Virtue Congruence in a Good State: A Defence Against Virtue Minimalism

VIRTUE CONGRUENCE IN A GOOD STATE: A DEFENCE AGAINST VIRTUE MINIMALISM

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Lay Abstract

In his *Politics*, Aristotle suggests that, in a good state, there is a connection between being an excellent person and being an excellent citizen, in that they are compatible and complementary to one another. However, certain contemporary liberal theorists hold this view is mistaken, that there is no compatibility between the two, in fact, on the view of these theorists, the very idea of being an excellent person is opposed to the excellences of being a good citizen. Therefore, they offer a reductionist account of virtue which excludes human excellence as necessary or reduces its aims to instrumental to the state is beneficial. This thesis explores the historical background of this position and challenges the claim of an incompatibility between human and civic excellence. It argues for Aristotle's original position that the two are compatible and complementary in a good state. Furthermore, it also argues that a reductionist position cannot give a proper account of the human agent and their ends.

Abstract

In Book III of Aristotle's *Politics*, Aristotle undergoes an examination of the question of whether or not the virtues of an excellent man are the same as those of an excellent citizen. While holding the two to be distinct, the two are compatible and complementary to one another in a good state. This presents a thick and rich conception of virtue. However, contemporary 'minimalist liberal' scholars have challenged this view. Not only are the human and civic virtues incompatible, but they are also opposed to one another in a liberal democracy. The line of thinking of these scholars is that the human virtue in some way is contrary to the preservation of the state and its ends. In liberal thinkers this takes shape clearly in the arguments of Andrew Sabl and William Galston. For Sabl, a focus on a broad set of virtue, including the human virtues, leads to a disintegration of the core virtues needed to preserve a liberal democracy as such. Galston argues that by advocating for an intrinsically valuable set of human virtues, we undermine the pluralism and freedoms inherent to a liberal democratic state and the advantages these bring. The basis for these arguments can be traced back to a wide variety of historical thinkers including Machiavelli, Hobbes, Kant, and Rawls. In this thesis, I will examine and challenge these historical arguments that form the basis of the minimalist liberal conception of virtue, taking aim at the incongruence of human and civic virtue and the problems with a minimalistic conception of virtue. In engaging in a minimalist conception of virtue in the state, we paint an incomplete and insufficient picture of the human agents that make up the state, and their ability to actualize themselves towards the states ends, as well as towards their own flourishing.

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Introduction

Within contemporary political thought opinions vary widely on the role of virtue in the state. The idea that virtue is an important aspect of the state can be traced back to a variety of schools of thought in many cultures. But, undoubtedly, Aristotle's account of virtue has been the most influential and discussed in the West. It is from Aristotle that philosophers get an important distinction between two kinds of virtues: the civic virtues and the human virtues. The human virtues are a major topic of discussion of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, where they are presented as the virtues that promote a state of being that is constitutive to living a life of human flourishing. Traditionally, they include the four cardinal virtues of temperance, courage, justice, and wisdom. The idea of civic virtues stems from Aristotle's *Politics*. In Book III of the *Politics*, Aristotle undertakes a discussion of the differences between the virtues of being a good man and those of being a good citizen. There, he claims that "It is possible for one to be an excellent citizen without having acquired the virtue in accord with which someone is an excellent man." (*Pol III 1276b30-35).* The role of the citizen, as defined by Aristotle, is "the preservation of the community, as their [the citizens'] function, and the constitution is the community." (*Pol III 1276b26-29*). The civic virtues then, for Aristotle, are the virtues that are aimed at preserving and advancing the state's ends. If a particular state's end is the acquisition of wealth, then a merchant, by being excellent in their craft, has civic virtue. The same can be said for the fisherman. A fisherman, merely by allowing for the state to preserve itself by acquiring capital through trade of a resource or by acquiring food, aids in the preservation of the state and its ends, and thus holds some degree of civic virtue. This is why being an excellent citizen and being an

excellent man are not the same. While the human virtues are aimed at the totality of the human good, not all states are aimed at the same end.

Aristotle concludes that the excellences of the good man and the good citizen are congruent with one another in a good state *(Pol 1278b1-5)*. The nature of this congruence for Aristotle, and the definition of congruence I will uphold throughout this thesis, is as being not only a compatibility between the human and civic virtues, but also that the two are complementary to each other. There is a compatibility between civic and human virtues in that the human virtues are not inherently opposed to the civic virtues. The virtuous disposition and activities of being a good person are not incompatible with the disposition and activities of being a good citizen in a good state. But this idea of congruence goes a bit further, not only are human and civic virtue compatible with one another but are also complementary to one another. The human virtues play an important role in the actualization of a good civic disposition, which in turn helps to preserve the states end of providing an opportunity for human flourishing which in turn provides the condition for the acquisition of human virtue. In this way the human virtues and civic virtues work in unison to establish a good state.

However, some contemporary thinkers argue against this conclusion. These arguments come from what one might conceive of as a "minimalist liberal" conception of virtue. This school of thought sees the human virtues as being incongruent with, or even detrimental to, the civic virtues of a liberal democracy. The ends of a liberal democracy, such as freedom, rights, and pluralism, are under threat if we try to uphold the view that certain human virtues are necessary for being a good citizen. The very idea of a single good human disposition stands against the pluralism and freedom a liberal democracy proposes to maintain. Thus, to uphold liberal values, the scope of civic virtue is minimized to a limited set, those that create citizens

that preserve freedom and plurality. As part of this minimization of virtue, human virtue is held as incongruent with the civic virtues. This minimalist liberal conception of civic virtue takes many forms. For example, William Galston takes a moderate approach that stays more in line with the Aristotelian tradition, arguing for the well-being of the state and the community, whereas Andrew Sabl takes a more extreme approach, denying the classical account of virtue and undergoing a more comprehensive minimization of virtue, restricting the virtue needed for the citizen to only the civic virtues that are necessary for the liberal democracy to exist.

The minimalist liberal conception of civic virtue started to gain prevalence in the 20th century but draws inspiration from earlier schools of political thought. Indeed, a kind of virtue minimalism and the argument that the human and civic virtues are incongruent can be traced at least as far back as the time of thinkers like Nicolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. Both Machiavelli in *The Prince* and Hobbes in *Leviathan* put a heavy emphasis on preservation as the state's end and paint a picture of human virtues as conflicting with this preservation. For Machiavelli, the virtues needed to preserve the state are more often than not contrary to those of what is considered a good person. The pursuit of the ideal oftentimes leads the citizens and the state on a path that conflicts with the citizens' preservation. Hobbes tells a similar story, but in contrast to a certain Machiavellian position, does not necessarily deny a congruence between civic and human virtues. Instead, Hobbes rolls them both into one. The human virtues and civic virtues aim at the same end, preservation, and preservation of the self is best met within the state. In this sense both human and civic virtue are instrumental. Both Machiavelli and Hobbes represent a minimalistic approach to virtue in that they reduce the aims of the state, and thus of civic virtue, to preservation.

In his *Metaphysics of Morals,* Immanuel Kant also influences a push towards an incongruence between the human and civic virtues with his focus on the natural right of freedom and the separation of right and freedom. Kant makes a distinction made between a disposition aimed at rights and one aimed at virtue, and only the former is coercible and influenceable by the state. This distinction, and Kant's focus on the value of freedom, would in turn influence John Rawls in his *Theory of Justice*, who draws a similar separation between rights and the supererogatory and his idea of justice. For Rawls, rights are meant to allow for a freedom of choice amongst people in society. Going against this pluralism of choice, stemming from rational choice, is to go against justice and the good. These historical accounts of virtue and the state, while not all against the congruence of human and civic virtue themselves, set the foundations for the minimalist liberal conception of virtue. Broadly minimalist accounts have one of two main features: first the human virtues are incongruent with the civic virtues, due to some kind of inherent incompatibility, and therefore should not be included in the discussion of what is needed for a good state. Second, they minimize the virtues needed to be acquired by citizens in a good state, both by excluding the human virtues and in some cases by minimizing the scope of civic virtues needed by the citizen.

However, taking a minimalistic approach to the role of virtue in the state raises the question: do these minimalistic accounts of civic virtue present a sufficient account of the human agents that actualize these state ends? By holding that the human and civic virtues are incongruent, is something important lost in our conception of the state and how it functions? Aristotle and Neo-Aristotelian schools of thought would argue that if what we are aiming for is a good state, that is, for them, one that is aimed at promoting human flourishing, then the human virtues are just as important as the civic virtues to the well-being of the state and its goal overall.

While I personally sympathize with this broadly Aristotelian view of the state and its ends, it is not immediately obvious that this view is able to meet the challenges raised by the advocates of the minimalist conceptions of virtue and the state. The challenges concerning preservation put forward by Machiavelli and Hobbes require further analysis. Machiavelli raises important questions concerning the compatibility of human and civic virtue, and Hobbes' reductionist account of virtue towards the end of preservation are not simply rejected. The arguments from liberal thinkers on freedom and pluralism are also not easily dismissed. Constraining freedom and pluralism seem inevitable to some degree, if one holds that some standard of virtue is beneficial for the state. These minimalist views all reduce, in one way or another, what is needed for the state to merely civic virtue.

However, if some degree of human virtue aids in, or is necessary in, the actualization of civic virtue in a good state, then this highlights something crucial about how the state functions. An important piece in making a good society is that the state cannot be reduced to a set of institutional procedures put forward by the state. A minimalist view, like the minimalist liberal conception, hypothesizes that preserving the state's ends, and the state's institutions that drive these ends, will result in those ends being upheld throughout society. A theory where the human and civic virtues are congruent holds that while a human disposition aimed at preserving and promoting the state's ends is valuable, achieving this requires a deeper account of the human agent. Ultimately, I will argue not only that there is a congruence between the human and civic virtues in a good state, but also that the human virtues are a vital part of the actualization of civic virtue in a good state. Furthermore, a minimalist account of virtue, whether excluding or including the human virtues, cannot fully account for the complex nature and ends of the human

agents that make up society. Ultimately, a thicker conception of human and civic virtue as compatible and complementary is beneficial both for the state and those within it.

This thesis will be structured as follows. It will begin (chapter 1) by examining the aforementioned historical and contemporary arguments in more depth, both those that directly argue for the incongruence between human and civic virtue, as well as those that are influential to the discussion. Each argument will then be addressed individually, starting in chronological order with Machiavelli and Hobbes and their arguments stemming from preservation, and then (in chapter 2) turning to the arguments from freedom and plurality originating from Kantian and Rawlsian thought. In both cases, I will argue, a minimalist account of virtue excluding the human virtues, or reducing their scope and ends, is insufficient in establishing a disposition that allows for the citizens to actualize and preserve well the conditions and opportunities that the civic virtues seek to preserve. Lastly (chapter 3), the minimalist liberal conception of virtue will be examined by delving deeper into the arguments of Sabl and Galston. While both thinkers make important contributions to the discussion, their overall theories fail on similar grounds to the historical arguments that influenced them; or so I shall contend.

CHAPTER ONE: Why Argue for the Incongruence and Minimization of Virtue?

Historical Arguments: Machiavelli

The idea of the congruence of human and civic virtue held out as a prominent view in the west, the idea being married into the Catholic church which upheld it alongside its own ideals of virtue. When looking at the history of political philosophy, it is not until Machiavelli's *Il Principe* that an account that breaks this mould enters the mainstream. To any readers of Machiavelli this should not come as a surprise, since the goal of Machiavelli's work is not to appeal to a heavenly authority, or to create a state of well-being and happiness, but rather to act as a guideline for the hypothetical prince to maintain his state and position. It is in framing his purpose in this way that Machiavelli starts to give reasons as for why there is an incongruence between the civic and human virtues. This becomes most apparent in chapter fifteen of *Il Principe* where Machiavelli notes: "He who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin than his preservation; for a man who wishes to act entirely up to his professions of virtue soon meets with what destroys him among so much that is evil." (*Il Principe XV).* Machiavelli draws a clear distinction between what is good for the ruler and state, and what is good for the person. Doing what one ought to do for the sake of what is considered good, for oneself or others, does not necessarily mean doing that which is good for the state or one's role in regard to the state. As Machiavelli states: "If everything is considered carefully, it will be found that something which looks like virtue, if followed, would be his ruin; whilst something else, which looks like vice, yet followed brings him security and prosperity." (*Il Principe XV).*

It is this line of thinking that serves as the basis for one of the primary arguments for minimalist/neutralist theorists. Namely, human virtue often acts contrary to the ends of the state and its government, and therefore serves as a bad benchmark for the types of virtue that one would want from the citizen who aims at the state's ends. In fact, human virtue can be seen as detrimental to the ends of the state and states of being that are traditionally seen as vices can, at times, seem more conducive to the ends of the state. What is definable as virtue then is whatever is instrumental towards one's ends given their circumstances. Machiavelli himself gives a clear example of this in chapter seventeen when he discusses Hannibal Barca: "Inhuman cruelty, which, with his [Hannibal's] boundless valour, made him revered and terrible in the sight of his soldiers, but without that cruelty, his other virtues were not sufficient to produce this effect." (*Il Principe XV).*

While kindness may be considered a human virtue, it was not one that was conducive to Hannibal's ends in service to Carthage. To advance Carthage's ends in the Mediterranean as a general and to diminish or annihilate the threat that the growing Roman Republic embodied, Hannibal enacted many cruelties to keep his ragtag army of various ethnicities together towards that end and did so with spectacular success. For Hannibal, the entire preservation of the Carthaginian state was on the line, and to meet the ends of preserving the state he acted in a way that one would traditionally think of as being contrary to the virtues that are advantageous for human beings to have towards their own ends. One can think of other ways in which human virtue seemingly fails to meet certain pragmatic ends that the state might want to uphold, even if we were to include one of the ends of the state as being the well-being of the citizens. Being a torturer is easier work if one is disposed to cruelty, and while the ethics of torture itself are debated, it can conceivably lead to ends that are beneficial towards the state and maintain the

well-being of the state. One can take the classic bomb threat scenario as an example of this. If a bomb is planted in a mall, and the bomb planter is in police custody, a cruel torturer may allow for the bomb to be located faster, and therefore maximize the chance that the well-being of all the mall's patrons is preserved.

Machiavelli's conception of virtues in line with the ends of the state can also be seen in his discussion of the series of Roman Emperors spanning from Marcus Aurelius to Maximinus in Chapter XIX of *Il Princpe*. In this chapter, Machiavelli notes the varied conditions of the Roman Empire that each emperor was presented with and the virtues and vices of each that led to subsequent success or failure of the emperors. What is of particular interest to Machiavelli is the way that the Roman state itself functioned. Unlike many of the states of Machiavelli's own time, the Roman Empire had a professional standing army that was heavily influential in the Roman political landscape. As a result, the success and failure of the various Roman emperors was reliant on how they managed this element of Roman politics.

It was this unique element of Roman politics that led to the downfall of those emperors who were, "lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty, humane, and benignant" (*Il Principe* XIX). Such emperors were prone to drawing the ire of the soldiers, and as a result were oftentimes overthrown or killed, leading to the people of the empire suffering as a result. Contrarily, those emperors who were cruel, and as a result earned the respect of the soldiers, also fell out of favour with the general population. Out of all the emperors who ruled out of love or fear, one of each category would succeed, Marcus Aurelius, and Septimus Severus. Machiavelli is quick to point out that the success of both was a matter of each emperor ruling with virtue according to their circumstance. Marcus adopted the empire when it was stable and the soldiers were satisfied, and thus due to his prudence and justness, was able to maintain that stability successfully until his

death. On the other hand, Severus adopted an empire in turmoil and it was due to his valour and bravery that he was able to maintain control despite being cruel, as it led him to be honoured by the soldiers and the citizens alike (*ll Princep XIX)*. Crucially, it is pointed out that the other cruel and kind emperors failed due to a lack of virtue in accordance with their circumstances. This makes Machiavelli's point clear, human virtue as it is regularly conceived is not necessarily conducive to the ends of the state.

