Hume's Theory of Mind: A Response to the Commentators

Abstract

In this thesis I address the problem of the commentators' interpretations regarding Hume's philosophy of mind. Precisely what theory of mind Hume articulates is the subject of much debate among the commentators although a definitive view has, as yet, not been attributed to Hume. The issue Is, of course, complicated by the fact that Hume says so many things about mind, and these numerous and often conflictlng assertions entirely elude the commentators' endeavours to systematize them into a coherent theory. Through and examination of what I take to be three representative readings, viz., those of R.F. Anderson, C.V. Salmon, and John Bricke, I show that each interpretation cannot but fail as a systematization of Hume's views about mind into a theory, since a positive reading of Hume's philosophy of mind cannot be accomplished without either abandoning aspects of Hume's metaphysics, acknowledging that a preferred interpretation Is unable to account for certain views that Hume propounds, alleging a deeply rooted inconsistency, or all of these possibilities together. Why Hume's work eludes the commentators In this way is a problem that is examined by considering his intentions in A Treatise of Human Nature (and the Enquiries); that is, more specifically, the aim of his sceptical critique of metaphysical concepts and doctrines, his conviction as an epistemologist that our knowledqe claims are confined to the realm of experience, and his project, viz., to set the sciences on a new foundation. The whole discussion calls attention to the difficulty that is encountered in the interpretation of Hume's views about mind and its importance, for Hume scholarship, lies precisely in the endeavour to bring these problems to light via a critique of the accepted readings.