

HUME'S THEORY OF MIND: A RESPONSE TO THE COMMENTATORS

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ABSTRACT

In this thesis I address the problem of the commentators' interpretations regarding Hume's philosophy of mind. Precisely what theory of mind Hume articulates is the subject of much debate among the commentators although a definitive view has, as yet, not been attributed to Hume. The issue is, of course, complicated by the fact that Hume says so many things about mind, and these numerous and often conflicting assertions entirely elude the commentators' endeavours to systematize them into a coherent theory. Through an examination of what I take to be three representative readings, viz., those of R.F. Anderson, C.V. Salmon, and John Bricke, I show that each interpretation cannot but fail as a systematization of Hume's views about mind into a theory, since a positive reading of Hume's philosophy of mind cannot be accomplished without either abandoning aspects of Hume's metaphysics, acknowledging that a preferred interpretation is unable to account for certain views that Hume propounds, alleging a deeply rooted inconsistency, or all of these possibilities together. Why Hume's work eludes the commentators in this way is a problem that is examined by considering his intentions in A Treatise of Human Nature (and the Enquiries); that is, more specifically, the aim of his sceptical critique of metaphysical concepts and doctrines, his conviction as an epistemologist that our knowledge claims are confined to the realm of experience, and his project, viz., to set the sciences on a new foundation.

The whole discussion calls attention to the difficulty that is encountered in the interpretation of Hume's views about mind and its

importance, for Hume scholarship, lies precisely in the endeavour to bring these problems to light via a critique of the accepted readings.

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INTRODUCTION

The attempts on the part of Hume's commentators to say precisely what doctrine of mind Hume advances, constitute a striking example of the phenomenon that Selby-Bigge draws attention to in his introductory remarks to the Enquiries, namely, that "it is easy to find all philosophies in Hume, or, by setting up one statement against another, none at all." (E. vii)¹ By way of an explanation of this phenomenon, (one that is prefaced by a comment to the effect that caution must be taken when reading Hume's philosophical works), Selby-Bigge writes:

His pages, especially those of the Treatise, are so full of matter, he says so many things in so many different ways and in different connexions, and with so much indifference to what he has said before, that it is very hard to say positively that he taught, or did not teach, this or that particular doctrine. He applies the same principles to such a great variety of subjects that it is not surprising that many verbal, and some real inconsistencies can be found in his statements. (E. vii)²

Essentially, Selby-Bigge emphasizes, here, the 'eccentric' or perhaps not overtly 'systematic' character of Hume's writings. Accordingly, the exhibition of such diversity in Hume's works, (note that the Treatise is mentioned specifically), makes it as difficult to discern what doctrine, if any, Hume holds, as it is easy both to find in Hume's texts all philosophies or none, and to subject his views, in addition, to the charge of inconsistency. These observations describe remarkably well the difficulties that beset that particular area of Hume scholarship devoted to questions concerning Hume's philosophy of mind. Hume's numerous and diverse claims about mind serve as evidence for a number of differing

and conflicting interpretations. Hume is thought to be, among other things, a materialist, a dualist, a subjective idealist, a neutral monist, a consistent sceptic (in which case he would present no doctrine of mind) although a definitive view has not been attributed to him. The commentators fail to agree upon this issue and the matter is complicated by the very fact that Hume's assertions lend themselves to each reading and yet not so decisively that one interpretation emerges as the victor since a wealth of counter-evidence may be found to undermine that view. While Hume is often, as a result, charged with being inconsistent, it also happens that entire parts of his philosophy must be abandoned for the sake of a coherent interpretation; in effect, attempts to render coherent certain of his views in terms of a single doctrine are made at the expense of other 'conflicting' or 'unmanageable' parts of his philosophy, those that cannot be incorporated successfully into a particular reading. This delineates, albeit briefly, a curious state of affairs to which I shall devote considerable attention in the body of the thesis. The following remarks are intended as a general outline of the central argument of the discussion.

It is my intention to show that those commentators engaged in the dispute concerning the ontological status of mind in Hume's philosophy cannot but fail in their attempts to attribute a single and coherent doctrine to Hume. In fact, the commentators are entirely misguided in their endeavours to cast Hume's views into a coherent, consistent theory, and this is precisely because Hume had no intention of presenting a systematic 'theory of mind'. Rather, he had aimed at doing away altogether with the ontological question. It is not until Part II, ('A Resolution to the Problem'), that a case is made for this assertion. In the first

part, ("The Commentators and Their Inability to Arrive at a Definitive Account of Hume's Theory of Mind"), of this two part discussion, I develop in considerable detail the problem for which the second part (i.e., a defense of the claim above-mentioned) is a resolution. The first part consists of (1) a general description of the phenomenon, viz., a) that the commentators are in disagreement as to Hume's position regarding the nature of mind, b) that Hume makes numerous claims about mind and c) that these can and have been employed to support various different readings, and 2) a statement of the problems encountered by commentators in their attempts to provide a 'positive' account of Hume's doctrine of mind. The interpretations of Hume's metaphysics proceed upon the assumption that Hume expounds a definite theory, and attempts to formulate an accurate account of Hume's views about the nature of mind are not without evidence. I maintain, however, (p. 10), that a positive reading of Hume's philosophy of mind cannot be accomplished without either abandoning aspects of Hume's metaphysics, acknowledging that a preferred interpretation is unable to account for certain views that Hume propounds, alleging a deeply rooted inconsistency, or all of these possibilities together. I proceed to illustrate this claim by presenting a critique of three representative interpretations, i.e., that of R.F. Anderson who argues for Hume's materialism, that of C.V. Salmon who considers Hume to be a subjective idealist, and that of John Bricke who believes that Hume is, without doubt, a dualist. None of these readings render coherent all of Hume's views about mind, and some views are formed into a single doctrine only at the expense of others. Invariably on each interpretation some aspect of Hume's metaphysics must be abandoned.

It is in order to note, here, that while neutral monism is mentioned among the possible interpretations of Hume's position, I have not devoted attention to a neutral monist reading. This is not for want of any such interpretation of Hume's views, for H.H. Price in his work entitled Hume's Theory of the External World regards Hume as a neutral monist, and it is also the case that William James believed himself to be Humean on this point. Rather, I have not considered this school since it would unnecessarily lengthen my discussion of the commentators. I believe that the examination of those interpretations presented by Anderson, Salmon, and Bricke, sufficiently illustrates the point that I wish to demonstrate. Moreover, I am not concerned to show which, out of the three readings focused upon, is correct. If this were my aim, then certainly neutral monism would have to be included as a candidate; i.e., possibly a correct interpretation. It is my intention in Part I to show what happens when commentators try to say positively what doctrine of mind Hume actually advances--any such attempts will be unsuccessful for the reasons mentioned above. If it is objected, as it indeed might be, that a neutral monist reading might successfully incorporate all of Hume's views about mind into a coherent theory I would respond by drawing attention to Hume's obvious criticisms of Spinoza. Hume speaks of Spinoza's doctrine, viz., that thought and feeling "are nothing but modifications of that one, simple, and necessarily existent being, and are not possess of any separate or distinct existence." (T. p. 240-1)³ as a "hideous hypothesis" and he quickly does away with such a view by suggesting that we could have no impressions of this substance that "is perfectly simple and indivisible, and exists everywhere, without any local presence." (T., p. 241) Presumably Hume

would, upon the same grounds, have no more sympathy for the claim that experience is the neutral stuff of which thought and feeling are believed to be modifications. Indeed, anyone intending to say that Hume is a neutral monist, even on the basis of evidence from elsewhere in Hume's writings, would have to contend with this objection. This comment is consistent, I believe, with the central premise of Part I, and if my reasonings in the second part are sound, it will make no sense, hereafter, to raise the question as to the metaphysical doctrine of mind that Hume holds.

In the second part of this examination, I offer an explanation of the commentators failure when it comes to articulating Hume's theory of mind. I argue that the commentators have seriously misunderstood Hume's intentions both in general and particularly with respect to the character of Part IV, Book I of the Treatise. That section "Of Sceptical and Other Systems of Philosophy" where Hume undertakes a series of what he calls "miscellaneous reasonings" on such topics as the causes of our belief in the external world, the nature of mind, and the problem of personal identity, is one the commentators rely heavily upon for evidence to support their interpretations. They do so without considering either the character of Hume's discussion there or where Hume's critique of various metaphysical concepts and doctrines fits into his overall project. Because the commentators believe that Hume presents a theory of mind and upon this assumption proceed to show exactly what theory Hume does in fact advance, they make Hume out to be a systematic philosopher whereas there is much in Hume's writings and in the view he adopts towards 'metaphysics' that suggests the contrary. That Hume is an unsystematic philosopher in the sense that he is neither dogmatic

nor doctrine-oriented, becomes clear when the problem of his intentions is raised in connection with the character of Part IV and with respect to Hume's project of setting the sciences on a new foundation.

Briefly stated, I argue that Hume's criticism of metaphysical theories designed to explain ultimate realities prevents him from articulating a theory of mind. In fact, his repudiation of 'abstruse' metaphysics as it occurs concretely in his sceptical critique of doctrines and philosophical notions in Part IV of the Treatise, provides a clear indication of Hume's intentions, namely, to do away with philosophical questions that cannot be decided on the basis of empirical evidence. Accordingly, speculative theories of mind, as examined by Hume in "Of the Immateriality of the Soul", have no legitimate ground upon which to justify their 'hypotheses' about the essence of consciousness. All this is in keeping with Hume's fundamental conviction that the operations of the understanding are confined in their scope to what we are able to experience and observe regarding matters of fact and our thinking about them. We can go no farther in our explanation of human nature than to make empirical generalizations, and a posteriori assertions. This becomes clear when we consider Hume's description of psychological propensities, viz., association, custom and habit, and causal inference, which constitute the basis of empirical psychology, rather than a 'theory' of mind as such. In all this, it is observed throughout, Hume holds true to his project, viz., to set the sciences upon a new foundation, namely, the science of Man, which in turn must rest upon observation and experience. Even Hume's moderate (academic) scepticism proves to be instrumental in furthering Hume's empiricist conviction. It is not only an important methodological tool employed to undermine 'abstruse'

metaphysics, but serves to limit reasoning and philosophizing by making way for the strong force of nature which ultimately wins out over abstract theorizing. It follows that his sceptical stance does in no way imply that we ought not to make any assertions whatsoever about mind. Instead they need always be considered in a moderate way--as not having ultimate authority. The power of explanation, when it comes to 'theories' about human nature is, for Hume, thus limited to a grounding in the concrete, i.e., experience and observation, and is, in the final analysis subservient to human nature itself.

It is along these lines, viz., by emphasizing both the crucial aspects of Hume's empiricist project and his criticisms of 'abstruse' metaphysics, that I attempt to explain why we can find no theory of mind in his philosophy, and should, therefore, (and unlike the commentators have done) refrain from searching for one.

PART I

It is generally acknowledged by commentators, notably John Bricke, R.F. Anderson and C.V. Salmon, among others, that David Hume holds, both in A Treatise of Human Nature and elsewhere in his philosophical writings, some view regarding the nature of mind and the relation of mind to body or matter. In the debate that continues among commentators who wish to arrive at a consistent account of what is, in Hume's metaphysics, a theory of mind, many diverse and often conflicting interpretations have been offered and defended, as Bricke notes in his recent book entitled Hume's Philosophy of Mind. With respect to the different interpretations of Hume's position, Bricke writes:

To some it is plain that Hume reduces matter to mind, that he adopts a radical subjective idealism without benefit of Berkeley's God or Berkeleyan minds. In the view of others he reduces both minds and bodies to some neutral stuff, anticipating the neutral monism of James and Russell. Some recent writers see Hume as flirting with a reduction of mind to matter in the manner of behaviourism or, more plausibly, so-called identity theories. Some think that, as a consistent sceptic, he has no constructive view about the matter of the mind and matter at all.¹

Bricke himself is of the opinion that Hume does indeed provide a constructive position in terms of the relations that obtain between minds and bodies, although in formulating his Generalized Humean Theory that takes from Hume's writings aspects believed to provide a contribution to the recent discussions of the Mind-Body problem, Bricke proposes to discard, as being inadequate, "many of the foundational elements in Hume's considered theory of mind..."² The Generalized Humean Theory is based not only upon claims made by Hume concerning psychophysical interaction

but as well upon an analysis of causal laws that form the foundation, in Bricke's view, of Hume's science of human nature. This theory, he argues, "will assist Hume in the formulation of the determinist position he defends in both the Treatise and the first Enquiry." Bricke writes, moreover, that "it will also enable him to deal with problems generated by admitted gaps in consciousness, by the causal role assigned to dispositional properties, and by the inexplicability (from the side of Humean psychology) of sensations."³ Aside from this, however, it is sufficient to note for the present that Bricke suggests, against all of the perspectives cited above, an interpretation believed to be consistent with Hume's assertions about matter and mind, namely, that of dualist-interactionism.⁴ According to this view, the mind and the body are said to be different 'things', although they enter into a causal relation with one another. The emphasis upon psychophysical causality between the realms of the mental and the physical is qualified by a sufficient condition of interactionism, viz., "that a philosopher holds that some psychological events have physical causes and that some have physical effects."⁵ This, according to Bricke, is clearly the case in Hume's account of mind.

The perspective of R.F. Anderson, on the other hand, as it is outlined in both his major work, Hume's First Principles, and a paper on Hume's theory of perception entitled "The Location, Extension, Shape, and Size of Hume's Perceptions," appears to be opposed to a dualistic interpretation. In Anderson's view, it is clear that Hume is a materialist, i.e., that he reduces mind to matter or brain activity. Both in his general analysis of Hume's principles and intentions and his specific discussion of that section of the Treatise--"Of the Immateriality of the Soul"--where Hume addresses the problem of the nature of mind, Anderson

examines the statements related to the existence and nature of perceptions which are said, by Anderson, to constitute the starting point or foundations of Hume's account of human nature. He stresses that the assertions made by Hume about perceptions are "assumed in all subsequent parts of his exposition."⁶ Upon this premise Anderson argues that Hume's assertions about perceptions--the foundational elements of his science--reveal a fundamental position with regard to the nature of mind in Hume's philosophy.