Historical Arguments: Hobbes

Machiavelli's views pitted him against the Catholic Church, since *Il Principe* was condemned as being contrary to Catholic teachings, but this did not stop similar veins of thinking from appearing in other places across Europe. Away from the ire of the Catholic church in newly Anglicized England, Thomas Hobbes conceived of a similar idea to the one that Machiavelli proposes. It is in constructing his own theory of the state that Hobbes also acknowledges that an account of civic virtue is necessary if the sovereign is to maintain power in the state (Cooper 2010). Hobbes himself admits that the commonwealth he construes opens new opportunities for humanities' negative nature, and therefore vice, to take hold, and thus there is a need to cultivate a kind of civic virtue (*Leviathan* XX). If strong state power is to be maintained, and therefore the social contract's obligation fulfilled, the citizens will also need to display some sort of virtue. The nature of this virtue for Hobbes takes on a very different set of ends than the Christian virtues of his day or the classical virtues of Aristotle. Namely, the end of virtue is a simple one, it is self preservation (Paganini 2016). A quick look into Hobbes' political theory is needed to fully understand the conclusion he reaches. Hobbes centres his negative view of human nature on humanity's natural negative passions which "carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like." (*Leviathan* XVII). Of these natural passions, one that Hobbes focuses on is pride or vainglory. It

is vainglory that leads people to have an inflated sense of self-worth in relation to others, leading them to take offence at the slightest potential wrongdoing against them. This leads to conflict, and it is in the escalation of such conflict that Hobbes believes that modesty, the key part of civic virtue, is nurtured. While modesty has a variety of definitions, for Hobbes it has a very particular definition, modesty is a type of self recognition of one's mortality (Cooper 2010, 253). The idea is that due to vainglory and pride, one will continue to get into altercations with other people until eventually this escalates to the point where one's life is in mortal danger. This leads to a sudden realization, a self-knowledge, that we as human beings are indeed mortal and that this is something shared among all human beings. It is the basis of our equality.

For Hobbes, the seeking out of excellence of the individual only leads one down the path of vainglory and pride (Cooper 2010, 244-248). It is in striving for a good human life or some personal excellence that we fall into the trap of going beyond our human capabilities and falling into vice. Inevitably, this leads one either to their own destruction or to the modest person's self realization. It is this realization that leads individuals in the state of nature to seek out the creation of the state and the sovereign; hence why it is characterized by Hobbes as a civic virtue and not a human virtue. The virtue of the citizen, modesty, is directly pointed at the ends of the state's preservation and prosperity, as without the state no semblance of human goodness can be found. In fact, it is man's passion for preservation and prosperity that are said to be the only road for peace for Hobbes, "The passions that incline men to peace are fear of death; desire of such things that are necessary for commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them." (*Leviathan* XIII). Humanity's basic aims are only met in the state, and this is why Hobbes defers all, including virtue, to its preservation and power. In this way, Hobbes presents a view that is

not against the congruence of human and civic virtue per se, rather he reduces all virtue into civic virtue.

It is interesting to note how this idea of preservation has continued to exist as a key part of the more contemporary minimalist liberal conception. In discussing civic virtue, political thinker Andrew Sabl points out that the focus should be on the "core virtues needed for liberal democracy literally to survive", rather than the ideal virtues that lead to well-being or flourishing (Sabl 2005, 211). Sabl believes that by focusing on ideal virtues we head in a direction that is more uncertain. He uses the analogy of health in relation to the state to emphasize his point. "The statements, 'The patient is dead', 'The patient is gravely ill' and 'The patient has not maximized her physical and mental health' involve decreasing degrees of certainty." (Ibid). Thinking of virtue in a similar way as Hobbes, in relation to how it focuses on the preservation of the state, Sabl tries to narrow down which civic virtue is the one most necessary for the people of a society to uphold. Political virtue theorist William Galston also puts a focus on preservation as a key part of the argument of the incongruence between human and civic virtue. "The only defensible conclusion of virtue is as instrumental. Civic virtue is in service of a single overriding public purpose-namely peace, and security." (Galston 2007, 625). Underlying these ideas is an assumption that Aristotle does not have a theory of preservation as part of his theory of full virtue, a claim that I will dispute later on (Paganini 2016).

Hobbes' conclusion has further consequences for virtue. Connecting back to civic virtue more generally, just as civic virtue is relative in the sense that what entails civic virtue is dependent on the type of state that one is part of Hobbes notes how one's role and circumstance help dictate how one can best achieve preservation of themselves and the state. Since everyone has different personal skills and dispositions, one should position themselves in work that best

suits their skills as well as meets the requirements of the state's preservation and prosperity. This can be made clearer by using Hobbes' example of the prudence of the family and the kingdom. For Hobbes, prudence is an intellectual virtue, and like all other virtues for Hobbes its aim is preservation. Therefore, the aim of running a family is to preserve the family and the aim of running the kingdom is to preserve the kingdom (Leviathan XIII). Interestingly, Hobbes treats the family unit much like a small state, one that relinquishes its rights to the state proper once it joins the commonwealth. However, the microstate of the family is important to preserve within the commonwealth due to providing the foundation for obedience and education, key parts of nurturing civic virtue, and thus maintaining the state's preservation (Chapman 1975). This kind of correlation exists for all kinds of work in the state. Those with an excellence for farming bring necessary food and wealth to the state, just as those with an aptitude for strength and courage enable the state to be strong and better meet the requirements for self-preservation. In short, Hobbes' theory of virtue can be said to be an object criterion, with virtues not being aimed at some mean or balance of right internal state of being, but instead virtue is whatever allows one to fulfill one's criterion, in Hobbes' case this is self-preservation.

By looking at both Machiavelli's and Hobbes' arguments we get a collection of similar reasons as for why civic virtue and human virtue are not congruent, as well as reasons as for why it is beneficial to nurture only civic virtue within the state. One train of thought that can be extracted from both thinkers is the idea that due to the pragmatic realities of human nature and human circumstance, the kind of human virtue that Aristotle conceives, which leads to human happiness, often leads to the destruction of the state. For Machiavelli this argument is centred on the virtues needed for rulership, as by aiming for their own happiness, or the happiness of others, the ruler fails in achieving the ruler's end, that is to preserve the state and themselves as the

state's head. Therefore, the civic virtue of the ruler, their excellence towards the state's ends, is not fulfilled when they try to meet the ends of human virtue, their own happiness. This marks a clear-cut separation between civic and human virtue, displaying that the two are not congruent with one another. For Machiavelli, they stand opposed to one another more often than not.

Hobbes comes to a similar conclusion. A striving for human excellence can be correlated with the striving for one's own glory, and this inevitably leads to one of two conclusions, one's own downfall due to pride, or the realization of one's own mortality, what he calls modesty. The former leads to a condition that is contrary to the state's ends and leads to the overthrow of the latter's self-preservation. The passions that exist within men that lead humans to their own self-destruction are always present. This is why we should act on those passions that best lead to peace, those aimed at self-preservation and prosperity, and this is only possible in the state, hence why civic virtue is nurtured. It is interesting to note how both Machiavelli and Hobbes both hold a similarly negative view of human nature, and how these play into their rejection of human virtue playing a role in the state. Machiavelli posits, "Because this is to be asserted in general of men, that they are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, [and] covetous." a line that is very similar to Hobbes' famous line about humans in the state of nature. (*Il Principe* XVII). It is due to this human nature that actions and dispositions that seem contrary to an individual's happiness must be undertaken to fulfill the base requirement for living a good human life, living.

Another shared feature between Hobbes and Machiavelli's accounts is the aims of the state, which plays a key role in their conceptions. Namely, both present what can be noted as minimalist accounts of the state's objectives. They provide a very narrow baseline of objectives that the state aims to accomplish. Both Machiavelli and Hobbes see the ends of the state as being self-preservation and prosperity (*Il Principe* XV, *Leviathan* XVII, XVIII). Therefore, it is not

surprising that both Machiavelli's and Hobbes' conception of civic virtue are both directed at achieving this end. Beyond this end however, governments do not interfere with the lives of the individuals that make it up beyond establishing dispositions of virtue that meet the state's ends, civic virtue. For Hobbes, this is a choice made due to both the need to preserve the state, but also due to virtue being relative in an instrumental sense. The excellences that each person can achieve are unique, as are which excellences are beneficial given a person's particular circumstances. It is similar to what Machiavelli presents when discussing the various virtues of the Roman emperors, but Hobbes applies the idea to all the citizens.

This framework provides the basis for contemporary arguments, notably one from Galston. Galston argues that if we are to affirm that there is a kind of human virtue, human excellences that make up an excellent type of citizen, we diminish the fact that there is a diversity of what types of people we might call a good citizen (Galston 2007, 630-632). He draws upon research by Joel Westheimer and Joseph Kahne to distinguish between three different types of good citizens. The participatory citizen actively participates in the civic affairs of the state, and such citizens come about through those programs which emphasize the knowledge, skills, and character needed to participate well while respecting the rights of their fellow citizens (Ibid). 'Personably responsible citizens' are the citizens who volunteer to help others, aid in the maintenance of public spaces, and follow the laws, and they are brought about through programs that emphasize honesty, integrity, and hard work. Lastly, there are 'justice-oriented citizens' who "are concerned with the structural social, economic, and political forces that create oppression and inequality." (Ibid, 631). These citizens' upbringings emphasize analytical capacities, a character that is disposed towards collective action, and the ability to deal with the conflict that such change brings to a society (Ibid). According to Westheimer and

Khane, each of these types of citizens is generally linked to a particular orientation and thus, the various groups are often at odds with one another. Understandably, the personally responsible citizens' lawful obedience may be at odds with the justice-oriented citizens' justice concerns about the law. It is interesting to note here that as human virtues, both lawfulness and justice are deemed to be desirable, but may run contrary to one another at times in that acting on one means not acting on another. Invoking Westheimer and Khane's research however, Galston notes the exact opposite. He suggests that the fact that there are various types of good citizens may not be a sign of conflict, but rather the sign of a good state. He notes, "A community, all of whose citizens where passionately pursuing social justice would be all sail and no anchor; a community of personally responsible citizens would be just the reverse." (Galston 2007, 632). Galston is pointing out the fact that by standardizing what entails a good citizen, and therefore constraining what virtues are entailed in the good citizen, we inadvertently deny the goods that other citizens bring to the table. This 'standardization principle' forms a key basis for Galston as for why civic virtue is incongruent with human virtue. The argument is in a sense two-fold: certain virtues we wish the citizens to have run contrary to one another in terms of their human ends, and these virtues, despite being opposed to each other, all entail good citizenship and civic virtue.

It is interesting to note that Galston's argument has a further basis in the writings of Plato, primarily in Plato's *Statesman,* although this is not a distinction that Galston draws upon himself. The *Statesman* is a Platonic dialogue starring an unnamed visitor from Elea, who discusses' what the proper work of the statesman is. According to the visitor, part of the work of the statesman, and by extension the state, is to intertwine the various virtues that individuals have that serve the ends of the state (*Stateman* 287e). An account very similar to Galston's comes up near the end of the dialogue when the visitor discusses the types of people to be put in office.

The visitor notes that both moderate and courageous individuals have excellences and deficiencies that are beneficial or detrimental to the state. The moderate has a "cautious, just, and conservative" disposition but may also "lack bite, and a certain practical keenness" (*Statesman* 311a). The courageous on the other hand are "inferior to the others in relation to justice and caution but have an exceptional degree of keenness when it comes to action." (*Statesman* 311b). The conclusion that the visitor comes to is that good statesmanship consists in the weaving together and intertwining of the excellences of the moderate and the brave, combined with right laws and rules, leading to a good and happy state.[1] While the character of the visitor is talking about kingship and not democracy, for the visitor is in fact opposed to democracy, it is quite easy for one to utilize the visitor's argument within a democratic context. Insofar as a democracy is the rule of the many and the citizen partake in rulership, then it is beneficial to weave together the excellences that citizens have towards the ends of the state, much like the visitor's statesman does. This conclusion furthers Galston's claim. The people of a state are diverse in both education and disposition; therefore, instead of trying to claim that certain human and civic excellences are better suited towards the ends of the state than others, it is more beneficial to accept that there are a wide range of civic excellences and bring together each virtue having a role to play.

Arguments from Rights and Freedom: Liberal Democracy

While thinkers like Hobbes and Machiavelli are pure minimalists in that they submit most of their theories to providing the minimum requirements of preservation and prosperity,

[1] The visitor suggests achieving this through the intermarriage of those of varying excellences. My focus is less so on the visitor's solution, but rather on this idea of the weaving together of various virtues that are beneficial for the state. This topic will be revisited in Chapter 3.

when talking about democratic theory the conversation gets more complicated. Contemporary democracies are directed towards more than just the preservation and prosperity of the state. Democratic theorist Robert Dahl provides a list of benefits that are inherent to a democracy, and while security and prosperity are noted on the list, the other major feature is the introduction of rights. "Democracy guarantees its citizens a number of fundamental rights that non-democratic systems do not, and cannot, grant." (Dahl 1998, 44). It is in arguing concerning rights that another major challenge is postulated by the minimalist liberal conception, that the kind of human virtue that Aristotle wants to uphold violates or is incompatible with the rights and values of a liberal democracy.

In arguing this while upholding civic virtue, the minimalist liberal conception is also claiming that civic virtue is compatible with rights, which begs the question, how are rights connected to civic virtue in the first place? Much like Hobbes' belief that self-preservation is the primary end of the state and something that can only be brought about by the state, the minimalist liberal conception of virtue holds the same to be true for rights. While physical security is the driving force behind Hobbes, the minimalist liberal conception extends preservation to the key rights and values of the liberal democratic system, equality and freedom. This works with Aristotle's idea that civic virtue is instrumental to the preservation and ends of the constitution that is in place within the state. The fact that values such as equality and freedom are an intrinsic part of a democratic constitution is traceable all the way back to the ancient Greeks in works like Plato's *Republic*.[2] Therefore, in directing one's virtues towards the states

[2] *Republic 558c,* "And it [democracy] would seem to be a pleasant constitution, which lacks rulers but not variety and which distributes a sort of equality to both equals and unequals alike."

ends, the minimalist liberal conception of virtue notes that the upholding of democratic rights and values are a paramount part of civic virtue (Macedo 1990, Galston 1991, Sabl 2005). It is in the application of this idea in relation to rights and human virtue, that the minimalist liberal conception of virtue remains minimalist. Much like Hobbes' idea that pursuing human excellence is contrary to one's end of self-preservation, the minimalist liberal conception holds that promoting human virtue is contrary to the preservation of basic liberal rights and values.

Argument from Rights and Freedom: Kant and Rawls on Freedom

Out of the arguments from rights, the one that is most prominently featured and holds the most sway for the minimalist liberal conception is the argument from freedom. Specifically, the idea is that human virtue is either separate from and/or contrary to the right of freedom. It stands in contrast to the ends of a liberal democracy and therefore the civic virtues that are desirable for one to have in the state, which include the upholding of rights and values such as freedom. Undoubtedly, one of the most notable arguments that separates rights and human virtue on the grounds of freedom comes from Immanuel Kant in his *Metaphysics of Morals*. According to Kant, virtue is not what forms the foundation of a good society; rather, it is the idea of natural right, namely freedom, that forms the foundation for the good society. For Kant, the duties we as humans have towards virtue are intrinsically separate from the duties of right, with the whole of the *Metaphysics of Morals* being shaped by the division of duties, those of right and those of virtue. The reason Kant separates right and virtue is because a duty of right is coercible by something external. The law is designed to be in accordance with and give protection to rights by

Republic 562c "Freedom: Surely you'd hear a democratic city say that this is the finest thing it has, so that as a result it is the only city worth living in for someone who is by nature free."

coercing people into external actions that are in accordance with said rights, while a duty of virtue is not coercible in the same way. This is the case for Kant because virtues are aimed at human ends, such as our own happiness, and ultimately this is something that happens internally within a human being, not externally (*MM* 6:239). On the other hand, one's right of freedom extends beyond oneself as in Kant's example of property. Possession is not something that occurs due to holding something physically; rather, possession is intelligible, it is an extension of one's freedom of choice for an object. For Kant, the laws are a product of this right. All laws that come to be are to protect our one natural right, "freedom, insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law." (*MM* 6:238). In the state of nature, one's freedoms are not able to be protected by coercion, and it is this realization that leads to the creation of the civil condition, "a condition in which what belongs to each can be secured to him against everyone else." (MM:237*)*.

It is on this idea of the right of freedom that Kant builds his idea of a good society, "the well-being of a state must not be understood as the welfare of its citizens and their happiness; for happiness can perhaps come to them more easily and as they would like it to in a state of nature …or even under a despotic government." (*MM* 6:318). Here Kant expresses a worry that lines up with his division of duties. Due to virtue, and subsequently happiness, being internal and not coercible it is not the state's job to provide happiness. Rather, for Kant, a good state is defined as one that has "that condition in which its constitution conforms most fully to principles of right." (Ibid). Despite the separation between right and virtue, this does not mean that Kant does not see a role for virtue in the maintaining of rights. It is in the *doctrine of virtue* where Kant conceives of the duties of virtue which connect back to right. Kant defines virtue as "the strength of a human being's maxims in fulfilling his duty", this strength being against those natural

inclinations that get in the way of our moral duties (*MM* 6:34). While this includes the duties to oneself, internal lawgiving, it also includes one's duties to right which are the state's ends. Respect for the law and rights is a disposition not of right but of virtue, even though it aims at the law's ends, since the impetus for following the law is an internal constraint not an external one (Ibid). Since the law and the state uphold the right of freedom, the duties of virtue are the duty of the individual to craft a character that meets these ends. The definition of civic virtue as excellences aimed at the preservation of the state's ends gives a clear picture of a Kantian view of civic virtue from his characterization of the duties of virtue. Kant acknowledges a distinction between virtues that aid in fulfilling the state's ends of right, that which are external from oneself fulfilled through adherence to right and law, from those that meet the end of individual happiness.

