

KANT'S DEFENCE OF FREEDOM:
AN
ANALYSIS OF THE THIRD ANTI-NOMY

BY



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KANT'S
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ABSTRACT

It can be argued that the most fundamental problem for Kant in the third "Antinomy" is that of personal identity. It is argued that an analysis of the third "Antinomy" leads to the problem of personal identity, because the solution to that problem provides the necessary grounds for justifying that the human will is free. In the last analysis, and in spite of the lack of Kant's explicit acknowledgement of the problem, the ultimate grounds for freedom can be none other than a knowledge of what it means to be a person.

This thesis does not pretend to solve the issue of personal identity. It simply attempts to connect the problem of freedom to that of personal identity within the confines of Kant's system. In so doing, it also raises the problem of having to step beyond the bounds of the criteria for knowledge in Kant. Hence, a new antinomy may have arisen.

DEDICATION

To
Marissa Lakowski
and
Victor Nichols

who showed me why freedom
was so important

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PREFACE

Writing this thesis has not been an easy task. The process however, has been a learning experience. It seems to me that philosophy is, for the individual, a process of becoming clearer about the problems and the possible answers regarding the relationships that human beings have to the world, to other human beings, and to themselves. I regard this thesis as an exercise in becoming clearer about one specific problem: the problem of human freedom. Grounding the claim that human beings are free in the face of reductive and sceptical philosophical positions has been an on-going concern of mine. Though this thesis does not represent all of my thoughts on freedom, nor what I take to be its more important aspects, it does represent a significant part of my concern. It is part of the process of justifying the significance or importance of freedom in a world where it is being systematically ignored. I think that I have become clearer, though the reader may not share my experience, and for that reason the thesis has been a rewarding endeavour.

Very often it is the case that a person's reasons for doing philosophy lie hidden from his consciousness. In my case I am certain that this is true, since philosophy seems to me to be a process of harmonizing what one proposes in thought with some pre-philosophical sense of truth. It is impossible to tell at this moment how close I

have come to harmonizing these two elements, but I am certain that the process is not complete. Thus, there remain many obscurities in my thinking which I am sure, have infiltrated my writing. For my lack of eloquence I accept full responsibility and beg the reader's patience.

Though I accept the full responsibility for errors and obscurities, I cannot accept full responsibility for insights and praiseworthy elements in the thesis. A great deal of what I have come to understand is due to the teaching of Professor Samuel Ajzenstat. Being exposed to his instruction and criticism has made me see problems in many different ways, has provided new perspectives for the possibility of solving these problems, and has shown me many of the deficiencies in my own reasoning. Since he has not tried to convert me to his position, I have found myself having to deal with all of these perspectives and in the end, disagreeing with him. Perhaps disagreement on the part of one's students is the price one has to pay for being a good teacher. My gratefulness cannot be expressed here, for once more, my inability with words limits my ability to express.

I am grateful for Professor Shalom's critical evaluation of my ideas and though they be devastating at times, they have forced me to think and see things that I might not have seen otherwise.

I extend appreciation to Professor Weeks for reading the thesis and for his influence on me especially in regards to Kierkegaard and the relation he has to Kant. I thank him, as with all of my readers, for making it hard to say anything 'valid'.

I want to thank David Pfohl who, for two years watched me stumble along and who lent support when the going got tough. There were many long nights and many coffees which were shared and many a time when David kept me going by his comments or by simply being there.

A great difficulty arises when one wants to say something of significance, but is aware of the responsibility of saying only what one has established the right to say. Very often it may appear as if I am impatient wanting to transcend the limits of 'right'. This is partly a function of having an equally compelling responsibility to those friends and family who are important to me. I thank them with the utmost of my affection and request their continued patience and support.

GENERAL NOTES ON THE TEXT

THE METHOD OF CITATION

Throughout the thesis I have used the Prussian Academy edition's standard system of referencing Kant's works as taken from the particular translations I have used. I have used an abbreviation followed by the page number in brackets to indicate the sections of Kant's works I am referencing.

ABBREVIATION

CPR-

Kant, I., Critique of Practical Reason, translated by Lewis White Beck. (Bobbs-Merril Co. Ltd.), Indiana, 1953. I have cited the Prussian Academy edition page numbers as given in Beck's translation in square [] brackets.

A...=B...

-----Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith. (St. Martin's Press). New York, 1929. Here I have used the standard referencing system as found in the margins of the Kemp Smith Translation.

Foundations

-----Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Lewis White Beck. (Bobbs-Merril Educational Publishing), Indianapolis, 1969. I have used the Prussian Academy editions' system of referencing found in square [] brackets in the Beck translation.

MM

-----The Metaphysics of Morals,
translated by Mary J. Gregor. (University
of Pennsylvania Press), Philadelphia, 1984.
I have used the Prussian Academy edition's
system of referencing as found in square []
brackets in the Gregor translation.

Where square brackets [] have been used, there it is indicated that

I have made an insertion for purposes of clarification.

INTRODUCTION

In Kant there are special difficulties in introducing the problem of freedom. One could approach it from a political point of view, a metaphysical or even moral point of view. Each point of view seems to be dealing with a separate issue. This paper begins with general moral concerns about culpability and introduces the metaphysical side of the problem by asking what the necessary conditions are if freedom is to be a legitimate aspect of the human character.

In considering the necessary conditions for freedom the question of what makes a person identifiable as something which can be free arises. It is my view that the question of personal identity¹ is the more fundamental question for Kant. It must be answered before the question of freedom could be settled. My criticism of Kant is not that he neglects or fails to see this problem, as I see it, because it would require him to transgress the boundaries he sets for himself in the investigation. Nevertheless, there are points at which Kant does over-step his own limits and says some radical things

¹ In a paper given at McMaster University in May of 1981 on Kant's historical writings, Professor Samuel Ajzenstat mentioned that he thought the real problem for Kant on the question of freedom was that of knowing whether or not an act could be called 'mine'. The way in which I characterize the mechanism of nature as a closed system of objects operating according to cause/effect laws was largely due to his comments. Identifying the problem of personal identity was at the same time brought to light with these comments.

about freedom and self-knowledge. For this paper, I am assuming that Kant has good reasons for doing this. I shall only be able to hint at what I take Kant to be doing. For example, I suggest that Kant may be using the "Antinomies" (especially the third and fourth) to show that we must adopt a different way of approaching the problem of freedom before we are enabled to recognize and affirm the reality of freedom. Since this thesis is, in many ways, a preliminary investigation of Kant's defence of freedom I shall not be able to dwell on what might be the alternative mode of apprehending the reality of freedom. I want to suggest however, that the inroad to this apprehension is found in an analysis of reflective consciousness, or, in Kant's terms, in a fuller analysis of the transcendental Ego.

My reasons for approaching the question of freedom in Kant through moral considerations are two-fold. First, it provides some kind of continuity between practical and metaphysical concerns. The problem comes to light more readily than if we were to begin from a purely metaphysical point of view. Thus, I take my lead from the second Critique using that work to connect the moral and metaphysical concerns. I shall be using the second Critique to set up a dilemma. Human beings as empirical beings, are considered as automatons and therefore, not free. Conversely, as moral beings they must be considered as free. Once this dilemma which is based on conflicting points of view is established it will give us a lead into the metaphysical concerns. The first chapter is designed then, to pare down what we mean by freedom and to suggest the kinds of conditions that would be necessary if freedom is to be made conceivable.

Secondly, to begin from a purely metaphysical point of view in Kant means recapitulating the arguments of the "Aesthetic" and "Analytic" of the first Critique in order to establish the nature of time, space, causality, phenomenon/noumenon, and appearance/thing in itself: a task far beyond the scope of this paper. The moral argument begins by condensing all of the first Critique's arguments which purportedly establish a necessity for assuming that the law of natural causality applies to all appearances and that they are, therefore predetermined to occur precisely as they do occur according to law. The purpose of the thesis is to understand and to uncover the problems involved in the defence of freedom. We have, therefore to allow Kant to take us some distance before we can see where the problems lie and where they lead.

As a result, the paper begins at a somewhat awkward place, the third "Antinomy" of the "Dialectic". I am beginning somewhere in the middle of Kant's work and for that reason I begin at a disadvantage. I shall not have established all of the concepts and distinctions necessary for understanding Kant's argument in the third "Antinomy". Instead, I have hoped to describe and summarize what Kant means by certain terms (eg., unity) in footnotes and the major distinction (appearance/thing in itself, phenomenon/noumenon) in an appendix. This was done to avoid having to make too many digressions that would make Kant's already difficult work to understand even more difficult.

I have organized this examination of the third "Antinomy" to begin with its relationship to moral matters as outlined in the second Critique. It is argued that culpability presupposes an ability for

the acting agent to do otherwise that he in fact does. Then, in order for this capacity to be confirmed as an actual capacity of the agent it is argued that an agent must be free, i.e., independent of empirical conditions. From that point the examination of the third "Antinomy" takes over in order to show why freedom must be incorporated into our understanding of the world (apart from moral concerns) and how it can be conceived as possible vis-à-vis natural necessity. An inevitable contradiction within reason arises that makes it necessary that both freedom and natural necessity be asserted even though they contradict each other. This conflict calls for a resolution. In the process of resolving the contradiction the meaning of freedom and its qualifications become clearer. The first problem the defence of freedom encounters once it has been established as a necessary concept is that it does not necessarily refer to human agents, but only to a cosmological agent (a creator). So the problem of extending the concept of freedom to human beings arises. Yet, a further problem is encountered once the legitimacy of the extension is established, for the first step that allows for the extension allows too much so that anything conceived to have an empirical character could also be considered to be free. So then, the problem of specifying to what particular objects the power of freedom should be ascribed must be answered before freedom can become a significant concept. At this point the notions of consciousness, pure apperception, an analysis of 'ought', and the meaning of the reversal in use of the category of causality are brought in to show how human beings can conceive

of themselves as first causes.

What all of this points to in the end is that the human agent needs to be able to identify himself as more than an appearance (an empirical object) before freedom can be known to be an actual part of an individual's character..

To conclude this paper all that I aim to show is that Kant needs an apprehension of the self as a thing in itself before freedom can be grounded with certainty. Secondly, I want to indicate that he was quite aware of this in spite of what he takes to be a moral proof for the actuality of freedom in the second Critique, and sometimes wrote as if this apprehension had been reached. I am concerned only to cite the sections where Kant does engage in direct and positive statements about the thing in itself: not to try to understand them. The only understanding that I want to reach is that the problems with which Kant is dealing in the third "Antinomy" and in the second Critique require of him to say what he does - or something like it - even though it is contrary to what he says he can say about the thing in itself.

The organization of the paper has taken the following route: the first section is brief and serves only to introduce the problem of freedom and natural determinism from a moral point of view. The second section, a more lengthy one, discusses the third "Antinomy" and its resolution to try to uncover the more fundamental problem of personal identity. It requires a more careful look at specific arguments in the antinomy in order to show how certain other problems necessarily arise. At several levels of the argument the problem of

personal identity arises which is to say that it underlies the problems being explicitly addressed in the third "Antinomy". So in the third section I have tried to show that this problem is not only more fundamental, but that Kant was aware of it and at times goes beyond the limits he sets for himself in order to say something about personal identity and about how we can know ourselves as things in ourselves.

