, the two uncontroversial premisses of the argument. They are, of course, necessary to the argument.
follows. Hence, infer that (6) is not false. This would be a sound argument, except for the fact that we have no proof of the other assumed premisses. What the argument does show, in conclusion, is that of the negation of (6), premisses 1 (p.70), and 2 (p.70), at least one is false. Which of these is false, Moore does not establish.

So much for Moore's defence of (4) through (7).

Subsection F.

Moore makes some interesting remarks about the concept of existence. The most important of these is simply that existence is itself a concept (proposition (9)). His reason for this belief is quite succinctly stated: "It (existence) is something which we mean" (p.180). This line of argument seems to make no sense (and even to perhaps not be an argument) unless it is recalled that concepts are the subjects of (any possible) affirmation (see page 38), i.e., concepts are entities to which we refer when we judge.

Proposition (11) is accepted by Moore due to Bradley's proof that the concept is necessary to truth and falsehood. As I want to avoid discussing Bradley in this essay, and as Moore does not repeat Bradley's argument in "NJ", I shall not discuss it. What I do wish to point out in connection with (11) is that it seems to follow from (1A) and (2A). For, since judgments have truth and falsehood, yet, being composed of concepts, cannot exist without concepts, the concept seems to be necessary
to truth and falsehood. (This argument assumes more than is explicit in (2A). (2A) merely asserts that judgments have a truth-value, whereas this argument also assumes that only judgments have a truth-value. This latter assumption is, I think, made by Moore.)

Propositions (10) and (12) seem to contradict each other. Part of what (10) asserts seems to be that what exists is composed of concepts, whereas part of what (12) asserts seems to be that concepts are not parts of what exists. Proposition (10) does assert, in part, that what exists is composed of concepts. And this is clearly a view Moore held. (In addition to the quote from Moore already cited - see page 53 -, consider the following. "It seems necessary, then, to regard the world as formed of concepts" (p.182). "An existent is seen to be nothing but a concept or complex of concepts..." (p.183).) What, then, are we to make of (12)? Moore's point here is metaphysical. The concept cannot consistently be described in terms of what exists "since it (the concept) is presupposed in the conception of an existent"(p.181), ie, concepts are the ultimate constituents of reality (and thus what exists is composed of concepts-proposition (10)) and hence cannot be explained in terms of anything else. Here it should be clear how our initial hypothesis as to the nature of concepts in Moore's philosophy (see pp.41f) allows us to interpret (10) and (12) in a manner
that makes Moore's views themselves consistent.

The last of Moore's theses to be considered here is the one that, on a casual first reading of Moore's essay, strikes one as utterly mad. How could anyone maintain that perception is the cognition of an existential proposition? It should be clear by now that, given my interpretation of Moore's concepts of concept, proposition, and existence, proposition (13) is obviously true. Concepts are possible objects of judgement (in the psychological sense of "judgement"), and these include things. Hence, "even the description of an existent (ie, a fact) as a proposition (a true existential proposition) seems to lose its strangeness, when it is remembered that a proposition is here to be understood, not as anything subjective - an assertion or affirmation of something - but as the combination of concepts which is affirmed" (p.183).

A final confirmation of my interpretation of Moore is an assertion he makes in "Truth and Falsity". He says (p.717): "It is the impossibility of finding any such difference between a truth and the reality to which it is supposed to correspond which refutes the theory (of truth as correspondence with reality)....A truth differs in no respect from the reality to which it was supposed merely to

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36 Facts are true combinations of concepts, when existence is one of the combined concepts.
correspond: eg, the truth that I exist differs in no respect from the corresponding reality - my existence."37

Subsection G.