The conclusion that Hume is a materialist is arrived at, in part, by an analysis, on Anderson's behalf, of Hume's claims about perceptions in the context of the famous passage in the Treatise where Hume has recourse to animal spirits and brain traces in order to provide an explanation of error. Whereas Hume has previously avoided any reliance upon physiological explanations of mental activity, "more", as he concedes, "in prosecution of my first maxim, that we must in the end rest contented with experience, than for want of something specious and plausible, which I might have displayed on the subject.,"⁷ he requires such an explanation in order to account for the mistakes that occur or arise from the association, (in particular the relation of resemblance), of ideas. It is upon the following passage that Anderson bases his argument that extended perceptions are, for Hume, located in the brain:

I shall therefore observe, that as the mind is endow'd with a power of exciting any idea it pleases; whenever it dispatches the spirits into that region of the brain, in which the idea is plac'd; these spirits always excite the idea, when they run precisely into the proper traces, and rummage that cell which belongs to the idea. But as their motion is seldom direct, and naturally turns a little to the one side or the other; for this reason the animal spirits, falling into the contiguous traces, present other related ideas in lieu of that which the mind desir'd at first to survey.

(T. p. 60-1)

Hume's imaginary dissection of the brain appears to provide considerably strong evidence in favour of Anderson's claim that Hume is a materialist. (He provides other more subtle arguments in both his article and in his book, although Hume's frequent mention elsewhere of animal spirits, to which I will return later, proves to be most convincing.) In fact, Anderson maintains, "Hume's explanation of the operations of the natural relations, and his explanation of error, depend upon the location of perceptions in the brain."⁸ If ideas are not actually located close to one another in the brain, Hume cannot give the weight he does to the animal spirits and offer an account of the mistake that might occur "whenever there is a close relation betwixt two ideas."⁹ Furthermore, Hume would be unable to render intelligible the assertion that those perceptions of sight and touch are extended.

Thusfar I have noted two of the predominant views about Hume's theory of mind, viz., that of materialism and that of dualism. Another, less frequently adopted interpretation, is offered, in contrast to those mentioned above, by C.V. Salmon in The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy. Salmon focuses his discussion upon Hume's so-called subjective idealism, although the latter is not construed in terms of Berkeley. According to Salmon, Hume's "conception of consciousness, and the method which he used to examine its structure...",¹⁰ i.e., a method of reflection characterized by Hume's concentration "upon what was actually passing in his own mind, and what was implicit in his consciousness itself,"¹¹ is a phenomenological conception of consciousness, the seeds of which are discoverable in Hume's Treatise and were developed later historically, by Edmund Husserl.¹² Unlike Bricke who places considerable emphasis upon Hume's position with respect to causality, (this applies also to Anderson,

although he focuses, as does Salmon, upon Hume's theory of perception), Salmon argues that causality, far from being the centre of Hume's thought, cannot support the whole of Hume's metaphysics. Rather, the fundamental problem of Hume's philosophy, and this is revealed particularly in Book I of the Treatise, consists in an examination of the principles of human consciousness in general and specifically those principles involved in the perception of the external world. Hume's science of human nature is believed, by Salmon, to be based upon the view that the subject is the only 'object' of philosophy¹³ and, furthermore, he points out that Hume "recognized that the subject was responsible for his consciousness of every objective sphere," although, "he considered himself obliged to qualify the subjective with some of the qualities of the objective sphere of Reality."¹⁴ In other words, Salmon regards Hume's investigation of consciousness to be seriously hindered by his naturalistic explanation of the subjective acts of consciousness, i.e., by his inability to avoid a reduction of consciousness to physical and psychophysical mechanism. Otherwise, the essence of Salmon's reading is that consciousness, for Hume, has absolute existence; that is, it can exist by itself and need nothing (e.g. material substance) to support it. From this perspective consciousness is not considered to be opposed to the world. Rather, the latter exists solely in relation to consciousness and its operations-- 'material' or 'objective' reality has no existence 'in itself' but exists only for a consciousness. This, very briefly stated, is, in part, the meaning evident from Salmon's emphasis upon subjective idealism in Hume's writings, and indeed such a position avoids any benefit of 'Berkeley's God or Berkeleyan minds'.¹⁵

The positions of the three commentators that have been summarized

above, (and to which I shall return shortly by way of a critique), are instances of differing interpretations of Hume's texts, readings that point to a lack of agreement among commentators on the issue of Hume's true beliefs concerning the nature of mind. While Hume is said to be a materialist, a dualist, a subjective idealist among other things, the view that is actually adopted by Hume--the only one that he could possibly endorse to the exclusion of all others--has by no means been decided once and for all. In fact, in proportion to the numerous and opposed views on this issue, there is considerable evidence to be found within Hume's writings to support any one of the perspectives presented by the commentators. (This poses a problem, of course, first because one would expect Hume to articulate his views about mind clearly and unambiguously if it were at all his intention to present a theory of mind, and secondly, granted that Hume does have a coherent account of mind, one might have thought that the commentators should have reached some agreement on this point.) Textual evidence indicates that Hume is, himself, not unambiguous in his views, and it is, therefore, possible to read his position in various ways. For example, when Hume speaks of an imaginary brain dissection, and has recourse to animal spirits and brain traces in order to account for errors in thinking, he appears, as Anderson notes, to be speaking like a materialist. When Hume asserts, in his discussion of the soul and its nature, that "matter and motion may often be regarded as the causes of thought, as far as we have any notion of that relation," (T. 250) it is possible to provide an Epiphenomenalist interpretation of Hume's views about mind and matter, one in which "consciousness is thought of as a mere by-product of the operation of the brain."¹⁶ Such experiences as the mood one is in upon observing a beautiful sunset, or one's

disposition while engaging in conversation with a dear friend are supposed to be, "in themselves, something more than the workings of the brain, but they are incapable of influencing the operation of the brain in any way."¹⁷ Hume appears to be saying something akin to this when he asserts that alterations in disposition are produced by a change in the situation of body. As Hume writes: "everyone may perceive, that the different dispositions of his body change his thoughts and sentiments." (T. 248) His assertions do not suggest, however, that thought also influences actions that we perform, so it may be concluded, given that Hume means by body also the brain, that mind or consciousness is an epiphenomenon caused by matter but having, in turn, no affect upon it. Nevertheless, Hume also maintains that "reason and judgements may, indeed be the mediate cause of an action, by prompting, or directing a passion.," (T. 462) and "The WILL exerts itself, when either the good or the absence of evil may be attain'd by an action of the mind or body." (T. 439) Such passages as have any bearing upon the causal connection or interaction that is believed to occur between matter and thought, and all those claims that reveal an explicit distinction, on Hume's behalf, between mind and body, provide evidence in support of the conclusion that Hume is a dualist rather than a materialist or an epiphenomenalist (the latter view is considered to be compatible with the materialist's assumptions).¹⁸ However, Hume denies, elsewhere, that we are able to possess any knowledge of the materials out of which the mind is composed, and we have no knowledge of the place where the perceptions of the mind are represented and make their successive appearance. In the following passage, Hume reduces mind or self to a bundle or collection of successive perceptions, and the fact that we have such a notion as 'self' is explained later as a fiction of the imagination:

The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different; whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity. (T. 253)

Hume proceeds to say, in a note of caution, that his comparison of the mind to a theatre must not be taken too far. He has wished to stress by the use of the metaphor that the mind is constituted solely by successive perceptions and that we have no knowledge, beyond these perceptions, as to the nature of mind. Accordingly, we do not possess "the most distant notion of the place, where these scenes are represented, or of the materials, of which it is composed." (T. 253)

In a comment on the passage in which Hume denies that we have any perception whatsoever of the self, (T. 252) D.M. Armstrong, although he is himself of the opinion that mental states are entirely reducible to brain states, considers Hume to be saying "that there is no continuing object in the mental sphere corresponding to the body in the physical sphere."¹⁹ Since we are, for Hume, aware of perceptions alone and do not observe a "spiritual principle" when we consider the activity of our own minds, Armstrong concludes, with some reservation, that Hume is a "Bundle" Dualist who "takes mind to be a succession of non-physical particulars or items distinct from, although related to, the body."²⁰ This view of mind is said most frequently to be adopted by Hume. Nevertheless, as Armstrong points out, (and quite correctly), "it is not absolutely clear whether or not Hume himself was a 'Bundle' Dualist."²¹ It is entirely possible, according to Armstrong, that Hume does not hold a materialist theory of body, since Hume often appears to regard physical objects in a manner similar to that of Berkeley, "making them nothing but our perception

'of' them."²² Hence, both minds and bodies would be comprised of no more than perceptions, and the material world would exist merely as a construction. Again, the suggestion that Hume is an idealist, after the fashion of Berkeley, does not lack textual evidence upon which it may legitimately be grounded. When Hume examines, in that section of the Treatise "Of Scepticism With Regard to the Senses", the basis of the opinion of both philosophers (in their inattentive moments) and the vulgar or common men (who adopt a 'natural attitude' always), namely, that "our perceptions are our only objects", he notes: (1) that we only suppose a resemblance to exist between external objects and internal perceptions, although we are unable to infer, via cause and effect, the existence of objects "from the existence or qualities of perceptions." (T. 216) and, (2) that resemblance between objects and perceptions is the outcome of an act of consciousness whereby the mind imposes something on to the 'world'. As Hume writes: "We never can conceive any thing but perceptions, and therefore must make every thing resemble them." (T. 216) He appears, here to deny the existence of matter, this by identifying objects and perceptions, the latter of which we are alone certain. Furthermore, in suggesting that we create, by an act of imagination or 'fancy', a resemblance between perception and object where none may exist, Hume seems to hold that the external world as we perceive it is indeed a construction. At the same time, however, the entire problem of the resemblance between perceptions and objects already implies a dualism to which Hume is apparently committed while he affirms the identity of the two realms.

If the admission that our perceptions are our only objects lends support to the idealist reading, it may do so only from the microscopic perspective, i.e., when the interpreter focuses upon isolated passages

only and disregards the context or the overview. At the outset of his examination of scepticism concerning the existence of the external world Hume has quite clearly stressed that the existence of bodies "is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings." (T. 187) It is more fruitful to ask "What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body?"--this is the question Hume proposes to consider--while he points out that "'tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or no?" (T. 187) Even then, Hume concludes his study of scepticism and the senses with obvious dissatisfaction. He observes that he had first begun "with premising, that we ought to have an implicit faith in our senses..." (T. 217) and yet reflection and reasoning upon the issue prompts a change of heart: "I feel myself at present of a quite contrary sentiment, and am more inclin'd to repose no faith at all in my senses, or rather imagination." (T. 217) Having found the philosophers distinction between perceptions and objects to be as unsatisfactory as the vulgar system, the latter because we are lead to the absurd opinion "that these perceptions are uninterrupted, and are still existent, even when they are not present to the senses." (T. 217) and the former, i.e., the philosophers, because they "arbitrarily invent a new set of perceptions" and, thereby, proceed upon a supposition that holds only in the attitude of reflection and is automatically denied when the philosophers "upon leaving their closets, mingle with the rest of mankind..." (T. 216) Hume concludes that there is no remedy for sceptical doubt, except, "carelessness and inattention." (T. 218) However, (and at the risk of belabouring the point), if Hume affirms on this basis that "there is both an external and internal world" (T. 218) (it is debatable whether his invocation of carelessness and inattention legitimately does away with scepticism),

he appears later to deny the external world when he argues that "the table, which just now appears to me, is only a perception, and all its qualities are qualities of a perception." (T. 239)

Hume is as ambivalent with respect to the existence of matter as is Armstrong in his position regarding Hume's actual views on the subject of matter, mind, their existence, and the relation. The aforementioned indecision that Armstrong expresses as to Hume's stand concerning the nature of mind is significant precisely because it reaffirms the uncertainty encountered in articulating a coherent interpretation of Hume's diverse and often contradictory claims on the issue of mind and matter. It should be evident at this point that Hume does not state unequivocally what he actually believes to be the case and the commentators are of little help when it comes down to sorting out Hume's position--as has been noted, there is little agreement among them on the question of the ontological status of mind and matter in Hume's philosophy. Indeed, it seems reasonable to expect that Hume might provide some response to such questions as "is man endowed with both a mind and a body, is he merely a 'material entity' like all others in nature, or is his nature such that he is constituted as consciousness?" or "What is there? Either matter alone, both matter and mind, or consciousness only?", since he is concerned in his metaphysical endeavour with human nature. Certainly it is upon the supposition that Hume expounds very definite views in answer to such questions that commentators persist in their attempts, (and not without considerable textual evidence), to give an accurate rendition of Hume's account of mind. The venture upon which the commentators embark, namely to make positive statements about the ontological status of mind and body in Hume's metaphysics is one, I believe and propose to demonstrate in the

remainder of this part of the discussion, that is doomed to failure. A positive reading of Hume's philosophy of mind cannot be accomplished without either abandoning aspects of Hume's metaphysics, acknowledging that a preferred interpretation is unable to account for certain views that Hume propounds, alleging a deeply rooted inconsistency, or all of these possibilities together. By presenting a critique of several commentaries--the readings offered by Anderson, Salmon, and Bricke respectively, will serve as examples of the dilemma--I intend to reveal the limitations of each view in terms of (a) the grounds for asserting that Hume is a materialist, a subjective idealist, a dualist... (b) the internal consistency, i.e., whether the interpretation is intelligible when compared with Hume's texts, and (c) what must be denied in terms of Hume's metaphysics in order that the position be maintained. An explanation of the difficulties that are encountered by the commentators in their attempt to provide a single, definitive, and consistent statement of Hume's theory of mind will be reserved for the second part of the examination.

1. R.F. ANDERSON AND THE 'ANIMAL SPIRITS'

There is considerable evidence throughout R.F. Anderson's writings on Hume's philosophy to confirm the conclusion that he does indeed believe Hume to be a materialist. In fact, he reaffirms his position--his views are elaborated in detail in his major work Hume's First Principles and in a paper on Hume's theory of perception entitled "The Location, Extension, Shape, and Size of Hume's Perceptions" published after the book and incorporating its essential tenets--quite succinctly in a recent commentary when he claims, in response to Professor Yolton²³, that Hume appears not to differentiate between mind and matter. "It seems not at all clear," he writes, "that Hume distinguishes soul or mind from the brain."²⁴ Anderson cites, in this context, a passage from the Treatise where Hume employs the terms soul and body interchangeably, noting that it is of no consequence which term we use to designate the source of bodily pains and pleasures. The statement is as follows: "Bodily pains and pleasures...arise originally in the soul, or in the body, whichever you please to call it..." (T. 276) Anderson takes such assertions along with more compelling ones, viz., Hume's references to animal spirits which emphasize Hume's explicit reliance upon a physiological explanation of association and errors in reasoning, as indisputable evidence for his conclusion that Hume reduces mind to matter and mechanism. Of course, Hume's frequent mention of physiological processes (cf. T. 276, T. 60-61, T. 185) does not by itself justify the materialist reading if he also allows that there are physiological effects and 'mental' causes,

e.g., as in an act of will. In order to establish his interpretation on more stable grounds, Anderson goes to great lengths in examining Hume's views about perceptions and causality. Some of these in connection with the claims about physiology provide the evidence that Anderson requires in order to take Hume's position to its apparently logical, although extreme, conclusion, viz., materialism, while others lead Anderson to an impasse. He must allege, finally, that Hume's metaphysics is essentially inconsistent. Before proceeding (1) to show the pitfalls of Anderson's interpretation--his rendering of Hume's beliefs about perceptions results in some striking absurdities--and (2) to illustrate the difficulty with his recommended solution to the inconsistency, it is significant to note how far Anderson goes in elaborating upon Hume's materialism.