The purpose of this paper has been to bring certain problems to light to promote further research and thought. It has not been written to solve any major question but I hope it has served at least to fulfill some of its intentions.

SECTION 1. Introduction of the Problem of Freedom Through Moral Concerns

Suppose someone were to kill someone else out of a violent impulse of anger. When he is brought before a jury his lawyer claims that according to physiologists and psychologists this man's physiological make-up and environmental conditions constrained him at the time to kill a complete stranger. He therefore, should not be punished for his behavior. He should not be punished, because at the time of the crime he could not be held responsible; being responsible implies that we have the capacity for doing otherwise than we in fact do. We do not blame a rock for falling off a cliff and killing somebody. We accept that its motions were caused by certain prior determinants that set it in motion. In a similar way we cannot blame our killer, because, like the rock, he could not do otherwise than he did. If we could explain a person's behavior according to prior determinants so that, in principle, we could have predicted his behavior at any given time, as we might have been able to predict the falling of a rock, could we then say of a person that he is culpable? Lewis White Beck identifies the psychologist's assumptions that in principle and despite the lack of an exhaustive knowledge of human nature man's behavior can be predicted with Kant's principle, "that human behavior might be predicted with the same certainty as an eclipse of the sun or the moon".¹

¹. [(Beck, L.W., A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, 1960. p. 29-30; hereafter referred to as Beck,...)(reference taken from CPR 99).]

If we were to make this assumption could we still legitimately say that our killer ought not to have acted as he did? Kant wants to say that despite the fact that a person might have been, "carried along by the stream of natural necessity, and in this way try to make himself out as innocent", yet he is still blameworthy and ought to repent (CPR 98). Despite the possibility that there is a thoroughgoing connection between all human actions Kant also claims that man is free in his causality to choose to do otherwise than he does. This power of choosing for Kant, is reflected in the behavior of a person from childhood and it is this capacity which is the ground for holding a person responsible (CPR 99-100). The question arises; how can a person do otherwise if all behavior is predictable and predetermined by causal law? How can there be any choice in the matter when the actual act was bound to happen and could not happen otherwise.

There seems to be a contradiction here, for though a person may claim to have the power to act otherwise than he did, the law of natural causality implies that there is no power to do otherwise. Kant agrees that under certain conditions, there is a contradiction here. If we are only capable of studying human beings in terms of their behavior, viz., empirically, then there is no freedom (A550=B578). There is no freedom in such a case, because the law of natural causality, "implies that every event, and consequently every action which occurs at a certain point of time is necessary under the conditions of what preceded it. That means that at the time I act I am never free" (CPR 94). Thus the question Kant is asking is how we can be called free, if at any given point in time we stand under the "inexorable

natural necessity" (CPR 95). He wants to assert both that we are free and naturalistically determined.

I agree with Beck that the real problem for Kant lies not in legitimating the concept of natural necessity, but on the side of freedom. It seems to be quite a natural thing for us to understand and accept that there is a natural causality and necessity (Beck 181) if not in a precise way, at least in a general way. So for the most part (and because I lack space) I leave the arguments for the legitimacy of the universality of the law of natural causality undefended. Thus our concerns shall be taking their lead from the assumption that all human behavior, studied through observation stands under a thoroughgoing natural determinism.

There are those, including Beck who believe that Kant's view of the relation between freedom and natural determinism is unintelligible (Beck 181). It is not my purpose to oppose this view, nor to agree with it. Rather, I want to show that because of the stringent doctrine of ascribing natural necessity to all appearances Kant is required to prove more than what he allows himself to be provable in principle. What I am aiming at is to show how Kant must and at times actually does attempt to claim something positive about the self as a thing in itself of which, as we shall see, he also claims that we can have no knowledge.

Instead of trying to make sense of Kant's argument for the compatibility of these two contradictory notions. I want to explore the implications of the principles that lead him to assert these opposite concepts. I understand Kant to be struggling with the

principles of rigour/certainty versus that of completeness. The principles of rigour and certainty lead Kant to ascribe natural causality to appearances universally and necessarily (cf. CPR 103 and A459=B477 regarding Kant's reasons for denying freedom). The principle of completeness, on the other hand, leads Kant to assert the necessity of freedom. If we can take it that Kant, in other places¹ establishes the need for ascribing natural causality to all appearances, then we may proceed to concentrate on why and how it is that Kant thinks he can establish freedom on sure foundations, vis-à-vis natural causality. A description of the concept of nature is required however, since Kant uses the concept of nature in the third 'Antinomy' to show why freedom must be considered. That is, since a natural explanation of appearances can never be complete, freedom, as spontaneous causality must be presupposed (A446=B477). We must briefly illustrate how Kant conceives of the world as a mechanism.

All events occurring in the world have prior causes determining them to be precisely as they are (A199=B244). Moreover, the chain of causes and effects extends indefinitely backwards in time. We need

¹. The second 'Analogy' is the major passage in which Kant argues for the necessity of ascribing natural causality to all appearances. He says there,
 Experience itself-- in other words, empirical knowledge of appearances-- is thus possible only in so far as we subject the succession of appearances, and therefore all alteration, to the law of causality; and, as follows, the appearances, as objects of experience, are themselves possible only in conformity with the law (B234).

As empirical beings then, we stand in a natural chain of events. As such all of our actions occur of necessity, because they stand in a predetermined order. Hence, there is no freedom when we are defined as empirical beings (CPR 95).

not say that there is a beginning nor an end to this chain of causes and effects (A449=B477). The system of objects that conform to the law of natural causality is therefore, a closed one wherein there is a thorough-going causal connection between events (A200=B245). In principle, all events are predetermined to occur (CPR 102, A553=B558). If human beings are defined as sets of appearances within this totality of appearances they are merely series of appearances. The way in which they appear consequently, is determined by temporally prior conditions which necessitate the precise behavior that occurs.

In light of this structure of the world and of our place in it the moral notion of culpability seems impossible. If we are merely parts in a larger totality, a more specific chain of appearances than the totality of appearances, then there can be no freedom to act differently than we do, because we act out of the necessity imposed on us by antecedent conditions. This is why Kant says that as empirical beings, there is no freedom (CPR 94). Now it may be argued that culpability does not presuppose that freedom is in any way contrary to natural necessity. Just as we condition someone to eat properly, or train them for some particular skill so too we condition a person to act responsibly. This is to say that the characteristic of being culpable is just as much a product of antecedent conditions as is a rock falling from a cliff. We might say that we certainly are free to imagine alternatives to the ways in which we are raised and we might even act against the ways of our upbringing. When we do act contrary to our upbringing punishment often follows in order that we

learn to obey. The offender is punished, because he is held responsible. It seems that we really do not need a radical notion of freedom to ground culpability.

Now referring back to the example with which we started, there may arise a case in which a man claims that he is innocent, because of the constraint placed upon him by causes beyond his control. The lawyer claims that he ought not to be punished, but the prosecutor says that he must. At this level of understanding the problem there is no solution simply because we are basing our judgments on common understandings and assumptions. From the defendant's point of view culpability means that he could have done otherwise than he did. Since he could not do otherwise (or so he claims) he cannot be held responsible. The prosecutor on the contrary, says that he is responsible even though he could not help doing what he did. The defendant can retort that if determinism is true, then it just so happens that the prosecutor is not in the defendant's shoes. If the prosecutor has simply had a more fortunate set of circumstances than the defendant, then what right does he have to place any judgment on the defendant? Both parties agree that antecedent determinants caused the behavior of the killer. Yet, they disagree as to what should be done. How could a jury make a decision on the grounds that they have been given? If morality and moral judgments must be certain, then they cannot rest on common opinion. If moral judgments regarding a person's behavior require that they are responsible, then we must ask what the grounds, or the conditions that are necessary for responsibility to be legitimate are.

We have recognized that a rock cannot really be held responsible

for falling and killing someone. If human beings are to be held responsible, then their actions will have to be distinguished somehow from natural events so that they have a capacity to do other than what antecedent conditions determine them to do. Thus, freedom from natural determinism in some sense is required in order for us to be held responsible. What follows is a brief outline of Kant's argument that establishes what freedom must be grounded upon in order to show that man is indeed culpable despite the fact that he is also a creature of prior determinants.

In the passage immediately following the one in which he states that 'freedom and natural necessity are contradictory (CPR 94), Kant argues that the grounding of freedom requires that that faculty be attributed to something other than appearances-- the thing in itself (CPR 95). He goes on to an examination of moral culpability and the various grounds upon which it may be based (Comparative or psychological freedom (CPR 96-7)). For Kant, a psychological (a relative freedom from constraint) basis is not sufficient to establish freedom. He says this because whether an action stems from outer or inner motivations (causes) is irrelevant. Both psychological and physical determinants amount to the same thing; they are both aspects of the mechanism of nature. Physical determinants can be called 'automaton materiale' and psychological determinants may be called 'automaton spirituale' (CPR 97). So then, a feeling of a lack of restraint is not grounds for freedom, because the cause of the action is conceived to be determined by antecedent causes and so on. Therefore, the

psychological feeling of freedom (the lack of restraint) is insufficient to establish moral culpability. When Kant says that a man is culpable despite natural necessity he is saying that culpability, and therefore freedom is to be grounded on something totally independent of the laws of natural necessity. As such, morality must be based on something non-empirical. For Kant, this turns out to be the self as a thing in itself (CPR 99).

Great difficulties arise for Kant since the requirement for grounding freedom on the thing itself seems to contradict his own stipulations as to what can be said of it, i.e., that it can in no way be known. Furthermore, we shall argue that Kant does not want to leave his defence of freedom as a mere possibility (logical possibility), but that he is required to and even attempts to show the reality of freedom. It is not enough that human beings can conceive of themselves as free, for that gives us only a negative ground for the assertion. What Kant must be able to do is describe in positive terms that freedom is "the power of originating a series of events" as appearances (A554=B582) and that such a power belongs to human beings. In order to do this Kant must go beyond the resolution of the conflict between freedom and natural necessity as given in the first Critique, namely, that he has demonstrated the compatibility of the concepts, not that he has demonstrated the actuality of freedom (A558=B586).

A question might be raised at this point concerning the rigorous application of natural causality to appearances. If Kant

is so interested in establishing freedom one might ask why he insists on such rigour. One wonders why he does not seek for some flaw in the concept of natural causality and then proceed to show that freedom is therefore possible. A possible explanation for his rigour might be that Kant believes that it will serve only to further the possibility of arriving at the truth of the matter just as he sees rigour furthering the hopes of establishing a science (CPR 104). That is to say, by trying to show how the concept of natural causality can account for all questions a problem reveals itself in the process. The attempt to account for appearances in terms of the natural causal laws leads to questions concerning the origin of appearances. The origin of appearances however, cannot be explained in terms of appearances and natural causal laws. Given this problem of explanation the investigation leads us to consider the possibility of other modes of explanation. Therefore, instead of looking for some problem in Kant's concept of causality at the outset I shall accept it (with reservation) in order to examine where it leads Kant. Because of this acceptance I shall be leaving aside many problems concerning space, time and causality.

