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|Title:||Vigilantism in Moral Philosophy|
|Keywords:||vigilante;vigilantism;moral philosophy;legal philosophy|
|Abstract:||Vigilantism is an underdeveloped concept in scholarly discourse, particularly within the field of philosophy. My definition of vigilantism is: private citizens who engage in illegal coercive activity, against alleged transgressors of some normative code. Vigilantes seek to fulfill some conception of justice, and in doing so, they presume upon the state's authority. This definition excludes similar activities, like police brutality or terrorism. It also improves upon earlier definitions from other scholars. There are many potential objections to the practice of vigilantism as a whole, and there are many examples of unjustified, immoral vigilantism. However, vigilantism can be morally justified under the following circumstances: a breakdown of the legal system, protection of vulnerable individuals, proportional punishments, fair treatment, attempts to mend the larger social issues, and the advancement of justice. Depending on the particular circumstances, vigilantism can be morally justified, morally optimal, or unjustified. Since I can only provide a cursory examination of vigilantism, these ideas need more rigorous investigation and development. Further discussion on this subject is very important, given our volatile political climate.|
|Appears in Collections:||Open Access Dissertations and Theses|
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|ahmad_safiyya_sultana_201708_maphil.pdf||Philosophical definition and moral justification for vigilantism.||604.24 kB||Adobe PDF||View/Open|
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