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|dc.description.abstract||<p>It can be argued that the most fundamental problem for Kant in the third "Antinomy" is that of personal identity. It is argued that an analysis of the third "Antinomy" leads to the problem of personal identity, because the solution to that problem provides the necessary grounds for justifying that the human will is free. In the last analysis, and in spite of the lack of Kant's explicit acknowledgment of the problem, the ultimate grounds for freedom can be none other than a knowledge of what it means to be a person.</p> <p>This thesis does not pretend to solve the issue of personal identity. It simply attempts to connect the problem of freedom to that of personal identity within the confines of Kant's system. In so doing, it also raises the problem of having to step beyond the bounds of the criteria for knowledge in Kant. Hence, a new antinomy may have arise.</p>||en_US|
|dc.title||Kant's Defence of Freedom: An Analysis of the Third Antinomy||en_US|
|dc.description.degree||Master of Arts (MA)||en_US|
|Appears in Collections:||Open Access Dissertations and Theses|
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