In summary, Kant wants to establish the grounds upon which freedom can be made possible. He conceives the third "Antinomy" to be the argument which establishes the possibility of those grounds, but only in a purely negative sense (CPR 49). Since any empirical aspect of man must be subjected to an analysis according to natural necessity the framework which Kant adopts leads him to having to ascribe freedom

to the non-empirical self. In turn this requires that a positive knowledge of the self as a thing in itself be possible: The third "Antinomy" does not accomplish this last task although the resolution to the antinomy does point to the necessity of such a grounding.

Now for the most part, Kant's later works do not take up the problem that I shall be outlining: the problem of personal identity. The second Critique seems to ignore this problem, since it supposes that morality gives freedom a positive definition as the causality of the intelligible world (CPR 49). I shall point out however, that Kant is not entirely satisfied with the moral affirmation of freedom. Just at the point where his problems lie is the point where the problem of personal identity arises.

In a conceptualization of the world where human beings are conceived of as appearances, parts of a larger totality operating in accordance with causal laws, they are defined simply as a series of appearances. As appearances they are caused by other appearances in the world to be as they are. As causes of other appearances they are the conditions for the coming to be of those appearances. All that their causality is however, is a link within a chain of causes and effects. Their causality is nothing more than the effect of a prior cause. Any act (effect) which seems to originate from an independent causal faculty in the human being is to be regarded as actually originating in anterior natural causes. In this sense we could not claim that an act was our act any more than it was the act of the totality of appearances. Therefore, the problem of knowing that we are free is

intimately linked with the problems of how we can say that an act is "mine". That is, how can we know that an act is exclusively caused by "me". Then the problem revolves around knowing what this "me" is. The "me" that causes free acts must be defined and grounded on something other than appearance. It must be an unconditioned, non-empirical condition for actions. Yet, to ground the self's identity as an unconditioned condition requires an apprehension of the thing in itself if an ultimate justification for claiming that an act originates from the self alone is to be valid. Hence, the problem of personal identity is a more fundamental one than the problem of freedom.

SECTION 2: Analysis of the Problem in the Third "Antinomy"

We have assumed Kant's right to say that the concept of natural causality is constituted in the synthesis of time and causality. In its application to all events and appearances a mechanistic viewpoint requires that we judge all events to have antecedent conditions causing the event under consideration to be precisely the way it is. This rule must hold without allowing for any exceptions. We tried to illustrate this concept by using the model of a closed system of the sum total of appearances whose relations could be understood according to causal laws. In this scheme of things all events occurring in time were predetermined and in principle, predictable. From this conceptualization of the world as mechanism arose a further problem for justifying freedom of the will, namely, that of personal identity.

The purpose of this thesis is to show that the question of personal identity must be answered prior to the question of freedom and that Kant's own argument in the resolution to the third "Antinomy" naturally leads to this problem. Though there may be other ways of tackling this problem in Kant I have chosen the third "Antinomy," because it seems to be the best example of how the problem arises. Since the resolution of the third "Antinomy" depends on the validity of the distinction between appearances and things themselves it sets the grounds for the question of personal identity to arise. That is, it raises the question of what exists in itself and, therefore, of what

the self is as it exists in itself. Thus, the problem of knowing what the unconditioned condition for the possibility of freedom is, is precisely the problem of knowing what exists. The third "Antinomy" also is an example of the rigorous employment of the causal principle. Despite the fact that we do not know how the world as it exists in itself operates and despite the possibility that there may arise an appearance that does not conform to the laws of nature¹ nevertheless,

¹. In the "Transcendental Deduction" Kant allows for the possibility that appearances may arise that do not conform to the law of natural causality. Here he stipulates that though all appearances must conform to the formal conditions of sensibility (time and space) they do not have to necessarily conform to the unifying concept of causality (A90=B123). It is possible that an appearance should arise so as not to be synthesizable according to the laws of cause and effect, thus rendering a confused experience. Nevertheless, he says, that we must judge all appearances according to the natural law, because it is a universal and necessary a priori rule (A91=B124).

We are not concerned here with how Kant justifies this principle. We are concerned with the results of it. As a principle of rigour, it provides a method for scrutinizing any claims that man is free. It does this by uncovering the fallacy in any purported ground of freedom that could, in principle, be analysed as naturalistically determined. By doing this the principle of rigour forces us to think through the defence of freedom until we reach an absolute ground, or until we fail to do so.

This interpretation of Kant's use of the natural law is consistent with the principles he sets himself at the outset of his philosophy. He requires of any system of explaining experience that it be complete (Axii), exhaustive (Axiv) and that its knowledge claims are certain (Axv). These criteria also agree with the rigour he wants to maintain in the second Critique where he says, "But, if a science is to be advanced, all difficulties must be exposed, and those which lie hidden in its ways must even be sought out, for each of them calls forth a remedy without which means cannot be found to advance the science, ..." (CPR 103).

It seems to me that these principles are employed in the Antinomies and in the case of the third "Antinomy" that principle calls forth a remedy to solve the freedom/determinism issue. In the Antinomies Kant is careful to characterize his method as a sceptical method, not as scepticism. He does not want to undermine all knowledge, and by inference, knowledge of a free faculty. (A424=B452), rather, he seeks certainty. I take it therefore, that when

we must maintain it so that the unity of experience is not destroyed and so that we are not presumptuous in ascribing freedom to ourselves.

If then, we take the third "Antinomy" to reveal in some way what must necessarily be thought by rational beings in order to explain appearances we can understand the resolution to the antinomy as an attempt to uncover the absolute ground upon which freedom can be established with certainty. The antinomy does this by first establishing a necessary contradiction in a rational explanation of appearances. Freedom-- an unconditioned cause of appearance-- is necessary for a complete explanation, but if an unconditioned cause is allowed, then it can never be experienced or (fit into a systematic understanding of experience) thus making a unified comprehension of experience impossible. A contradiction arises, because the other requirement of rational beings is that of unity. Now if a resolution to this contradiction is to be found it cannot be based on an analysis of appearances, because that is what caused the contradiction in the first place. If a means for grounding the faculty of freedom in the unconditioned is to be found we must find some mode other than through perception to gain access to objects (to what exists). The third "Antinomy" makes this alternative mode necessary both for grounding freedom and for resolving the contradiction. The term I shall use to designate this alternative mode of access to objects is 'apprehension'. In spite of

¹. continued from previous page: Kant insists on the universal ascription of natural necessity to appearances he is doing so in order to establish freedom on certain foundations. As it turns out, the sceptical method not only acts as a test for certainty, but it is instrumental in developing the need for freedom.

Kant's specific use of this term, I shall use it as a general term to indicate different means by which we gain access to objects in some positive way. By the end of the resolution to the third "Antinomy" then, Kant is required to apprehend the thing in itself. We turn now to the task of showing how this comes about.

The "Thesis" of the third "Antinomy" argues that out of the requirements for a complete explanation of appearances freedom, i.e., a spontaneous first cause of appearances, arises as a necessary concept. The necessity arises because of what natural causality cannot explain, yet requires in order to complete its explanation of appearances. Kant's method is to take the side of natural causality to see if it can fill the requirements set by the principle of rigour. Then, in taking the side of natural causality the naturalist must assert a concept that does not allow itself to be explained by the system of natural causality. Given that an equally binding principle (unity) requires that no anomalous concept be allowed reason brings itself into contradiction. The contradiction is that freedom must be asserted for purposes of a complete explanation, but its assertion renders the unity of that explanation impossible. If a resolution to the antinomy is to be possible it is to be found in the distinction between appearances and things in themselves. Kant claims to resolve the antinomy by stipulating that natural causality applies to appearances only, whereas freedom is to be attributed only to things in themselves. The resolution to the antinomy constitutes the first step towards grounding freedom with certainty. It establishes a means and a right to think both freedom and natural causality as applied to one and the

same appearance though considered from different points of view.

Within the argument for making natural causality and freedom compatible (making freedom possible vis-à-vis natural causality) Kant must also argue for the legitimacy of attributing that possibility to human beings (as a character of their wills). The "Thesis" itself argues only on behalf of the cosmological sense of freedom, viz., that there must be a spontaneous first cause of appearances, or a creation (A446=B474). The section entitled, "Observation on the Third Antinomy" is Kant's attempt to justify ascribing that notion of freedom (as a spontaneous or uncaused first cause to human beings (A450=B478). I shall argue that this extension as it stands is not successful precisely because a more fundamental problem arises; apprehending the self as a thing in itself is necessary before the extension can be validated.

One more problem that requires a qualification faces Kant before he really gets started in establishing freedom. If the compatibility between the two concepts is to work, then Kant must understand or conceptualize free causality in such a way that it does not interfere with the a priori ascription of natural causality to all appearances. He has to make this qualification in the light of the argument presented in the "Antithesis". There it is argued that freedom must mean lawlessness¹ (A447=B475) when juxtaposed with natural causality. Freedom

¹. We shall be dealing briefly with the problem of interpreting the passage in which the term 'lawlessness' is used later on. For the present purposes what I shall interpret Kant to mean by 'lawlessness' is the following. Given that we are explaining appearances with the presupposition that natural causality is the sole principle used for explanation and because of which unity is gained, the

simply contradicts the law of natural causality so that if they are to be made compatible freedom will have to be conceived to apply to an order of things completely distinct from the world of appearances. The compatibility requires that freedom not apply to appearances at all and therefore, it is not to be conceived as having an empirical effect. If this is the case, then one wonders why it is that Kant insists on the necessity of freedom. We proceed with an investigation of Kant's argument in the "Thesis" in order to see where the antinomy may lead us.

For purposes of explanation (A444=B472), further, a complete explanation (A446=B474) of appearances, "it is necessary to assume that there is another causality, that of freedom" (A444=B472). Kant argues for the necessity of assuming free causality (an unconditioned first cause) by deriving a contradiction on the assumption that natural causality is a sufficient ground for completely explaining the sum total of appearances. According to the law of natural causality any event that takes place, "presupposes a preceding state upon which it follows according to a rule" (ibid). It follows that each preceding state had a preceding state and so on 'ad infinitum'. In a mechanistic structure of the world the series of causes and effects must be conceived to regress indefinitely backwards in time and without a beginning. Now a distinct event in a succession of distinct events

1. Continued from previous page: notion of a free cause anywhere within the chain of causes and effects necessarily introduces an unaccountable factor into the scheme of things. Freedom would thus render the possibility of a natural explanation impossible, that is, if freedom is to have an empirical effect.

necessarily comes into and passes out of being within this continuous chain of being and not being. It follows that at one point in time the event under consideration did not exist (was not appearing). To exist then, as an appearance means to exist only temporarily. Consequently, any finite set of appearances exists only temporarily. Any finite set of appearances is assigned therefore, a previous cause. This argument implies that for any given event there has been an indefinite number of temporarily existing events leading up to and causing the event under consideration to be precisely as it is. The regress upon the antecedent conditions must always remain indefinite, because it is always necessary to add one more previous state to any given state in order to explain it. Any statement as a result, that claims that A caused B can at best be a relative beginning for an explanation and not a first beginning (A446=B474). In principle, there can never be a first beginning from which the entire series of causes and effects arise if we adopt a natural causal model for explaining appearances. This is what I take to be the meaning of Kant's statement that, "nothing takes place without a cause 'sufficiently' determined 'a priori'" (ibid). Hence, to claim that a mechanistic scheme of explanation is complete is a contradiction in terms.