In concerning himself with Hume's so-called doctrine of matter Anderson finds, throughout his extensive critical examination of Hume's metaphysics that (1) the "intellectual world" of which Hume wishes to provide an account is explained in material terms, (2) the principles of connection among perceptions, namely, the associating qualities of the imagination--resemblance, contiguity, cause and effect--are material; that is, "they consist in certain characteristic movements of the animal spirits in the brain."²⁵ Sensation, it is concluded, is also mechanical since Hume explains the connection between perceptions and the external world of objects "by the physical and mechanical influence of external bodies upon our own. (H.F.P., p. 163) Belief, for Hume, is regarded as instinctive, which means, in Anderson's terms, that there is a mechanical power "which serves to connect thought to the world of external events. (H.F.P., p. 163) Not only does Anderson argue that the "principles of connexion" for all aspects of the mental life of the organism...is

ultimately mechanical" (H.F.P., p. 163)--this applies to association, sensation, and belief--but as well he contends that the 'intellectual world' is a world within a larger world, i.e., the material universe. All events, whether they are 'mental' or 'physical' (indeed according to Anderson's reading Hume makes no such distinction) are explained, ultimately, for Hume, in terms of the motions of matter. Connections among existences (both perceptions and objects) are material. "In saying that the true and secret causes of all events," Anderson maintains, "lie in the fabric and structure of minute parts, Hume has made matter the sole and true power in the universe and hence the ultimate source of all causal explanation." (H.F.P., p. 163) Accordingly, all causes are material causes. Anderson denies, in effect, that Hume could be anything else than a materialist; that is, he thereby affirms Hume's deeply rooted commitment to the view that mind is of the very same essential nature as the material universe. In Anderson's critical analysis of Hume's metaphysics it follows from (1) that Hume explains everything in terms of matter, that (2) Hume reduces everything to matter. Since the mental realm or the 'intellectual world' as Anderson puts it, admits of explanation solely in terms of mechanical processes and motions of matter, Hume has reduced mind to matter. This is the case because Hume allows for no other explanation of 'mental' events except a physiological one and because he affirms that acts of consciousness, e.g., association, sensation, perceptions, belief, do not exist in a manner different from 'physical entities'; that is the ontological status of the operations of the understanding is material. In fact, Hume is committed to the conclusion that whatever exists is material since he supposedly propounds a doctrine of universal mechanism--consciousness operates upon the same principles as

matter, and the universe to which the 'intellectual' realm belongs is also material.

Yet, while Anderson shows, on one hand, that Hume reduces consciousness (acts of thinking, believing, sensing) to mechanism, he reveals, on the other hand, that Hume's science (the principles it embodies) is inconsistent. Some of his views conflict with Anderson's conclusion that Hume's metaphysics is at the core a doctrine of matter and mechanisms. (H.F.P., p. 179) This is a problem for which Anderson provides no solution, except to reaffirm that the inconsistency is a necessary consequence of conflicting principles in Hume's system--(1) that all perceptions are distinct existences, i.e., they are substantial and need nothing (mind substance) to support their existence, and that there are, consequently, no connections between distinct existence, (2) that some perceptions have location in the brain, i.e., they are material and dependent upon the operations of animal spirits, and they are, therefore, connected by mechanistic laws of association--and to suggest in a parting remark in the conclusion of Hume's First Principles that natural science ought, perhaps, to have been the foundation for "a compleat system of the sciences" (T. xvi) that Hume proposes, in the "Introduction" to the Treatise to build upon a new foundation, namely, experience and observation. The implication of Anderson's suggestion is that the science of Man--one that would consist of an explanation, based upon experience, of the principles of human nature--is more properly natural science, and in this Hume is not regarded, by Anderson, to have sufficiently distinguished his project from that of the natural philosopher.

Whether Anderson's final pronouncement regarding Hume's endeavour in the Treatise, (more precisely what Hume's task ought to have been), is

or is not a tenable one, requires further consideration, although not prior to an assessment of his claims about perceptions, i.e., that some perceptions are located in the brain, and his conclusions about causality, viz., that Hume's doctrine of universal mechanism requires that cause and effect are inseparable and, hence, identical,

A. The Place of Perceptions and the Animal Spirits

One of the ways in which Anderson lends support to the view that Hume's physiological explanation of consciousness implies materialism, (although he does not say this explicitly), is by illustrating that Hume's assertions about perceptions are compatible with and, indeed, point to the conclusion that mind and brain are identical. Some of those perceptions that compose the mind are, for Hume, quite literally in the brain, according to Anderson. As he writes: "we know the location of those perceptions which have location. They are in the brain where, so Hume tells us, they possess extension."²⁶ Certainly, it is evident that Hume does believe some perceptions to be extended. He suggests as much when he maintains: "To say the idea of extension agrees to anything, is to say it is extended." (T. 240) However, much depends upon the meaning that is assigned to the term extension when it is taken as an attribute of perceptions, (impressions and ideas that compose the mind). Moreover, the way in which we construe "extension" in this context, will determine the validity of the inference that Anderson makes from a) that they have a place and spatial properties--in principle such entities would be quantifiable.

The precise meaning that Hume gives to the notion of extended perception is subject to various interpretations, out of which Anderson adopts the least intelligible position. It is possible to understand by

"extended" perception, an image, the appearance of an object, or a 'mental entity' entirely like objects, yet not located in the external world. We can say of the image either that it is "extended in the retina" (T. 372) or that it is a mental picture. The former is a notion of representation based upon the model of optics, while the latter occurs within the context of our reflection upon experience--"When I shut my eyes and think of my chamber, the ideas I form are exact representations of the impressions I felt." (T. 3)--and in terms of an imaginary scene that we construct for ourselves; e.g., "I can imagine to myself such a city as the New Jerusalem, whose pavement is gold and walls are rubies, tho' I never saw any such." (T. 3) The appearance of an object would be "that table, which just now appears to me..." and the appearance "is only a perception, and all its qualities are qualities of a perception." (T. 239) Hume speaks frequently about the appearances of objects. He states in the Appendix of the Treatise that we can avoid many difficulties in our reasonings "as long as we confine our speculations to the appearances of objects to our senses..." (T. 638) Moreover, he writes: "'Tis thus the understanding corrects the appearances of the senses." (T. 632) If by the latter, Hume means impressions, then he is speaking about perceptions, although neither as "mental pictures" nor as a retinal image. The final alternative--the one that Anderson presents--is the most problematic. In taking extended perceptions to be things like objects in so far as they exactly resemble objects--according to Anderson, "Hume goes a considerable way toward requiring an exact resemblance between a perception and the object it represents." (H.P., p. 166)--Anderson argues, further, that "the perception of an extended object" is extended, has size, and location. But these perceptions "cannot have the same location as the

objects they represent. Instead, they are in the brain." (H.P. p.166)

Hume certainly does admit that extended perceptions of sight and touch are spatial entities possessing length, breadth, and depth. For instance, he maintains that a table--it appears only as a perception--has all the qualities of a perception, and in particular extension. He maintains that "the perception consists of parts," and "these parts are so situated, as to afford us the notion of distance and contiguity; of length, breadth, and thickness." (T. 239) However, Hume does not say that such perceptions "exist within the spatial limits of the brain." (H.P. p. 166) We would not experience them as such even if we closed our eyes and reflected. The appearance would be before us in either case and the location would be "really in front of me" or "in front of me as imagined". Aside from this, it is surely absurd to claim that extended perceptions--Anderson notes that they "cannot have the same size as their objects" (H.P., p. 166)--possessing three dimensions are to be found inside of the perceiver's head. On Anderson's reading, one might expect Hume to believe that the brain contains small replicas of the external world. Of course, if we perform a real brain dissection this view will undoubtedly turn out to be false. We will observe the neurons firing and running along the synapses. Perhaps this is no more than Hume intended by his comment that it would "have been easy to have made an imaginary dissection of the brain, and have shown, why upon our conception of any idea, the animal spirits run into all the contiguous traces, and rouse up the other ideas, that are related to it." (T. 60) There is no indication, here, that the conception of an idea is identical with the motion of the animal spirits. Aside from the fact that Hume appears to suggest that ideas are located, it is not clear in what way they are, and the evidence upon which Anderson

finds his conclusion that extended perceptions--material entities--exist within the spatial limits and fibres of the brain is not at all convincing.

One of the many passages that appears unequivocally to support Anderson's reading, indicates, on the contrary, that an extended perception is an image "extended in the retina". True, Hume does proceed to add, "and in the brain or organ of perception." (T. 372) Nevertheless, this and other textual evidence of similar import fails to validate Anderson's inference that since some perceptions are extended, although they cannot have the same place as their counterparts in the world, they must occupy space within the brain. (The latter view commits Anderson to the claim that these perceptions also have solidity.) It seems clear enough that the extended perceptions on the retina is an image, (one that we could not experience subjectively), and that Hume employs the model of optics in this particular discussion of objects and ideas. He does note that "the eye refracts the rays of light, and the optic nerves convey the images to the brain..." While such assertions appear, once again, to confirm Anderson's charge that Hume explains consciousness in terms of mechanism--which amounts in this case to a reduction of the former to the latter--they cannot without absurdity establish the claim that the image conveyed to the brain is literally a replica, and a smaller one at that, of an external object. It is impossible to conceive by what strange and miraculous process an extended perception having all the qualities of external objects except the same size and location could be conveyed, as refracted rays of light, by the optic nerve and deposited within the brain. Granted, Hume employs a mechanistic model of seeing, here, but it explains very little, least of all how, on Anderson's reading, extended perceptions get into the brain or are transformed from

light rays into replicas of objects and by what operation these entities are made smaller so as to fit within the limited confines of the brain where they are said to be close to one another.

Thusfar, the intelligibility of Anderson's contention that Hume believes some perceptions to have a place within the material fabric of the brain has been questioned on two counts, viz., the meaning assigned to an "extended" perception of sight and touch, and the grounds for inferring that these perceptions have a spatial location in matter--that ideas and impressions which might be called 'mental entities' are not to be distinguished from physiological and, hence, material processes. Indeed, to be subject to physiological laws of thought, (i.e., relations of ideas through association), all perceptions must be material, and extended perceptions are supposed quite literally to exist in this way. Furthermore, "Hume's explanation of the operations of the natural relations, and his explanation of error," Anderson emphasizes, "depend upon the location of perceptions in the brain." (H.P., p. 169) Anderson's insistence that the operations of thought could not otherwise occur, in Hume's account, were it the case that perceptions had no such location, leads him to accuse Hume of a fundamental inconsistency, one that is, according to Anderson, essentially insoluble. The premise employed by Hume when he proposes to "consider in general what objects are, or are not susceptible of a local conjunction" (T. 235) with matter, namely, "that an object may exist, and yet be nowhere," (T. 235) constitutes the evidence for Anderson's charge. Since all perceptions must be located if thought is to occur, the very acknowledgement on Hume's behalf that not all perceptions (e.g., passions and emotions) exist in this manner surely implies a contradiction. "Indeed," Anderson writes, "he has said

that all our perceptions except those of vision and touch, exist "nowhere".
 "If this is true," he proceeds to argue, "then Hume's explanation of the associating qualities, and his explanation of error, can apply only to ideas of vision and touch." (H.P. p. 169) Of course it is false, Anderson contends, to say that we do not associate smells, sounds, passions "by resemblance, by temporal contiguity, or by cause and effect." (H.P. p. 169) All of these perceptions admit of association and equally certain is the fact that "errors may occur in our thoughts employing such ideas." (H.P., p. 169) Again, there is no possible resolution to the inconsistency concerning the location, extension, size, and shape of perceptions because Anderson holds firm to view that "Hume employs these terms univocally throughout..." (H.P., p. 170) Not only must we take Hume literally in his use of these terms but as well they can be interpreted only in one way--there are not several possible meanings.

We might legitimately argue, contrary to Anderson's assertion that all perceptions must be located in the brain as evidenced by Hume's reference to animal spirits and brain traces as an explanation of how association of ideas really comes about, that no perception has this location and, thereby, real rather than represented extension, size, and shape. It is possible that the animal spirits constitute a physiological basis and cause of thought, the latter being of a different order. Presumably the following assertion is justification for this view:

...thought and motion," Hume maintains, "are different from each other, and by experience...are constantly united; which being all the circumstances, that enter into the idea of cause and effect, when apply'd to the operations of matter, we may certainly conclude, that motion may be, and actually is, the cause of thought and perception. (T. 248)

Since cause and effect are different, and since motion (cause) and thought

(effect) are different, it would appear that Hume does not reduce thought to motion of the animal spirits as Anderson suggests. However, in his discussion of causality in Hume's metaphysics, Anderson, as will be shown below, violates this distinction only to result, once again, in absurdity and a further allegation of inconsistency on Hume's part, although, this time on a deeper level.

B. Causality and the Doctrine of Universal Mechanism

Hume fares no better in Anderson's discussion of causality than he does when Anderson speaks about the way in which perceptions exist and where they exist. Again, Hume is said to hold two contradictory views, one that supports the materialist reading, viz., that the connections between distinct existences are material connections inherent in the "structure of minute parts," (the physiological explanation of the 'intellectual' world is emphasized), and the other that consists of a denial that there are any connections whatever between distinct existences. (In the 'intellectual' realm such existences are perceptions, while in the 'external' world they are objects.)