To sum up - Section III of this essay began with a fairly careful attempt to isolate Moore's main results in "NJ". These were expressed in propositions (1A) through (2B), which were then briefly discussed. The nature of the concept was then briefly discussed, and the hypothesis that concepts were (or included) things was put forward. Other assertions of Moore's were then isolated (proposition (3) through (13)). Moore's arguments in support of these propositions, as well as his arguments in support of (2B), were then examined. At various points throughout this discussion, remarks were made showing how the nature of the concept is fundamental in Moore's philosophy, and indicating that our initial hypothesis regarding the nature of concepts was correct and has significant explanatory value (eg, it allows (10) and (12) to be consistent). All of this required occasional discussion of other concepts in Moore's philosophy, necessity being perhaps one of the most important of these.

All of this should not mislead anyone into thinking that the hypothesis that concepts are things (in the broad usage of 'thing' exemplified in such phrases as "of the

37 Cp. further page 89 of "Experience and Empiricism".
things that are that they are, and of the things that are not that they are not") is unproblematic. Many of Moore's assertions make this hypothesis doubtful. A few of these have been quoted already in connection with other topics. (See, eg, page 64 footnote.) Perhaps the most important of these remarks are those attributing properties to concepts that are clearly not properties of some things. Thus, eg, it was pointed out on page 44, that concepts are incapable of change. The problem here is due, in part at least, to a confusion regarding the word "thing". The sorts of things that are subject to change are complex things (complex concepts). Things (concepts) as metaphysically ultimate entities in terms of which everything else is to be explained can reasonably be said to be changeless. It may seem improbable, however, to explain away this problem by noticing this ambiguous usage of "thing", since Moore does seem to make the three following assertions. (1) Concepts are incapable of change. (2) Judgements are complex concepts and are true or false. (3) Truth and being are one. From these it seems to follow that some complex concepts are incapable of change, and that facts are incapable of change. This latter assertion probably reduces to the assertion that everything is what it is, and is not another thing. The former, however, might be thought to imply that complex concepts such as the man G. E. Moore are incapable of change.
It is, nevertheless, a matter of plain common sense that such things as men and women are capable of change, and hence that not all things are concepts, if concepts are incapable of change.\textsuperscript{38}

The explanation of all this is not that concepts are not to be regarded as things (entities). For, as I have shown throughout this section, this hypothesis is very well confirmed. The point to be noticed is that Moore's usage of "concept" is not uniform. He quite often fails to indicate whether he is speaking of simple concepts (which seems to be his main usage) or complex concepts. This is only one of several ways in which "NJ" suggests a rather hurriedly written essay. (In this it is not unlike most first public expressions of a "new philosophy"). Other examples have already been mentioned (see page 56, footnote 22, and also the discussion of Moore's concept of necessity). More surprising than these occasional inconsistencies and misleading usages however is the remarkable coherence of the essay.

Before going on to Section IV and a brief outline of Russell's views in which are similar to views of Moore, a few points arising from Sections I and II should be mentioned.

\textsuperscript{38} It is possible to argue here that "Common Sense" and certain ordinary usages are wrong or misleading.
To begin with, Russell's claim that Moore was, while an undergraduate, a Lucretian materialist should be recalled. Lucretius was perhaps as uncompromising a materialist as has ever existed, holding that only matter (and the void) exists.\textsuperscript{39} Bearing this in mind, we should not be surprised to find that, when he rejected Idealism, Moore returned to this full-blown materialism. And this does seem to be what actually happened. Moore does not say he is a materialist in "NJ", but he nowhere says in that essay anything which seems inconsistent with the assumption that he is a materialist. And, there seems to be very good evidence that he was a materialist when he wrote "NJ" since two of his claims in this essay (propositions (7) and (10)) entail a strong form of materialism. As was indicated above, proposition (10) has as a consequence that whatever exists is composed of concepts. And proposition (7) obviously has as a consequence that concepts are not part of anything mental. And from these two assertions (that whatever exists is composed of concepts and that concepts are not part of anything mental) it does follow that nothing mental exists. Whether Moore was aware of this consequence, I have been unable to determine.