One of the key figures of contemporary political philosophy that Kant inspired by this distinction is John Rawls. Like Kant, Rawls also divides excellences into those that are directed at rights and those that are supererogatory acts that are beyond what is necessary for the state's ends (Rawls 1971, 100). However, undoubtedly Rawls biggest contribution to the minimalist liberal conception of virtue is his concept of what entails a person's good, "what is for him the most rational plan of life given reasonably favourable circumstances" (Ibid, 347). Rawls puts forward the hypothesis that a person's good lies in the execution of this rational plan of one's wants. He upholds that this is not just someone choosing whatever one wants to do; rather, a rational plan for life is one that includes some basic set of virtues directed towards justice. "Therefore, the representative member of a well-ordered society will find that he wants others to have the basic virtues, and in particular a sense of justice. His rational plan of life is consistent with the constraints of right, and he will surely want others to acknowledge the same restrictions.

In order to make this conclusion absolutely firm, we should also like to be sure that it is rational for those belonging to a well-ordered society who have already acquired a sense of justice to maintain and even to strengthen this moral sentiment." (Ibid, 383). Much like Kant, Rawls characterizes a subset of virtues as being conducive to the upholding of rights, and therefore something that should be upheld within a well-ordered state directed towards those ends. Rawls suggests that there should be some constraints on one's rational plan for life insofar as it infringes on justice; however, as part of his theory of justice, freedom of choice of one's rational plan is a key part of one's rights, again a takeaway from Kant's theory. "There is no need to set up the account of the good so as to force unanimity on all the standards of rational choice. In fact, it would contradict the freedom of choice that justice of fairness assures to individuals." (Rawls 1971, 393). It is in the fulfillment of one's freely chosen rational plan that one finds happiness. Rawls upholds a theory of plurality in terms of the good. For him there is no standard of good that needs to be upheld in one's rational plan for life, and consequently the human excellences that allow one to live a good and happy life are what are instrumental to whatever rational plan one has chosen. To impose human virtues that point towards a certain way of living is contrary to this freedom of choice, and therefore the rights and justice that make up a well-ordered society.

Sabl and Galston on Freedom and Plurality

It is in upholding Rawls' idea, the human good being found in freely chosen rational plans, that the minimalist liberal conception argues that human virtue is not congruent with freedom as it does not uphold the pluralism that exists and is promoted by a liberal democracy. The 'liberal' part of a liberal democracy is in danger if we accept a theory of human virtue that holds some states of being to be good while others are not, as doing so leads to a theory

advocating constraints contrary to the basic freedoms liberal democracy values. The concern is that if one is to uphold a concept of human virtue that is similar to Aristotle's, one that lays out a series of objective virtues that lead to a particular end, human flourishing, then one infringes on the right to freedom and the plurality this right promotes. If part of the ends of a democratic state is that it preserves and upholds this freedom and plurality, then upholding this sort of human virtue runs contrary to these ends.

This idea that human virtue, or virtue in general, constrains freedom exists with varying degrees within the minimalist liberal conception of virtue. The difference between minimalist liberal thinkers primarily exists in how many civic virtues are deemed beneficial to the state's ends and where they put their emphasis in terms of the state's ends. Sabl notes this distinction well when he states, "liberal-democratic virtue theorists ought to, but often do not, distinguish between the core virtues needed for liberal democracy literally to survive, and the ideal virtues needed for it to do maximally well" (Sabl 2010, 211). This distinction leads Sabl to a conclusion that is similar to one of the aforementioned Hobbesian conclusions, that by pursuing human excellence we put the state's ends and our own in danger. While for Hobbes the danger was the preservation of person and state, for Sabl the danger is instead the preservation of the basic rights and freedoms of the state that are in danger when political philosophers strive for a thriving or flourishing democracy and the virtues that seem conducive to this end. To uphold a democracy while still maintaining the kind of freedom and pluralism that is advocated for by a Rawlsian conception of the good, Sabl notes these core civic virtues should be upheld by the state: toleration, non-violence, and democratic sportsmanship (Ibid, 216).[3] These virtues are all aimed

[3] While Sabl's notions of nonviolence and democratic sportsmanship are rather self explanatory, his definition of toleration stems from Galston, who notes that some life plans might be better than others, but we still should tolerate the choice of life plan of others, realizing that it is

at the upholding of the kind of pluralism advocated for by Rawls as they focus on the interference on the freedoms of others. Advocating for any virtues beyond these is only an excess of what is needed to uphold the state's ends and should be left to "the hurly-burly of social debate and individual choice." (Sabl 2010, 219).

In contrast, Galston is more moderate in his approach. Galston upholds a similar duty to rights as Rawls and Sabl do, but his standardization argument further tempers his argument against human virtue on the grounds that it is contrary to freedom. A focus on certain human virtues constrains the many civic excellences that exist within a pluralistic society and does not allow them to come to fruition (Galston 2007, 630). As such, Galston notes that infringing on freedoms and the plurality it promotes is not beneficial to the state. While Sabl's approach was minimalist in the number of civic virtues it included, Galston's is minimalist in that his virtues are very general dispositions conducive to citizenship. Included in Galston's list are civic virtues such as respect for others' rights, law-abidingness, and loyalty to society (Galston 1991, 221-27). In line with the Rawlsian formulation of the good life, these virtues are aimed more so at the maintaining of rights and justice set about by the state. The way that Galston words and constructs his list of civic virtues is general enough that it minimizes the infringements on freedoms and plurality that he champions. Notably however, Galston does not engage in the same kind of Hobbesian discussion that Sabl does. While Sabl seeks to establish core virtues needed for a democracy to exist, Galston instead engages in the construction of civic virtues that aim towards a good democracy that will allow the democracy to be healthy. This distinction will

education and persuasion that are the means to getting others to realize a better life plan, not coercion (Galston 1991). It is this non-coercion that Sabl most identifies in his view of toleration, although what falls under coercion is not specifically stated.

prove important in later discussion when arguing against their respective conceptions and combating their minimalistic reductionism.

In their distinct formulations, both authors establish two principles, human virtue is contrary to the kind of pluralistic free society that is part of the ends of a democratic state, and there are conceptions of civic virtue that do not infringe on the right to freedom and plurality. For both, this adds to the reasoning behind why human and civic virtue are incongruent with one another. Their conclusion deriving from the right of freedom as conceived from Rawls plays into their support for a minimalist liberal conception of democracy. Civic virtue upholds the state's ends, and the state is better situated to provide the conditions of rights and preservation for the people. As well, those rights should impose as few constraints as possible to uphold the right of freedom. The citizens only need to be disposed towards those rights and the laws that enforce them, and beyond this the state should be as uninvolved in the people's lives as possible.

While more arguments can be levied against Aristotle's congruence between human and civic virtue, these stand out as the most prominent and problematic for holding to Aristotle's view. Machiavelli and Hobbes' push towards preservation as a state end and instrumental approach encourages a theory that pushes for incongruence between human and civic virtue and a reductionism of virtue respectively. These ideas are furthered within the democratic context by Galston and Sabl. The preservation of the democratic state and promotion of civic virtue, or virtue as a whole as merely being instrumental to the state's ends is more beneficial to society than holding some standard of excellence that is unachievable or contrary to preservation as a state end. The divisions of right and virtue in Kant, and his characterization of the right of freedom play into Rawls theory of justice and freedom. This in turn heavily informs the various minimalist conceptions of civic virtue, the idea that enforcing a standard of human virtue is

contrary to the values and rights that a democracy upholds, and thus aims at being as unobtrusive to the freedom of the citizens as possible. It is these arguments that form the core of the overall argument against Aristotle's congruence of civic and human virtue. Moving forward, I will aim to challenge these views and the arguments that naturally stem from them, arguing that not only is their congruence between human and civic virtue, but that this congruence is necessary in any state that aims at some aspect of human flourishing.

CHAPTER TWO: Issues with Virtue Minimalism in Preservation and Freedom

The previous chapter presented an overview of the major challenges to the congruence of civic and human virtue, looking at both historical arguments, and contemporary arguments stemming from those historical arguments. Moving forward, I will be examining the validity of the challenges against the congruence of civic and human virtue. What all the previously mentioned theories have in common is that they are minimalistic in scope and effect and that they exclude intrinsic human virtue as being congruent with civic virtue to maintain this minimalism. The theories argue that advocating for human excellence will create people who threaten the preservation of the state, or that by enforcing some standard of human virtue, one harms the natural rights and duties one has towards their fellow humanity. Additionally, upholding more minimalistic ends for the state allows for one to hold a more minimalist conception of virtue, making the goal of the citizen more attainable. If the end of the state is merely self-preservation or the upholding of rights, then the expectations put on the citizens are less than in a state in which they are expected to deliberate on every aspect of the state. However, does this minimalistic view of the state and its citizens work out this way in practice? While we can make a set of laws, standards, and procedures aimed at minimalistic ends, this excludes an in-depth look at the most important part of any society, the human agents within it. Can a

minimalistic conception of the state's end, and thus of the civic excellencestates citizens ought to attain, give an account of human agents that are capable of meeting these ends and meeting them well? Furthermore, by reducing the state's ends to something so minimalistic, can we say that we are aiming at a good state, that is, a state that is good for the people who live within it? Moving forward then, my objective is to examine the aforementioned ends that civic virtue is aimed at preserving, whether we can say that they are aimed at a good state, and whether civic virtue alone is sufficient in establishing these ends as well on its own.

Preservation in Accordance with Human Virtue

The Machiavellian/Hobbesian position, as it was described in the previous chapter, is in accord with Aristotle's notion of the good state on one significant point: preservation of the state is important.[4] Aristotle certainly agrees that preservation plays a large role in the formation of a good state. However, for Aristotle, preservation is not itself the end of the state. Rather than being the end itself, the state "comes to be for the sake of living, but it exists for the sake of living well." (*Pol. I 1252b25*). The state's formation is a result of people coming together for the sake of preservation, living, and this is a key function of the state for Aristotle, since it is a prerequisite for living well. Furthermore, when discussing what it is good for the state to have, in *Politics* Book II, Aristotle makes it more explicit that, "what is good for a given thing in fact

[4] There is a line of thinking that Aristotle does not argue for preservation at all in his virtue ethics. Most authors who claim this point to parts of the *Nicomachean Ethics* but do not investigate the whole text, or the *Politics* where Aristotle oftentimes cites preservation. Since the *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics* are meant to be read together, and virtue and the political life is part of the end of virtue, and the political life is contingent on the preservation of human needs necessary to living, preservation can be said to be very important to Aristotle. Part of the confusion seems to come from how Aristotelian thought blended with church thought during the 13th century. Machiavelli's points against human virtue seem to be arguing against the Catholic church's scholastic interpretation of human virtue aimed at faith and Godly living, rather than the more pragmatic classical Aristotelian system aimed at human flourishing.

preserves it." (*Pol II* 1261b8-9). This idea is encapsulated in Aristotle's definition of civic virtue as that which preserves the state's ends, but the idea also extends to the human virtues as well. The human virtues, being aimed at that which is good, are also in part aimed at preservation; for what is the point of obtaining what is necessary for the good life if one cannot maintain one's life? This fact helps a lot in blunting the impact of Machiavelli's and Hobbes' arguments. In the Machiavellian argument, often the virtues that are good for a person are contrary to the ruler's preservation, and thus the state's. However, it is not entirely evident looking at an Aristotelian theory of virtue and its connection to politics that Machiavelli's argument stands. What the Machiavellian challenge fails to acknowledge is that Aristotle's arguments are not necessarily contrary to the preservation of the state.

Given that the Aristotelian conception of virtue and the good life is one in which preservation is necessary, acting to maintain preservation is not contrary to the overall end of living well. As Aristotle notes in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, "while it is satisfactory to acquire and preserve the good even for an individual, it is an even finer and more divine way to acquire and preserve it for people and for cities." (*NE I 1094b9-11).* The good is not just something to be acquired by the state, but also preserved. An individual and/or a city often face circumstances of fortune, however, that threaten the stability necessary not only to living well, but to living in general. Insofar as the aim is living well, then it may be choice-worthy, within a given unchoice-worthy circumstance of fortune beyond the individual's or the state's control, to act for the sake of the preservation of the state. This may include activities that can seem contrary to human virtue and living well, when those activities are aimed at preservation of the circumstances necessary for upholding the state's good. Such activities are, in fact, virtuous activities on those

occasions, insofar as they are done in the right way, with the right feeling, for the right thing, and in the right amount.

For example, for Aristotle, acting angrily is not inherently an unvirtuous action, as Aristotle explains regarding the virtue of calmness. While not having an internal state of being that is predisposed to anger is certainly a virtue, this does not mean that one should not carry out actions in anger. Rather, it is what one directs one's anger towards, what thing, and for what purpose that matters (*NE* 1126b5-11). The same may be said of actions that seem cruel. Insofar as the action is done for the right reason, for the right thing, and not more than what is necessary, then what seems cruel on paper may be justifiable to preserve the good life of the city, and therefore the individuals within it. Such actions would be virtuous, in that they were the best decision to make given the circumstances, even though the action might be perceived as being cruel by others. Interestingly, Machiavelli himself acknowledges that cruelty for the sake of cruelty, and by consequence having an internal state predisposed to cruelty, is not beneficial to the individual or the state's preservation. Instead, it is for him a matter of whether said cruelties are well or ill employed: "Those cruelties we may say are well employed…are done once and for all under the necessity of self preservation, and are not afterwards persisted in, but so far as possible modified to the advantage of the governed." (*Il Principe VIII).* Cruel acts are only beneficial when they are necessary for preservation of the state and should as much as possible be tailored towards the benefit of the people. What this entails is that it is necessary for the ruler to have a kind of deliberation and prudence, knowledge of what is beneficial for the people, and knowledge of when to enact a cruelty to make well employed. This furthermore points to a further distinction within Machiavelli, that there are two accounts of human virtue present within *The Prince*. The first is one based on a kind of Christian morality, and this kind he holds as being

incompatible with preservation. The second is a kind of prudential wisdom that is necessary for the ruler to have for their own preservation and the benefit of the state. In citing Machiavelli in support of their claims, minimalist thinkers are seemingly making the mistake of attributing human virtue to the former rather than the latter.

It may be argued that presenting cruel actions, or other seemingly undesirable actions, as virtuous is on some occasions a dangerous mentality for one to take. One does not have to look hard to realize that cruelties undertaken under the pretext of helping the state and the people fail to meet this mark and use it to mask injustices. The French Revolution is one example where the French populace took on a kind of cruel disposition for wanton execution in the name of liberty. What is important to keep in mind here is that the difference between the choice-worthiness of a particular circumstance and the choice-worthiness of an action in relation to that circumstance, and how these factors affect one's state of virtue. For example, a historical example can be taken from the naval traditions of the 17th-19th centuries. In the event that a crew was shipwrecked on a deserted island, and was left without any food, it was customary for the remaining crew to draw lots. Whoever drew the short straw was then dispatched by the rest of the crew and cannibalized. Undoubtedly, killing a crewmate is a cruel action to have to take. However, this does not mean that it is unvirtuous, given the circumstances. The unfortunate circumstance of being shipwrecked on an island with no food is unchoiceworthy, and to preserve the lives of the crew, it is (or at least could be) an act of prudence to cannibalise one of the crewmembers. However, partaking in this action with the right feeling, disposing one's feelings to the understanding that the circumstances within which one must kill and eat another human being are not good circumstances, and understanding that this action is a necessary cruelty rather than something to be enjoyed, is all part of virtuous action, on the Aristotelian view.