An objection might be raised at this point that requiring an absolutely complete explanation is to ask too much of any system. Why should a relatively complete explanation not suffice? A naturalistic explanation seems to be sufficient for explaining particulars though it may not explain the totality of particulars. It seems that we lose nothing by denying a first cause, so why bring in the notion of an

absolutely first beginning when it only serves to make the principle of natural causality contradict itself? Perhaps in practise a relatively complete explanation is sufficient but conceived a priori (which the concept of natural causality must be, since it is not an empirical concept -- for Kant) a relatively complete explanation in a natural causal scheme does not accomplish what it would be intended to accomplish. Namely, it would be meant to provide an exhaustively complete account of appearances. The exhaustiveness is meant to eliminate the possibility of alternative explanations. We would want to eliminate other possibilities to show that the proposed explanation is a necessary one and not simply arbitrary. If our choice of a system of explanation were ultimately arbitrary, it would ultimately be irrational. In that case a natural model would have to admit an irrational and therefore, a systematic element into the scheme of things. In order to avoid this problem one must eliminate the possibility of an extra-systematic ground for the system in principle and not merely in practise. As a principle and conceived a priori then, the concept of natural causality must assert that it is an absolutely complete explanation, because all other possible explanations must be eliminated. It follows that the contradiction in this assertion is unavoidable.

In summary, the contradiction is as follows. "The proposition that no causality is possible save in accordance with laws of nature, when taken in unlimited universality, is therefore self-contradictory" (A446=B474). As soon as a state is given, whether it be a present state or some preceding state, the regress upon its conditions is also

prescribed. Consequently, by definition, a mechanistic scheme of the universe does not admit any criterion for completion, because the notion of completion is ruled out by the infinite nature of the task. The proposition must state that natural causality is both a complete and an incomplete explanation at the same time.

If there is to be a first cause it must be conceived to be totally distinct from the mechanism of nature (A446=B474); it is described as "absolute spontaneity" where, "a series of appearances, which proceeds in accordance with laws of nature, begins of itself" (ibid). A complete explanation of appearances therefore, requires a causality (a ground for the totality) totally distinct from natural causality. If my exposition of the contradiction is correct and freedom is necessary, then our next task is to show how it can be possible vis-à-vis natural causality. We already know the problem concerning the application of freedom to appearances (that it cannot be conceived to have an empirical effect). There may be a way of avoiding this problem by avoiding the need to make freedom possible. The "Antithesis" tries to eliminate the need for assuming free causality by arguing for the preferability of unity over completeness of explanation.

The "Antithesis" argues that there are insurmountable problems in admitting anything other than a mechanistic explanation. Reason may require both a complete and a unified¹ explanation, but since the

¹. By unity Kant seems to mean that there is an organized body where each member of that body can be understood as systematically related to one another according to a rule or principle (Bxiii). What such an organized body allows is the synthesizing (B104) of particulars or individuals under broader categories (B114). Unity also requires that nothing within the organized body remain unaccounted

criterion of completeness produces a contradiction rendering the system impossible as a system, the other equally necessary criterion, i.e., unity, is to be preferred. However, this produces a conflict within reason itself. It seems then, that there is no higher court of appeal so that the "Antithesis" does not argue so much for the refutation of the criterion for completeness, rather it argues for the preferability of unity. But this denial of completeness does not seem to be warranted especially since the notion of a first cause does not seem to produce any fundamental problems for the ascription of natural causality. A first cause is simply that, first. It is not conceived to interfere with the laws of nature. What follows are the reasons for arguing against this notion of a first cause. It is the ascription to human beings of the causal capacity that really does harm to the unity of a mechanistic scheme and it is against this possibility that the "Antithesis" is really arguing.

Admitting free causality into the mechanism of nature renders the laws of nature, as a priori laws, impossible (A447=B475). If free causality is to mean that there is an unconditioned cause outside of time, then it cannot be explained according to natural laws. If free causality is conceived as an efficient cause, considered as a determinant for events in time, then it produces effects that may or may not harmonize with an explanation according to natural laws. The problem with the concept of free causality is that it requires of us to make an

continued for previous page: for, or inexplicable according to the organizing principle, i.e., something which does not fall under the category. Kant's way of putting this negative requirement is to say that unity cannot allow any auxiliary hypothesis (B115).

exception, a priori, to the laws of nature. Just when and how a free cause would enter the scheme of things could not be determined a priori. Therefore, just when natural laws would apply to the scheme of appearances could not be determined a priori. This dilemma for Kant, is inescapable, because the fundamental properties of appearances (that they must be judged to operate according to natural laws) would no longer be absolutely fundamental, nor exclusively ascribed to appearances as their sole mode of explanation. For, if free causality could determine appearances just as natural causes could, then a system of nature is hardly thinkable; "...the influences of the former would so unceasingly alter the laws of the latter that the appearances which in their natural course are regular and uniform, would be reduced to disorder and incoherence" (A451=B479). The a priori foundation for experience would be destroyed. Freedom therefore is not compatible with natural causality.

There is a notion of free causality however, which is compatible, because it would not have to be conceived as altering the laws of nature. A distinction is recognized in the "Observation on the Third Antinomy" that allows for an innocuous notion of freedom. A cosmological first cause is a bold idea though perhaps allowable in a mechanistic scheme, but the same concept of freedom as ascribed to, "substances in the world itself" (human beings) can never be permitted (A451=B479). I interpret this passage to mean that a cosmological first cause may be unverifiable, but permissible so long as considerations concerning it do not open or make possible the notion of the freedom of particular objects that exist as appearances. The two types

of freedom (as first causes) are conceived as affecting appearances in different ways. If human beings for example, were endowed with the power of spontaneous causality they could change the course of appearances from somewhere within the midst of a chain of appearances, and thus, change the course of appearances from what would be expected according to natural laws. A cosmological first cause in contrast refers to creation, or the first cause which started the totality of the chain of appearances. It does not have to be conceived as interfering with the natural chain of causes and effects once it has begun. It is clear that the real problem for a naturalistic interpretation of appearances is the concept of human beings with free wills. In reference to the "Thesis" it is the extension Kant purports to make in the "Observation on the Third Antinomy" of freedom to human beings that the "Antithesis" is really attacking. The cosmological first cause may be as harmless as deism, yet if it allows for a conceptual gap in a mechanistic explanation (as the "Observation" on the "Thesis" argues) then it cannot be allowed. If we are to take Kant's insistence that nothing can be allowed in a system which would interfere with the causal laws of nature, then the extension of the concept of freedom must not interfere with this rule. This is the only way in which natural causality and freedom could be made compatible.

It seems as though Kant has considered alternative solutions for making the two causalities compatible, but rejects all of them in favour of the solution given above. For example, he considers the possibility of conceiving free causality as having a law-like nature so that it could be conceived to have an empirical effect, yet not

interfere with the natural laws. The whole idea behind making freedom law-like would be to make it systematically compatible with the concept of natural causality so that the unity of experience would not be destroyed. If laws indicate the relations that hold between events and appearances, then as a lawful faculty the relation that the effect of free causality has on appearances could be determined a priori. Both causalities then would be conceived to be synthesizable under the more general category of law as such. These laws taken as the a priori capacity of the understanding to arrange concepts under a unified whole are one and the same. The "Antithesis" rejects this idea of freedom, because nothing new would be added in such a case; "it would simply be nature under another name" (A447=B475). To assert that there are laws of freedom as well as laws of nature is redundant. Conceived a priori then, the distinction is superfluous. If freedom is to have any meaning at all it must be considered as something foreign to natural causality, i.e., it must be considered a lawless causality in relation to natural causality¹.

¹. There are difficulties with this passage, since Kant refers not to freedom as such, but to the laws of freedom. He stipulates that "it is not possible to say that the 'laws' of freedom enter into the causality exhibited in the course of nature..." (A447=B475). The reference to the 'laws of freedom' seems to be an anticipation of Kant's moral writings where freedom is conceived to be of a lawful nature. For example, in the Critique of Practical Reason freedom is described as "...a capacity of a being which is subject to special laws (pure practical laws given by its own reason), ..." (CPR 87). In the moral context, freedom is equated with the law of morality for it is "in fact, a law of causality through freedom, ..." (CPR 47). With these things in mind we might want to temper or modify what Kant means in the "Antithesis". I am taking it however, that there are reasons for Kant doing things the way he does and that perhaps these definitions are not his final ones. Rather they may be definitions to be used until we can replace them by

It is difficult to understand Kant's definition of freedom in the "Antithesis" and the severity of the refutation of freedom that it results in. Unless we can understand him to be leaving out some important factor it is difficult to see how he will ever set freedom on sure grounds. We know that Kant thinks that these antinomies are unavoidable (A422=B450) so that in some way he takes the definitions given so far as ones we must necessarily give ourselves even if temporarily. So we shall proceed with the intention of understanding how it is that Kant proposes to solve the antinomy in order to assert the possibility of freedom. The resolution seeks some kind of compatibility between freedom and nature. From the "Thesis" we have what we want to assert about freedom. Now from the "Antithesis" we want to find what we have to assert on the side of natural causality.

Kant states that the idea of a free causality necessary for a complete explanation of appearances is contradictory to the principle of unity (A445,447=B473,475). The problem is inescapable, so though we may have to think these contradictory notions the "Antithesis" attempts to justify preferring unity over completeness.

The possibility of such an infinite derivation, without a first member to which all the rest is merely a sequel, cannot, indeed, in respect of its possibility, be rendered comprehensible. But if for this reason you refuse to recognize this enigma in nature, you will find yourself compelled to reject many fundamental synthetic properties and forces which as little admit of comprehension

1. continued from previous page: more accurate ones. I am supposing that the antinomies are being used heuristically by Kant. That is, they are leading us into problems in order to lead us out again with a fuller understanding. So I leave the conceptualization of freedom as 'lawlessness' in order to see where it may lead.

(A449=B477).

The claim is that natural causality is a fundamental law which cannot and should not seek further grounding even though reason's need for further grounding may be present; "But in compensation it [natural causality] holds out the promise of a thorough going unity of experience in accordance with laws" (A447=B475). If we were to ignore the need for freedom, the unity of experience could be left intact. We could eliminate freedom and no critical problems for the system of natural laws would arise and experience could be left unified.