Another point arising from Section II has to do with Section IV. Given proposition 14 of section II (see p. 35),

\textsuperscript{39} Marxists, eg, who are certainly materialists, do not all deny the existence or immateriality of mind.
it follows that in 1898-1899, Russell must have held very similar views to those just discussed. Thus, Russell's philosophy, as expressed in The Philosophy of Leibniz, should prove close to Moore's in "NJ", and, barring any major changes before 1903, so should his views in POM. (The reader will see this for himself when he gets to Section IV.)

A final point relevant to Section II is this. On pp. 36f, the difference between a widely held interpretation of the Russell-Moore relationship and the interpretation arrived at in Section II of this essay was discussed. It should be even clearer by now that the sort of view espoused by Warnock certainly does not apply to this early period.

Finally, a point made in Section I (p.4) is highly relevant here. It is probably impossible to discover how much of the content of "NJ" is due to Moore, and how much to Russell. The essay was written during and/or following a period of close personal interaction and discussion between the two. As will soon become apparent, Russell's views in 1903\textsuperscript{10} are similar in many respects to Moore's in this essay. It would, however, be a mistake to conclude that Russell got these views from Moore. The interaction during this early period (on certain issues) seems to have been such that it would be inaccurate to speak of influence, as opposed to

\textsuperscript{10} Or 1902, as the book was actually finished in December, 1902, although it was not published until 1903.
interaction, at all. Their common views in this period were, most probably, a joint product, in most cases.
IV

A comparison of Moore's early philosophy with Russell's would involve a great deal. It would be necessary to interpret the important writings of each from their first works up until, say, 1905 or so. And this would involve doing a developmental study of each of them. Further, it would be necessary to study the remarks of each concerning the influence of the other, and to assess their mutual influence. In this thesis I am concerned only with a part of such a project, namely, a study of Moore's influence on Russell, particularly in the early years of their association. Thus, in Section II only Russell's remarks concerning Moore's influence on him (and not Moore's on Russell's influence on Moore) were examined. In Section III, Moore's views in "NJ" were briefly characterized. And, in this section of the essay, some things will be said about some aspects of Russell's philosophy in POM, although this will only be the minimum necessary to show some of the major similarities and differences between POM and "NJ". Very little has been or will be said about the early views of either as expressed in other of their early publications, or of Russell's influence

1 As "NJ" is only 18 pages in length, the 30-odd page discussion of it in Section III might be thought to be not "brief". I do not think, however, that what was said regarding Moore's essay in Part III can be said to even approach saying what should be said.
In this section I discuss Russell's doctrine of concepts and propositions in \textit{POM}, and point out its fundamental similarity to the doctrine of concepts in "NJ". The similarity of the two positions, coupled with the results of Section II of this essay, serve to establish that "NJ" expresses many of the key views held by Russell himself in 1898, views on which he was much influenced by Moore. I also point out a number of differences between Russell's doctrine of terms in \textit{POM} and the theory about concepts in "NJ". Where such differences exist, there are two possible interpretations: (1) we can assume that Russell's views in 1898 were different from Moore's and therefore did not change as of 1903, or (2) we can assume that Russell agreed with Moore in 1898 but changed his mind by 1903. There seems to be, in general, no way of deciding between these alternatives.

One of the more important of Russell's philosophical terms in \textit{POM} is the word "term". Russell's concept of the term is also one of the main subjects on which he was influenced by Moore. Thus he says: (page 44, first footnote) "The notion of a term here set forth is a modification of Mr. G. E. Moore's notion of a concept in his article 'On the Nature of Judgment'..., from which notion, however, it differs in some important respects." Unfortunately, Russell does not say in what respects the two notions differ. I
will try to indicate some of these differences. It should be noticed, however, that an important aspect of both notions is the total role they play in their respective philosophical systems. Hence, without a complete discussion of both Russell and Moore's early philosophy, the discussion of the relation of the two notions must also be incomplete. Although not everything worth saying about the relations between terms and concepts can be said here, some things can be said. To begin with, let us see what Russell has to say regarding terms.