A similar line can be taken with seemingly cruel political actions. One can imagine the circumstances within which the ruler, or rulers, must make a cruel decision for the preservation of the state. If a town is suffering from a deadly contagious virus, it is not contrary to human virtue for the state to impose a quarantine on that town, even if this results in a seemingly cruel action towards those in the town. It is certainly not a choice-worthy circumstance to impose a quarantine on those suffering but given no other more viable alternative, it may well be the most choice-worthy action to take. A ruler who, due to an excess of kindness, refuses to act by putting a quarantine in place may well be acting from a position lacking prudence and from an excess of kindness, resulting in an unbeneficial outcome. The flip side of this is true as well. The individual who does not just act cruelly, but has a vicious disposition, is more inclined to enact cruelties beyond what is necessary for preservation, and therefore might enact cruelties without mindfulness of what is beneficial towards the ends of the state, including its preservation. By acknowledging that one should not dispose themselves to cruelty, but that in certain unchoice-worthy circumstances seemingly cruel acts may be justified, a Machiavellian point that human virtues call for us to act in ways that are contrary to the state's preservation is not well founded.

Preservation: Against Hobbes' Minimalism

The fact that preservation is inherent to, and works within, the Aristotelian framework also aids in combating one of Hobbes' claims: his claim that human virtue inevitably leads to the civic virtue of modesty, and that people are mortal, and their lives are best protected within the state. The type of individual that Hobbes is describing – one who, in trying to become an excellent human being, does so to the extent that it puts their life in danger for no good reason – is not compatible with Aristotle's view of virtue. They are not virtuous, on Aristotle's view, but rather are the holders of an excessive disposition. In Hobbes' own view, this would be an excess

of vainglory. This state of being compels the individual to act contrary to their self preservation, and therefore to what is good for a person and the state. To a degree, then, Aristotle's idea of preservation of the state aligns neatly with Hobbes'. But only to a certain extent. Both thinkers emphasize the importance of putting into place the conditions that lead to the preservation of the state, as well as material ends. The difference between the two is that Aristotle's theory of human flourishing goes well beyond mere preservation of life. It raises the question of what one do with this life that has been preserved?

It would seem quite contrary to human nature that preservation alone is sufficient for living a good life. Even prior to the establishment of civilization proper, it is known that human beings made instruments and created art. Once civilization was established and people met a certain benchmark of what is necessary for them to live their lives, they branched out to utilize their innate capacities to learn, think, develop themselves, seek new means of entertainment and pleasure, etc. It may be argued that an excessive focus on any of these things, to the extent that the preservation of the state is put in serious jeopardy, is not beneficial to the people or the state. However, a state merely aimed at preservation and the material wealth to maintain that preservation, in and of itself, as the final ends, is one that ignores this aspect of human nature and the capabilities that humans have for choosing a variety of good things. Martha Nussbaum puts the point I am making here well when she talks about the 'heaping up of means' being a poor benchmark for a good state (Nussbaum 1990). A life of peace and material wealth is one that merely provides an opportunity, it does not actualize anything. Peace and having wealth cannot actualize anything in and of themselves, they merely provide the means for one to do so.[5] This

[5] In his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle breaks potentiality and actuality into three parts, first order potentiality, second order potentiality, and actuality, which is characterized as a kind of *energeia* or activity. The idea here is that a state built on the idea of preservation, and whose civic virtues

idea of potential and actualization is important in establishing why it is necessary for a state to have some notion of virtue. Resources, procedures, and circumstances in the state do not exist in a void, they exist within a complex system of institutions and relations driven by human agents with various needs, capabilities, and goods. Insofar as the actualization of human agents is best met in the state, the will of the individual for their own sake, and the will of the state which oversees the collective and is aimed, at least in part, at the same end of human flourishing, are concerned with the preservation of the state.

If we hold, as Aristotle does, that preservation is a key part of human virtue, then it can be argued then not only that human virtue is compatible with the kind of preservation that Hobbes discusses, but also that by upholding a thicker account of human virtue alongside Hobbes' civic virtue, one's capacity to meet that end of preservation is better actualized. Hobbes fears that the pursuit of human excellence for one's own sake steers people down a path that will lead them to their own undoing assumes that human excellence is contrary to preserving oneself well. However, since, as has been argued, preservation of self is an integral part of human virtue, at least as conceived by Aristotle, then it can be argued that human virtue is conducive not only to preserving the individual, but also to preserving and upholding the conditions that Hobbes puts forward as being integral to preservation. Hobbes scholar Gianni Paganini notes:

> "Laws of nature prescribe what natural reason dictates for preserving our lives; maintaining peace is the first means to this end. Therefore, social virtues like modesty, equity, trust, humanity, and especially keeping contracts and covenants recommend

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are aimed at self-preservation will not be suited to actualize human goods beyond this self preservation. Peace and money create the means within which humans can perform activities, but cannot perform these activities themselves, let alone deliberate what good activities may come from these means.

> actions aimed at peace, which is the first and foremost condition of anyone's self-preservation." (Paganini 2016, 227).

A question arises as to whether the kind of instrumentalism of Hobbes' theory – his view that virtue is a kind of object criterion – is sufficient to establish the kind of peaceful state Hobbes wants. If we hold that the development of virtue comes about as a result of developing one's disposition through activity, as Aristotle does in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, then the various kinds of work that people do to preserve themselves and the state are not inherently conducive to upholding civic virtue. The fisherman may contribute to the goal of his own preservation and the preservation of the state by providing food for the state and selling his fish. However, this activity in and of itself does not dispose the fisherman towards a kind of peaceful disposition, as fishing alone is an activity that provides a means towards preservation, but not the acquisition of an internal condition aimed at preservation through peaceful living.

The covenant of the social contract that Hobbes conceives of, and the laws that stem from this contract, are enacted by human agents for their benefit, to benefit their self preservation. A question must be raised, however, about how much a theory of self-preservation itself is conducive to communal living. If one's feelings are disposed towards engaging with others merely with one's own self-preservation as the driving goal, is this conducive to nurturing a good disposition towards one's fellow humanity? Hobbes' theory is geared towards a very self-interested way of thinking, since the ends of human beings are always self-preservation. Hobbes imagines a state where one's self-preservation is best met in the state, but that does not mean that one's goal of self-preservation as an individual goes away, since it is still the driving force behind acknowledging and forming the social contract. Even the elements of traditional and religious human virtue that Hobbes reshapes into civic virtue in *Leviathan* engage in this kind of

self-interested talk. Virtues like gratitude serve the purpose of maintaining justice, and justice is valuable because it serves the social contract, itself a means to secure preservation for individuals (*Leviathan XV).*

To combat this self-interest, another force is needed to stop the individual from falling back into vainglory and greed. Hobbes is explicit in *Leviathan* that the feeling that drives the virtue of modesty, and therefore self-preservation, is fear (*Leviathan* XII-XIII). However, one may raise doubts whether fear can create the kind of community that Hobbes seems to acknowledge is conducive to his state. The idea of fear as a valid means of control and of maintaining the state is shared by Machiavelli and Hobbes.[6] Yet, in a state that is maintained by the fear of death, everyone is driven by self-interest of their own self-preservation. While laws can help maintain peace so that the state can function, laws cannot, in and of themselves, nurture a disposition of community conducive to the following of laws, especially if the feeling motivating those following the laws to do so is only their desire for self-preservation. Laws create potential for community to occur, since the peaceful conditions that laws promote are necessary for community. But if one's feeling towards these laws and the creation of the state is only self-preservation, this does not promote the actualization of anything beyond that end.

Aristotle discusses why this is problematic for the state in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. In Book IX, he lays out his theory of concord, claiming that a community in concord is one that acts with the same mind towards certain aims and is disposed towards those aims. This requires,

[6] There is a misconception that Machiavelli believed that fear alone was what was needed to rule the state. However, Machiavelli rather believes that both love and fear are beneficial virtues, but in circumstances of necessity, fear is a better bet since in times of danger, individuals would turn to the preservation of themselves and their property rather than the state, so making oneself the object of fear helped preserve the state. (*Il Principe* XVII).

however, a certain kind of virtuous citizen, those that "wish for what is just and advantageous, and also seek it in common." (*NE* IX 1167b8-9). When the state is made up of base people, those who lack sufficient human virtue, concord within the community fails. It leads to each individual "overreach[ing] in benefits to themselves and shirk[ing] labours and public services…he obstructs his neighbour…trying to compel one another, but not trying to do the just thing themselves." (*NE* IX 1167b11-16). He reiterates this point in the *Politics:* "For if the ruler is not going to be temperate and just, how is he going to rule well? And if the ruled is not going to be, how will he be ruled well? For if he is going to be intemperate and cowardly, he will do none of his duties." (*Pol I 1259b30-40*). A disposition towards a common advantage, and the disposition conducive to achieving this with others, are beneficial towards said advantage. Even if the fear of death, modesty, is enough to make people create the social contract towards the ends of preservation, this feeling is not carried into future generations, nor is it sufficient to produce any sort of concord. Hobbes' counterpoint to this is that state-propagated fear will keep civil society together, replacing the fear felt in the state of nature: "And the same are the bonds that men are bound and obliged: bonds have their strength, not from their own [human] nature, but from some evil consequence upon the rupture." (Leviathan XIV). This is the purpose of the sovereign and the laws for Hobbes, to instill this fear and to keep society together.

However, while this fixes the problem with maintaining the virtue of modesty, as Hobbes sees it, the fact that the social contract that brings people together is founded on fear and promotes fear as its driving force is contrary to the other civic virtues that Hobbes wants to promote. As Hobbes notes, acknowledging the need for civic virtue, society is more than just a bunch of individuals working instrumentally towards their own ends; even in a non-democratic authoritarian government, there are times wherein social cooperation and trust between

neighbours is beneficial. However, the self-interest that a society aimed primarily at self-preservation promotes is not conducive to this. Aristotle's theory of concord highlights the potential problems found in a Hobbesian society where each person wants to benefit from justice, but only buys into the idea insofar as it benefits them. This compels others to act justly insofar as it benefits themselves, while aiming their own actions at their own self benefit and towards self-preservation. If the common advantage a Hobbesian society tries to reach is self-preservation, but the society being promoted by Hobbes is not one that promotes well the human virtues conducive to this preservation, then even his reductionist sense of civic virtue is not as well-aimed at self preservation as it could be. Since Hobbes works under the assumption that a certain kind of human excellence is contrary to preservation, it makes sense that he excludes it from being potentially beneficial to the state. However, if human excellence is aimed at preservation of the self, but also at other aspects of the human life, such as engaging well and justly with one's peers and creating a disposition of concord with one's fellow citizens, then it seems to be in congruence with the kind of civic virtue that Hobbes wishes to uphold. This is not to say that society cannot function on some basic level under the Hobbesian model, which promotes a civic virtue centered on fear and self preservation; enough authoritarian dictatorships have existed to prove that such a system functions, albeit not well. Furthermore, a certain coercive fear of the law and its consequences seems to be part of a good state. However, such a state cannot function as well, or work towards ends beyond preservation as well, as a state with a more complete system of civic and human virtue.

Two things are therefore apparent. Firstly, self-preservation is inherent to *both* civic *and* human virtue and, as such, the two cannot be said to be incongruent on these grounds. Secondly, even in a state with mere self-preservation as its end, an account of human virtue that extends

beyond just preservation is beneficial. In fact, human virtue aimed at broader ends than preservation allows one to better dispose one's feelings and to act in ways that are conducive to one's own preservation, given that one's preservation is better actualized within a group that functions well.

Freedom: What is the Value of Freedom as a State End?

So far in this chapter, I have argued that an Aristotelian theory championing the congruence of the civic and human virtues is compatible with, and in fact beneficial to, even the kind of state centered on self-preservation that Hobbes and Machiavelli envisage. Furthermore, Hobbes's minimalistic conception of virtue and instrumentalism is contrary to the very end that he wishes to achieve. However, this does not mean that an Aristotelian theory can meet the challenge from the argument from freedom. Arguments from freedom for a minimalist-liberal conception of the state find their impetus from a very different set of concerns than the arguments from preservation. The basic worry motivating such arguments is that a thicker conception of virtue, which includes the human virtues, takes away from the free choice of those within a society, since, by stating that certain dispositions are good, one inadvertently takes the choice away to dispose oneself in a different way. This is in part why Kant makes the point that it is not the state's job to enforce one's flourishing; rather, the state and its laws are aimed at the enforcement of rights (*MM* 6:318). Even in the most libertarian take on rights and laws, there exists a precondition, that of not infringing on the rights of others and to hold each person as a free agent who has freedom as an end they want to achieve. However, much as Hobbes' state which aimed at preservation runs into problems due to a thin account of virtue, so too does an account of the state based on freedom. In aiming civic virtue at freedom, without a congruent account of human virtue, the citizens of the state fail to actualize well the opportunities that

freedom gives, both to the state and to the individual, leading to the devaluing of freedom itself. In this way, any account of civic virtue that focuses exclusively on freedom will be self-undermining. A richer account of civic virtue, one that includes human virtue is required.

Kant realizes the need to create a disposition conducive to the upholding of rights, and this results in the need for civic virtue in the state. By contrast, the nurturing of human virtue, for Kant, is a matter of individual choice and happiness, since it cannot be externally coerced. It is the result of one's internal choice and lawgiving (*MM* 6:220-221). The notion of civic virtue that he puts forward comes at the confluence of duties of right and duties of virtue. To dispose oneself towards the laws that uphold right is an internal action in line with right. Rawls furthers this idea, noting that by upholding a theory of the good, one restricts the freedom of choice that upholding right allows for (Rawls 1971, 393). But this raises an important question that Kant and Rawls do not address in full, one that touches on the very core of their theories: what is the value of freedom? Both Kant and Rawls hold that freedom – more specifically, freedom of choice – is the value that is of utmost importance to uphold within the state. But neither gives a complete account of why freedom of choice itself is valuable. Therefore, an in-depth look is needed at what value freedom brings to the individual and to society. With a wider freedom of choice comes wider freedom of action. However, the ways in which one can actualize one's freedom are not in and of themselves beneficial to the state or the individual. Hence, a minimalistic theory of civic virtue is not fully capable of nurturing a disposition that is both in accordance with freedom as an end, nor can it utilize that freedom towards ends that are better for the state, the self, or one's fellow citizens.

Before moving forward then, an account of the value of freedom is needed. After all, before discussing the preservation of an end and the degree of virtue necessary to maintain and

utilize said end well, it needs to be understood what the value of this end is. This is a different question than asking what the nature of freedom is. Kant, for example, spends a lot of time arguing for freedom as humanity's one and greatest natural right, "the only original right belonging to every human being by virtue of his humanity" (*MM:*238). The natural ability and the "human being's quality of being his own master" is a hallmark of our rationality and ability to make free choices towards our own ends (Ibid). This sets up freedom as something to be held by every person, but does not, in and of itself, show why freedom is good for a person. What is clear out of the gate is that freedom, maximally stated, or all freely chosen actions, are not valuable on their own, particularly if one wants to hold that it is better to live in a civic state than the state of nature. There is a reason why Kant adds the caveat of 'insofar as one does not infringe on the freedom of others' and why Rawls agrees and talks about 'rational plans for life', rather than just any plan for life. This comes down to two primary reasons. First, both philosophers are holding that the state is a better place to be than the state of nature and, as such, some notion of living together with one's fellow humanity comes into play. Something must then hold the people together, or at least prevent them from tearing each other apart. Both Kant and Rawls chalk this up to individual rationality and the rights and duties that stem from this rationality. Second, both Kant and Rawls maintain that humans and their ends are valuable. Human beings are, as Kant puts it, ends in and of themselves as rational agents able to make free choices. Already these points illustrate something about freedom's value: that it is conditional to some extent, freedom alone can not only be unbeneficial, but it can also be obtrusive.

Rawls works from this key take away from Kant's theory with his idea of a rational plan of life, that is, one's freely deliberated and chosen life plan. Rawls holds that one's own freedom, and a certain amount freedom from the actions of others, is necessary to implement the rational

plans that one sets out for one's own life, and that the value in doing so is that it leads to happiness: "Someone is happy when his plans are going well, his more important aspirations being fulfilled, and he feels sure that his good fortune will endure." (Rawls 1971, 359). Happiness on these lines comes from the satisfaction of one's desires, their rational plan, and freedom is essential to this process.[7] However, this seems to be lacking, both as a theory of happiness and as an account of the value of freedom. Consider for example the individual who sets their whole rational plan of life around becoming a nurse and then, when they achieve this plan and are in tens of thousands of dollars of debt and despise their job, is not a happy individual, despite their desire being satisfied. What Rawl's theory of happiness does point to is the role that freedom has in well-being overall, not just in stating that it allows for one to make choices for oneself, but that said plans must be rational in some way. The fact that these plans must be rational in some way points to there being more to freedom's value than just freedom itself or the choices towards various ends that it gives the individual, but this is not something that is discussed by Rawls. The mere act of having free choice over one's ends does not mean that one will choose their ends in a way that is good for them, nor can it give an account of freedom's value.