Anderson is incredibly ingenious in his attempt to disclose what he considers to be the "inner meaning and most fundamental principle of Hume's doctrine of causation," (H.F.P., p.163) namely, that cause and effect are identical--the very same with one another as with necessity, power, and efficacy that is inherent in the structure of matter. Nevertheless, his understanding of the causal nexus, although quite consistent with his view that the perceptions of the 'intellectual' world must themselves be material (in the brain), points to an absurdity. In fact, this fundamental principle which Anderson discovers in Hume's

writings, viz., that necessity and cause and effect are identical, denies the very meaning of causal connection, i.e., that causality is a relation between causes and effects, whether this relation is a philosophical or a natural one. (T. 15) Generally a relation requires two components, and in the present case they are cause and effect. We say, for example, that event (a)--my act of throwing the glass upon the hearth--is the cause of event (b)--the glass having shattered into fragments. Now, Hume's 'Rules by which to judge of causes and effects' (T. 173) stipulate that "1) The cause and effect must be contiguous in space and time. 2) The cause must be prior to the effect. 3) There must be a constant union betwixt cause and effect..." (the relation is defined by such a union), and "The same cause always produces the same effect, and the same effect never arises but from the same cause." (T. 173) The latter is a principle derived from experience and observation and upon it is founded "most of our philosophical reasonings." (T. 173) These, the first four rules of the seven compiled by Hume, are the most pertinent for this discussion as they clearly reveal that Hume takes causality in the ordinary sense, namely, as a relation between two different terms.

According to Anderson, both events a) and b) "must appear to us incompletely and imperfectly, as two existences,"--we experience them as contiguous, a) as cause prior to b) as effect, constantly united, and necessarily so--although in reality cause and effect comprise a single existence. What we perceive, then, as apparent, and what really is the case are separated as if into the phenomenal and noumenal realms posited by Kant. Yet, for Hume, all our knowledge is limited to experience and no science "can go beyond experience, or establish any principles which

are not founded on that authority." (T. xviii) If Hume were to argue that we cannot experience and perceive the identity of cause and effect while at the same time affirming the unperceived existence of such an identity, he would violate his own principle and one could, then, accuse him of merely speculating or of entertaining an a priori hypothesis, unsupported by experience. Anderson must admit this, given his conclusion about causality in Hume's metaphysics.

Nevertheless, we need not go so far, since Hume's analysis of necessary connection already implies that we receive the idea of a necessary union between cause and effect if not from an "impression convey'd by our senses, which can give rise to that idea," or from "some internal impression or impression of reflexion," (T. 165) then, from custom. As Hume writes: "There is no internal impression...but that propensity, which custom produces, to pass from an object to the idea of its usual attendant." (T. 165) It is certainly legitimate to ask, from the standpoint of Hume's epistemology, by what means we could be aware of such a propensity besides our experience of it. In order to render Hume's claim consistent with his premise that knowledge is limited to our experience, then this would have to be the case, i.e., that we do in fact experience the propensity which custom produces.

A clarification of Hume's epistemology and what he is committed to in maintaining that knowledge cannot go beyond the authority of experience, (what Hume understands by experience is an issue that will be dealt with later), says nothing of the absurdity that Anderson attributes to Hume when he asserts that, for Hume, cause and effect are really identical; that is, a single existence. What it means to suggest that cause and effect are identical is not entirely clear, and Anderson's

conclusion that Hume's notion of necessary connexion is to be understood in this way is, therefore, problematic. Granted, Anderson is able to substantiate further his view that Hume is a materialist. His argument would be essentially as follows: If all true causes are material causes, and if all causes and effects are in reality identical, then all causes and effects are material. However, the intelligibility of Anderson's reading is open to question. How we can possibly comprehend the identity of cause and effect, even as material, is difficult precisely because the meaning of causality is undermined--causality implies a relation between two terms, viz., a cause and an effect. Given that Hume does believe cause and effect to be identical, he might mean that something, (e.g., matter or the Deity), is the cause of itself. Perhaps only in this case could we claim that the cause and the effect are one and the same. Still, it is not evident that this rendering of causality would be meaningful on Hume's criterion, namely, that all ideas employed in thinking must be derived from some precedent impression. (cf. E. 22. T. 107) Hume presents such an argument when discussing both the power in matter and an "active principle in the deity." (T. 159) Against the Cartesians who "have concluded, that matter cannot be endow'd with any efficacious principle..." Hume argues that "the same course of reasoning should determine them to exclude it from the supreme being." (T. 160) He puts an end to the debate about the existence of power in matter or in the deity by saying "that as all ideas are deriv'd from impressions, or some precedent perceptions, 'tis impossible we can have any idea of power and efficacy unless some instances can be produced wherein this power is perceiv'd to exert itself." (T. 160) According to Hume, the required instances have not been produced. Similar argumentation would

render unintelligible the identity of cause and effect.

Indeed, in that very section of the Enquiries, (section VII, 'of The Idea of Necessary Connexion' [p. 60-72]), from which Anderson takes passages to substantiate Hume's conviction in the identity of cause and effect, we find Hume denying that we can know of such an identity. Admittedly Hume does write: "and experience only teaches us, how one event constantly follows another; without instructing us in the secret connexion, which binds them together, and renders them inseparable." (E. 66) The implication of the underscored statement certainly does appear to give strength to Anderson's view 1) that Hume holds that there is some 'secret' connexion of cause and effect, and 2) that this connection is inseparable; i.e., cause and effect are identical according to Hume's formulation.

Yet, Hume says farther on in his discussion of the power in matter that the "power or energy" by which motion of the body is effected, "like that in other natural events, is unknown and inconceivable." (E. 67) Likewise, he notes regarding the "theory of the universal energy and operation of the supreme Being" that it "is too bold ever to carry conviction with it to a man, sufficiently apprized of the weakness of human reason, and the narrow limits to which it is confined in all its operations." (E. 72) One could postulate the identity of cause and effect and argue for the inseparability of the causal nexus, as Anderson believes Hume does, (and not without some evidence). However, "though the chain of arguments...were ever so logical..." (E. 72) it is clear that, for Hume, this is to venture "quite beyond the reach of our faculties." Our argument may be logical. Nevertheless, we can possess no factual understanding of the unknown and inconceivable, (as the notions of secret

connexions and powers are for Hume). Strictly speaking all claims about 'unknown' causes are speculative and lacking in firm grounding. As Hume emphasizes:

"We are got into a fairy land, long ere we have reached the last step of our theory; and there we have no reason to trust our common methods of arguments, or to think that our usual analogies and probabilities have any authority. Our line is too short to fathom such immense abysses." (E. 72)

To talk then, about the inseparability of cause and effect can only be 'hypothetical' or 'fancied' according to Hume. We may reason about it as a 'possibility'. Still, no experience can confirm such reasoning because the very subject about which it is conducted lies outside the realm of experience.

It is not entirely evident, then, upon what grounds Hume does justify the identity of cause and effect since he denies, on the basis of experience, the efficaciousness of matter and of a supreme being. In the context of empirical events Anderson's assertion that both cause and effect must, for Hume, really be a single existence is not compelling because it makes no sense. Having thus attempted to reaffirm Hume's materialism, this time by examining the notion of causality and proposing that cause and effect are the same in reality although not in appearance, Anderson cannot avoid the charge of inconsistency against Hume's system. Aside from the above mentioned difficulties with Anderson's reading of causality, it is important to note that there are, according to Anderson, connections among distinct existences and that these connections are material. Yet, this conclusion cannot accommodate such assertions made by Hume as, the mind or self is 'nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions' (T. 252) possessing no unity or

identity, hence, no connection. Anderson finds Hume to be inconsistent here as he did upon examining the nature of perceptions, finding some to be dependent upon mind (i.e., located in the brain) and others to exist independently (i.e., by themselves and nowhere).

C. The Final Verdict

The preceding assessment of Anderson's interpretation, I believe, reveals two things. First, that Anderson is unable to claim both that all perceptions must be located in the brain and that some (extended ones) do in fact possess this location, without committing Hume to an unintelligible position and without maintaining at the same time that he is inconsistent. The same applies, secondly, to Hume's views about causality and the material connections, (defined by the identity of cause and effect), supposed to exist, for Hume, between distinct existences, whether they are objects or perceptions. Anderson cannot argue that Hume really presents a doctrine of universal mechanism without once again discovering Hume's principle, viz., that there are no connections between distinct existences, perceivable or otherwise, to be opposed to the preferred position. In short, Anderson's attempt to show that Hume is a materialist cannot be accomplished except by leading Hume to absurdity and charging him, at the same time, with inconsistency.

The final verdict passed by Anderson upon the whole of Hume's metaphysics once again reveals the materialist bias as it does the inevitable failure on Anderson's part to render Hume consistent in his views about mind and the external world. This Anderson is unable to accomplish without having to propose what amounts both to a denial of many of Hume's serious claims and to a reformulation of Hume's aims in

general. Anderson's proposal that "it is upon natural philosophy, perhaps, that his (Hume's) complete system of the sciences should have a foundation," (H.F.P., p. 176) however tentative, reemphasizes the essential drawback of Anderson's analysis. He has come to conclude, not in the absence of great difficulty, that "The nature and function of matter...are among the more central elements of his (Hume's) doctrine," (H.F.P. p. 176) and that "the science of human nature itself is dependent upon another science, that of matter." (H.F.P., p. 176) In order, then, to resolve the conflicts inherent in Hume's system, an entire revision of Hume's metaphysics would be called for, one in which Hume would have to abandon such claims as 'some objects exist yet are nowhere' and there are no connections between distinct existences'. Aside from the impossibility of such a reformulation, (the philosopher is not present to perform the task), and the tone of the recommendation, (what ought to have been the case does not alter Hume's metaphysics as it stands), Anderson's conclusion assumes not only that Hume is a materialist, but as well that his own arguments for Hume's preferred view constitute undeniable proof of this. However, Anderson's arguments in favour of a materialist interpretation are by no means flawless and it seems a dubious venture to rewrite Hume's metaphysics in order to render his account of mind consistent with a reading that does not do justice to the text. Either Hume is both the materialist and the inconsistent metaphysician that Anderson makes him out to be, or Hume's theory of mind may, on another reading, be articulated with greater coherence.

2. C.V. Salmon and Hume's Subjective Idealism

The reading offered by C.V. Salmon does not promise to stand up to the major criticism of attempts to provide a systematic account of Hume's theory of mind. This major objection, briefly restated, is that upon any interpretation the commentator must find Hume to be inconsistent or must admit that many of Hume's views do not fit within the suggested framework and need be abandoned for this and other reasons if Hume is to hold a coherent theory.

Now, Salmon wishes to claim that Hume is, within limits and in a very special sense, a subjective idealist. It is worth noting that Salmon's view regarding Hume's assertions about mind--consciousness is the term Salmon frequently employs--is exactly the reverse of Anderson's in many respects, particularly when it comes to his assessments throughout The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy of those limitations in Hume's metaphysics that prevent him (Hume) from further describing the processes of consciousness beyond the activities of perception to which Salmon sees Hume's discussion in Book I confined. ("...the Treatise," Salmon observes, "is governed by Hume's conception of the nature of human consciousness."²⁷) Salmon contends in his Introduction that despite the fact that Hume's Treatise was to "be a study of the whole nature of man", (C.P., p. 299) Hume's metaphysical speculations, as Salmon puts it, "resolve themselves into an analysis and description of the subjective 'act' of external perception" (C.P., p. 299). More important are such assertions as 'Hume reifies perceptions where he should not, thus undermining

the distinction between objects and perceptions, that 'Hume at once affirms and denies causality,' and finally, by far Salmon's most extensive criticism, (it does in fact incorporate the previous ones mentioned here), that Hume falls prey to a real hypostasis which undermines his true account of consciousness--renders his subjective idealism impure by reducing experience, (i.e., experience as experienced by a subject), to "psycho-physical experiences." (C.P., p. 317) The upshot of Salmon's general analysis is that Hume is not only inconsistent in the respects cited above, but also that he ought not have succumbed to the natural attitude which denies his true philosophical examination of mind. Again, in the many claims that Hume should have maintained x instead of y, z, or w, in order to strengthen his position, should or ought are the watchwords in terms of the legitimacy of Salmon's analysis. The suggestion that Hume ought to have held x or that he ought to have denied y in order to be more consistent in his views about consciousness already implies that he did not do so in fact. This inadequacy in terms of his real intent as outlined by Salmon may either be attributed to a failure of Hume's philosophy or to limitations in the commentators reading. In either case Salmon must acknowledge Hume to fall short of his desired goal as a subjective idealist into manifest inconsistencies.

Salmon's account of the virtues of Hume's subjective idealism and where he departs from these only to involve himself, according to this commentator, in contradictory conclusions, is incredibly complex and it is neither possible nor desirable within the limits of this appraisal to follow in extensive detail the development of Salmon's arguments throughout his dissertation. I propose to undertake a treatment of those salient features of Salmon's account following a similar procedure as

adopted in examining Anderson's reading, in order not only to reveal the grounds upon which Salmon maintains that Hume is a subjective idealist but as well to assess the validity of his major claims and to lay bare the inconsistencies that mark, in Salmon's view, the not inconsequential failures of Hume's metaphysics, i.e., his account of consciousness.

A. Subjective Idealism--A special Case

The first question that requires consideration if an evaluation of Salmon's interpretation is to be given, (and this to illustrate that Hume's analysis of mind does not admit of systematization according to this reading), is 'In what sense does Salmon understand Hume to be a subjective idealist?'. The conception of consciousness that Salmon attributes to Hume must be carefully distinguished from the metaphysical doctrine which is characterized by the premise that "only mental things exist."²⁸ Whether it is accurate to maintain that Berkeley held this view is not an issue here, and although it is true that assertions made by Berkeley about the nature of mind are very similar to claims that are to be found in Hume's writings, Salmon's emphasis, despite his mention of Berkeley in connection with Hume's scepticism, lies elsewhere.

Early in his discussion Salmon quite explicitly states both the central premise that forms the basis of his examination and the reasons for this choice of focus rather than another more usual one. He contends, in fact, that neither reason nor causality constitute the centre of Hume's thought because these concepts cannot support the whole of Hume's metaphysics and because, as Salmon infers, the essence of human nature would be rational or causal which is clearly not the case for Hume as Salmon notes in the following remark:

But Hume did not consider it as either one or the other. He admitted no objective causality, and if he did not actually deny the human faculty of reason, he confined it to as narrow a sphere of activity as he could. Hume's science of Man was conceived as an investigation of the principles of human consciousness, and the principles which he examined most closely in Book I were those involved in external perception." (C.P., p. 300)

Moreover, according to Salmon, if Hume's "conception of consciousness, and the method which he used to examine its structure..." (C.P., p. 300)--the nature of mind and the method employed in revealing its essence are intimately connected--are to emerge from obscurity, Hume can neither be considered as a precursor of Kantian philosophy which has been too formal...", nor of empirical psychology which is "...too objective to be in sympathy with Hume's descriptive and subjective work." (C.P., p. 301) Rather, Hume's successors are thought, by Salmon, to be Brentano and Husserl and his conception of consciousness and the method by which its structures are revealed is phenomenological.