The notion of term is first introduced in what is surely one of the most striking passages in POM. As this passage will be discussed in some detail, it had better be quoted in full.

Whatever may be an object of thought, or may occur in any true or false proposition, or can be counted as one, I call a term. This, then, is the widest word in the philosophical vocabulary. I shall use as synonymous with it the words unit, individual, and entity. The first two emphasize the fact that every term is one, while the third is derived from the fact that every term has being, i.e., is in some sense. A man, a moment, a number, a class, a relation, a chimera, or anything else that can be mentioned, is sure to be a term; and to deny that such and such a thing is a term must always be false.

The first and last sentences quoted expresses a criterion of sorts for being a term. Four conditions of being a term are enumerated:

1) Whatever may be an object of thought;
2) Whatever may occur in any true or false proposition; 3) Whatever can be counted as one; and 4) Whatever can be mentioned.

Russell does not discuss whether all of these conditions must be met before something can be counted a term. (I take it as obvious that he regards each of these conditions as sufficient conditions of termhood. Notice, eg, that the first sentence quoted is disjunctive in form.) I think he would admit, however, that each of these is a necessary condition, if only because these four conditions are true of all terms. What can occur in a proposition is coextensive with the thinkable and the mentionable, which are coextensive with each other. The third property analytically belongs to all terms, as can be seen when it is stated without the other three: A condition of being a term is to be countable as one. These four conditions then, are necessary and sufficient conditions of being a term. Yet, if regarded as a criterion of termhood, they are rather weak. For, each of these conditions contains a modal word ('can' or 'may'). This is important, as it allows something to be a term even though it is not in fact ever thought of, mentioned, or counted. In short, it follows from these conditions that it is at least possible that there are non-mental terms. (Is this more than possible? It is rather easy to prove that, given Russell's conditions for being a term, there are terms that are not part of the
content of existing (human) minds. Consider the set of propositions: \( 1 = 1, 2 = 2, 3 = 3, 4 = 4, \ldots \) etc. This is an infinite set. Further, the numbers 1, 2, 3, etc., are terms, since they each occur in a true proposition (condition 2). Hence, there are an infinite number of terms and thus more than can be the content of existing (human) thoughts.\(^2\) Hence, Russell's doctrine of terms involves a rejection of a key Idealist thesis.) This is one of the strong points of these four conditions. The disadvantage to regarding these four conditions as a criterion of termness lies in the conditional nature of each condition. Each of these conditions can be stated: \( x \) is a term if and only if it can (may) be that \( \phi x \). It is not clear how these conditions are to be interpreted so that they are descriptive of terms and also do not presuppose the existence of minds.\(^3\)

The passage quoted above, in addition to containing an implicit "criterion" of termhood and an implicit rejection of terms as mental, contains three other points worth

\(^2\) This argument is not given by Russell. The example of numbers seems fairly well chosen, since in the above quoted passage he says that numbers are terms. On pp. 357f, Russell gives a proof that there are an infinite number of ideas. He also points out that not all of these ideas need be supposed to exist. That is, even though there are an infinite number of states of mind, only a finite number exist.

\(^3\) I'm not sure whether or not Russell has a problem here. Assuming that if no minds existed nothing could be thought or mentioned, then the conditions, if actually hypothetical, yield that everything is a term, but they do this in a vacuous way.
mentioning here. "Term" has the same meaning, as used in POM, as "unit", "individual", and "entity". Secondly, terms are (have being). Finally, a list of terms is given. (Examples given elsewhere include Socrates, humanity, points, instants, bits of matter, particular states of mind, and the pseudo-existents of a novel (p.45), and the Homeric gods (p.449).)