Freedom: The Aristo-Razian account of Freedom

While freedom of choice alone may not be sufficient for living a good life, this is not to say that freedom is not valuable, as it seems to be an important part of living a good life and

[7] Rawl's desire satisfaction can also be read as a form of hedonism. Such a read of Rawls can be inferred when he notes that: "When we feel that our plans are of little value, we cannot pursue them with pleasure or take delight in their execution." (Rawls, 1971 440). There is an implication that the pursuit and satisfaction of our rational desires is good, since it gives an individual pleasure. This way of reading Rawls faces problems as well, since freely chosen actions are most definitely not always pleasurable in practice or in the outcomes they lead to.

having a good state. In both *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics,* Aristotle also does not dismiss the importance of freedom for the citizens. A state that has too many restrictions is detrimental to the development of the community as a whole. After all, if at least part of what makes a state good is that it provides the opportunity to live a good life, then being overly restrictive in what one allows within the city is to deny the opportunity for activities that allow for flourishing. It also restricts an important part of the development of the individual, namely self-actualization. A state in which a capable individual is not free to actualize their own ends to some degree is one that restricts the potential of its citizens. Self-actualization is an important part of the development of the human person and is contingent on the individual having some degree of freedom, in order to have the ability to pursue ends that contribute to their own flourishing, and also to dispose one's feelings freely to the activities being pursued.

In his *Morality of Freedom,* political philosopher Joseph Raz undertakes his own analysis of freedom, looking at why it is valuable, and the interplay between one's choices, one's internal state, and how freedom interacts with the freedom of others. In his discussion of freedom, Raz makes an important distinction between the free person and the autonomous person. On Raz's account for the individual to be autonomous in the truest sense, and not just free, they need to achieve some level of what he calls self-realization, "the development to the fullest extent all the valuable capacities a person possesses." (Raz 1986, 375). Raz's argument is built on two premises. The first is that the autonomous life is one that is full of choices, both good and bad, and a life that is constrained completely in restricting the good choices one can make is not autonomous and thus not a good life. The second is that even the free agent needs some minimum capacity of reason and comprehension to utilize their freedom. An agent who cannot do so cannot be said to be fully autonomous.

What Raz's second point highlights is that freedom cannot actualize anything on its own, it is merely a condition, inherent or bestowed, upon an individual. Freedom in this sense is a lot like material wealth, as it is part of what provides an *opportunity* for a good life, but not what actualizes it. It is a kind of second order potentiality. One important challenge that is raised by Raz's formulation is that if good choice of action is the end of freedom, why allow freedom at all? If one could equally achieve those same ends by means of coercion or manipulation, then why allow for an autonomous life at all? What is the value of the autonomous life over the life without autonomy, if both can achieve the same ends? One problem with this argument in favour of the non-autonomous life is an over-focus on *outcomes* in the achieving of a good life. This leads to a complete disregard of the performative aspect of activity, not just in how performance can lead to an outcome, but also the value of performative action in and of itself. The value of a soccer game is not just in winning the soccer game, but also in the enjoyment and opportunity to demonstrate one's capacities during the soccer game. The same can be said in the establishment of a good state. Worrying only about the outcomes that the state produces ignores the potential goods that come out of performative action within the state. This would include civic goods such as deliberation, collaboration, the sharing and creation of new ideas and concepts, and daily demonstrations of civility, and the community and friendship between citizens.

Furthermore, the non-autonomous life is one that disregards not just choice, but also the chances for an individual to freely undertake a variety of virtuous activities that influence their general disposition. As Aristotle notes in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, a right feeling is a necessary part of virtue and virtuous activity (*NE* 1106b21-23). Raz gives further weight to such an argument, noting that "A person who feels driven by forces which he disowns but cannot control, who hates or detests the desires which motivate him or the aims that he is pursuing, does not lead

an autonomous life." (Raz 1986, 382). Involuntary actions, or actions not taken freely, are not actions that are virtuous, they are forced or the result of ignorance, and the origin of these actions is not found from within the individual through their own feelings and rationality, but rather from outside of the individual (*NE 1111a22-24)*. In making the value of freedom merely about choice external to the self, the liberal conception of freedom – and by extension the minimalist liberal conception of the state – fails to acknowledge the value that freedom has within the individual. This leads into the second point in favour of autonomy, namely that the non-autonomous person lacks self-sufficiency to any degree. The self-sufficient person, for Aristotle, is the person who has achieved human flourishing within themselves through virtuous action (*NE 1097b14-16)*. They are able, through their own voluntary action, to achieve what is necessary to live a good life. An individual who is incapable of actualizing their own good ends through their own actions is one who misses out on the parts of one's excellence that are performative in nature, as well as being more beholden to fate, ignorance, and other external forces.

What we get from combining Raz's theory of freedom and Aristotle's theory of self-sufficiency and virtue is a more complete account of the value of freedom. Both Aristotle and Raz hold that the value of freedom is intrinsic in the sense that it is a necessary requirement for living a good life, but instrumental in the sense that it is not itself the ultimate end, of either the state or the individual. Raz's distinction between the free life and the autonomous life raises the point that an individual needs to have some semblance of self-realization to utilize freedom of choice well. Aristotle's theory of self-sufficiency, voluntary action, and virtue helps to explain why a self-realization principle is necessary, not just by stressing the importance of an internal disposition that drives one's own action, but also by providing a theory of what kind of internal state is conducive to using one's freedom well, that is, towards excellent activities that are good

for the self. Hence, on this combined "Aristo-Razian" view (as I will call it), freedom is not self-sufficient for either person or state. Freedom is not necessarily choiceworthy by itself, but rather is choice worthy in conjunction with other inherent aspects of a human agent. Freedom along these lines then can be said to be valuable, not merely in allowing for choice, but also in providing the opportunity and conditions from which one can develop an internal impetus towards virtuous activity and self-realization.

A criticism that can be levied against this kind of thinking is that it is focused on the achievement of some kind of success. Whether one is talking about outcomes or performance, such a theory leaves no room for the failure that freedom allows. The Aristo-Razian account of freedom is too focused on good ends, and thus undervalues failure's importance. One of freedom's greatest advantages is the fact that it may lead to failure, of outcome or of performance. It can be argued that it is through being free to fail that one is able to develop oneself towards good ends, and that making the good ends a part of freedom's value disregards this aspect of freedom. However, this line of thinking is flawed. It is not because the failure itself is valuable that the choices and actions that lead to failure are not a valuable part of freedom. The value of such a failed action is not in the failure of one's action, but instead lies in how one *uses* said failure to develop themselves and inform future actions. The repeated failure of the individual who also fails to learn from their failure, and thus continues to fail with no change of thinking or heart, is not one that utilizes the opportunity that failure brings to the individual. Contrarily, the individual who fails repeatedly, but takes to heart their failures and thinks of ways to better improve themselves as a result, is utilizing well the failure that freedom allows for. This is the case even when one does not achieve the particular outcome they are aiming for. The man who tries to lift 400 lbs and fails, but in doing so develops a disciplined training regimen to get

stronger, experiences the general heightening of well being that comes with continuous exercise and is still engaging in beneficial development stemming from their failures. This suggests a further argument against Rawls' points about freely chosen rational plans. Even when one does not achieve one's rational plans, one can still be made better of by the activities that were aimed at achieving one's rational plan. What this shows is that while allowing for failure can be a valuable part of freedom, as it allows for an opportunity for learning and self-development, a certain kind of human agent is still needed, one that is self sufficient and autonomous in the Razian sense, to actualize this opportunity.

It is often argued that Aristotle's theory of virtue and self-sufficiency is egoistic in nature. This argument could be extended to the Aristo-Razian conception of freedom. The individualism that theories of freedom promote often falls under this criticism, and the Aristo-Razian conception seems to be even more susceptible to this claim, with its increased focus on self-development. Aristotle's theory of self-sufficiency, however, is not guilty of this perceived egoism. The development of self sufficiency is not an egoistic project, but one that is innately connected to one's fellow humanity. As Aristotle writes in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, "what we count as self-sufficiency is not what suffices for a solitary person by himself…but what suffices also for parents, children, wife, and in general for friends and fellow citizens, since a human being is a naturally political animal." (*NE* 1097b8-10). Since human beings are political animals – beings whose flourishing is connected to other humans – self-sufficiency is best met within the state and community. This is for a variety of reasons. Being together allows for distribution of labour and the attaining of the material goods necessary for human life, as well as a space to allow for virtuous activities such as the deliberation between fellow citizens and the attaining of friendships. There are aspects of living a good human life that are best achieved within the

community and also many that are entirely contingent on one's interactions with one's fellow human beings. As a result, part of living freely well lies not just in developing our innate human excellences towards how they affect ourselves, but also towards living well with our fellow humanity. Aristotle further suggests this is the case in his discourse on justice, when he notes that justice is "complete virtue to the highest degree," as "the person who has justice is able to exercise virtue in relation to another, not only in what concerns himself." (*NE* 1129b381-36).

Freedom and the Congruence of Civic and Human Virtue

What does this have to do with the congruence of human and civic virtue? On the minimalist liberal conception of virtue, the fear is that a theory of human virtue acts contrary to the ends of civic virtue in a liberal democracy, as it provides constraints on the freedom of the individual that restrict the citizens' choices. Furthermore, freedom and rights are best preserved by disposing oneself to the laws and rights put forward by the state. However, this assumes that freedom is intrinsically valuable as a state end. What a broadly Razian view, like my Aristo-Razian conception of freedom, maintains is that freedom alone is not sufficient as a human end, nor as a state end, as it is not a principle that actualizes its own ends or generates any value beyond a potentiality, an opportunity, to pursue and/or realize value. It disregards both what enables one to use freedom well and also the complexity of human nature, and the disposition that drives the human individual, and thus the state. The problem that the minimalist liberal conception runs into is that, in trying to uphold the right of freedom over virtue, it fails to realize this important aspect of freedom, that its value is not fully actualized by itself. Both Kant and Rawls would certainly argue that one should use their right of freedom well, that is, in a way that is conducive to utilizing and respecting the rights of one's fellow citizens (*MM* 6:220-221, Rawls

1971, 295).[8] However, the kind of disposition that they suggest nurturing in this regard is one that is aimed at the law, and therefore the right of freedom, rather than at the totality of human flourishing, and how one's innately human disposition allows one to actualize this freedom well. This is where Kant's and Rawls' view of freedom and its utilization creates an account of the human agents within society that is too minimalistic. The type of individual needed to utilize the right of freedom well cannot be reduced to a disposition that is aimed solely at freedom as the end, like the minimalist liberal conception of civic virtue does. The Aristo-Razian conception of freedom shows that to truly be autonomous, a thicker theory of the human agent is needed, one which involves the human person as a self-sufficient human agent, not just one disposed towards the preservation of freedom for oneself and others.

It is important to also note that an Aristo-Razian theory of freedom involving the human virtues is not inherently contrary to pluralism. Certainly, it is against an absolute pluralism, but this is also the case for all political views and ends, barring some kind of anarchy. A Kantian does not allow for megalomaniacal murderers to hold their pluralistic views. Such views are constrained, since this would infringe on the rights and freedoms of one's fellow humanity. The idea that some ideas and actions should be limited is not new to the state, it is one of the functions of the law, as Kant rightly notes. However, while Kant's principle of civic virtue disposed one towards constraints imposed by the law and duty to respect rights, due to the separation of right and virtue, it does not compel individuals beyond the extent of the law. Many of the activities that one partakes in are not constrained or coerced by the law: one's daily

[8] Rawls has a theory of self-actualization within *Theory of Justice*; however, it is aimed at creating a state in which the individual can respect and coordinate one's own rights to freedom over one's rational plans, with the rational plans of others (Rawls 1971, 437,438). In including Rawls, I take aim at his theory of freedom and happiness due to the impact that it has on contemporary thinkers, not necessarily at the totality of his theory.

activities, hobbies, mindset, casual and deliberative interactions and talks with peers, etc. These activities, for the most part, fall beyond the scope of right. Yet they impact the disposition of the individual regardless. If we hold to the Aristo-Razian conception of freedom, then it is the kind of disposition stemming from one's basic human functions, those that the human virtues are concerned about, that drives freedom's usage, value, and therefore activities conducive to freedom's preservation. This provides further reason why incongruence of human and civic virtue is too reductive. One's disposition, and what affects it, goes beyond just the law and what the state compels one to do. Thus, an internal motivator beyond external coercion is necessary. For Aristotle, this is primarily education, and the habits, philosophy, and laws that it promotes. All of these together make a city into a community (*Pol. II 1263b35-40).* Education provides an individual with the knowledge and comprehension to cultivate one's own human virtues. This allows it to fit into the Aristo-Razian theory of freedom well, since education compels voluntary activity to develop oneself, and therefore to become an autonomous agent, rather than merely a free one primarily directed by coercion. [9]

However, it must be acknowledged that the idea that upholding a notion of human virtue constrains the choices, and thus the freedom, of the individual and thus harms pluralism has some merit. Encouraging certain activities and dispositions as beneficial or harmful to the individual creates an internal constraint of choice on the individual. However, conversely,

[9] Certainly, I think that Kant would agree with this. He divides right and virtue, as one is externally coercible and the other is not, but would not reject the premise that virtue is good for one to have, hence the entire *doctrine of virtue*. What Kant does not do in depth is discuss how education, of the laws, good habits, and philosophy, affects one's internal disposition. Of course, education does not necessitate anything, but to neglect that education has a formative aspect and even a coercible element is to miss out on a key part of what informs a human agent. I will not go much further into depth on education, not because it is unimportant, but because doing so will put me off track for what this thesis is trying to achieve. The important thing to note is that education can, and should, have a formative aspect on the internal disposition of human agents and their human virtue, as do other communal activities that are not legally coercible in nature. Whether or not contemporary education is as aimed towards this as it ought to be is an interesting and pertinent discussion but not one that will be discussed here.

encouraging human virtue enhances the autonomy of the individual. Human agents that are more self-sufficient and able to regulate themselves better are able to make better decisions concerning their life choices. Furthermore, a theory of human virtue that notes that some choices are choice worthy, and others are not, does not necessarily mean that choice is constrained significantly. Stating it is good to be temperate, while it may constrain particular intemperate activities in particular circumstances, also leaves open a wide range of activities that are a temperate in nature. There is an important difference between an absolute pluralism, that seeks to maximize plurality and diversity of views, and a pluralistic society, one that see's the value and necessity of a degree of plurality but does not hold all freely chosen actions and lifestyles as being good.

The arguments from freedom and plurality show, much like the arguments from preservation, not only why a congruence between human and civic virtue is beneficial, but also hints at a further truth. Both the capacity to uphold the virtues that preserve the ends of the state, the civic virtues, and the ability to make use of those ends are contingent upon the human virtues, on the excellences that the individual has in being able to actualize these ends. In Hobbes this was seen in maintaining the social harmony that he believes is necessary for preservation of the state and thus the individual. In the arguments for incongruence between human and civic virtue stemming from freedom, to maintain rights and freedoms, as well as to utilize them well, human virtue is a necessary component, allowing for truly autonomous agents. A reduction of the scope and ends that the state seeks to achieve fails in establishing an incongruence between the civic and human virtues. As long as it is human agents that actualize the states ends, some semblance of the human virtues is necessary to achieve those ends, and ideally achieve them well.

CHAPTER THREE: Against Sabl and Galston: The Minimalist Liberal account of Virtue

I have contested that the kind of human virtue that Aristotle conceives of is not only compatible with, but also beneficial for and an important part of, fully actualizing the values and aspects of the state that minimalist theories of virtue are concerned about. Both the argument from preservation and the argument of freedom fall victim to their own minimalism. The arguments paint a picture of the human citizen that is reductive of people's capacities, while still wanting to establish a minimal set of civic and/or human virtues that are, in turn, dependent on those capacities to fully actualize the ends those civic virtues are aimed at. However, there are still unanswered questions and challenges regarding the congruence of the human and civic virtues. Having discussed the basis for the minimalist liberal conception of civic virtue, we are now able to undertake an examination of some of the more contemporary arguments from a minimalist liberal conception, namely, those of William Galston and Andrew Sabl. Both thinkers draw upon both preservation and freedom in their discourses on virtue in the state, particularly within the context of democracy. First, I will dispute Sabl's minimalism and his argument for why a thick theory of civic virtue, including the human virtues, is problematic for society. For Sabl, striving for a thicker theory of civic virtue including the human virtues leads to the degradation of the core virtues necessary for the existence of a democratic state. Secondly, I will look at Galston's minimalism, primarily his concerns that a theory of human virtue harms the plurality of good citizens within a state, and the minimalist conception of civic virtue that he proposes to maintain this plurality.