Setting aside, for the moment, the possibility that Salmon's initial premise, (viz., that the essence of human nature or consciousness²⁹ is neither rational nor causal), may be called into question, it is important to begin with the primary focus of Salmon's discussion if we are to discern the nature of Hume's subjective idealism within the limits, (Hume's examination of the principles of external perception), and the framework, (phenomenological), set by Salmon. Now, one of the most crucial views to which Salmon considers Hume to be committed in part is that consciousness is primary; that is, it is neither derived from nor reducible to an objective sphere, e.g., a psycho-physical reality. Neither are the objects "of which this act of consciousness is conscious," (C.P., p. 314) reducible to "subjective contents of consciousness." (C.P., p. 31

In other words, the world of spatial objects, for instance (note that it is the consciousness of material objects that involves external perception) would not be regarded as 'mental entities' that are essentially 'private' and 'in ones head' so to speak. In Salmon's account, and from the phenomenological perspective generally, "subject" and "object" are possible only through consciousness and are derived from the very structure of consciousness itself. Hence, as Salmon writes: "the principles of the objective worlds presuppose the consciousness in which we know these worlds." (C.P., p. 315) Furthermore, any objective sphere (e.g., the 'real' world of external objects) "is due to, and must be explained by, the processes of consciousness itself." (C.P., p. 315) Indeed, Salmon stresses that the foundation of philosophy must rest upon the assumption that consciousness is "self-sufficient" and that "The evidence of each present state of mind to its present state of self must be taken to be ultimate and absolute." (C.P., p. 313) This means, in effect, that the evidence given to consciousness through introspection (the true philosophical method according to Salmon) is not to be doubted--such are the facts or so-called uncontested data of consciousness that are the objects of reflection.

The affirmation of the primacy of consciousness in Hume's philosophy amounts, in Salmon's estimation, to Hume's insightful recognition "that the subject was responsible for his consciousness of every objective sphere..." (C.P., p. 302) This is evident from Hume's practice of introspection (the method he is said to have employed) as Salmon notes:

Hume's purpose was to examine his own consciousness, and, turning his attention from what was objective to him in everyday life, to concentrate upon what was actually passing in his own mind, and what was implicit

in his consciousness itself. (C.P., p. 306)

Certainly, the numerous 'thought experiments' that Hume performs throughout his examination of human nature bear witness to Salmon's contention. Although Hume may not have been entirely aware that he practiced philosophical introspection, according to Salmon, and even if "Hume's own descriptions of the experiments he is going to conduct conform to the 'psychological' rather than to the 'introspective' method..." (C.P., p. 317) (the former is empirical, e.g., as in the observation of others from which only general principles arise, while the latter is a priori, e.g., the examination of one's own states of consciousness as experienced, from which universal principles are derived.) his approach appears to conform to Salmon's evaluation. One of Hume's descriptions, appearing in his discussion of scepticism with regard to the senses (T. IV, II, p. 196), is a case in point. Hume is engaged in providing some answer to the question as to how the opinion that "the continued existence of body depends on the COHERENCE and CONSTANCY of certain impressions," (T. 195) comes about. He first of all observes his situation and notes that he is in his chamber in front of the fire--the existence of the material world is assumed as given. He proceeds, then, to observe that memory experience, because it does not extend beyond the past existence of objects, cannot provide testimony (nor can the senses) of the continuance of objects. He is seated and is reflecting when the porter enters: "...I hear on a sudden noise as of a door turning upon its hinges; and a little after see a porter, who advances towards me." Accordingly, this event occasions "many new reflections and reasonings." What follows assumes, very much, the character of observing what passes in his consciousness as he examines what the present phenomena reveals about the way in

which we arrive at the above-mentioned opinion. Indeed Hume's description involves an act of reflection and an appropriate object of this reflection that differs from common experience, i.e., the natural attitude of which Salmon speaks. Perhaps Hume's reflection may be regarded as an instance of what appears to be a groundless claim on Salmon's part, namely that while Hume believes empirical sciences to be limited to experience and observation in the objective sense, "philosophy "can go beyond experience"." More specifically, "Philosophy can go 'into' experience, can concentrate upon experience itself, and that experiencing which presents us with all the objects of our knowledge and conditions them." (C.P., p. 322) On this point Salmon is, no doubt, attributing far more to Hume's philosophy than is legitimate precisely because Hume himself did not go very deeply 'into' experience, but assumed experience in a very ordinary sense. Salmon, however, recognizes this when he maintains that Hume is limited, in the final analysis, to the principles and approach of empirical psychology, because Hume "cannot justify his practice of the introspective mode." (C.P., p. 322) Hume's inability to justify what he is doing is attributed to the fact that Hume regarded the natural and reflective states as contradictory, and this because he did not recognize the relation between consciousness and its objects. Hence, Salmon considers Hume to have chosen between "objects in consciousness and objects outside it," (C.P., p. 306) thereby making the reflective attitude that we perceive nothing but our own perceptions and the natural attitude, i.e., the experience of independent realities, mutually exclusive. In another terminology, Hume has committed himself to dualism, and while this contradicts the subjective idealism to which Hume is acknowledged to adhere it also presents difficulties for Hume's true account of external perception.

It may be granted that there is evidence for Salmon's reading and his criticisms find justification in Hume's writings which show (particularly in his discussion of scepticism) Hume's inability to reconcile the natural attitude and that of reflection except via the only alternative remaining to him, namely the remedy of "carelessness and inattention." (T. 218) Moreover, because Hume does make this dualistic assumption, he is committed in his analysis of external perception to the view that there are external objects that cause subjective perceptions, the latter of which exist "within the mind". There arises the problem, then, of how we get out of the flux of subjective, mind-dependent perceptions, to objects. While Salmon maintains that Hume admits of no objective causality he must also acknowledge that Hume's misunderstanding of the relation of subject and object, according to his reading, amounts to a contradiction; i.e., this view contradicts Hume's subjective idealism.

If Hume were to provide an accurate account of external perception in keeping with his introspective method, hence on the basis of the Subjective 'experience' of consciousness, he would have to say that a material object appears to me in a certain manner, i.e., through a multiplicity of perspectives and that the series of perspectives which are subjective phenomena give the intimation of a stable and objective thing having an independent existence beyond the flux of perception. Indeed one might take this to be Hume's intention when he says: "That table, which just now appears to me, is only a perception, and all its qualities are qualities of a perception." (T. 239) Aside from the fact that Hume's observation bears no resemblance to the essence of the material object and the perception of it as described above, Salmon himself would argue, here, that Hume has confused the perception of the

table and the perspectives implied in the act with the material object that appears; in other words, Hume reifies the perception where he ought not. Hume is thus found to contradict himself and he is, therefore, an impure sort of subjective idealist.

B. Hume Succumbs to the 'Real' Hypostasis

In order to account for those aspects of Hume's metaphysics that violate his intended study of the subjective acts of consciousness via a method of introspection, Salmon alleges that Hume falls prey to a 'real' hypostasis; that is to say, he employs "objective laws...in explaining the principles of consciousness." (C.P., p. 315) As Salmon contends: "Hume did not always succeed in keeping his reflections pure of reference to physical and psycho-physical reality..." (C.P., p. 301) Hence, while he recognized that objective spheres were derived from consciousness, "he considered himself obliged to qualify the subjective with some of the qualities of the objective sphere of Reality." (C.P., p. 302) Quite clearly, on Salmon's reading, this explains Hume's reification of perceptions, i.e., that perceptions are made into things, as it makes intelligible both Hume's fall into dualism (i.e., that he considered consciousness and objects to be opposed) and the said contradiction that Hume involves himself in by at once denying and affirming causality. With regard to the latter Salmon remarks that Hume shows our perception of cause to be dependent upon subjective processes of consciousness. True, Hume does admit "that the constant conjunction of objects determines their causation" (T. 173) and indeed this constant conjunction, which constitutes our perception of the relation of cause and effect, is intimately connected, for Hume, to the associating principles of the

Imagination. Since the imagination is a central aspect of consciousness, according to Salmon, and since causation is a principle of the imagination it would not be objective in the empirical sense. Yet, Salmon argues, Hume "proceeds, first to deny that there is any such thing as real cause--an inverse of the real hypostasis--and then,--a direct use of the real hypostasis--to assert that it is a cause which governs the processes of consciousness," (C.P., p. 317) which is a manifest contradiction. Any references to animal spirits testifies to a real hypostasis, according to Salmon.

The implication of Salmon's criticism in terms of rendering systematic Hume's account of consciousness is that Hume, in the final analysis, would be required to abandon any attempt to explain mind by way of reference to material reality, precisely because 'reality' as an objective realm is considered by Salmon to be derived from consciousness, the latter of which is not reducible to the former. It is at this point, then, that a difficulty emerges in Salmon's reading. He is unable to provide an account of Hume's theory of mind without discovering that Hume's views fall short, in crucial respects, of his apparent intentions; that is, without clearly asserting that Hume is unavoidably inconsistent. Although it may be granted, on one hand, that Salmon's positive reading does appear to have basis in Hume's writings, it seems, on the other, that Salmon, in part, imports his own bias into the interpretation, and this in the manner of accusing Hume of reductionism. (Indeed Hume may be a reductionist. Anderson certainly thought so and John Bricke often makes the same allegation in specific instances.) Nevertheless, the point is more clearly revealed in the following general remark:

In our own day, owing largely to the extravagant faith
in reality, which the success of the natural and physical

sciences has produced, we have seen the birth of a physiological psychology which claims to comprehend philosophy. (C.P., p. 317)

The position which Salmon regards Hume to hold would not allow such a conception of philosophy. In fact the only true method for philosophical inquiry is that of introspection and the subject is the only object of this reflection. Now, we may return to the initial premise that Hume's conception of the nature of human consciousness is not causal, otherwise the essence of human nature would as well be causal. (Salmon is absolved from any criticism concerning his assertion that the essence of human nature is not rational. Hume is by no means a rationalist. In fact, the narrow sphere Hume allotted to reason is aptly revealed by the famous statement that 'reason is the slave of the passions'.)

Salmon runs into difficulty with his claim about causality for several reasons. First of all, he stresses that Hume "admitted of no objective causality" (C.P., p. 300) and later finds Hume to be inconsistent on this point. In fact, in a more detailed examination of Hume's "contradictory attitudes towards causality" (C.P., p. 343) Salmon acknowledges that "whoever wishes, can find authority for regarding Hume as an empirical psychologist, or even a species of physiologist, "since, as Salmon notes once again, "Hume did badly by causality, denying it, and making use of it, alternatively." (C.P., p. 341) Concisely put, the strength of Salmon's initial statement is considerably modified throughout his discussion and the final verdict in terms of Hume's attempt to explain the principles of consciousness amounts to the affirmation that Hume may or may not be a subjective idealist in the special sense employed by Salmon, depending upon whether one considers causality to be a focus for Hume's examination or whether one considers Hume to deny it altogether.

At a glance, this comment may suggest only that Salmon is unable to deal successfully with Hume's so-called contradictory views about causality. If we see his remarks in the context of the assertion that Hume falls prey to the real hypostasis a more deeply rooted problem arises. This brings me to the second point. It was already noted that Salmon must deny some aspect of Hume's philosophy if Hume is to be considered consistent in his subjective idealism. The extent of this includes Hume's vindication of "his conception of the dependency of the sciences on 'human nature'." (C.P., p. 315) Salmon stresses that Hume can validate his view, viz., that the sciences are to have a new foundation upon human nature, solely on the condition that he "places the 'origin' of the whole content of all the worlds which we perceive, or could perceive, in a purely subjective 'genesis'..." (C.P., p. 315) i.e., in the productive (creative) imagination, and that he practices the "introspective method". Indeed the very conception of human nature is at issue, here. Salmon has shown that Hume's introspection is tainted by objective explanation, hence Hume does not consistently practice the method Salmon attributes to him. Moreover, Hume often explains the principles of the imagination in 'realistic', i.e., mechanistic or causal terms, such that consciousness might be thought of as material. Since Salmon takes Hume's method and his conception of mind to be intimately connected, and since he acknowledged that Hume often explains the principles of human nature in the terminology of cause and effect, he may be charged with the offence of arguing in a circle, and this because the grounds upon which he affirms Hume's subjective idealism are later called into question, yet must be sustained if Hume is in fact to be found guilty of 'real' hypostasis. The limitation of Salmon's analysis is as follows: He has

disregarded from the outset that Hume's intention may indeed have been to apply an experimental method of natural science to moral subjects, and that the human nature which was to be a foundation for the sciences is possibly material nature that admits of causal explanation.

C. A Final Remark

The outcome of Salmon's interpretation points once again to the dilemmas encountered in any attempt to say, without noting inconsistencies, what Hume's theory of mind is. Certainly, Salmon has assumed a great deal in his analysis, only to show that Hume is not, in fact, consistent. Moreover, the complications of Hume's method become all too apparent. Although Salmon does have some evidence to make a case for Hume's employment of introspection, (the view he attributes to Hume implies a certain view of consciousness, i.e., that it is absolute), Hume's commitment both to dualism and the objective reality (particularly his reliance upon causal explanation), cannot so easily be denied, as Salmon demands, if we are to remain true to the text. While there appears to be a dilemma in Hume's intentions, one that points to a fundamental drawback of his metaphysics, it is possible that another reading may render Hume's views about mind consistent.

3. John Bricke's Account of Hume's Philosophy of Mind

Of the three commentators here, John Bricke presents the most explicit statement of Hume's position regarding the ontological status of mind and matter. Bricke's extensive evaluation of Hume's theory of mind as it appears in his recent work entitled Hume's Philosophy of Mind consists in an articulation of Hume's dualist interactionism. Not only does Bricke examine all of the relevant aspects of Hume's metaphysics, viz., Hume's scepticism, his assertions about self, objects, substance, perceptions, etc., but as well, he proceeds to make a case for Hume's dualism which takes, as Bricke himself puts it, "the form of a critique of attempts to show that Hume is a reductionist, whether of a physicalist, idealist or neutral monist variety."³⁰ With respect to the former, i.e., those issues in Hume's philosophy that bear upon his views about mind, Bricke presents a summary in the "Introduction" to his enterprise of those aspects which he treats extensively throughout. They are as follows:

...the assemblage of issues tied to Hume's reification of perceptions; his claims about the observability of inner states; the role he assigns to causality and to the body in his account of the workings of the mind. (P.M., p. 3)

He also examines Hume's views "on the central metaphysical and epistemological questions concerning the nature of the self, the conditions of personal identity, and the relations of mind and body." (P.M., p. 3)

Along with his assessment and denial of other possible readings of Hume's claims about mind, Bricke illustrates that Hume acknowledges the existence of psychophysical causality. This acceptance of psychophysical

interaction is considered, in Bricke's account, to be in accord with his dualism--Hume is said to characterize "the differences between the mental and the physical" (P.M., p. 25) which supports the claim that he admits the existence of both mind and body--as it is with a bundle theory of the self. According to Bricke "...there is no reason to suppose that a dualist cannot think in terms of causal transactions between bodily events and the perceptions that constitute a mind." (P.M., p. 26) In fact, "A bundle dualist may be an interactionist," (P.M., P. 26) in Bricke's account.