It should be noticed that Russell has now given us synonyms for "term", and has also given necessary and sufficient conditions of being a term, and has even given what could (perhaps) be regarded as a criterion for being a term. This seems to differ from Moore's view that the concept (or term) is ultimate and indefinable. In fact, however, Russell's position here is quite similar to Moore's. It is true that conditions one through four can be taken as necessary and sufficient conditions of being a term, or even as a criterion of being a term. But this is derived from the fact that they are true of all (and only) terms, and is not meant to explain what terms are. Similarly, the words "unit", "individual", and "entity" are said to be used as synonymous with "term", but this is intended to be somewhat arbitrary. (See, eg, the word "call" in the above quoted passage.) In this connection,

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4 Not all of the issues raised by the quoted passage are discussed (eg, whether or not "term" is in fact "the widest word" in Russell's philosophical vocabulary, and why).
a remark of Russell's on page 152 is worth quoting. He says: "We decided (in chapter 15) to regard both term and a term as indefinable."

It was mentioned earlier that terms have being. This raises another topic in Russell's theory of terms: the distinction between being and existence. Being is what "belongs to every conceivable term, to every possible object of thought" (p.449). Everything has being. "Existence, on the contrary, is the prerogative of some only amongst beings. To exist is to have a specific relation to existence..." (p.449). Existence is a term, and to be appropriately related to it is to exist. Existence therefore has being, but does not itself exist.5

An additional point of importance is that terms are, "in fact, possessed of all the properties commonly assigned to substances or substantives" (p.44). These properties include the following.

1) Terms are logical subjects. (This is easily proved. Each term is "the subject of the proposition that itself is one".) (See page 44.)

2) Terms are immutable. "What a term is, it is" (p.44). A

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5 An important term related to 'being' and 'existence' is 'real'. Russell's usage of 'real' in POM allows anything to be real if it "has no dependence upon the mind" (p.446).
term cannot change.

3) Terms are indestructible. (See p.44.) Terms can exist and cease to exist but they cannot cease to be. (See p.471.)

4) Each term is numerically identical with itself (one), and numerically diverse from all others. (See p.44.) (But cp. also p.132f. The number one is not what is meant here.)

5) Terms are not linguistic. (See, eg, pp.47 and 53.)

6) Terms are the constituents of propositions. (See, eg, pp.42 and 44.)

The final aspect of Russell's theory of terms to be mentioned is his division of terms into things and concepts. Things are those terms which are indicated by proper names (in a broad sense of "proper name"). Thus, things include Socrates, G. E. Moore, particular points in space, "particular states of mind", and, in general, any particular existent. (Non-existent terms are not excluded.) Concepts are terms which are not things. Thus, they are indicated by all words which are not proper names, ie, adjectives and verbs. Roughly, concepts indicated by adjectives are class concepts or predicates, and concepts indicated by verbs are relations.

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6 See page 46 for a possible qualification here.
In addition to Russell's theory of terms, two other aspects of his philosophy in *POM* need to be briefly (and roughly) characterized before the extent of Moore's influence can be seen. These are: Russell's concepts of propositions and necessity.

Terms, as we have just seen, are the constituents of propositions. Whatever occurs in a proposition is a term. But not every combination of terms forms a proposition. Consider, eg, the terms: A, difference, and B. These three terms form a propositional concept, not a proposition. (Propositional concepts are would-be propositions where the verb term has been replaced by the corresponding verbal noun term. See page 52.) Every proposition must contain at least two terms, one and only one of which is a verb (relation). And this verb must occur as verb, and not as a verbal noun. Thus, propositions are seen to have an essential unity (since relations, as relating, occur in them). "The verb, when used as a verb (and not as a verbal noun) embodies the unity of the proposition..." (p.50). Hence it follows that all propositions have being. Thus Russell's assertion (p.449) that "Being is that which belongs to every conceivable term...and to all...propositions themselves." (Cp., eg, pp.35 and 49.)

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7 See paragraph #53 for a slight qualification of this point.
And finally, the concept of proposition can be defined: \( p \) is a proposition if and only if \( p \) materially implies \( p \).\(^8\) (See p.15.)