While many thinkers adopt a minimalist liberal conception, I choose to focus on Sabl and Galston here because they offer a good representation of the range of thinkers that hold a minimalistic liberal view. Sabl's view is more extreme in its minimalism, since he argues for a very thin view of civic virtue aimed at preservation of what is necessary for democracy. He gives critiques that show how the views of Machiavelli and Hobbes, with virtues aimed at preservation, are applicable and pertinent to the discussion in a contemporary democratic context. His view highlights a more individualist view of plurality and freedom. Galston, by contrast, is a more moderate voice within the discussion on the nature of virtue and the state, including the discussion on the congruence of the civic and human virtues. Galston himself finds his origins in Aristotelian thought and this is shown in his work, with its focus on the well-being of the people in the state. However, despite being partial to an Aristotelian view, he still advocates for an incongruence between the human and civic virtues. In contrast to Sabl, Galston's view, while still advocating for plurality and other liberal ends, is much more communally minded. While both authors raise important concerns about how civic and human virtue should interact in the state, neither set of arguments is sufficient to establish incongruence between the civic and human virtues. Especially in the case of Galston, they highlight why a benchmark of human virtue is important to have for a good citizen.

Sabl's Minimalism

In his paper, *Virtue for Pluralists*, Sabl's biggest concern is the fact that in the contemporary discussion of what virtues are needed in a democratic society, there exists a wide range of answers depending on what the purpose of the democratic state is. Sabl lists a number of thinkers and a wide variety of views on what the civic virtues of society should be aimed at. For some, like Galston, civic virtue is aimed against a kind of 'barbarization and tribalization' (Sabl

2005,208). Others argue that democracy should be aimed at a kind of anti-traditionalism, since traditional virtues are aimed at the constraining of the common person, which is contrary to the kind of freedom upheld by a liberal democracy, as is the case with Stephen Macedo (Macedo 1990). Further still, some argue that civic virtue should be aimed at a kind rational understanding and deliberation, as doing so is the best way to bring out the best of a liberal democracy, allowing for a community built on mutual respect and understanding (Sabl 2005,208). It is the wide perspective of views that exists in the philosophical community about how civic virtue should be a part of a liberal democratic state that leads Sabl to note that there is a lack of clarity in the discussion around virtue and the state. This leads him to take a stance that is similar to Hobbes', focusing on the "core virtues needed for liberal democracy literally to survive", rather than those that are aimed at some sort of ideal (Ibid, 211). Sabl is not interested in the preservation of just any state, but rather what is necessary for the existence of a liberal democratic state, one that allows for a freedom of plurality and expression. To do this, he undertakes what he calls a 'forensic theory' of core virtues, underlined by a commonsense approach that makes points that "are so clear that they seem obvious" (Sabl 2005, 213). This division of virtue into core virtues and ideal virtues is what leads Sabl to advocate for a minimalist conception of virtue. Sabl uses the analogy of the patient as the state, noting that: "The statements, 'The patient is dead', 'The patient is gravely ill' and 'The patient has not maximized her physical and mental health' involve decreasing degrees of certainty." (Ibid 211). If the state no longer exists, this is clear and certain. Saying the state is degrading is less certain and stating that the state has not maximized flourishing is even less certain. It raises questions about the nature of flourishing that are less common sense and intuitive and, therefore, disputed amongst philosophers.

Sabl bases his minimalistic conception of civic virtue on the fact that the state should aim at cultivating the core virtues necessary for preserving the state. To preserve a liberal democracy, Sabl claims that only three civic virtues as being necessary: tolerance, non-violence, and democratic sportsmanship. Tolerance is defined by Sabl as the virtue of a society to not coerce by force the superiority of any ideology. To turn others to one's own ideology or way of thinking one must rather utilize persuasion and education (Ibid, 216). Tolerance is also the virtue often noted as being the hallmark of a liberal democracy. It is necessary so that individuals within the state can practise their rights and freedoms within the state. A state in which everyone tries to coerce each other by force to fit into what they think is a better course of action is not one that is liberal. The second civic virtue, non-violence, fits Sabl's common sense theme, "those prone to settle political disputes by force endanger the polity for obvious Hobbesian reasons." (Ibid,216). In describing non-violence, Sabl aligns himself with Hobbes' idea of civic virtue, noting, like Hobbes, that state coercion alone is not sufficient to achieve non-violence, and that an internalized civic virtue aimed at peace is needed within the citizens of a state.[10] The last civic virtue Sabl claims is necessary for the individual is democratic sportsmanship. In short, the people of a democratic society need to be 'good losers' in the sense that they uphold their commitment to democracy and democratic principles even when the vote does not go their own way. If there is a lack of a sense of democratic sportsmanship by the majority, or if it does not exist at all, then democracy ceases to exist altogether. This makes democratic sportsmanship an essential virtue to the preservation of a democratic state. For Sabl, any virtue beyond these core

[10] Sabl seems to leave room within his theory of non-violence to allow for certain displays of violence, most obviously self-defence against other individuals or the state, but it is unclear where acts of uncivil disobedience would fall within his theory of non-violence. Sabl aligns himself partially with Stephen Carters condemnation of violence based on difference or close mindedness, so this would certainly condemn a kind of unjust or ignorant uncivil disobedience, but perhaps not a more thoughtful and just instance (Sabl 2005, 216).

three must either a combination of the three core virtues, or is instead one of the ideal virtues which are not necessary. These three core virtues provide the basis for any liberal pluralistic democracy.

By talking about core virtues, those that are essential for the preservation of the state, Sabl's minimalist view of virtue struggles with some of the same issues that the minimalist views of Machiavelli and Hobbes do. While certainly not negligent of the human condition, Sabl's theory of virtue is dismissive of the classical human virtues as being congruent with civic virtue. This creates problems when it comes to the actualization of the states of being that he tries to maintain. His reasoning for this is found in one of his footnotes: "the virtues that are good for the polity, and relevant for political discussion, are quite independent of the human virtues." (Sabl 2005, 209). Sabl bases this position on a Machiavellian instrumentalism centered on the preservation of the state. However, this is a mistaken read of the classical virtues, as I argued in the previous chapter in my discussion of Machiavelli and Hobbes. Preservation of the state is not necessarily contrary to human virtue, and, in fact, human virtue is often beneficial towards the end of preservation.

This can be further illustrated by looking at Sabl's virtue of tolerance and the role he believes tolerance has in the preservation of the state. A key part of Sabl's definition of tolerance, which originates from Galston, is that tolerant citizens are able to utilize persuasion and education as the means to convince others of a better course of action, rather than using force.[11] Underlying this commonsense principle, however, are a complexity of human emotions,

[11] The kind of deliberation through persuasion and education is not a core part of democracy, just a side effect of toleration. It falls under the kind of "hurly-burly of social debate and individual choice" that Sabl advocates for (Sabl 2005).

propensities, and virtues that are necessary to actualize this seemingly simple end. First and foremost, a certain disposition is needed to not resort to force and to actually engage with another person in a civil and respectful manner regarding what actions may be more beneficial to them. This requires properly human virtues. Some examples, both taken from Aristotle's list of virtues in *Nicomachean Ethics*, are calmness, so as not to fall into anger, and the virtue of friendliness, which has one interacting with others in a way that is beneficial for the other person. The ability to engage with another person respectfully and in a meaningful manner is a prerequisite for convincing others of a better course of action, as is not turning to force or violence. These abilities fundamentally are virtues that are contingent on the human virtues. Furthermore, the abilities required for persuasion and education are reliant on the utilization of certain human virtues, namely thought, understanding, and comprehension of one's education, and the prudence and wisdom to use these virtues to persuade others well.

How one engages with other human beings as a socio-political creature is part of one's excellence as a human being, and subsequently affects a civic virtue such as tolerance. If we hold that human beings flourishing is contingent on their being part of a political community and agree with Sabl that toleration is important for preserving that political community, and that human virtue is a necessary part of actualizing the performative aspect of toleration, then human virtue is congruent with civic virtue. The problem with holding Sabl's minimalistic view, on which the human virtues are not congruent with the civic virtues, is that it does not promote the cultivation of the human excellences needed to actualize the civic character he deems necessary for even the core virtues required for the preservation of the democracy. This same problem can be seen in Sabl's other two virtues of non-violence and democratic sportsmanship. For them to

be properly actualized to serve the end of preservation, a more thorough account of virtues is needed.

In arguing for the preservation of a *liberal democracy*, Sabl opens himself up to more criticism, as what is necessary for a democratic function is disputable and, in fact, Sabl does not consider everything a democracy should entail. While Sabl's account is not as reductive as that of democratic theorist Anthony Downs, who argues that the sole democratic function is to allow for a smooth transition of government, it is still arguably very reductive (Christiano 1996, 135-140). For example, if some level of social deliberation is an essential aspect of democracy, as Thomas Christiano argues, then Sabl's minimalistic account of civic virtue is not complete. Tolerance, democratic sportsmanship, and non-violence are not sufficient to promote meaningful social deliberation by themselves. Not only do the citizens need to understand, on some level, what is being deliberated about, they also need to be able to engage with it critically with others to some degree, which entails a thicker account of virtue than Sabl's account of civic virtue implies. Sabl's minimalist account, then, falls prey to a problem similar to that facing Hobbes'. The human elements that play into even the core virtues aimed at preserving the state require a thicker account of virtue, one that considers the preservation of the state's ends, but also includes the human excellences required to achieve and maintain those ends. Additionally, Sabl's account of what is necessary for a democracy to exist is open to debate, as he does not give a meta-account of what exactly makes a democracy a democracy, leaving much room for a thicker account of virtue than Sabl posits himself.

<u>Sabl and Pluralism</u>

However, Sabl's concern goes beyond just the preservation of the state. Sabl is equally concerned with upholding a free pluralistic society and, according to him, holding on to a thicker, more idealized theory of virtue threatens this. In part, this is due to how idealized theories of virtues define civility. If one tries to view the state as a kind of community, like Aristotle does, then there is a greater emphasis on achieving a particular ethical and moral end in the state and, subsequently, a greater emphasis on the social cohesion being built off these ethical and moral ends. For Sabl, such a view takes away from the minimal set of core virtues he tries to substantiate and threatens to harm the kind of pluralistic society he claims his necessary in a liberal democracy. Sabl's point hits at one of the main arguments that I have stressed throughout this thesis, that one of the reasons why human virtue is congruent with civic virtue is that it is important in actualizing social and communal ends. In this way, Sabl's argument diverges from Hobbes' position, which see's social harmony as an important part of the preservation of the state. Instead, for the sake of pluralism and freedom, Sabl argues that at their core, the civic virtues necessary for the liberal state's ends promote a "strong preference for leaving alone." (Sabl 2005, 218-219). This does not mean that there will not still be ideal virtues within a society. In fact, a truly pluralistic society is one in which there are a number of ideals vying for dominance in the realm of social debate. Furthermore, Sabl also admits that a focus on the core virtues results in a society that might be lacklustre in some ways: "We can disagree on what makes for the richest form of liberal democracy while agreeing that a politics that stood for only peace and toleration would be too thin to attract our allegiance and too shallow to inspire action." (Ibid). Nonetheless, Salb still holds that "What is universally desirable, and the necessary object of consensus, is only the core [virtues]." (Ibid, 219). Sabl recommends, not the removal of ideals, but rather that these ideals should not be held as a concern by the state since, barring those that

are inherently against Sabl's core virtues like a violent ideology, they are not necessary for the state's existence and preservation. By removing a particular ethical end as being an integral part of the state, Sabl aims for a society that allows for a greater range of freedom. So, he advocates for a pluralistic society that still maintains a kind of Hobbesian pragmatism in noting that some level of civic virtue is necessary to preserve the core ends of a liberal democratic state.

Sabl assumes that by holding onto a particular ethical end in society, pluralism will be diminished, and subsequently the liberal aspect of liberal democracy will also be diminished. This is why toleration of other viewpoints is one of his core virtues. Yet, Sabl's worries are not necessarily the case. One of the attractive aspects of a broadly Aristotelian account of the state, on which the state is aimed at human flourishing, is that it reflects a thick theory of humanity and their capacities and goods. As has been hinted at throughout this paper, there are many different conditions, means, and states of being that need to work together within society and within individuals to achieve some measure of human flourishing. These include: preservation, material wealth, social virtues, dispositions of character and rationality, freedom, and more. This leaves room for a large amount of pluralism in a society, both in the form of differing views on what is lacking or misused in terms of human flourishing and in regard to the state's choices, as well as individual choices. The world is ever in flux, as are the environmental, social, economic, and political circumstances of any given state. Given everything that is necessary to achieve human flourishing, and that the world is ever changing, there is much room for a plurality of views as to what measure of change is necessary.

Furthermore, there are disagreements about how the state should go about using certain means to achieve human flourishing. This can be seen in the ongoing dispute between varying economic systems. While capitalist thinkers like Peter Boettke advocate that the free market

brings about the best conditions for human flourishing, more egalitarian thinkers like Rawls argue that a more socialized economy better achieves the conditions for human flourishing. It is likely that the answer to this question may even be relative to the particular historical and socio-economic circumstances of a specific state, and exactly what issues it is facing at the time. While an Aristotelian theory of virtue would not advocate for an absolute pluralism, on which all thoughts and ideas should be upheld in a society, it is certainly pluralistic in that a wide range of thoughts and ideas about what is good for the state and its people are upheld.

Sabl and Community

This leads us into Sabl's last reason for dismissing the congruence of civic and human virtue, his rejection of the need for community. This is not to say that Sabl thinks that community is not valuable at all, rather his criticism of community comes from trying to uphold community as being a necessary part of what is needed for the state to exist. In setting up his criticism of community as being necessary for the state, Sabl quotes political and legal philosopher Judith Skhlar, who asks "what on earth is so impressive about agreement and unity? When we are told that we need—all the millions of us—a national purpose, that even a 'damnable ideology' is more effective than none, we may well ask, 'Why?' and 'Effective for what?' Why do we need an 'identity' as a people? Just what means are to be used to achieve it?" (Shklar 1986, 100-101). Shklar calls into question whether the people of the state need any sense of community at all, and Sabl piggybacks on this view. Rejecting a view of the state as a community held together by some uniting ideology allows Sabl to cast doubt on a thicker conception of virtue. Since establishing a sense of community and social cohesion amongst individuals demands a wider range of virtues than only worrying about one's own rational plans and outcomes, by eliminating community as a requirement for the preservation of a liberal

democratic society, he can further minimalize the core civic virtues needed. This frees him from the kind of criticism I used against Hobbes, that social cohesion and a sense of community are necessary for the preservation of the state.

Sabl's denial of the need for community as a unity challenges a conception of the state as a harmony that dates back to Plato and his recurring theme in *Republic*. For Plato, the ideal state itself is a whole, aimed at the good, each part doing its own work as part of the overall whole, working in perfect harmony (*Republic 443-444a)*. Shklar questions the value of harmony and asks why it's so desirable. While she asks important questions concerning the nature of harmony and its purpose in the state, she seems to be aiming her questions at a kind of extreme form of communitarianism, wherein social cohesion and harmony are the end of the state and should be achieved by any means necessary. This is why she questions why it is thought that a 'damnable ideology' is better than none. She is questioning the unchecked drive towards establishing *any* ideology for the sake of social cohesion. This, however, is not the focus of a classical account of civic harmony. In a classical account, having some sense of harmony within the state is important for the end of human flourishing in that it aids in the functioning of the state's constitution, not only institutionally, but by providing a basis from which human flourishing can be improved. A classical account of harmony is not one that holds that even a bad ideology is worth preserving if it creates harmony. In fact, in both *Republic* and *Politics*, Plato and Aristotle spend much of their time sifting through the various ideologies of their time to argue why some ideologies are not beneficial and ultimately run contrary to harmony and its goal, human flourishing. Aristotle states this explicitly, "political communities must be taken as being for the sake of noble action, not for the sake of living together." (*Pol III 1281a1-2).* Harmony between people aids in achieving the various conditions and values necessary for human flourishing,

including preservation, freedom, material wealth, and virtue. The goal for these classical thinkers is to establish a harmony of the right kind that aims at this end, not merely community for communities' sake.