The advantages that natural causality holds out places the onus of proof and compatibility onto the side of freedom. That is, the "Antithesis" negatively specifies what an assertion of freedom must not offend. In effect though, it does not deny the possibility of a solution. So if the necessity for completion cannot be refuted it is incumbent upon the explaining being to find a solution. In a later work (the second Critique) Kant insists that a solution is possible. He says that mechanistic necessity and freedom do not in fact contradict each other and that this was shown in the "Dialectic" of the first Critique (CPR 104). That solution, as we have mentioned, is found in distinction between appearances and things in themselves. In order to show how Kant uses this distinction we return to the problem of extending the concept of freedom from a cosmological concept to the wills of human beings.

We have recognized that a complete explanation requires a cosmological first cause (A448=B476). That was all that the "Thesis"

legitimated. Nevertheless, Kant claims,

But since the power of spontaneously beginning a series in time is thereby proved, ..., it is also permissible to admit within the course of the world different series as capable in their causality of beginning of themselves, and so to attribute to their substances a power of acting from freedom (ibid).

What Kant is saying is that it is permissible to extend the concept of free causality to all appearances ("different series"). What he wants to do is extend it more specifically to a particular series, i.e., the human being as is evident in his "Observations" on the thesis (the example of my free act of rising from my chair) (A450=B478). Does Kant have the right to this extension? The major problem of the antinomy regarding freedom lies in the justification for the extension. So far the only way in which human beings can be described is as different series of appearances. As appearances freedom cannot be ascribed to human beings without interfering with natural laws. The problem then, is found in identifying these human beings in a non-empirical manner. The question is, is it possible to define what a person is without using empirical predicates?

By way of introducing the resolution we might say that the ground for the extension is that both the cosmological and the psychological notions of a first cause are purely intelligible notions. They refer to noumenal objects. Yet, this ground will be seen to be too general to be of any use so that a more specific grounding is needed. Once a distinction between 'intelligible' and 'noumenal' is developed we shall have a specific way for grounding the extension. It is through

the activity of beings that are purely intelligible objects to themselves (even though they be empirical as well) that the extension purports to be valid. In the attempt to establish this positive ground we shall find that the question of personal identity underlies the problem of extension, because in order, finally, to justify the extension, human beings must be defined and identified positively in a non-empirical manner. I take it that when Kant refers to the necessity of ascribing freedom to the thing in itself (the noumenal self) (A528=8566 ff.) he means that this ascription if it were possible, would be the absolute grounds for affirming freedom. What this amounts to is that we must be able to apprehend the self as a thing in itself. This final justification is the task that remains at the end of the resolution of the antinomies. That resolution seeks only to make the transcendental concepts of freedom and mechanism compatible (not that they are in reality actually co-existent) (A558=8586). Two problems remain; that of completing the grounds for freedom, and for differentiating human beings from all other appearances. Both of these problems require, in the end, an apprehension of the self as a thing in itself. In other words, both problems for Kant require a way of demonstrating the actuality of freedom as a characteristic of the self as a thing in itself.

As the argument for the extension begins Kant appeals to the distinction between appearances and their corresponding things

in themselves, or 'substrate'.¹ This distinction allows him to say; "...it is now also permissible for us to admit within the course of the world different series as capable in their causality of beginning of themselves, and so to attribute to their substances a power of acting from freedom" (A450=B478). Freedom is attributed to the 'substances' of the different series which is to say freedom can be attributed to the underlying permanence of beings who, when viewed as appearances, are merely temporarily existing, conditioned objects.² A kind of duality is being posited. As empirical beings humans are mechanistically determined. As things in themselves, or substances, they can be considered as free. The ascription of freedom is possible, because as noumenal beings the description of those beings does not have to conform to the law of natural necessity. So then, the possibility is not claiming that this is the way things actually are, for that would require some kind of verification method which Kant disallows regarding noumena.³

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1. see Appendix for a brief description of the distinction between things in themselves and appearances. There the relation between the concepts of 'noumena' and the 'intelligible' are briefly described as well.
 2. The notion of 'substance' is not being taken as a key term so that I shall not be discussing it. Briefly, all that I am going to mean by it when referring to Kant's use of it is the non-empirical aspect of appearances which may or may not underlie appearances.
 3. The distinction between possibility and actuality is recognized both here (A558=B586) and in the second Critique where he states that the possibility ("can be") of making freedom and natural causality compatible had only to be changed to an actuality ("is") (CPR 104). That is, by the end of the first Critique the distinctions between things in themselves and appearances allowed us to think of human beings as things in themselves. Therefore the possibility that freedom could be attributed to them was opened up. We are not dealing with the problem of Kant's argument for the actuality of

I shall be interpreting Kant's argument (concisely expressed in (A542=B570 - A547=B575)) in the following way. By examining the notion of intelligibility (taken merely as an object in the noumenal realm) he finds grounds upon which the extension can be based. However, a problem arises in that these grounds allow for an indiscriminate ascription of freedom to any object whatsoever, thus making the concept of freedom trivial. To avoid this problem Kant must find a criterion for specifying which "different series" should be attributed the capacity for freedom and in just what way this capacity can be utilized.

Kant has already established the possibility of an intelligible realm (a realm distinct from and independent of the conditions of appearances (see Appendix) in virtue of the positive meaning of noumenon. Since we had to admit that our mode of knowing objects (as appearances) did not necessarily exhaust all of the ways in which objects could exist, we had to also admit that our mode of knowing objects was not knowing those objects as they were in themselves. An object as it is in itself may have characteristics that are entirely unknowable for our particular mode of knowing objects. We do not acquire a concept of these noumenal objects through experiencing them. Rather, we acquire the concept through thinking about the limits of

3. continued from previous page: freedom at this time so much as we are trying to show how he thinks the possibility opens up. We shall indeed proceed to look at his argument for the actuality of freedom, but only in order to show why it is inadequate and leads him into a vein which must consider going against the principles he sets in the first Critique for claiming knowledge of objects.

empirical knowledge. This thinking process is the only means by which the possibility of noumena is recognized. Since these objects cannot be given in an intuition and yet are objects conceived to exist they are called 'intelligible' objects. We are justified in thinking these objects on the proviso that we make no knowledge claims regarding their actual existence. This means that to the extent that we can think a first cause outside the realm of nature, that cause is a purely intelligible object. The concept is for pure understanding: for purposes of reason alone (A479=B507).

Freedom in this sense, is a pure transcendental idea, which, in the first place, contains nothing borrowed from experience, and which, secondly, refers to an object which cannot be determined or given in any experience (533=B561).

Now, human beings are appearances so that they are empirical objects. Yet, due to the distinction between an object as it appears and an object as it is in itself, these human beings can be considered to have characteristics that are not observable or intuitable. Thus, they can consider themselves as purely intelligible objects. Human beings then, having a noumenal side, meet with one of the criteria for calling something free. In this sense we have the same intelligible status as the idea of a cosmological first cause. On the grounds (principles) which Kant has set so far, human beings can consider themselves as noumenal objects. Now the cosmological object is conceived to be a first cause by definition, but the Ego's causality is considered only as a possibility thus far. The idea of it's causality is legitimated so far only negatively. As a noumenal object it is considered to be independent of antecedent conditions. As a thing

in itself it can be considered as a cause of appearances, because it is conceived to underlie appearances. Like any other object which has a corresponding thing in itself for its appearance, the self as a thing in itself is purely negative and is in no way considered to affect the realm of appearances in so far as it would affect the laws of nature. It therefore, might meet with a second criterion for freedom, namely, that it does not interfere with the ascription of natural causality to appearances (cf. A531=B559).¹ Once we accept Kant's argument a different problem arises.

¹. Kant clarifies a little more of what he means when he says that it is possible to conceive of things in themselves not interfering with the ascription of natural causality to appearances. When Kant says that we are permitted to consider "different series as capable in their causality of beginning of themselves" (A450=B478) he does so mainly on methodological grounds. Since we must judge all appearances to conform to the laws of natural causality we must admit that these laws are not constitutive of objects in themselves. The concept of natural causality then, he calls a regulative concept. It is a rule by which we prescribe a causal regress onto appearances (A509=B537). The concept of natural causality tells us only how an "empirical regress is to be carried out" (A510=B538) not how appearances are actually constituted. When the notion of natural causality as a regulative concept is coupled with the admission that there may arise an appearance which does not conform to the principle of natural causality (A90=B123) problems arise which would seem to destroy the possibility of a unified experience. If we have to accept the possibility of exceptions to an a priori rule it is difficult to understand the meaning of a priori. In principle, if we cannot know that an appearance is going to conform to an a priori law, then the grounding of the necessity for ascribing the law is called into question. But despite this problem Kant insists that no exceptions to the rule can be made. We are not concerned with the legitimacy of this assertion here, but we are concerned with the conclusions Kant draws. Once more, it seems as though Kant is using the principle of natural causality more as an heuristic tool to force a rigorous justification of freedom than as a principle that actually is necessary. But again this brings up problems which we cannot go into.

Things in themselves belong to the noumenal realm (which as yet, has no determining characteristics) and as such are at best, negative possibilities. If we are to base freedom on these noumenal grounds, then the concept of freedom, presumably, applies to anything that can be conceived to have a noumenal side. All appearances may have a noumenal side and therefore, all appearances, when considered as things in themselves can be conceived as free. We may admit to an a priori limit to any empirical investigation (B311), but in thereby asserting noumenal objects we gain no further insight into the actual natures of these objects. Therefore, the ascription of free causality to "different series" of appearances must be made indiscriminately. If something positive is ascribed to one noumenal object it may just as well be ascribed to another noumenal object. If freedom were to be based on the concept of noumenon alone, then clearly we would not have established anything of any use.

Instead of appealing to noumenal grounds as such to extend freedom to human beings, Kant's argument attempts to develop a more specific ground for freedom and a more specific way in which it can be attributed to human beings. After first establishing the concept of things in themselves as possible grounds for the explanation of appearances Kant proceeds to argue that there may be some effects (appearances) that have only an intelligible cause (A545=B573). He seems to mean here that though all appearances must be assigned a preceding appearance as its cause, there may in fact be some appearances that have only an intelligible cause without a preceding cause. There are at least two things Kant is attempting to establish with this

possibility. First, he is beginning to specify that there is a type of causality whose effect does not fall under the interpretation of a naturalistic analysis. Up to this point every effect (appearance) could be assigned either an empirical cause or an intelligible cause, but if it was assigned an intelligible cause it was also assigned an empirical one. Now Kant is saying that there may be an intelligible cause that cannot be assigned an empirical cause. The notion of an intelligible cause is being used in a slightly different way from its use in the past (as a merely negative possibility). The second thing Kant is doing is setting up another problem: that of showing how an exclusively intelligible cause is possible. In order to show how such an exclusively intelligible cause is possible he must posit some kind of hypothetical situation (because we have accepted so far that all appearances are assigned a preceding empirical cause in principle so there is no reason to suspect that there is an exclusively intelligible cause) in which that cause's ground can be established completely independently of empirical determinants. In other words, he has to establish some kind of intelligible structure to explain how an intelligible cause could be positively defined and how it would operate. Once this is done he has the further task of showing that the possibility refers to an actuality. He must do this by illustrating a need to conceive of such a possibility (without being circular). In his argument Kant is very much aware of the distinction between how an exclusively intelligible cause is possible and that it needs to be considered. So the argument revolves around two things. First, the activity of pure apperception is to provide a structure in which a purely intelligible cause is conceived.

