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http://hdl.handle.net/11375/24520
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.advisor | Griffin, Nicholas | - |
dc.contributor.author | Lougheed, Kirk | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-06-13T15:08:29Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2019-06-13T15:08:29Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11375/24520 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Conciliationists hold that hold that epistemic peer disagreement about whether a proposition is true constitutes a (partial) defeater for that proposition. Non-conciliationists, on the other hand, deny that peer disagreement constitutes a (partial) defeater for a proposition under dispute. A defeater is a reason to doubt the justification one thought one had in believing a certain proposition to be true. While there are dynamic views in the literature, conciliationism and non-conciliationism represent the two most defended positions. This debate has highlighted a number of interesting and underexplored ideas in epistemology, such as the distinction between first-order and second-order reasons, the uniqueness thesis, and independence requirements. I develop and defend an underexplored argument in favour of non-conciliationism. A researcher may be reasonable to remain steadfast in the face of disagreement about a proposition related to her research if doing so will yield epistemic benefits. I draw on two main sources of evidence for this claim: (i) there are numerous real-life examples where this occurs, and (ii) there is empirical evidence to suggest that cognitive diversity helps enhance prediction and problem-solving. The most pressing objection to this argument is that it conflates practical reasons with epistemic reasons. I argue that this objection fails because the reasons in question actually are epistemic. A better distinction is one between synchronic epistemic reasons and diachronic epistemic reasons. I then explore how far, if at all, this argument can be taken beyond research contexts. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.subject | Epistemology of Disagreement | en_US |
dc.subject | Epistemic Peerhood | en_US |
dc.subject | Conciliationism | en_US |
dc.subject | Non-Conciliationism | en_US |
dc.title | Disagreement and Change of View | en_US |
dc.type | Thesis | en_US |
dc.contributor.department | Philosophy | en_US |
dc.description.degreetype | Thesis | en_US |
dc.description.degree | Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) | en_US |
Appears in Collections: | Open Access Dissertations and Theses |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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Lougheed_Kirk_S_201906_PhD.pdf | 1.3 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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