Russell's remarks on his own views on necessity in POM consist of the following four sentences.

The only logical meaning of necessity seems to be derived from implication. A proposition is more or less necessary according as the class of propositions for which it is a premiss is greater or smaller. In this sense the propositions of logic have the greatest necessity, and those of geometry have a high degree of necessity. But this sense of necessity yields no valid argument from our inability to imagine holes in space to the conclusion that there cannot really be any space at all except in our imaginations. (p.454)

Russell footnotes Moore's article "Necessity" at the end of this passage.

Although the preceding sketch of certain of Russell's philosophical views in POM is only a sketch (and a significantly and unavoidably over-simplified sketch at that), it should make the extent of Moore's influence obvious and will serve as a basis for making a brief comparison with Moore's views as discussed in Section III.

Some of the similarities between Russell's doctrine of terms and Moore's doctrine of concepts should now be

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\(^8\) This is a "mathematical", as opposed to a "philosophical" definition. On page xix, "proposition" is said to be a name for the "true or false as such". Cp. page 13 where Russell argues that "x is a man" is not a proposition because it has no truth value.
obvious. Terms and concepts are both "possible objects of thought", "incapable of change", not linguistic in nature, not mental, the constituents of propositions, and are both ultimate constituents of reality or substances. Further, existence is a term or concept, and to exist is to be related in a certain way to existence. All terms and concepts have being. Propositions (judgements) are the things which are true or false. Additional similarities could be pointed out, but the aim of much of this essay up to this point has been to make the similarities obvious to the reader. Some of the differences between Russell and Moore's views may be less evident. Before discussing some of these differences, Russell's remark discussed on pp.13-14 of this essay) to the effect that many of the differences between his own and Moore's views at this period were differences of emphasis should be recalled. Hence the existence of a difference does not imply the existence of a disagreement.

Russell's concept of a term differs in a number of ways from Moore's term "concept". To begin with, Russell uses the word "term" where Moore uses "concept". Further, Russell subdivides terms into things and concepts, whereas

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9 But see below.
10 This is more implicit than explicit in Moore's case.
11 Also, the absence of a disagreement in POM makes it highly probable that Russell agreed with Moore on any given issue expounded in "NJ".
Moore makes no corresponding division of concepts. Russell also pays considerably more attention to language and grammar when developing his views on terms, and argues for a correspondence between various types of terms and various parts of speech. Russell also comes very close to giving a definition of terms. Moore, of course, holds that concepts cannot be defined. Somewhat related to this last point is Russell's admission (See p.55%) of a more fundamental (or general) term than "term". Moore held that all concepts were equally adjectival (see p.46 of this essay), whereas Russell distinguished between terms which are logical subjects and terms which are not. (Although even for Russell all terms are substances.)

Perhaps one of the philosophically most important differences between Russell and Moore on terms (or concepts), and one that involves a disagreement and not merely a difference of emphasis, is Russell's admission that some terms are mental, i.e., that not everything which exists is non-mental. Russell and Moore agreed in rejecting Idealistic Monism. Moore went on to hold that reality is pluralistic and material, whereas Russell adopted a pluralism of substances, while avoiding both (strong) materialism and idealism. This is, I think,

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12 The sense of logical subject I have in mind here: Those terms which occur in some proposition where they cannot be regarded as the subject of the proposition are not logical subjects. (See p.43.) This is Russell's criterion for being a thing.
the most significant of the differences between Russell and Moore's early philosophy that is not merely a difference of emphasis. Most of the differences that are to be found are of this latter type. These need not be discussed or "explained", since their existence (and even the existence of some substantive disagreements) is perfectly compatible with the thesis that Moore was the major positive philosophical influence on Russell during this period.

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13 Among living philosophers.


--------. "Necessity", Mind, IX (1900), 289-304.

--------. "Real", in J. Baldwin, ed., Dictionary of Philosophy. 1902, 420.


--------. "Light versus Heat", The Observer, 8 August, 1954.