Second, moral considerations or the analysis of duty provides a need for this structure to explain it. Supposedly the concept of duty is to be found nowhere in nature and requires the purely intelligible structure to explain it.¹

When Kant says that, "only as we ascend from the empirical object to the transcendental should we find that this subject, together with all its causality in the [field of] appearances, has in its 'noumena' certain conditions which must be regarded as purely intelligible (A545=B573) he is doing two things. He is distinguishing noumena from the intelligible by saying that intelligibility sets certain conditions within the noumenal realm. In this way the intelligible is somewhat more specified than the concept of noumenon. Secondly,

¹. This whole concept of duty which requires a non-empirical explanation is problematic. If there are effects in the world of appearance which we call dutiful actions, or if duty itself is considered as a phenomenon (an appearance of sorts) which cannot be analysed according to a naturalistic scheme, then there is a phenomenon which cannot be assigned a preceding cause in time. This admission would directly contradict the a priori rule of natural causality which we have already admitted as binding. If we are to maintain both the a priori rule and the notion of needing an intelligible explanation, then we must be able to say that although some effects have only an intelligible cause it must seem as if an empirical cause preceded the appearance even when in fact it did not. Further, we must also be able to assert that the appearance might have been predetermined according to natural laws (A553=B558), yet still be exclusively the effect of an intelligible source which is independent of natural laws. The above-stated problem is an anticipation of the problem of application. It is the problem Kant faces in the second Critique and is not our concern except to maintain our awareness of the stipulation that all appearances must be assigned a preceding empirical cause. It would seem that Kant would have to give up the notion of predictability and predetermination. He however, does not give it up. What happens in fact is that the concept of freedom and its grounding suffers. If we can keep this problem in mind it may help us to understand the strange admission Kant makes in the resolution, i.e., that he was only striving to make freedom and natural causality compatible not in actuality, but merely transcendently (A558=B586).

he is claiming that there is a way of apprehending this noumenal cause by ascending through the conditions necessary for explaining certain phenomena which is shortly to be specified as the 'ought' (A547=B575). In order to "ascend" to the transcendental to the conditions within the transcendental subject Kant develops the structure through which this can occur.

In the ascension to the transcendental Kant is careful to demonstrate some kind of continuity between the empirical and transcendental. He wants to show how first, the forms of sensibility (the categories) which are the a priori aspects of experience indicate that there is a realm (the intelligible) which is independent of empirical conditioning. Even though the employment of those categories is empty outside of experience (B315, see also A239, B298) it still enables us to consider a realm separated from empirical conditions. These categories are the forms that synthesize the particulars (appearances) in experience to form a unified and comprehensible whole (B102). In so far then, as an object is experienced it has both an empirical and an intelligible aspect. "Whatever is ⁱⁿ an object of the senses is not itself appearance, I entitle intelligible" (A538=B566). The whole argument then, takes its lead from the basic distinction between the a priori and empirical aspects of experience. }

Next Kant uses the concept of noumenon developed as a purely negative concept to open up possibilities, i.e., previously it opened up the possibility that not all objects needed to be judged according to natural laws, because it opened up the possibility that there may be

objects existing independently of our modes of intuiting them. These objects then could be considered as the causes of appearances though we could in no way confirm the hypothesis. These causes were called intelligible causes. These objects as things in themselves were conceived to have analogous aspects to appearances. In regards to perception then, this intelligible cause was understood as the corresponding thing in itself to the appearance.

We should pause briefly here to anticipate the remainder of the argument. The notion of an intelligible cause changes, for in the case of the noumenal self taken as an intelligible cause there will be no corresponding appearance for which its noumenal aspects are reflected in the empirical realm. The second sense of an intelligible cause is based upon the category of causality (the form-- not the object or possible content of an intuition). The self conceived as a noumenal object and as a purely (exclusively) intelligible cause does not have an empirical object corresponding to it. Its effect in the empirical realm therefore does not have to result in the coming into being of a particular appearance. It is not a ground for explaining the factual existence of an appearance. When we talk about human beings as intelligible cause we are talking somewhat ambiguously. I am not sure that it is always clear in Kant that this distinction is being made.

When Kant says there are some among the effects that have only an intelligible cause he is not referring to the corresponding thing in itself of an appearance. It is my understanding that he is referring to an entirely different kind of ground for causality. For instance,

when Kant illustrates what he means by a free cause he uses the example of rising from a chair (A450=B478). He is not trying to explain the actual coming into being of himself as a physical body, but is trying to explain how that body is determined to operate or behave. The kind of causal ground which Kant is talking about then, is something which governs the empirical realm. What Kant is referring to, is the self in its deliberative and decisive activity as it utilizes the categories (the form of causality) for a purpose other than for explaining the elements within experience. What the notion of an exclusively intelligible cause suggests is that the self begins a series of appearances and as a purely intelligible object it has no antecedent empirical condition. It has no antecedent, because it is not an empirical object so that it cannot have an empirical antecedent.

In summary the self regarded as an object of the senses has a two-fold nature-- as phenomenon and as noumenon. It also has a two-fold causal explanation like any other object of the senses-- empirical and intelligible. We have also tried to show that there is a double meaning in the concept of an intelligible cause in Kant's resolution to the antinomy which is not clearly indicated by Kant. Further, Kant has found an alternative causal scheme for explaining appearances that does not render the natural one impossible. There is no conflict between the two explanations (A541=B569) since the noumenal explanation is a purely negative possibility. I want to specify that for Kant, there is no real problem because he is using the notion of an intelligible cause only in the first sense, not in the sense of an 'exclusively' intelligible cause. We must keep in mind that Kant is developing this

argument to be able to say that our capacity for noumenal causality allows us to do otherwise than we in fact do (CPR 98). The qualifying adjective, 'exclusive', therefore, becomes a key point in Kant's argument. It is the second sense of an intelligible cause that Kant is using in the second Critique. If Kant wants to claim the power of doing otherwise than one in fact does, then he must proceed to specify in what way human beings can consider themselves as causes (determiners) of their own wills (the problem he deals with in sections A545=B573 - A547=574).

What we are leading up to is that Kant must establish the second sense of an intelligible cause (the exclusive sense) on the self's knowledge of itself as a purely intelligible object and that it possesses a power of representing purely intelligible ideas to itself by which it determines its own actions. This power is the capacity to reverse the use of the categories (causality) to prescribe actions and not simply describe them. In the end, this power must lie in a being or thing which does the reversing. Affirming that this being has the capacity for reversing the use of the categories requires a direct apprehension of it. We are now investigating the concept of a cause not in relation to its effects as we were in the first sense of an intelligible cause, but in relation to its ground.

The intelligible capacity employs the categories for transcendental use, namely, to unify the thought of a manifold in general (A247=B304). The concepts that are generated in this realm are called ideas (god, freedom). These ideas cannot be represented 'in concreto'

(A567=B596). The 'intelligible' refers then to an independent (from empirical conditions) realm in which rational beings generate concepts that can be defined in a positive way for purposes of reason alone (unity and completeness). Since reason has these purposes of its own it indicates that there is something which can posit non-empirical and purely intelligible objects. We have seen how the possibility and the necessity of a cosmological first cause opens up. It was also established how the self could be considered a first cause, but only in a trivial sense. It now remains to show how the possibility of an exclusively intelligible cause opens up. Kant uses the notion of "pure apperception" to establish this possibility.

Man is a peculiar series in the causal chain of appearances. Though he knows himself as an appearance, like all other objects in nature, he,

knows himself also through pure apperception. He is thus to himself, ..., a purely intelligible object For it views itself exclusively in the light of ideas, and in accordance with them determines the understanding which then proceeds to make an empirical use of its own similarly pure concepts (A546-7=B574-5).

The notion of pure apperception breaks down into two aspects. First, apperception means that there is some kind of reflective self awareness. Second, the adjective 'pure', indicates that whatever it is that one is aware of in being aware of itself, it is not empirical in any way. Kant must be speaking about a thing which has an awareness of itself which is of a purely formal character. Then the capacity for pure apperception is based on the unchanging 'I' which, "forms the

correlate of all our representations in so far as it is to be at all possible that we should be conscious of them" (A123). There is something which accompanies, or is presupposed in any representation. It is a kind of constant by which the manifold of appearances is united as belonging to something which is aware of them. The 'I' is not the matter or content in the same way an appearance is, because it is not intuitable. It is a logically necessary concept required in order to account for the unity of experience. As such it is a purely formal concept (B132). The notion of pure apperception seems to imply that we can be aware of something which is not the content of our awareness which seems totally absurd.

The only way in which I can begin to understand this idea is to allow the concept of awareness to remain rather vague. Kant seems to need the concept of awareness, because he uses verbs such as 'views' to indicate the way in which we come to know about this 'I'. A peculiar thing begins to take place with this concept of awareness. First, Kant is not using the language of his previous arguments in establishing the concept of noumena and intelligibility. There he qualified that it was possible to think noumenal objects, but not be aware of them because we had no acquaintance at all with them. Here he is using the language he uses when referring to empirical objects. Man "knows himself" and the intelligible object "views itself". From these passages it seems that Kant is making more of the 'I' and attributing other qualities to it which a purely formal concept would not allow. At this point I cannot understand the notion of 'pure' when it is to mean a merely

formal and a priori concept. The only way in which this whole idea of a purely formal 'I' which views itself makes any sense to me is if I understand it (the purely formal part) to be the indicator of a thing which makes the purely formal notion necessarily thought. Perhaps the following helps to explain how a purely formal idea can be the indicator of something which exists which makes the thought necessary.

In the sense that the 'I' is known through the activity of pure apperception it plays an analogous role to the thing in itself in respect to appearances, i.e., it implies that there is a permanent 'substratum' for the representation of itself as pure apperception. "I think" accompanies all of my representations as a purely formal concept, but as the "I think" plays an analogous role to appearances (as something we can be aware of) it has a corresponding thing in itself which thinks. The formal concept becomes the content for thought and points the thinker towards the conditions necessary for that awareness to be possible. What Kant seems to be doing is speaking about the 'I' as an object by assuming that it is the only possible condition for explaining the concept of the "I think".

But even this analysis is not enough to account for the language Kant is using. Pure apperception is the activity of knowing oneself as a purely intelligible object. Somehow this peculiarity of human rational beings allows them to know themselves instead of merely assuming that there is a self.

As a thing which thinks the 'I' is considered to be an object, but since the content of its object is not a sensible object, but,

"acts and inner determinations which he cannot regard as impressions of the senses"¹ (A546=B574) the 'I' is considered to be an object in a purely intelligible sense. There is no appearance. There is only an activity of thinking which has its ground in a "purely intelligible object" (A547=B575). In the same passage Kant argues that there are peculiarities that distinguish the intelligible object from empirical ones. Since it views its objects exclusively in the light of ideas and then seeks to make an empirical use of them (ibid) it and its activities cannot be analysed according to empirical conditions. Once more Kant is using the regressive method to establish the conditions necessary for the possibility of determination by ideas alone to be possible, but he is speaking in terms of objects now and not merely the forms (categories). He seems to be saying that there is a significant difference between being determined by ideas and by empirical conditions.

