Virtue Congruence in a Good State: A Defense Against Virtue Minimalism

Abstract

In Book III of Aristotle’s Politics, Aristotle undergoes an examination of the question of whether or not the virtues of an excellent man are the same as those of an excellent citizen. While holding the two to be distinct, the two are compatible and complementary to one another in a good state. This presents a thick and rich conception of virtue. However, contemporary ‘minimalist liberal’ scholars have challenged this view. Not only are the human and civic virtues incompatible, but they are also opposed to one another in a liberal democracy. The line of thinking of these scholars is that the human virtue in some way is contrary to the preservation of the state and its ends. In liberal thinkers this takes shape clearly in the arguments of Andrew Sabl and William Galston. For Sabl, a focus on a broad set of virtue, including the human virtues, leads to a disintegration of the core virtues needed to preserve a liberal democracy as such. Galston argues that by advocating for an intrinsically valuable set of human virtues, we undermine the pluralism and freedoms inherent to a liberal democratic state and the advantages these bring. The basis for these arguments can be traced back to a wide variety of historical thinkers including Machiavelli, Hobbes, Kant, and Rawls. In this thesis, I will examine and challenge these historical arguments that form the basis of the minimalist liberal conception of virtue, taking aim at the incongruence of human and civic virtue and the problems with a minimalistic conception of virtue. In engaging in a minimalist conception of virtue in the state, we paint an incomplete and insufficient picture of the human agents that make up the state, and their ability to actualize themselves towards the states ends, as well as towards their own flourishing.