Time in Mind: Understanding the Role of Episodic Future Thinking in Intertemporal Choice

Abstract

Humans and other animals systematically discount the value of future rewards as a function of their delay, and individual differences in the steepness of this ``delay discounting'' are predictive of a range of important real-world outcomes. Episodic future thinking, the mental simulation of episodes in the personal future, is one means by which to curb delay discounting. This thesis seeks to contribute to our understanding of how this effect occurs. The account that predominates in the literature is that episodic future thinking simulates the experience of future rewards, enabling their undiscounted value to be appreciated in the present. This thesis takes this account as a starting point, formalizing it in a mathematical model and carrying out several experimental studies to test its predictions. We find that key predictions are not borne out and develop an alternative account in which simulated experience plays a less central role.