In terms of a systematic and plausible statement of Hume's theory of mind, Bricke's treatment is certainly impressive, although by no means is it to be absolved from criticism. It is questionable as to whether Bricke's critical assessment really does save "the textual appearances" as he suggests is the case. Indeed, as I shall demonstrate, his proposed emendations of Hume's metaphysics--they rest, I believe, upon the premise that Hume, however clearly a dualist interactionist, is one who requires considerable aid in strengthening his philosophical system--leave very few of Hume's views unaltered. In light of a serious charge that many of Hume's doctrines are defective and, consequently, do not stand up to close scrutiny, Bricke argues that "many of the foundational elements of Hume's considered theory must be scrapped." (P.M., p. 1) Of these he cites the theories of introspective awareness, of thinking, Hume's "epistemological idealism, his reification of perceptions and his scepticism with regard to the senses." (P.M., p. 1) Bricke also alleges that Hume is unable "to provide, in his own way and on his own premises, and empiricist explication of the very idea of mind." (P.M., p. 1)

In order to put Bricke's criticisms in perspective so that they may be properly evaluated it is essential, first of all, to establish briefly that Hume is a dualist of the interactionist sort according to Bricke's analysis, and to reveal the grounds upon which Bricke bases his conclusion. It remains to be shown that while Bricke affirms Hume's dualist interactionism on the one hand, he appears to deny Hume's dualism on the other--at least, it is not clear what sort of dualism Bricke attributes to Hume when the outcome of his examination of introspective awareness is completed. In addition to this obscurity, the fact that Bricke calls for such a drastic revision of Hume's philosophy of mind points once more to the difficulty manifested in attempts to articulate systematically and coherently Hume's theory of mind.

The concluding remark of John Bricke's work on Hume serves, I believe, as an appropriate point of departure for the present evaluation which is concerned to illustrate the limits of the "elaborate constructive theory of mind" (P.M. p. 4) that Bricke proposes, early in his discussion, to ascribe to Hume. Indeed, Bricke states his own verdict regarding Hume's metaphysics clearly enough in the following passage:

If my argument has been sound, much that is most characteristic of Hume's philosophy must be abandoned. Some may feel that nothing that is characteristically Humean emerges unscathed. As I have tried to show at many places, however, what is commonly taken to be characteristic of Hume is very far from the whole of him. Any sound assessment of his position must reckon with this fact. (P.M., p. 153)

Succinctly put, the general position adopted by Bricke is that Hume does have a so-called constructive theory of mind (what this is remains to be shown) although what is most characteristic in Hume's metaphysics, i.e., his views concerning introspective awareness, his epistemological idealism (which, Bricke stresses, "provides part of the motivation for his

holding..." "...a representative theory of perception" (P.M., p. 153) his reification of perceptions, and "his imagist account of thinking," (P.M., p. 152) must be eliminated because they pose problems for Hume's empiricist, non-idealist, program. In saying this much, one already perceives a similar dilemma to those occurring in the readings presented by Anderson and Salmon, viz., that it is not possible to state Hume's true doctrine regarding the ontological status of mind without finding aspects of his views that do not fit the preferred reading. That this difficulty is an intrinsic element in Bricke's interpretation becomes more clear upon examining the constructive theory which he takes Hume to articulate.

It is well worth noting, at this point, what is meant by constructive theory of mind in Bricke's analysis, for this will clarify, albeit only in part, the very nature of his assessment of Hume's metaphysics. There are, in fact, two ways in which one may understand the notion of constructive: (1) It constitutes a positive claim about the doctrine Hume is believed to hold, namely that of dualist-interactionism. The latter requires, according to Bricke's discussion, that Hume believe in the existence of the physical world, i.e., that he provide a "constructive account of the belief in bodies" (P.M., p. 5), that there be textual evidence to illustrate Hume's commitment to psychophysical interaction, and that Hume not be a reductionist. (2) It refers, also, to a theory outlined by Bricke, one that is based upon minimum premises held by Hume. This is, in Bricke's words:

...the formulation of a Generalized Humean Theory (GHT) of psychophysical interaction, constructed from Hume's explicit interactionist claim and a set of premises taken from his analysis of causality, in order to see whether a fundamentally Humean theory can make any contribution to more recent discussions of the mind-body

problem. (P.M., p. 25)

Aside from the emphasis upon causality and interaction, Bricke's proposal of GHT depends upon Hume's acknowledgement of both the existence of mind and body, hence upon the examination of Hume's scepticism in the initial chapter--"Scepticism, Perception and Physical Objects"--of his work.

Now, those aspects of Hume's philosophy that are considered by Bricke to be fundamentally Humean above and beyond those thought to be characteristically Humean (i.e., what must go if Hume is to remain true to his empiricism) are few and simple. In order to arrive at the first necessary, although not sufficient condition for Hume's dualism, Bricke goes to great lengths to show that "Hume's scepticism presents no bar, and is intended to present no bar, to his holding a theory of mind that keeps suitably in touch with the plain man's view." (P.M., p. 24)

Although, according to Bricke, Hume both presents sceptical arguments "against the naive realism of common sense, against the representative theory of perception, and against the very belief in physical objects," (P.M., p. 5) and believes these to be irrefutable, Hume holds at the very least that the conclusion 'physical objects do not exist' cannot be believed, and this because of the strong forces of nature against principle. Certainly, even Hume's analysis of the cause of our belief in physical objects is based upon the assumption of their existence, as is evident from Hume's own statement:

We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? but 'tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings. (T. 187)

That Hume does believe in the existence of bodies is not to be denied, and indeed Bricke is justified in asserting that "Hume's radical

scepticism is not designed to advance the thesis that there are no physical objects." (P.M., p. 24) For one, if this were not the case Hume would quite obviously be guilty of inconsistency by assuming the existence of material objects while at the same time denying their existence. Bricke contends that Hume is not a Pyrrhonian sceptic--he holds with the plain man that there are bodies possessing distinct and continued existence--and that the sole point of Hume's sceptical arguments is "to put a rein on radical departures from the plain man's metaphysics." (P.M., p. 24)

Whether Bricke is justified in his suggestion as to the purpose of Hume's scepticism is open to question. Nevertheless, the fact that he does not consider the target of Hume's scepticism to be physical objects assures Bricke of the minimum necessary condition to support the claim that Hume is a dualist, viz., that he affirms the existence of bodies and is, thereby, capable of holding a theory that is compatible with our ordinary or 'natural' attitude towards the world. This, as Bricke notes, "means a theory that countenances connections between a person's (mind-independent) body and his mind." (P.M., p. 24) Of course, this plain man's view cannot be naive realism (i.e., the view that we directly perceive objects and not perceptions/'mental entities') since Hume, according to Bricke's analysis, "claims to have shown that the naive realism of common sense, although believable, is false." (P.M., p. 23) The only position that avoids the false conclusions of the naive perspective and a radical scepticism (although "concedes as much as possible to the irrefutable sceptical arguments" (P.M., p. 23) that arise in the philosophical attitude or reflection) is a representative realism. It is precisely this position that Hume is said to hold despite the fact that he considers it to be a "'monstrous offspring'

(T. 215) of the claims of nature and reason." (P.M., p. 24)--the outcome, so Bricke observes, "of the inextinguishable belief in physical objects and the recognized falsity of the plain man's unreflective view about the very things he perceives." (P.M., p. 24) Aside from the fact that, according to Hume, "there are no logically compelling grounds for choosing physical objects as the causes of one's perceptions", (P.M., p. 23) Bricke notes that the view adopted by Hume has the virtue of being "relatively natural" in so far as the existence of physical objects is preserved. If we proceed one step farther in Bricke's analysis, it becomes clear that the representative theory ensures the distinction between perceptions (mind-dependent) and bodies (mind-independent) required, along with Hume's affirmation of the existence of bodies, to support the conclusion that Hume is a dualist. Hence, Bricke not only has the minimum premise that he needs, viz., Hume's belief in bodies, but as well the distinction between bodies and minds implicit in representative realism. It is thus that he is able to conclude, prior to his defense of Hume's interactionism and arguments designed to deny the claim that Hume is a reductionist: "The picture that emerges from our examination of Hume's views about perceptions is that of a mind-body dualist who admits some degree of mind-body interaction." (P.M., p. 25)

While Hume's views about perceptions constitute the basis upon which Bricke is able, early in his discussion, to establish his central claim, Bricke considers his thesis not to be sufficiently demonstrated at this point. He proceeds to illustrate, so as "to avoid begging the question", (P.M., p. 25) (1) that Hume admits both the logical possibility and the fact of psychophysical causation, and (2) that Hume is definitely

not a reductionist of any sort. Although Bricke elaborates upon these propositions in considerable detail, it is not appropriate, here, to assess his arguments, precisely because I am not concerned to show whether Bricke's interpretation is or is not 'correct'. Nevertheless, the conclusions that Bricke draws after stating his case are significant in so far as they reveal limitations of the so-called 'constructive theory' that Bricke wishes to attribute to Hume. It will become evident, shortly, that once Bricke does away with Hume's epistemological idealism, there appears to be nothing 'constructive' that remains of Hume's philosophy aside from the minimal premise that Bricke arrives at in his examination of Hume's views about perceptions. In fact, the major support for Hume's dualism (i.e., representative realism) is itself called into question.

Bricke maintains that Hume is without doubt an interactionist, although this conclusion is founded upon a criterion that Bricke himself regards as weak, namely, that it is "a sufficient condition of his being an interactionist that a philosopher holds that some have physical effects." (P.M., p. 32) According to Bricke, "Hume holds that all sensations have physical causes." (P.M., p. 32) where physical cause is understood as:

...causes in the physical world outside one's own body, causes in one's body as normally observable, for example, the conditions of one's sense organs, and causes in one's brain and the central nervous system as well as other inner physical causes. (P.M., p. 28)

To say, then, that for Hume all sensations are the results of some physical cause means that they have as their source external, bodily, and physiological causes. For Hume, only volitions "that give rise to bodily movements", Bricke maintains, "have direct physiological effects." (P.M., p. 31)

He supposes that because the association of ideas has a physiological basis, (i.e., the 'animal spirits'), in Hume's view, so associated ideas would also have physiological effects. Yet Bricke offers this claim only tentatively since not a great deal of evidence is available from Hume's texts to support such a position.

Given an analysis of Hume's assertions, then, Bricke is able to make only a limited statement upon which he proceeds to construct a "Generalized Humean Theory (GHT) of mind-body interaction." (P.M., p. 32) He admits to construing Hume's claims about interaction "in a way clearly stronger than he (Hume) intends." (P.M., p. 32) Furthermore, Bricke stresses that Hume does not "pursue questions of mind-body interaction far enough to be forced to take a stand on such a theory as GHT", (P.M., p. 32) since such a theory is not Hume's way of viewing the relation between mind and body. The theory construction presented by Bricke is intended as an improvement upon the limited position that Hume is believed to articulate on the subject, first because "it allows him to admit the possibility of what may be called 'the completeness of physiology'..." (P.M., p. 36) Secondly, Hume would be able to explain psychological events by psychological, physiological, or psychophysical laws depending upon the situation that he wishes to discuss. Finally, Bricke maintains that, within the parameters of GHT, one would be able "to speak with the Humean psychologist and with the physiologist, as well as with the plain man." (P.M., p. 36) In saying all this, Bricke presumes a great deal about the way in which Hume intended to explain psychological events, about Hume's views on the possibility of explaining all brain events and states according to physical laws, in short, about what constitutes explanation in Hume's philosophical writings. If one

considers that Hume is only minimally an interactionist and goes to no lengths in developing mind-body interaction according to Bricke's admission, then the generalized theory supposed to improve upon Hume's views appears rather as an imposition upon the philosopher since it presupposes that Hume had intended to proceed along these lines.

Even more problematic for Bricke's analysis is the claim that while Hume is a mind-body dualist "one looks in vain to him for a developed philosophical account of the differences between the mental and the physical; between perceptions and the features of physical objects." (P.M., p. 44) Hume is, in effect, a dualist who offers no 'constructive' claims about the distinction save, as Bricke notes, to indicate a distinction "by several reiterated pairs of expressions: 'moral philosophy' and 'natural philosophy' (T. 175, xix, 8, 275-6); 'moral phenomena' and 'natural phenomena' (T. 136); the 'intellectual world' and the 'natural world' (T. 232, 263)" (P.M., p. 44) But these distinctions tell us no more, according to Bricke, than that Hume is a dualist, and this founded upon the distinction already made between perceptions and the physical world. One might certainly object that the pairs of expressions are far from implying a dualism, since one could quite legitimately speak of two different regions of inquiry, e.g., natural science and moral philosophy, without thereby suggesting that man has a dual nature. Furthermore, it is appropriate to say that moral philosophy has an object particular to it, viz., moral phenomena, which for Hume would include "men's behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures." (T. xix) or "moral good and evil", (T. 457) while natural philosophy would concern itself with natural phenomena, e.g., the orbits of the planets. The distinction by itself does not necessarily

indicate mind-body dualism as much as it suggests that each 'science' has its appropriate object. From a methodological standpoint Hume is perfectly justified in drawing a distinction although he seems to run into difficulties in applying an experimental method to moral subjects (if, that is, we understand this method to be that of the natural scientist). This is another matter altogether, however, and it is sufficient to note only that the pairs of terms employed by Hume may indeed have an import quite different from that suggested by Bricke.

While these contrasts indicate very little about the nature of the distinction between the mental and the physical (it is not clear even that they imply dualism) the contrast between the 'internal' and the 'external' frequently employed by Hume is more telling in so far as it amounts, according to Bricke, "to contrasting the modes of access one has to one's own perceptions, on one hand, and to bodies and the perceptions, on the other." (P.M., p. 44) In Hume's account, then, we have access to external objects through 'external' senses, while we have "privileged access" to perceptions which are 'internal' and private. For Hume, access to the latter requires, as Bricke notes, introspective awareness. Now this is quite consistent with the dualism implicit in Hume's representative theory of perception upon which Bricke relied initially to establish the claim that Hume is a dualist. Furthermore, the distinction in modes of access to bodies and perceptions reveals more about the nature of the mental and the physical--the former, described as internal, is 'private' and the latter is 'public' because external. Nevertheless, Bricke's criticism of introspection calls even this into question along with the grounds upon which he was able to establish Hume's dualism.