What Kant may mean by this is problematic, for he later insists that the determination of the will by ideas is not significantly different from causality by appearances. As events occurring in time they are both subject to the laws of nature, one as an 'automaton spirituale' and one as an 'automaton materiale' (CPR 97). Whether or not this reduction is valid is not my interest here. What is of interest is that Kant does not think that determination of the will by ideas is significantly different from a determination by empirical conditions. Thus

¹. Specifically, Kant uses the concept of 'ought' as the intelligible idea which cannot be analysed as a sensuous concept. We shall briefly discuss this problem subsequently.

we cannot take the regressive method used to establish the a priori nature of the categories as the basis for establishing the independence of the 'I' from empirical conditions.

If we can accept that Kant is not using the regressive method then he realizes that grounding the knowledge of the 'I' as a purely intelligible object requires other means. Yet the means he chooses do not suffice and he is forced once more into the regressive method.

He says that though normally the understanding is determined according to the senses (A547=B575) it can be determined by reason through ideas (ibid). This understanding then, somehow makes an empirical use of these ideas by determining the will and thereby determines the behavior of the agent. The understanding makes use of its own concepts (the category of causality) for different purposes than for organizing perceptions into a synthetic unity. In order to use the category of causality to prescribe and not merely to describe is to reverse its use. Now the reversal indicates that there is a thing which does the reversing. Since the awareness of the reversal is brought to consciousness, the regressive method can be applied to the analysis of it. The analysis is meant to establish the necessary conditions for the reversal to be possible. These conditions are not ideas, but a self endowed with the capacity of self-determination. Kant proceeds to show how this reversal might take place by analysing the concept of the 'ought'.

The capacity of the self to oppose the natural order of things empirically determined purportedly marks an essential difference

between the purely intelligible object and objects which have an empirical correlate.

Reason does not here follow the order of things as they present themselves in appearances, but frames for itself with perfect spontaneity an order of its own according to ideas to which it adopts the empirical conditions, and according to which it declares actions to be necessary even though they have never taken place and perhaps never will take place (A548=B576).

The difference between the self as an intelligible object and the way in which other objects in nature are conceived is that the self can contradict what it takes to be a natural progression of events. It can determine itself to act in a way contrary to what it supposes nature to be dictating. As an intelligible object to itself the self can assert that the whole of nature ought not to have happened (A550=B578). In the capacity to contradict nature the self is not conceived to be part of nature. It is separated from nature, because nowhere in nature does the concept of an 'ought' arise (A547=B575). Nature is simply, a concept describing the way things are, have been, or will be, not what they ought to be. If nature were conceived to have the capacity to determine what ought to be despite what must be according to its laws, that concept would contradict itself. The intelligible self as the source of the 'ought' must be distinct from the natural processes at least in its thinking processes. In contrast it dictates to itself what it ought to do and forms a scheme by which it acts.

So far, Kant has established a kind of structure through the concepts of reason, understanding and the will in which an intelligible cause can be conceived. Through an analysis of morality he has shown

the necessity of adopting that structure in order to account for morality. However, as shall be shown in section three, the moral argument is not sufficient to establish the grounds of freedom. Nor does Kant himself seem certain of its validity at times. I suggest that his uncertainty is due to the limitations of the regressive method in arguing for the grounds of freedom. The regressive method provides the possibility and perhaps the necessity for saying of the self that it is independent of nature, but it does not establish that it actually is independent.

At this point I should pause to recall what Kant believes he has legitimated regarding the assertion that rational beings are free. This hopefully, will clarify why Kant has not and does not think that freedom actually is a fact and that the regressive method is not adequate to proving the fact. He is propounding a concept of freedom which is compatible with the concept of natural causality (A558=B586). He is not saying that the laws of nature or that freedom are constitutive concepts of the way things actually exist. It is precisely this reality which he says he is not describing (A558=B586). In fact, the antinomies are supposed to reveal the fallacy in the assumption that the true constitution of things is discovered (B535=A507). The meaning of the conceptual compatibility of freedom and natural causality is therefore, that we have been considering logical (non-contradictory) possibilities, but we have not found a way of discovering whether these possibilities are actualities (ascribable to things in themselves). That I take it, is why Kant can only say,

"if we wish to save it [freedom], no other course remains than to ascribe the existence of a thing so far as it is determinable in time, and accordingly its causality under the law of natural necessity, merely to appearance, and to attribute freedom to the same being as a thing in itself" (CPR 95).

The distinction between knowing that freedom is the case and thinking its possibility amounts to the distinction between fact and logic. That is, if we knew for a fact that freedom was true of human beings it would make no sense to establish its possibility. Since it is the possibility of freedom which Kant is after, it seems that he is concerned with the mere logical possibility of freedom.

It may be recalled that Kant from the outset is attempting to set freedom on sure foundations (CPR 3). Now in the second Critique Kant attempts to complete what the first leaves undone. He says there of the first Critique; "it was only a question of whether this 'can be' could be changed to an 'is'" and he thinks that the reality is proven through the requirements of morality using the regressive method (CPR 104-5). But his moral argument leaves the problems generated in the first Critique unresolved. I propose that these problems come back to plague Kant in the second Critique and cause him to see that morality may not be a sufficient basis from which to establish the certainty of freedom.

In the first Critique Kant entertains the possibility that the entire conceptualization of freedom may have been entirely illusory (A545=B573). In the first place, there may not be such a thing as a

thing in itself corresponding to the appearance or activity that we supposedly attribute to it. This means that whatever Kant meant by 'know' when he said man knows himself through pure apperception it could not mean that it gave certain knowledge of himself as a thing in itself. Yet, what he meant by 'know', as we have pointed out, must mean more than "logically possible" since a logical necessity does not imply that there is a real necessity. This is due to the fact that logical necessities arise out of certain presuppositions that do not necessarily pertain to reality. Since the logical possibility of the thing in itself was made for purposes of completing an explanation of appearances it may or may not be the case that a thing in itself exists.

In the second place, the activity of pure apperception and of representing ideas to oneself could be analysed as events to be observed even though Kant argued that these data could not be reduced to empirical conditions. But, as events occurring in time, they could not be their own grounds for existing so that the same sceptical doubt could be levelled against them as was levelled against the grounds of a moral motive (Foundations 407 and MM #392). It can never be confirmed with certainty that hidden motives were not masquerading as pure intelligible motives. In like manner it could never be confirmed with certainty that pure apperception didn't have hidden determinants other than the purely intelligible object.

Now with these problems in mind and considering the odd language Kant uses to describe our knowledge of the intelligible object

we might begin to uncover a more fundamental problem that Kant has and of which he seems to be aware. We must try to see Kant's argument in a different light if we are to understand him, or if we are to understand that we cannot understand him.

The regressive method (analysing the conditions necessary for certain phenomena to be explained) is insufficient. Yet, the analysis of the 'ought' may be all we have to ground freedom unless more can be made of Kant's positive statements regarding the intelligible object. Whether or not something more can be made of the activity of pure apperception is not entirely clear to me. I think however, that something more must be made of it and is made of it by Kant. The activity of pure apperception raises the problem of consciousness and of reflective consciousness. The being who recognizes that he is constrained by natural laws is the same being who presents the 'ought' to himself. Moreover, it is this being who knows that he does both. Through the activity of pure apperception he views himself as a purely intelligible object which is somehow separated from both empirical and rational activities. Even though Kant does not want to make much of this status of the 'I' in the first Critique he seems to assume that a great deal has been made of it in later works (eg., that the faculty of reason raises man above the effects of all empirical conditions (Foundations 452)). Supposedly, he does not have the right to say such definite things about the self in light of the restrictions placed on him by the antinomies. It is my intention to show that it is only by somehow apprehending the self as it is in itself that we

could know and legitimately assert that such statements are true and that the activity of pure apperception as well as representing pure ideas to oneself actually proceed from a purely intelligible object. It is precisely that object in contrast, that cannot be known. It would seem then that freedom cannot be grounded with certainty. Kant may not be capable of showing that freedom is grounded with certainty. ▶

The following section illustrates that Kant does not think that the status of the self as a thing in itself is merely problematic nor unknowable. The problem of grounding freedom has brought us back now to the problem of personal identity. As appearances human beings belong to a totality of causes and effects in which there is only natural necessity. In order then, to ground freedom human beings must be identified in some other way than as appearances. If pure apperception is to open the way to this identification then the self must be its own grounds for identifying itself. This means that it must be capable of apprehending itself as it actually exists.

SECTION 3: Kant's Awareness of The Problem of Personal Identity

Kant's analysis of experience and subsequent defence of freedom has brought us to the point of recognizing that we are "constrained to think a transcendental object as underlying appearances, though we know nothing of what it is in itself" (A540=B568). When the self was regarded as a transcendental object freedom could be ascribed to it while at the same time, all of the self's empirical characteristics could be considered as mechanistically determined. We were then enabled to ascribe both freedom and natural causality to one and the same being at one and the same time. It was on the basis of a dualistic self-understanding that man could consider himself from both perspectives. In this the defence of freedom turns on the distinction between things in themselves and their appearances.

The dual aspect of the self so far has been of a quasi-hypothetical nature based on a need of reason to ascribe both freedom and natural causality first to all existing objects and then to human beings in particular. The hypothetical or conjectural character of the duality remains even after the regressive argument (the 'ought' argument) has been made and a purported knowledge of the intelligible object has been gained. So far, a conclusive justification for claiming that human beings are constituted with free wills is lacking. As was argued previously, Kant must do more than to argue for the possibility of freedom through the appearance/thing in itself distinction and more than assert its necessity through morality if freedom is to

be set on sure foundations. Before we can say that there is a free will in man we must be able to say that there actually is an object to which that capacity refers. In this quasi-hypothetical vein any positive characteristics we might want to attribute to things in themselves can at best be problematic such that those characteristics may or may not refer to an actual object.

If we accept the separation-of-realms thesis a different mode of apprehending objects is necessary before we can say that freedom actually does refer to things in themselves. That is, if we want to be certain that freedom can be predicated of human beings we cannot approach the investigation with purposes that we impose upon the object of investigation. A final justification requires a presuppositionless apprehension of the self as a thing in itself. Up to this point in our investigation Kant's analysis of the intelligible object is not the object which exists 'per se', but is an object for the understanding required for the purposes either of completing an explanation of the self as an appearance or of the phenomenon of duty. The thought of the self as it is in itself is generated by certain problems in understanding and within the limiting structure of the apprehending being. In the end, the concept of a thing in itself is considered only because we have a certain constitution that requires of us to give a complete account of the explanations we posit. The problem is that everything which is posited within Kant's framework does not arise because that framework is capable of grasping what exists in itself, but if a full and certain ground for the posited objects (the self) is to be attained what exists 'per se' is precisely what needs to be

apprehended.