Aristotle argues in the *Politics* against the kind of non-interference and lack of community that Sabl and Shklar advocate for. In Book III of *Politics* Aristotle explains what makes a city a city. He posits that a city in which there is merely a "guarantee of just behaviour towards each other" is not a city at all, and the principle holding the citizens together is no different than an alliance between two states (*Pol III* 1280b9-11). In such a state, citizens are no different than political allies in that they are people with an agreement on just behaviour that live in different locations. This idea of Aristotle's provides a counter to Shkalr's claim on why community and unity is needed. A degree of unity and community is not just important to achieve some ideal state goal, but also is an essential component of what makes a state a state. By reducing a state to a guarantee of just behaviour, we reduce the state to its laws, while disregarding the human aspect of the state that is needed to come together and actualize the laws and one's other human ends. A state in which laws are held over each citizen, but there is not association between citizens is not a state at all. Aristotle likens this kind of state to "each…treating his own household as a city." (Pol III 1280b25). This would entail the kind of non-interference that Sabl upholds. Aristotle suggests otherwise this is not the case. Instead, citizens should, in a good state, be concerned with the quality of the citizens around them. If we take the congruence of human and civic virtue seriously it makes sense that Aristotle thinks this way. If the human virtues play a role in actualizing the goods the state allow for, and the civic virtues preserve them, then we as citizens should be concerned about the quality of those around us, and this means entails a higher degree of communal engagement than mere non-interference.

This further entails promoting good association with others. The mere idea of promoting civic virtue entails a concern for civic virtue and the quality of the citizen, and if community and human virtue aids in this then disregarding them is counterproductive to Sabl's overall goal. Furthermore, since Sabl admits to core civic virtues as being necessary for the democratic state to even exist, then the quality of one's fellow citizens is of concern to all, given that the preservation of the state is beneficial to them and a necessary aspect of the state's existence.

Both as part of establishing a unity and as an essential component of what aids in the promotion of a state, community is an essential element of a state and cannot be used as a way to advocate for a minimalization of virtue. Skhlar and Sabl are right to question what establishing community is for, but disregard that it is not merely community, but the right kind of community that is aimed at flourishing that community should be aimed at. Furthermore, if it is held that community is not just beneficial for the state to have but is necessary to uphold and promote the quality of citizen that even meets the benchmark of a minimal account of civic virtue, then a minimalization of virtue that disregards this fact runs contrary to the overall ends that Sabl is trying to achieve. Combined, the two points make a powerful case for having a thicker conception of virtue. Community is part of what makes a state a state, but as both Skhalar and Sabl note, the idea of community or the community itself can be corrupted. This is why community needs the right aims, as well as the people that can carry out these aims while maintaining community, hence the need for human virtue.

But all of this is not to say that Sabl's points have no merit. Rather, they bring into focus important considerations that must be addressed when discussing a congruence between the civic and human virtues. Most notably, there remains a question as to the degree of virtue that needs to be upheld by the citizens. It is important to note here that Sabl himself is not against there being

further goals that society tries to maintain. Instead, he seeks to establish a basic set of virtues that are necessary for a democratic society to exist. This is the point of his patient analogy, it is a warning that the thicker one tries to make an account of the state's ends, and subsequently the account of virtue that goes alongside it, the more disputable and less clear it becomes what virtues one should uphold, leading to needless dispute. Sabl is cautioning virtue theorists that in proposing a set of virtues that are conducive to being a good citizen, one must be careful not to distract from those virtues that seem necessary for the existence of a democratic state. As was brought up in the discussion about Hobbes, a truly virtuous person is one that is disposed towards preservation. What an Aristotelian theory will argue is that if one lacks sufficient human virtue, one fails to actualize the opportunities that preservation and peace allow for and takes away from states of being that are important towards the end of preservation. While flourishing is the aim of the Aristotelian theory, Hobbes' and Sabl's points are still important to remember. Without an eye on what preserves the state and the good life, one acts contrary to human flourishing, even if one pursues other ends conducive to human flourishing. In this way, Sabl's patient analogy serves more as a warning to those who pursue theories of virtue, that the well-being of the state may be harmed if one loses sight of some of the proper basic aspects of the state that ought to be preserved. [12]

Overall, while Sabl brings up noteworthy objections that raise important questions about the nature of virtue and the state, his minimalistic project is not sufficient as an argument against

[12] Since the point of this paper is to primarily argue for the congruence of civic and human virtue, I have chosen not to answer the question of to what degree human virtue and civic virtue are congruent, or how thick of a theory of virtue can be realistically upheld by the citizens, two other questions that Sabl's analogy raise. I would say that complete virtue as Aristotle imagines it in *Nicomachean Ethics* is too lofty of a goal, and that more so citizens should have at least part of complete virtue as Aristotle hints at in *Politics*. Exactly what this looks like is a discussion for further inquiry.

the congruence between civic and human virtue. Serious doubts can be raised against the pragmatism of his minimalistic account of civic virtue as a whole. Much like Hobbes, Sabl's arguments fall prey to their own minimalism, and do not give a sufficient account of the human agent as being the actualizer of ends, including state ends. Like other minimalist accounts, Sabl does not see the link between human virtues, along with the activities conducive to nurturing them, and the performance of the civic virtues. In stating that more thick 'idealistic' conceptions of virtue should be left to "the hurly-burly of social debate and individual choice", Sabl rejects the formative aspect that such activities have on the individual and subsequently their ability to actualize civic ends well (Sabl 2005, 219). One's properly human activities aimed at flourishing, inform their ability to be a good citizen, to have civic virtue. Furthermore, one cannot reduce the notion of community to try and achieve a more minimalist conception of virtue. Not only does community make for a better state able to uphold even the minimalistic ends Sabl wants, it also is an essential part of what makes a state a state. While Sabl's arguments touch on important considerations when it comes to the correlation between virtue and the state, they do not establish a minimalistic conception of civic virtue or show that the human and civic virtues are incongruent with one another.

Galston

Now that we have addressed Sabl's arguments for the incongruence between civic and human virtue, we can turn to Galston, who is an influential and more moderate voice in the discussion on the relationship between virtue and the state. Unlike Sabl, who argues for a set of core civic virtues to be maintained at the expense of doing away with 'ideal virtues', Galston's notion of civic virtue is much more comprehensive. While Galston's view of liberal democratic virtues has a focus on preservation, he is also concerned with a more broadly instrumental

approach to civic virtue. He is concerned with what virtues are good for the state to have and allow the democracy to function well as a community. Like Sabl, Galston is adamant that there is an incongruence between human and civic virtue, despite his academic Aristotelian roots: "Human and civic virtue…cannot be fully congruent." (Galston 2007, 625). Galston has written extensively on these issues, so for the purpose of brevity and using Galston's more contemporary views, I will be using Galston's arguments from his article *Pluralism and Civic Virtue,* which gives an overview of his major positions and reasoning against the congruence between human and civic virtue.[13] First, I will explore some areas of agreement and dispute that I have with Galston's general theory and interpretation, particularly in his interpretation and utilization of human and civic virtue as concepts. I will then address Galston's major arguments: his argument from societal differences, the pluralism of what entails a good citizen, and the nature of his minimalism. All in all, Galston's theory of civic virtue is much more amenable to a congruence between civic and human virtue than he believes.

Points of agreement

First, Galston's theory highlights some important aspects of the nature of civic virtue and the nature of virtue in political thought that are worth elaborating on. One of Galston's primary objectives, other than arguing for the incongruence between the civic and human virtues, is to establish why virtue is a necessary component of political thought and what the nature of the discussion should be about. A large part of the purpose of civic virtue for Galston is to maintain

[13] Some of Galston's other works include, Galston, William A. "Liberal Virtues." *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 4 (1988): 1277–90. https://doi.org/10.2307/1961760, Galston, William A. "Pluralism and Social Unity." *Ethics* 99, no. 4 (1989): 711–26. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381231, Galston, William A. *Liberal purposes: Goods, virtues, and diversity in the liberal state*. Cambridge University Press, 1991. Galston, William A. "Civil Society, Civic Virtue, and Liberal Democracy." *Chi.-Kent L. Rev.* 75 (1999): 603.

a level of commonality between a community's members that is necessary for collective living, while allowing for individual choice and various paths that one chooses for their lives. In a liberal democracy this is a balancing act, trying to maintain a kind of commonality while not infringing too much on the rights and freedoms of the individual. The issue then becomes a problem of how one maintains this sense of commonality amongst the people of a state. Galston notes that, "Whatever their substance and scope in particular communities, the collective lives we make are not one-time creations. They need constantly to be sustained and oftentimes renewed." (Galston 2007, 629). Maintaining civic virtue is an act of constant performance, not a one -time task.

Galston distinguishes two approaches to achieve the cultivation and maintaining of civic character within political philosophy. The first of these approaches is what he calls the institution-based approach. It holds that humans innately have everything that they need in terms of disposition and character to properly live communally well. Thus, it focuses less on how human beings are, and more on how they are arranged within the state. By properly arranging human beings, civic virtue is improved and re-enforced. This kind of proper arrangement occurs within the various institutions that exist within the state, the various education systems, jobs, and civic duties on partakes in. The second approach is the character-based approach. This approach is more skeptical about base human nature being able to actualize civic virtue through institutions, instead arguing that a more comprehensive internal mode of thinking and acting beyond just what is innate is needed (Ibid). Kant can be said to be an advocate for an institution-based system. He focuses on the upholding of law and nurturing virtues conducive to right through the law's coercion and other institutions that uphold right, as well as the virtues conducive to doing so. Rawls is even more of an upholder of an institution-based approach to

civic virtue. For him, a disposition aimed at justice is nurtured by partaking in society's institutions and examining the activities and actions of others within these institutions, leading to a collective civic virtue (Rawls 1971, 429).

Here Galston and I are in agreement: an institution-based account of civic virtue, or of virtue in general, is insufficient to achieve the aim of society. A more in-depth account of the human being as the actualizer of civic ends is necessary. Institution-based accounts do not give a sufficiently in-depth account of the human agent, assuming that innate human character is enough to actualize the ends that the state wants to achieve. Furthermore, Galston and I are also in agreement that while institutions can be formative to the development of one's virtue, the broader life that one lives within the community is just as formative. One's family upbringing, the friends one makes, the discussions one has with other citizens, one's personal choices and other social and communal aspects associated with living all play into the development of civic virtue as a whole. Even if a society can function on some basic level with such a thin account of virtue, it would be beneficial to have a more character-based conception of upholding virtue. Galston gives the example of following the law. While under an institution-based system, it would be assumed that the citizens comply due to understanding that laws that are enacted under valid procedures for valid reasons. In reality, however, this is not the case. Instead, "the community invests large sums to deter individuals from breaking the law, and even more to punish transgressors. These "surplus" compliance costs add to the burden of political life and diminish the community's capacity to pursue affirmative goods." (Galston 2007, 629). To reduce these compliance costs means to reduce the number of offenders, and this involves a focus on developing a kind of inner character. In affirming these views, Galston is not vulnerable to many of the same criticisms that I levied against Kant, Rawls, or Sabl, namely, that their political

theories failed to account for enough depth in the totality of the human condition. His minimalism and rejection of the congruence of civic and human virtue stems from a different background than many of the thinkers discussed thus far, even though he touches on many of the same values and problems.

Problems with Galston's Interpretation of the Civic and Human Virtues

One area of contention that needs to be addressed is the way that Galston frames the discussion surrounding the civic and human virtues. The basis for Galston's characterization of the civic and human virtues stems primarily from Aristotle. On Galston's view, the human virtues are those that "are desirable for their own sake, for all individuals." (Ibid, 625). While how they are performed changes from culture to culture, the substance of what human virtues are is unchanged across cultures. Civic virtue, on the other hand, is valued more instrumentally, "for its contribution to sustaining a political community." (Ibid, 625). Since what may be good for a community is contingent on the purpose, history, institutions, and principles of a community, the civic virtues are more relative, for Galston (Ibid). This again tracks with Aristotle's position that the civic virtues are contingent on preserving the aims of a particular constitution. Since there are many constitutions, civic virtue changes depending on the constitution it is trying to uphold. For this reason, Galston states that the human and civic virtues are incongruent with one another. In his view, they aim at different ends that can be at odds with one another. As Aristotle himself notes, "It is possible for one to be an excellent citizen without having acquired the virtue in accord with which someone is an excellent man." (*Pol III* 1276b35).

It is here that I believe Galston makes an important error in his framing of the human and civic virtues. Certainly, the human virtues and civic virtues are different and, as Aristotle points

out, one can have civic virtue without having human virtue. However, Galston leaves out a key part of the equation: whether or not the citizens are living in a state with good ends. Since civic virtue is aimed at the preservation of the state's ends, this also includes state ends that are contrary to well-being, flourishing, and rights. In a totalitarian regime in which the chief end of the state is the preservation of the dictator and his lineage, civic virtue of the citizen is compliance with the dictator and their laws, whatever they may be. This would be the case even if those laws are contrary to human virtue and human flourishing in every possible way. In such a state, civic virtue and human virtue would be incongruent. However, this is not the type of scenario that most political philosophers conceive of when they consider the incongruence of human and civic virtue. Instead, they are concerned with whether the two are congruent in a *good* state, whatever their definition of this is. Galston is no exception to this. When Aristotle says that one can be an excellent citizen without being an excellent human, he is talking about those constitutions that are not aimed at the common advantage and human flourishing. "And whether then, to take the virtue in accord with which a man is good and a citizen is excellent as the same or distinct is clear from what has been said: in one sort of city the good man and the excellent citizen are the same, whereas in another they are distinct." (*Pol III 1278b1-5.)* So, Galston is correct that human virtue is not, in every constitution, congruent with civic virtue, since there are constitutions that are simply incompatible with complete human virtue. But this is not a total incongruence.

Galston is concerned, however, with the establishing and maintaining of a good liberal democratic state. The idea that a certain standard of citizens is needed for a democracy to run well is far from new and stems all the way back to at least Aristotle. In conceiving of the wisdom of the many in a polity, it is not merely any collective of citizens, but rather those with "part of

virtue and practical wisdom." (*Pol III* 1281b1-6). This goes hand in hand with something else that Aristotle says about the good citizen: that they are equal parts rulers and ruled. A citizen in some way takes part in deliberative office and therefore must have a certain level of prudence and virtue, such as rationality and good character, to engage in this function of a democracy sufficiently. The good citizen must also be able to be ruled and have the virtues conducive of following the rule of law and the constitution (*Pol III* 1277a25-28). Aristotle is not saying that all the citizens must have perfect human virtue, as this is virtually impossible. Rather, his claim is that the citizen of a good state should have both human virtues to acquire and deliberate on what is good for themselves and others, and civic virtue to maintain the state that allows them to acquire these things. He frames this distinction in a rather sexist way unfortunately, noting how the citizen should be like the husband and wife of the household, where the man acquires what is good for the household, and the wife preserves the household itself (*Pol III* 1277b16-32*)*.

This highlights an important reason why the civic and human virtues are congruent with one another. If even part of the state's end is human flourishing, then to have a good state and utilize what is upheld and maintained through civic virtue, one must have a certain degree of human virtue to actualize this. The same can be said of a liberal democracy. To acquire what is good from the democratic system that the civic virtues maintain and preserve, the citizens need a level of human virtue conducive to democratic participation, rationality, and a character conducive to deliberating well with others.[14] Furthermore, as was discussed in the section on the

[14] How strong this point lands is somewhat dependent on what one holds as the value and purpose of democratic government. The more epistocratic one is, the more rationality and comprehension are important to democratic rule. That being said, even if the value of democratic rule and voting is to hold an equality between citizens, like Waldron or Christiano suggest, then there is still value in human virtue in that it is essential in recognizing this equality and actualizing human character and interactions between citizens that preserve and align with this equality. As was mentioned in chapter 2 in the discussion of preservation, human virtue is

value of freedom, a certain level of human virtue is needed to actualize the good that comes from the rights and freedoms that a liberal democracy upholds and maintains. Importantly, this creates a kind of positive feedback loop. Good citizens with a higher degree of human virtue are more able to aim at good civic ends, those conducive to human flourishing. This, in turn, provides the conditions needed for individual human flourishing, and subsequently provides the basis for more good citizens. Ideally, this cycle continues. If Galston wants to accept that well-being and preservation of the state are worthy ends, then regarding the human virtues as being incongruent with the civic virtues is counterproductive, as both have a role to play in the state and its human objectives.

Galston also over emphasizes the pursuit of self-interest as a part of the human virtues, stating that the human virtues are good for the sake of individual flourishing, while framing the civic virtues as those that are good for communal preservation. This is seen in his own framing of civic virtue as "a trait that disposes its possessor to contribute to the well-being of the community and enhances their ability to do [so]." (Galston 2007, 630). This emphasis on human virtue as being about the individual is partially true; however, it is reductive of what the human virtues all entail. While there are disagreements among Aristotle scholars about whether the ends of human virtue ever have the good of the other as part of the end, certainly human virtue is concerned with the plight of one's fellow humanity on some level.[15] Even if one holds the view

beneficial even to a very minimalist kind of state, so in a state that wants to uphold equality through rights and institutions such as voting, human virtue is arguably just as valuable.