In the final chapter of his book,--a chapter called "Introspection and Sensory Awareness"--Bricke purports to "get to the bottom of his (Hume's) philosophizing about mind," (P.M., p. 100) and indeed presents a critique of Hume's method of introspection which has grave consequences for Hume's ontology. Now Hume is said, in Bricke's analysis, to have an imagist account of thinking and he is committed accordingly to the view that there exist objects, i.e., "introspectible images", "that do meet one's inner gaze"; (P.M., p. 125) in other words, there are mental items that we can become aware of through introspection. Bricke suggests that Hume possesses an "analogical theory of introspection" (P.M., p. 130--as an 'inner sense' theorist he "would like introspection to outer sense or perception of physical objects." (P.M., p. 126) Hence, just as we are aware via 'external' senses of physical objects, we are aware of 'perceptions' through 'inner sense'. Bricke's criticism of Hume is largely directed towards the claim that we are aware through inner sense of impressions and ideas construed as 'reified mental particulars'. He argues, contra Hume, that awareness of images, feelings, sensations is not awareness of mental entities or objects. Rather, these are "states of mere awareness of their own contents or objects." (P.M., p. 150) Bricke goes on to illustrate what he means in the following:

To have a sensation of blue is to have mere awareness not of a sensation but of a blue patch. To have an image of blue is likewise to have mere awareness not of some mental entity but of some blue patch. To have a sinking feeling in the pit of one's stomach is to have mere awareness of the content in question. (P.M., p. 150)

Essentially Bricke is attempting, here, to clarify a distinction that Hume, admittedly, does not always make between perceiving, i.e., imaging, feeling, sensing, and the object of what Bricke calls mere

awareness (rather than thinking or "introspective judgement" which "requires both awareness and concepts." (P.M., p. 125) Furthermore, Brücke clarifies the nature of the object of such awareness--the object is a blue patch, a sinking feeling, etc., and not a sensation or a mental entity. Hume's theory of introspection breaks down because there can be no 'inner observation of mental entities' according to Brücke. Consequently Hume's theory must be abandoned upon these grounds.

Brücke argues that the failure of Hume's account of introspection has grave consequences for other central elements of Hume's metaphysics. It eliminates "one of the principal supports of his imagist account of thinking", (P.M., p. 152) precisely because images (quasi-sensory) and objects of sense awareness are not thoughts--the latter require concepts in addition to awareness of content. While one might venture criticisms against Brücke's analysis (e.g., his rejection of Hume's account of thinking is founded upon a limited view of thinking, and further, Hume's distinction between image and word would likely fulfill the requirement for 'introspective judgement'), the damage done by his rejection of Hume's theory is farreaching, as Brücke notes in the following remark:

Rejection of Hume's presumptive views about introspection is...intimately bound up with rejection of his reification of perceptions. With the rejection of this doctrine, however, goes the rejection of his epistemological idealism. With his epistemological idealism must go Hume's sceptical arguments regarding the external world, as well as his attempts to show the ineradicably antinomic character of the human understanding on such matters, for each of these contentions has epistemological idealism as a essential premise. (P.M., p. 152)

Hume cannot even justify his claim that the mind is a bundle of reified perceptions, because no such entities exist according to Brücke. Hume accordingly can speak of a bundle theory only on the condition that he abandons the notion of 'mental entities' and of 'inner sense'. Hume

would even have to revise his so-called "constructive views about sense perceptions" which are revealed in his representative theory of perception, since epistemological idealism provides the motivation for Hume's views about perceptions according to Bricke's analysis. He writes:

The direct objects of observation are mental particulars that represent the physical objects to which one has no direct access. Our objections to Hume's account of introspection sink this theory of sense perceptions as well as their ostensible object. (P.M., p. 153)

Indeed, Bricke contends that there is no non-idealist representative theory discoverable in Hume's philosophy.

If we consider the state of affairs to which Bricke has reduced Hume's metaphysics, there is no doubt that not a great deal remains of the 'constructive' theory of mind that he sought at the outset to attribute to Hume. First of all, Bricke has acknowledged that Hume is only minimally an interactionist and it is upon this premise that he constructs a Generalized Humean Theory that is supposed to aid Hume's position. On Bricke's own admission Hume neither regards the relation of mind and body in the fashion outlined in his 'Humean' theory nor does Hume develop mind-body interaction in the depths required if he is to take a stand on the GHT, although Bricke still considers such a theory construction to be an immense improvement upon Hume's recognizably limited position. What is 'positive', then, regarding Hume's interactionism is much more Bricke's construction than anything for which Hume could be expected to be held responsible.

It has been noted above that Hume does not, according to Bricke, present any constructive views concerning the distinction between the mental and the physical, and if Hume is a dualist the mention of 'reiterated pairs' does little to advance or confirm Bricke's position.

The outcome of Bricke's rejection of introspection in Hume's philosophy is that Hume's dualism seems to be undermined entirely. At least, if Hume's epistemological idealism must go, so according to Bricke must the representative theory of perception, and the latter constitutes the foundation for Bricke's initial conclusion. Be that as it may, the point is that Bricke abandons a great deal of what is characteristic of Hume's metaphysics, and indeed if we consider what remains as fundamentally Humean it is not clear that Bricke has proceeded beyond his initial conclusion that Hume believes in the existence of mind and body and admits some degree of interaction. While he has constructed much upon this premise, (particularly the GHT of interaction), in the absence of those "foundational elements in Hume's considered Theory of mind" (P.M., p. 1) it is no longer evident what constructive theory remains to be attributed to Hume himself.

CONCLUSION TO PART I

It is significant to consider, at this point, what the examination of the commentators readings suggest in terms of Hume's so-called 'theory of mind'. I have attempted to show the limitations of each interpretation as far as a coherent reading, (and more so a systematic reading), of Hume's views about mind is concerned, and it should be evident from the preceding analysis that the commentators have had to acknowledge, in presenting their positions, inconsistencies in Hume's writings that can be rectified not by the presentation of an alternate reading, but by a denial of aspects of Hume's metaphysics. In either case, some drastic revision of Hume's philosophy of mind must follow upon any given interpretation.

In his attempt to reconcile Hume's views about perceptions with the assertion that the mind is the brain, for Hume, Anderson comes to the conclusion that Hume is fundamentally inconsistent. Hume's contention that some perceptions are dependent, that there are material connections among perceptions (i.e. the animal spirits), confirms, along with Hume's views about causality, according to Anderson, the assertion that mind is, for Hume, reduced to matter. However, these claims are inconsistent (respectively), in Anderson's analysis, with Hume's claims (1) that there are some perceptions that possess no location, hence, cannot have extension, size, and shape, as attributes; (2) that all perceptions have distinct and independent existence; and (3) that there are no connections, (material or otherwise), among perceptions that exist in this manner. Anderson hints at a resolution of this conflict by suggesting

that Hume's "science of MAN" is more properly natural science, and therefore Hume's "compleat system of the sciences" ought to have as its foundation natural philosophy. Certainly those of Hume's assertions about perceptions that do not fall within both the materialist thesis and the doctrine of matter and mechanism would have to be abandoned entirely. While Anderson's proposal is consistent with the materialist explanation that he believes Hume to provide with respect to the principles of human nature, he must deny all that is strictly philosophical in Hume's writings.

First of all, his recommendation appears to undermine Hume's belief that all sciences bear relation to human nature. Indeed, Hume's hypothesis constitutes, in part, a radical basis upon which he proceeds to unfold his metaphysics. Hume maintains that:

Even, Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in some measure dependent on the science of MAN; since they lie under the cognizance of men, and are judged by their powers and faculties. (T. xv)

If we assess this statement (one that hardly reveals by itself a mechanistic overtone but rather traces the sciences back to the extent of human intellectual powers and faculties) in terms of Anderson's proposal, then, natural philosophy would be dependent upon natural philosophy since the 'science of MAN' is more appropriately a science of matter and mechanism in Anderson's estimation. The important distinction that Hume draws between this science of MAN (or human nature) and all other sciences which are said to depend upon it entirely disappears. If the human powers and faculties are responsible for the understanding of all sciences, then, to explain these faculties and powers by physical laws and upon the premises of natural philosophy which is, by Hume's own admission, a second-order science in so far as it depends upon one more primary, i.e., the

science of human nature, constitutes a paradox; for how can the primary science of human nature be natural philosophy if the latter depends upon the principles of human nature? To explain these principles by a science that itself depends on "the knowledge of man" amounts to saying that we can only become "thoroughly acquainted with the extent and force of human understanding, and cou'd explain the nature of the ideas we employ, and of the operations we perform in our reasonings", (T. xv) via a science that already presupposes these ideas and powers of reasoning. Furthermore, if these ideas and intellectual powers are, as Anderson suggests, material and hence entirely explainable in terms of physical mechanisms and laws, there would be no need, on Hume's part, to characterize the relation between human nature and all the other sciences as he does-- the understanding of the faculties and intellectual powers of man could no longer be a prerequisite for improvements and changes in the other sciences, since human nature does not differ essentially from material nature and is explainable in purely materialistic and mechanistic terms. Even the four sciences of "Logic, Morals, Criticism, and Politics," in which "is comprehended almost every thing, which it can any way import us to be acquainted with, or which can tend either to the improvement or ornament of the human mind." (T. xvi) would have, as their new foundation, matter and mechanism.

Now it may indeed be the case that the paradox above-mentioned, along with its attendant difficulties, are more of Hume's making than they are the outcome of Anderson's analysis. One thing is clear, nevertheless. If we take Anderson's recommendation seriously, then the methodological division Hume makes between explanation of principles of human nature via experience and observation and explanation by reference to natural

and physical causes would be entirely superfluous. Certainly Hume's maxim that 'we must in the end rest contented with experience' (T. 60) would have to give way to the premise that all the principles that Hume seeks explanation for (e.g., those of the union among our ideas), can be accounted for in terms of natural and physical causes. Hume's imaginary brain dissection and all references to optics etc., could not possibly be exceptions to his overall purpose, but would constitute the source of his conclusions about human nature--an attempt not to rely on experience and what is given in it but to get behind it and at causes.

If Hume's is a natural philosophy, because a doctrine of matter and mechanism, then those philosophical considerations embodied in Hume's criterion of meaning, among other things, would have to be abandoned according to Anderson's prescription. Certainly Hume's criterion of meaning, as stated most concisely in the Enquiries (E. 22) has less to do with a doctrine of mechanism than it does with language and what we mean when we employ philosophical terminology. Indeed Hume's intent is clearly philosophical--the concern to delimit what we can intelligibly say from what would be meaningless according to Hume's empirical criterion does not constitute a 'first principle' of natural science. It is in its import aimed at the sensibility of those philosophical notions that are the objects of metaphysical debates, and accords essentially with Hume's maxim that we must rely upon experience as an authority for all our philosophical assertions. Whether or not the criterion is a sufficient one is not an issue here. The point is that Anderson's interpretation cannot do justice to the philosophical aspects of Hume's metaphysics--reference to the criterion of meaning is a case in point. All that has been said, thusfar, serves to reaffirm the limitations of Anderson's reading.

The opposite of Anderson's recommendation is apparent in Salmon's denial of Hume's naturalism, which he regards as an inappropriate reduction of both the contents and operations of consciousness to an explanation based upon physical laws of cause and effect. Essentially Salmon's criticism of Hume, viz., that causal explanation has no place in an analysis of the essence of mind, amounts to the claim that Hume confuses two realms, namely, the natural world to which causal laws apply and the realm of consciousness to which they do not. Salmon's rejection of Hume's naturalism along with Hume's tendency towards a real hypostasis allows him to make sense of the claim that Anderson's proposal could not, viz., that all sciences bear relation to human faculties and powers. In fact, Salmon takes consciousness to be primary in Hume's analysis and believes that Hume's insightful recognition of this also implies that consciousness is, for Hume, the source of all objective realms, the sciences, (natural science among them), included. If any causal explanation of the principles of mind is abandoned, then, there is no problem with maintaining, as Hume appears to, that the science of MAN is both at the centre and primary while all others are secondary because no paradox occurs from a methodological point of view. The principles of human nature are not explainable by natural laws but according to laws (essentially those of the imagination) immanent in consciousness itself and discoverable through the method of introspection--conclusions about the essence or structure of mind are based upon the evidence of consciousness itself and are discoverable via a method appropriate to its object. Of course, the subjective idealism that Salmon attributes to Hume is limited, by Salmon's own admission, precisely because he asserts that Hume falls into a Berkeleyian idealism and, hence, a solipsism. This,

with reference to Hume's discussion of scepticism regarding the senses, implies that the subject cannot go beyond its own perceptions to the objective world and is, therefore, enclosed upon itself. Because Hume's scepticism is, according to Salmon, characterized by a contradiction between 'real' and 'conscious' moments of our perceptions, Hume is unable to account for the existence of objects in the real world, (particularly their continued existence). Besides this deficiency that Salmon finds in Hume's analysis of external perception, (one which essentially defines the extent to which Salmon can attribute a subjective idealism of the phenomenological bent to Hume), Salmon's reading imposes, itself, a more drastic limitation upon Hume's discussion of mind. If Hume is to hold true to his project, as Salmon understands it, Hume would have to guard against speaking of causes when inquiring into the essence of mind. All references to psychophysical causation, to animal spirits, to optics; in short, any tendency to reduce consciousness to a material and physical nature would have to be avoided entirely. Once again, Hume's philosophy cannot remain unscathed given Salmon's interpretation, since all in Hume's account of mind that is founded upon naturalistic presuppositions, (e.g., that consciousness is explainable by natural, causal, laws that mind is in any way reducible to physical nature, that man can be understood essentially as an object in nature, etc.), must go if Hume is to be successful in examining the essential structure--particularly that of external perception--by employing introspection as a method.