For the above-stated reason I believe that Kant must find an alternative way for grounding freedom. The method that has been employed to this point establishes the necessity of an unconditioned condition, but it cannot establish its actuality. As this unconditioned condition is the noumenal self, a way must be found for apprehending the self apart from any presuppositions. If this final apprehension is not possible, then the final grounding for freedom is not possible and in light of the necessity for ascribing the natural rule to all appearances the concept of freedom would be empty. The compatibility of freedom and natural causality would also turn out to be a meaningless compatibility, for if in fact there is nothing to which freedom refers, making the concepts compatible is a mere play of words. Something must be done to bring to light the actual nature of the self. This is why I take the question of personal identity to be the more fundamental one for Kant.

Kant himself hints at the direction that we have taken. When he says that free causality regarded as the causality of the thing in itself is the only means by which we can think freedom (A538=B566) and that is compatibility with mechanism depends on this ascription (A539=B567, cf. A541=B569) he seems to be suggesting that there is more to the distinction between appearances and things in themselves than a merely epistemological distinction. We can recall that Kant argued that due to the activity of pure apperception and the notion of duty there was a peculiarity surrounding the self which produced a problem for a mechanistic analysis of the human being. What this

peculiarity was, was not fully drawn out in the first Critique. Once we begin to look at Kant's moral writings there is a marked difference from the first Critique. In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant thinks he has proven the actuality of freedom or at least provided a "sufficient substitute for an a priori proof" through showing its necessity in moral reasoning (CPR 48).

In the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant recapitulates the problem of necessarily having to assume oneself as a thing in itself in order to provide a basis (explanation) for the pure activity of representing pure ideas to oneself (Foundations 541-2) and to ultimately ground morality. This argument is more forceful than in the first Critique (A538=B566) especially when he emphasizes the notion of the pure activity of rational beings, for in that activity Kant sees man as actually elevated above the limits of understanding and that all limits hitherto placed on the understanding have now been transcended (Foundations 452).

Now man really finds in himself a faculty by which he distinguishes himself from all other things, even from himself so far as he is affected by objects. This faculty is reason. As a pure spontaneous activity it is elevated above understanding.

After specifying how it is that the faculty of understanding is limited by the contingencies of sensibility Kant goes on to say of this rational faculty that,

reason shows such a pure spontaneity in the case of ideas that it far transcends everything that sensibility can give to consciousness and shows its chief occupation in distinguishing the world of sense from the world of understanding; thereby prescribing limits to the understanding itself (Foundations 452).

Kant is speaking here as if there were an actual capacity of reason, first to transcend, and then to prescribe to the understanding how it is to be used. He has not given us a proof that this capacity is not illusory, yet he has made more of the notion of intelligible activity and its status than he has permitted in the first Critique. There, the self and its powers were not considered as actual, but here he is speaking matter-of-factly. In the same section of the Foundations Kant continues by saying that it is the independence that reason has from the conditions of sensibility that allow freedom to be thought of as independence from determining causes in the world of sense (ibid 452).

In the second Critique once more, Kant uses the argument that freedom applies to things in themselves and not to appearances (CPR 54-5). He is not confident that this ascription has set freedom on sure foundations however. In the "Critical Elucidation..." Kant expresses how important the separation between appearances and things in themselves is, and even though a "lucid presentation" of this separation is not available it nevertheless must be true if freedom is to be saved (CPR 103). Instead of saying that he has demonstrated that freedom applies to things in themselves as a matter of fact, he says that the only solution to the problem (what I take to be the problem of the third "Antinomy") that makes any sense is to ascribe natural causality to appearances and freedom to things in themselves (ibid). So here Kant seems to be withdrawing the assertion that freedom actually is grounded in things in themselves. He cannot therefore say that reason actually does transcend the limits of sensibility and can

thereby prescribe for the understanding. The certainty in this section of the second Critique is not there. He says there that only if we wish to maintain both freedom and mechanism are we constrained to conceive of their domains, in the way described (CPR 95). So, if freedom is to be saved, "no other course remains but to ascribe the existence of a thing in so far as it is determinable in time, and accordingly its causality under the law of natural necessity, merely to appearances, and to attribute freedom to the same being as a thing in itself" (ibid).

Now all of this is admitted after Kant has argued that morality serves as a "sufficient substitute for any a priori justification [of freedom]" (CPR 48). The moral law once again does not establish the certainty of freedom. In the first place, morality or the 'ought' as a phenomenon has an ambiguous status as it seems to be analysable in naturalistic terms and in rationalistic terms. Morality as such cannot prove the metaphysical actuality of freedom. At best it can show that freedom needs to be presupposed for moral agents.

Kant is also aware of other limits to the moral argument. Morality is a justification of the actuality of freedom for those who acknowledge the moral law as binding upon them (CPR 47). It is therefore, not a universally recognizable justification for freedom if it is the case that not all persons experience duty. Even if all persons acknowledged the moral law as binding that would not be grounds for stating that freedom was thereby proved. Kant's hesitations then in the "Critical Elucidation..." are only appropriate and it seems to indicate his awareness that the issue of grounding freedom is not yet

settled.

We tried to indicate earlier what the ultimate ground of freedom might be in the notion of an object (transcendental) which was capable of pure apperception. What Kant seemed to recognize there was that the self was an intelligible object knew itself and viewed itself in ways which were not entirely formal. The non-formal aspect of self-knowledge was indicated in the power the self had in reversing the use of the category of causality. Returning now to this idea we see Kant taking it up once more in the second Critique. The self which is conscious of itself as an appearance, "is conscious also of his own existence as a thing in itself, also views his existence so far as it does not stand under temporal conditions, and to himself as determinable only by laws which he gives to himself through reason" (CPR 97). Once again the notion of consciousness arises as a structure through which the self is known. A slight difference can be noted between the first Critique's way of describing conscious self-awareness and the second's way. In the first Kant said that man knows himself through pure apperception which we analysed as knowing the formal component to all representations, the "I think". We noted however, that Kant was using odd language to refer to a merely formal (logical) concept (the verb 'views' was a problem here). Now Kant is saying that we are conscious of ourselves as things in ourselves which does not appear to be a formal notion particularly because the thing in itself is regarded as an object (content) as opposed to a form.

Kant is using descriptive language to say of the self that it

prescribes laws to itself through reason. Some thing or entity is doing the prescribing and somehow we are aware of this thing (we are conscious of it). Once again, Kant is speaking mater-of-factly about this thing in itself-- the noumenal object. It is as though he has apprehended the noumenal self in such a way as to be able to describe its activity. It is not merely a problematic concept any longer, since he is not stating simply negative things about the noumenal self, but is being very positive about what he is claiming.

I think that at least this much is clear; Kant is making statements in the two sections we cited that over-step the boundaries he stipulates concerning the knowledge of things in themselves. Just what is being stated about the self is not clear to me. Just how we are conscious of ourselves as things in ourselves remains a puzzle. It is not by virtue of apperceiving the activity of prescribing one's own laws to oneself that we are aware of our noumenal selves, for Kant states that we are both aware of our selves as things in ourselves as well as (also) of ourselves as legislating laws to ourselves. There are two different things of which we are aware. Concerning consciousness of the noumenal self there was very little I could find. He does not qualify the above-quoted statement with an 'is-to-be-conceived-as' so it appears he is directly contradicting his statement about not having any acquaintance with things in themselves at all (B62). Either this is a blatant contradiction, a move of desperation, or as in the case of the third "Antinomy", a preparation for uncovering something further that we have not been able to see so far. The problem Kant is facing when he asserts these positive

characteristics of the self is knowing the self as a thing in itself, for that is the necessary knowledge that must be gained if freedom is to be firmly grounded.

This brings us to the point of the paper. The question of personal identity has been shown to be the underlying problem both for the extension of the concept of a first cause from a cosmological to a psychological sense, and for finally grounding freedom as ascribed to the human will. In conclusion, I understand the resolution to the third "Antinomy" to generate another problem. In order to finally ground freedom the identity of the person must be positively established on non-empirical grounds and in order to identify the person requires an apprehension of the self as a noumenal object. Whether Kant's own statements which make him appear as though he knew the character of this noumenal self are valid or make any sense at all cannot be judged here. Those statements do however, point to the awareness Kant had of the problem that has been outlined. Perhaps what is being developed is another antinomy which is to serve as a further stepping-stone for further insight.

APPENDIX

On the distinction between appearances and Things in themselves

Space does not allow for a lengthy discussion on the distinction between things in themselves and appearances. What we shall do is to give a brief description of the distinction and the relation things in themselves have to the concepts of 'noumena' and the 'intelligible'.

All appearances have two sides,

the one by which the object is viewed in and by itself (without regard to the mode of intuiting it-- its nature therefore remaining problematic), the other by which the form of the intuition of this intuition is taken into account (B55).

There are forms through which we perceive objects and these forms limit the aspects of an object of which we are aware. Now these forms (space and time),

are merely subjective conditions of our intuition and that in relation to these conditions all objects are therefore mere appearances, and not given us as things in themselves which exist in this manner (A49).

Now, since we are limited in our knowing an object we cannot assert that we know all aspects of the object. We can only say that we know or are given appearances. Now things themselves, or objects as they exist independently of our mode of intuiting them may underlie appearances (as the objects which explain the empirical existence of an object), but nothing positive can be asserted of them (ibid). That is to say,

All our intuition is nothing but the representation of appearances; that the things which we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them as being, not their relations so constituted in themselves as they appear to us, As appearances they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us (A42).

We have no knowledge of things in themselves simply because we have no acquaintance with them (B62). Kant does not however, simply leave the thing in itself as a merely negative concept. A beginning of some kind of positive notion is introduced by the concept of 'noumena'.

We know that our knowledge of things is limited by the forms of intuition. We can know that we are limited a priori. The concept of the thing in itself is the limit to sensibility, i.e., in what it can claim to know. This a priori limit to sensibility is called 'noumenon' (A255=B311).

If by 'noumenon' we mean a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensible intuition, and so abstract from our mode of intuiting it, this is noumenon in the negative sense of the term. But if we understand by it an object of a non-sensible intuition, namely, the intellectual, which is not that which we possess, and of which we cannot even comprehend the possibility. This would be 'noumenon' in the positive sense of the term (B307).

The a priori limit to sensibility constitutes a "negative extension" wherein noumena are considered as "unknown somethings" (B312). What this suggests is that there may be existing things for which we lack the capacity to intuit. Each appearance, including human beings as empirical objects, may have aspects to them which cannot be intuited. Secondly, there may be objects which have no empirical aspect at all (god or angels) that exist, but not in such a way as we can become aware of them. These objects' possibility can only be thought, never

intuited. Thus they are intelligible objects or intelligible aspects of objects.

That which is intelligible then refers to a realm which is distinct from the empirical realm and may or may not have a referent for its ideas of objects which cannot be intuited. If we were to posit an object which could not be intuited and did so through intelligible means, we could not tell whether our idea of an object actually referred to an object that actually existed.

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