[15] Exactly how concerned one ought to be towards well-being of one's fellow persons is hotly debated amongst Aristotle scholars. Certainly, self-interest is a big part of what Aristotle's approach aims at, he does care, as Galston notes, about individual flourishing. Some scholars point to this goal of the Aristotelian project as showing that ultimately any concern for others is concern for one's own flourishing. Others will note Aristotle passages on self-sacrifice and friendship show that genuine concern for others is an important part of flourishing. Personally, I hold the view that the two are inseparable, part of human excellence, and thus human flourishing,

that one cares about others, merely due to it being good for oneself, this still establishes that community is an important part of human flourishing and thus human virtue. Even on more egoistic reads of Aristotle, community and the opportunity it provides for virtuous activity is a vital part to living well. It is this point that Galston undersells in the way that he divides human and civic virtue. Humans are social animals and part of our excellence as human individuals is to be found in our interactions with our fellow humanity. For this, and for instrumental reasons, human flourishing is best reached in a community.

In stating that the civic and human virtues are incongruent with one another, Galston fails to ask how contingent human flourishing is on the upholding of the state with a good constitution. If a good state is beneficial or necessary for human flourishing, then a basic level of congruence exists already between the human virtues and the civic ones. By preserving the state, the individual preserves the circumstances necessary for their own flourishing. Thus, we can see a symbiotic connection between the human and civic virtues that implicates that they are congruent rather than incongruent. The human virtues are necessary to actualize well the states of being that are conducive to the preservation of the state, including a liberal democracy. Furthermore, human virtue is best achieved within the state and thus the fostering of civic virtue is necessary to preserve and maintain the conditions that the state provides. This is not to say that the state is worth preserving in all scenarios. One can easily imagine a state that actively limits one's ability to live well, by not providing the conditions that give the opportunity for people to flourish. I am not saying that all states are worthy of preserving merely by being a state, but

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is found in caring for others for their own sake. While one's own flourishing is part of the end of acting virtuously towards others, this can only be achieved well by caring about other for their own sake to some extent. For more on this topic, a good start is Annas' work on egoism and self-interest. Annas, Julia (2008). Virtue ethics and the charge of egoism. In Paul Bloomfield (ed.), Morality and Self-Interest. New York: Oxford University Press.

rather that those states that provide the conditions that allow for flourishing to some degrees are. In this sense, both the civic virtues, and the human virtues are aimed at the same thing, the good of the person. This highlights the problem with holding civic virtue as being good by itself. It aims at the preservation of the state and its conditions but does not answer for whom. Insofar as civic virtues preservation is ultimately for the human good, then separating the human goods with those of the state is illogical.

A good citizen by what standard?

The aforementioned does not, however, address one of Galston's main concerns with a congruence between the civic and human virtues: the standardization of the citizens. Galston argues that if we hold to objectively good human virtues, we run the risk of standardizing good citizens into one group, when there are a multitude of ways of being what one could call a good citizen. "Members of the community must guard against the impulse to standardize citizens beyond what healthy civic life requires." (Galston 2007, 630). This is one of the advantages of a liberal pluralistic democracy. It permits a degree of freedom that allows for a diversity of good citizens, each having their own part to play in upholding a good democratic state. Some individuals participate more in civic affairs of law, others are more focused on small-scale community development, while others participate in advocating for social justice. All these types of citizens have a part to play in making a good state. By restricting what being a good citizen entails to one kind of person just one type, society loses out on certain excellences that are beneficial to its preservation and well-being. "A community all of whose citizens were passionately pursuing social justice would be all sail and no anchor; a community of personally responsible citizens would be just the reverse." (Galston 2007, 632). Therefore, even though the characters of the differing citizens may be opposed to one another on a fundamental level, they

still all entail important civic virtues and work better as a collective of parts. Having opposed civic excellences is a sign of a healthy liberal democracy, rather than an unhealthy one.

Galston's point has much merit. He is right to be wary of over standardizing the citizen as it aids in the good functioning of the state. However, his account leaves out an important part of the puzzle: that something is needed to weave together the various excellences of the citizens. Earlier, I drew a comparison between Galston's standardization argument and Plato's *Statesman* in that both argue that a collective of many different types of citizens is needed. One of the fundamental differences between the Visitor's account and Galston's is that Galston does not provide an account of any connecting principle between the virtues. While Galston might reasonably say that the personally responsible citizen is all anchor and no sail and the citizen pursuing social justice is all sail and no anchor, and that both parties need each other, he does not provide an account of what ties these two types of citizens together. This is important, as while having a degree of differing, even opposing, civic excellences is good for the state, a lack of any harmony is detrimental to the state and, therefore, to the citizens that make up the state. It could be argued that institutions are the link between the citizens. This is the argument that Rawls makes. By working together and seeing the civic excellences that others bring to the table in a just way, one is motivated to do the same (Rawls 1971, 468). There is some truth to this, since institutions provide a space for excellences to intermingle. However, by itself this provides merely an association of peoples and does not actualize any connectedness. As Galston noted, institutions themselves are not entirely sufficient to create and nurture the type of character necessary for civic virtue.

What is needed, then, is an account like the one the Visitor gives in the *Statesman.* Something is needed to weave the various excellences of the citizens together. While we might

not be inclined to follow the Visitor's advice of intermarriage of people of varying virtues, Plato's account still provides an important point: a good state requires a harmonious "weaving together" of different kinds of citizens. In the *Statesman*, it is the ruler's job to weave together the excellences of the citizens (*Stateman* 287e). However, if each citizen in a liberal democracy is in part a ruler, then each citizen carries a responsibility for weaving together the excellences of the whole. This requires more than just the preservation of certain state conditions, like Sabl's civic virtue of tolerance that aims at being able to leave each other alone. It also requires the human virtues aimed at the acquiring of a disposition within each person to be able to engage with one's peers, and the understanding and rationalizing of what each brings to the table towards the common advantage. While Galston is worried that upholding a standard of human virtue like this will run contrary to the civic excellences garnered from having a multitude of good citizens, the human virtues are more flexible than Galston conceives of them as being. One can use a virtue of character, calmness, as an example. If we want to maintain that a certain level of harmony exists amongst the varying types of good citizens, then it is pragmatic that they have a character that does not lead to wanton bursts of anger at every disagreement. The virtue of calmness does not interfere with the civic virtues that characterize the good citizens Galston envisages, as none of them are contingent on an angry disposition. The same can be said for most of Aristotle's virtues. They are aimed at right regulation of basic human dispositions and characteristics. They also do not necessarily preclude the enactment of particular activities. Other non-Aristotelian virtues such as empathy are also valuable towards the end of harmony between citizens. Understanding how and why others feel what they do and approaching deliberation and engagement with others with this in mind, is helpful. There is a certain level of relativity associated with the human virtues that Galston undersells. While a virtue like calmness is static,

in that it is always about the right regulation of anger, what that looks like is partially dependent on any given scenario. The justice-oriented citizen's right demonstration of calmness in any given situation may be different than the personably responsible citizens, but both would show calmness insofar as they regulate their anger in the right way for the right reason. This recognition of the flexibility of the human virtues makes them far less susceptible to incongruence with the civic virtues than Galston postulates.

Underscoring all the human virtues is prudence: right reasoning and deliberation about what action is conducive to flourishing as a totality rather than just a part of flourishing. It is the enactment of this prudence that helps weave the citizens together, and understanding the goods that the other civic virtues uphold for the state and, by extension, the individual. Prudence starts as an understanding of good regulation of the self "about things that are good and beneficial for himself…about what sort of things are means to living well altogether." (*NE* 1140b27-30). Prudence is important in everything that is needed to live well, not just one aspect of it. This is why the good citizens of an oligarchy are not prudent and thus not fully good men. They focus on the acquisition of one part of living well, wealth, but not the totality of what is conducive to human flourishing. For Aristotle, a degree of prudence is needed for good democratic rule. In order to act as a good collective, an understanding of what part of a good life that each citizen brings is needed. This understanding starts with a comprehension of, and character disposed towards, the good life. This is human virtue.

Galston adopts a moderately minimalist approach in constructing his account of civic virtue. He aims for the well-being of the democratic system and the people within it and reconciles this with the plurality of a liberal democracy. To achieve this, he excludes the human virtues, as he feels they are incongruent with the civic virtues. While there is a lot to like about

Galston's theory, in excluding the human virtues from civic virtue he fails to actualize many of the key aspects of his theory. While advocating for a certain depth of character in the citizens as necessary for a healthy democracy, his conception of civic virtue cannot actualize this depth of character by itself. A disposition internal to individuals set on acquiring what is good for themselves is needed alongside the preservation of what is good for the state. He wants a character-based conception of virtue but does not provide the total framework conducive to this. There is merit to Galston's suggestion that a plurality of different types of good citizens with varying civic virtues has benefit to the overall community. However, Galston restricts theories of human virtue too much, not accounting for their flexibility, making it difficult to establish incongruence between the human and civic virtues on these grounds. Furthermore, his account of a plurality of good citizens lacks an aspect that weaves the varying excellences together. Human virtue provides a disposition conducive to weaving together the people and thoughts that contribute to a good state. Coming from different scholarly backgrounds, Sabl and Galston represent contemporary arguments as for why the civic and human virtues are incongruent. In both Sabl's more extreme minimalist approach and Galston's more moderate one, neither can do away with human virtue completely in their accounts of the state insofar as human virtues are necessary towards the acquisition and actualization of the civic virtues, and thus the state.

Conclusion

A broadly Aristotelian theory of human virtue and of the state is not just compatible with the civic virtue of preservation that both Machiavelli and Hobbes endorse but is often necessary to achieve this preservation. Human virtue bestows the prudence needed to preserve the state and the good it provides. A degree of human virtue is also necessary for the kind of social harmony and upholding of laws that Hobbes deems necessary for the preservation of the

state. The reductionism of Hobbes' theory of virtue does not satisfy the objective of preservation in the way that he wants it to. We can see a congruence even in these most minimalist accounts of the state, as to preserve the state is beneficial for one's own preservation, which is necessary for flourishing. Thus, a good human condition is needed to perform the human activities conducive to this preservation. Overall, human virtue is necessary to actualize the opportunities that a basic level of preservation of life allows for.

The arguments from freedom face a similar problem in that human virtue is necessary to actualize well what freedom and pluralism allow for, namely opportunity. Freedom's value is found in concert with human virtue and wise action. An autonomous agent that can use their freedom well is an individual who is disposed towards the civic virtues aimed at the preservation of the rights and freedoms the state seeks to uphold, while also utilizing that freedom well in their own lives. An account of freedom that does not specify how it is valuable for the individual is insufficient. The argument from pluralism also fails to establish an incongruence between human and civic virtue. Given that what the liberal state actually aims to achieve is a pluralistic society and not an absolute pluralism, some level of constraint will always be necessary in society. Having autonomous agents that are prepared to make more choice worthy decisions concerning their own lives will lead to a healthier pluralistic society overall. Furthermore, the claim that the human virtues constrain pluralism too much is unfounded. The human virtues, as conceived of by Aristotle and Aristotelian thinkers, have a high degree of flexibility in their implementation and do not constrain the plurality of society, as some may claim.

Defending against the arguments from preservation, freedom, and pluralism highlights many of the problems with the minimalist liberal conceptions of virtue put forward by recent thinkers such as Sabl and Galston. Examining Sabl's more radical minimalism, which focuses on

the core virtues needed for democracy's preservation, shows that, even by taking such a minimalist approach, a degree of human virtue is necessary to actualize these core virtues well. Toleration, non-violence, and democratic sportsmanship ng a human condition suited to their continuous enactment. Sabl does not succeed in his attempt to deny that community is a core aspect of the state. Shklar's assessment of community, which Sabl uses as a vehicle for his own argument, also falls short, as it is aimed at community for community's sake, rather than at a classical account wherein harmony is aimed at human flourishing. There are doubts as well about whether a state without any community can be deemed a state at all, a point that Sabl does not address. Additionally, in denying the need for community, Sabl also denies a level of association and concern with the quality of the citizen that is not consistent with the rest of his framework. While Sabl's patient analogy points out an important danger for all political theorists discussing virtue, it is not a defeater for a thicker conception of virtue, including the human virtues. Finally, Galston, while contributing a great deal to the conversation on virtue and how it contributes to the state, also does not an establish incongruence between the human and civic virtues. His distinction between institution based and character-based approaches to cultivating civic virtue is enlightening; however, in excluding the human virtues, his account is missing a vital piece needed for the cultivation and maintenance of good civic character. Furthermore, his interpretation of Aristotle also overemphasizes the self-interested nature of human virtues. While it is disputed how egoistic an Aristotelian theory of human virtue is, it certainly is concerned with community and the good of others to some extent. In short, all of the minimalist theories I have examined fail to show an incongruence between the human and civic virtues. Instead, they illuminate why human virtue is necessary to some degree in any state, and even more so in a good state.

The conclusion that the human virtues are in fact congruent with the civic virtues, and that they are necessary for the actualization of good civic virtue, raises a number of questions and problems that lend themselves to further investigation. One of the pragmatic issues that comes from this congruence concerns the division of labour. While we might say that theoretically it would be better for society to uphold a congruence between civic and human virtue, is this practical? Different citizens specialize in different fields, allowing for a variety of products and kinds of expertise needed for a society to function well. However, this creates a couple of problems for the actualization of human virtue. The first is that not all types of work are conducive to the acquisition of human virtue. This is an argument that goes back to the time of Plato and Aristotle. Both saw the merchants, craftsmen and farmers as being unable to acquire human virtue due to the nature of their work not giving them the time to practise the activities conducive to human virtue (*Republic* 395c, *Pol* VII 1328b38-1329a2). Similar arguments are often advanced in contemporary democratic discussion concerning the ability of the citizen to participate well in the democratic system (e.g., Brennan 2021). Due to the division of labour, most people do not have the time or ability to understand and comprehend the increasingly complex issues that face democracies. Including human virtues as necessary to fully actualize democratic ends puts further strain on citizens to perform when doubts are already being cast on the average citizen's ability to participate well in democracy.

Another question my conclusions in this thesis raise is: what is the role of the state and the individual in cultivating human virtue? If the human virtues are essential for actualizing the civic virtues and the opportunities the civic virtues provide, as I have argued, then it is in the state's best interest to promote the acquisition of human virtue. As I hint at in this thesis, and Aristotle also notes in the *Politics*, education certainly seems to be one of the ways that the state

can promote human virtue. Whether or not the current educational system is well suited to achieve this objective is another topic of further potential discussion. The state and its institutions might also promote spaces and activities that allow for virtuous activity to take place. However, this in and of itself is not enough, as Galston and I highlight. A deeper understanding and view of the character of a person and how it is developed is necessary.

This raises another important implication, that by accepting human virtue as necessary for the acquisition of civic virtue and for the good utilization of what civic virtue provides, each individual citizen is more accountable to the total flourishing of the state and themselves. The citizen, then, is both in part ruler and ruled. The acquisition of human virtue benefits the individual and the collective community in that it aids in actualizing civic virtue and the state ends it preserves. Additionally, while the state and its institutions may play a role in how people can actualize their own flourishing, it is how an individual actualizes the opportunities that the state provides that will lead to their own flourishing. This is increasingly true based on the amount and depth of the ends that the state tries to uphold, since it could put more requirements on the citizen. For example, a higher degree of human virtue is necessary in a contemporary democracy than in the kind of state that Hobbes envisages, since there are more complex ends that are being preserved in a contemporary democracy. While I might not fully agree with Kant's idea that one cannot coerce the internal disposition of the individual, it is certainly the case that it can be difficult to do so. Much of the work in developing human virtue must stem from the individual, leaving them accountable for their part in the acquisition of human virtue. This leaves us with questions as to how to make people accountable for the development of their own human virtue, given that it will aid themselves, others, and the state to do so.

In a world where academics are highly focused on institutional and structural solutions to civic issues, a broadly Aristotelian view points out that such solutions require the right kind of people, namely those that are able to actualize the ends the state wants to achieve. The state's ends are not achieved only by procedures, but also by the people that enact those procedures. A play cannot be performed well with only a script, but only with good actors. In coming to the conclusion that the human and civic virtues are congruent with one another, I am not arguing that institutional and structural problems do not exist, as they certainly do. A broadly Aristotelian theory that holds the human virtues as valuable concludes that we cannot *only* look to institutional and structural problems when evaluating what is amiss in society. Not only can the opportunities that state structure and institutions provide go to waste without human actors that can make good use of those opportunities, but poor human actors are also unable to preserve the very ends good structures and institutions preserve. It is for this reason that human virtue and civic virtue should not be thought of as incongruent. While holding the two as congruent presents additional questions and challenges for a state, disregarding the human virtues altogether leads to a state that is unable to properly actualize its own ends.

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