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http://hdl.handle.net/11375/29692
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.advisor | Becker, Suzanna | - |
dc.contributor.author | Kinley, Isaac | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-04-24T16:54:22Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2024-04-24T16:54:22Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2024 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11375/29692 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Humans and other animals systematically discount the value of future rewards as a function of their delay, and individual differences in the steepness of this ``delay discounting'' are predictive of a range of important real-world outcomes. Episodic future thinking, the mental simulation of episodes in the personal future, is one means by which to curb delay discounting. This thesis seeks to contribute to our understanding of how this effect occurs. The account that predominates in the literature is that episodic future thinking simulates the experience of future rewards, enabling their undiscounted value to be appreciated in the present. This thesis takes this account as a starting point, formalizing it in a mathematical model and carrying out several experimental studies to test its predictions. We find that key predictions are not borne out and develop an alternative account in which simulated experience plays a less central role. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.subject | delay discounting | en_US |
dc.subject | decision making | en_US |
dc.subject | intertemporal choice | en_US |
dc.subject | episodic future thinking | en_US |
dc.subject | mental imagery | en_US |
dc.subject | computational modeling | en_US |
dc.subject | impulsivity | en_US |
dc.subject | goal-directed behaviour | en_US |
dc.subject | reinforcement learning | en_US |
dc.title | Time in Mind: Understanding the Role of Episodic Future Thinking in Intertemporal Choice | en_US |
dc.type | Thesis | en_US |
dc.contributor.department | Psychology | en_US |
dc.description.degreetype | Thesis | en_US |
dc.description.degree | Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) | en_US |
dc.description.layabstract | Pursuing our goals for the future usually means sacrificing immediate gratification, yet we often make decisions that are not in our best interest over the long term. This is because we assign lower subjective value to future rewards the further they are from the present. Individuals differ in how much they devalue future rewards, and these differences are related to many real-world outcomes. Our tendency to devalue future rewards is reduced when we vividly imagine the future in a process called ``episodic future thinking,'' and this thesis seeks to understand how this effect occurs. The most obvious explanation would seem to be that episodic future thinking ``simulates'' the experience of future rewards and allows us to recognize their value in the present. However, using results from several experimental studies, I argue that this may not be the best explanation after all, and I develop an alternative. | en_US |
Appears in Collections: | Open Access Dissertations and Theses |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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kinley_isaac_d_202401_phd.pdf | Isaac Kinley PhD thesis | 2.91 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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