While Salmon takes Hume's method of introspection to be one of the crucial features of Hume's approach to the 'essence of mind', Bricke finds Hume's account of introspective awareness to be, from both a methodological and an ontological perspective, one of the drawbacks of

Hume's metaphysics, particularly when it comes to Hume's views about mind. Although the distinction that Hume makes between modes of awareness of external and internal events is evidence for Hume's dualism, according to Bricke, introspection and the imagist account of thinking that goes along with this mode of access to mental events must be abandoned. As was noted in the critique of Bricke's commentary, (it is significant, by way of summary, to mention it again here), Bricke maintains that 'introspectible images' which are supposed, for Hume, to be objects of inner sense, do not qualify as thoughts since the latter are essentially of a conceptual nature. Moreover, these entities, i.e., images--construed as reified mental particulars--are not objects that one might become aware of through introspection. Certainly, if the existence of objects of introspection is denied, then the very act of becoming aware of such objects via inner sense is called into question.

The privileged mode of access to mental contents or events is only a manifestation, however, of a far more deeply rooted problem in Hume's account of thinking and perception. Bricke's criticism of introspection and the attendant premises (1) that one has privileged access, through inner sense, to 'introspectible images', (2) that such images are thoughts, (3) that an image-thought (perception) is a reified mental particular, leads to a denial of Hume's epistemological idealism and all those aspects of Hume's philosophy, (e.g., his scepticism with regard to the senses, his representative theory of perception, his reification of perceptions, the antinomy of the understanding; that is, the radical opposition between reflection and the attitude of common sense, etc...), that presuppose it. In short, Bricke's explicit statement that many of the foundational elements of Hume's metaphysics must be abandoned, (and this

because they hinder the development of his constructive theory of mind), is directly linked to difficulties that he finds in Hume's epistemology.

The implications of Bricke's denial of epistemological idealism are farreaching in terms of Hume's metaphysics. Again it is important to stress that Bricke has in mind, all the while, Hume's constructive theory of mind and in particular, what Hume cannot maintain if he is, as Bricke argues, a bundle-dualist-interactionist. The fact that Hume could not, via his method of introspection, observe a bundle of 'reified perceptions', is a case in point. It follows that interaction between the bundle of perceptions that constitute the mind, for Hume, and body would make no sense if the former cannot be observed. Those of Hume's views that are 'idealistic' in character are understood, according to Bricke's interpretation, in terms of Hume's epistemology, so that there appears to be no incompatibility in saying both that Hume is a dualist from an ontological perspective, and that he presupposes idealism from an epistemological point of view. Yet, 'what there is', (i.e. the existence of ultimate realities), and 'how we know what there is' cannot so easily be separated, as indeed Bricke's interpretation shows, for he must deny Hume's epistemological idealism if Hume is to be consistent in his views about mind. True, he relies upon Hume's representative theory of perception and evidence from Hume's discussion of scepticism with regard to the senses in order to establish that Hume is a dualist and to show, in addition, that Hume's scepticism is not a bar to mind-body dualism. Later, of course, with the criticism of epistemological idealism, Hume's scepticism must be abandoned, (one wonders why, if scepticism does not prevent Hume from being a dualist), and so must Hume's representative realism.

With respect to Hume's writings much more has to be discarded than is apparent from what Bricke maintains explicitly. That whole section of the Treatise, "Of scepticism with regard to the senses", would, it seems, serve no useful purpose because the arguments there are motivated by the presuppositions of epistemological idealism. Furthermore, Hume's academic scepticism in general which surely plays a very important methodological role in his philosophy, both as an insurance against bold metaphysical claims and doctrines, and "to give us a notion of the imperfections and narrow limits of human understanding." (T. 657) has no place in his philosophy if the constructive theory that Bricke attributes to Hume is considered to be fundamental. At least, if one considers Part IV of the first book to be written in this tone, (i.e., as an examination of so-called 'sceptical' topics), then a denial of Hume's sceptical arguments would render Hume's discussion superfluous except insofar as evidence may be found in that part to support a reading concerned with Hume's 'theory' of mind. Even Hume's own appraisal of the Treatise as it appears in the "Abstract" indicates that the author himself regards scepticism to have a significant place in his philosophy. In this connection Hume writes:

By all that has been said the reader will easily perceive, that the philosophy contain'd in this book is very sceptical..." (T. 657)

He refers specifically to the discussion of belief in "external existence" and proceeds to say that "our author insists upon several other sceptical topics; and upon the whole concludes, that we assent to our faculties, and employ our reason only because we cannot help it..." (T. 657) Presumably he is referring, here to those discussions also appearing in that section "Of the sceptical and other systems of philosophy", (i.e.,

questions concerning the immortality of the soul, personal identity, etc.).

Rather than maintaining, as Bricke does, that epistemological idealism commits Hume to an untenable scepticism, it would be perhaps more appropriate to suggest that Hume's scepticism serves a methodological purpose in its own right, and is not simply a consequence of the epistemology that Bricke attributes to Hume. The same would undoubtedly apply to Hume's first principle regarding perceptions, viz., that all our ideas are copies of impressions. Given Bricke's criticism of Hume's views concerning perceptions, namely that he 'reifies' them and that images are not thoughts, and also his claim that there is no non-idealist representative theory of perception in Hume's philosophy, (these problems are, again, a consequence of Hume's epistemological idealism), then it appears that Hume's 'criterion of meaning' will have no legitimate place among the views that are fundamentally Humean, according to Bricke's final verdict. If it is acknowledged that Hume's criterion of meaning is founded upon that 'imagist' account of thinking which Bricke finds to be entirely misguided, then Hume's methodological principle would as well fall under attack. Clearly, according to Bricke's analysis, to have an idea cannot mean to be aware of an image that exactly resembles an antecedent impression. Ideas or thoughts are rather conceptual--they are not images attached to words, nor could they be entities or mental particulars that copy other atomic entities, namely, impressions. All this follows from the fact that the methodological principle presupposes idealism, according to Bricke's estimation, (although he does not say so explicitly), and it would, therefore, have to be abandoned entirely or, of course, restated in a non-idealistic manner.

Bricke's denial of Hume's epistemological idealism and all that

it implies proceeds from the attempt to say positively what 'theory' or 'doctrine' of mind Hume advocates. In order to formulate Hume's constructive theory, all that is inconsistent with those views taken to be fundamentally Humean, (i.e., that he is a bundle-dualist who admits of interaction between mind and body), must be done away with. So it is the case with the interpretations of both Anderson and Salmon--a drastic revision of Hume's metaphysics is called for in order that either a coherent or systematic doctrine may be attributed to Hume, or some fundamental inconsistency in Hume's account of mind is to be resolved. (The latter, I believe, is most characteristic of Anderson's reading.) If taken as the correct reading, each interpretation poses a drastic limitation upon Hume's metaphysics, and as a total picture of what Hume maintains either one is an imposition upon the text to the extent that a positive claim concerning Hume's doctrine involves also a denial and revision of his views. Each commentator highlights certain aspects of Hume's philosophy and plays down others depending upon the account of mind Hume is believed to articulate. For instance, Salmon takes introspection to be significant for Hume, while Bricke maintains that Hume's account of introspective awareness must be abandoned. Certainly, there are points upon which the commentators agree, e.g., they all maintain that Hume 'reifies' perceptions. Nevertheless, the way in which such observations are dealt with differs in each case and this because the view taken of the various aspects of Hume's philosophy is informed by the theory of mind attributed to Hume at the outset. Bricke criticizes Hume for construing perceptions as reified mental particulars, a view which, if Hume continues to maintain it, prevents him from claiming that the mind, as experienced, is a bundle of perceptions. If this bundle of

perceptions cannot be perceived, according to the way Hume is thought to regard perceptions, then interaction between mind and body becomes problematic. Salmon also accuses Hume of making perceptions into things--Hume is guilty, he claims, of a real hypostasis. Yet it is Hume's naturalistic bias that Salmon finds to be a fault in Hume's account. Accordingly, he is accused of making an attempt to reduce mental acts of perception to 'real', i.e., material, existence. Now Anderson as well acknowledges that perceptions, (at least some of them), are things for Hume. But in keeping with Hume's materialism, (as evidenced, in part, by his recourse to animal spirits), Anderson attempts to find a legitimate place for these entities, and provides arguments to show that perceptions have location in the brain.

Other fundamental elements, e.g., Hume's account of causality, are considered by each commentator within the context of the ontological status of mind in his philosophy, and, once again, are understood according to that particular doctrine that Hume is thought to hold. For both Anderson and Bricke, causality contributes in an important way to the view of mind Hume is said to articulate. Yet, Anderson regards the causal connection, for Hume, in such a way as to reinforce the claim that Hume is fundamentally presenting a doctrine of matter and mechanism--the identity of cause and effect, is taken, by Anderson to reveal Hume's belief that the universe is entirely material in nature. Bricke understands causality, on the other hand, in terms of the two way interaction said to obtain between mind and body in accordance with the dualism that he attributes to Hume. Salmon, in opposition to both Anderson and Bricke, charges Hume with reductionism. Hume's error, in Salmon's opinion, consists in reducing consciousness to physiology by giving, at times, a misplaced causal explanation of mental acts, one

which contradicts his true account of mind, viz., subjective idealism, where any causal explanation does not apply.

Although it is the case both that the commentators do agree on certain points and that they focus upon fundamental aspects of Hume's philosophy, this can be of no help in resolving the dilemma of the conflicting interpretations, nor can there be any justification, on this basis, for what each commentator denies in attempting to say what the ontological status of mind is in Hume's account. The fact that certain constants are appealed to shows, at the very least, that the commentaries are not entirely fabrications but have some basis in Hume's texts. More important, however, is the way in which these common elements are moulded according to the position Hume is thought to hold with regard to the ontological status of mind. The variations that central notions in Hume's metaphysics have undergone with each reading are no doubt a function of the perspective from which the commentator approaches Hume's writings. This, it may be objected, is merely to make a statement as to the nature of interpretation per se: In so far as one always takes on a point of view when attempting to understand a text, the text will take shape according to that view, hence, an interpretation cannot paint a total and true picture of what a philosopher is attempting to say. Be that as it may, the modifications that Hume's text undergoes at the hands of the commentators serves to point out even more clearly their disagreement on the issue of Hume's theory of mind. Indeed, Salmon presents the most interesting suggestion of this when he acknowledges that Hume is not only the subjective idealist that Salmon considers him to be but as well that Hume falls into a Berkeleyian idealism, and could be a materialist if anyone chose to regard him as such because there is

some evidence to support this position. While it is true that Hume does make claims about the nature of mind, his views, nevertheless, elude the commentators endeavours to formulate them into a coherent and systematic doctrine. That Hume's writings do not lend themselves easily to a specific theory is revealed in the commentators failure to say, without abandoning certain of his views, what position Hume actually holds. Regardless of the fact that the commentators have dealt with common elements of Hume's philosophy and are found to be in agreement in certain respects, whatever the commentators do with these commonalities does not leave Hume's philosophy unscathed and systematic in the long run.

Having said all this, it remains for me now to provide a resolution to the problem examined throughout the first part of this discussion, one that will, hopefully, put an end to the debate among the commentators over the ontological status of mind in Hume's philosophy. It is not my aim in Part II to make any judgements of the correctness of either interpretation in relation to the other, and certainly another attempt to say what theory of mind Hume presents is to no avail since it would end in failure for the same reasons as do those readings above-mentioned. Moreover, such an attempt would put the proposed resolution of the conflict upon the same footing as those readings already considered, in which case there would be, properly speaking, no resolution of the debate but, instead, a fruitless continuation of it. The debate indeed is a fruitless one precisely because the endeavour to answer the question 'What is the ontological status of mind for Hume?' (this question either directly or indirectly provides the motivation for the commentators interpretations) is based upon a fundamental misunderstanding of Hume's intentions. The fact that Hume's diverse claims about mind escape systematization along

with the fact that the commentators are unable to identify, label, and coherently articulate Hume's 'theory' is, I believe, a dilemma that has, as its source, both the character of Hume's philosophy, (particularly Part IV, Book I of the Treatise where most evidence is discovered of Hume's claims about mind), and an unwarranted presupposition on the part of the commentators who try to discern what position Hume is actually presenting. Each of the interpretations considered above is motivated by the assumption that Hume intended to present a particular doctrine. So, it is already presupposed from the outset not only that Hume is a systematic philosopher, but as well that Hume does and in fact intended to provide an answer to the ontological question, (in the form of his theory), concerning the nature of mind. Hume's own claims can certainly be misleading if they are understood from this dogmatic point of view, one that is quite opposed to the spirit in which Hume examines those metaphysical questions pertaining to the substance of the soul, its local conjunction with matter, and personal identity. Indeed, the commentators, attempt to attribute a specific doctrine to Hume (and all that this implies regarding Hume's intentions) constitutes, according to my estimation, a fundamental misunderstanding of the general character of his endeavour and the point of his arguments in Part IV of the Treatise-- (that part upon which the commentators rely most for evidence in support of the doctrines they attribute to Hume). From this perspective the commentators readings are essentially impositions upon Hume's text, because they fail to take into account the fact that the ontological question is, for a number of reasons, unanswerable according to Hume. To say this is, I believe, consistent with the spirit of Hume's academic scepticism, his insistence that the authority of experience alone can

provide evidence for metaphysical claims, his view that human understanding is limited, among other things. It is with these comments in mind that I will attempt to provide, in the second part of this discussion, a resolution of the problem illustrated throughout Part I.

PART TWO

A RESOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM--HUME'S INTENTIONS RECONSIDERED

It should be clear from the preceding examination that Hume's writings do not lend themselves to a coherent, systematic, metaphysical theory of mind. The fact that it is not possible to discern such a theory in Hume's philosophy is evident from the commentators' failure to render many of the fundamental tenets of his philosophy consistent with the theorist that they attribute to him. Why Hume's work eludes the commentators in this way is a problem that remains for us to consider in the following discussion. In order to shed light upon the dilemma it is necessary to return to Hume's writings, and in particular to reemphasize not only Hume's views towards metaphysics in general but as well his sceptical position with respect to metaphysical theories of mind. The latter is clearly articulated in the section of the Treatise entitled "Of the Immateriality of the Soul" where Hume examines in some detail "difficulties and contradictions in every hypothesis concerning our internal perceptions, and the nature of mind..." (T. 323) Hume's discussion of the soul, there, constitutes one of the 'several topics' that occupy him in his "sceptical critique of metaphysical concepts and doctrines..."³¹ that takes place in Part IV, Book I of the Treatise-- "Of the Sceptical and Other Systems of Philosophy."³² In addition it is important to restate his aims as an empirical psychologist (for this, as it turns out, is the only way in which to construe Hume's notion of a 'true' metaphysician). Hume's desire to set the science of

man on the only solid foundation that he believes it is able to rest securely upon, viz., experience and observation, along with the empirical project that he envisions, namely "the application of experimental philosophy to moral subjects", (T. xvi) serve to distinguish his philosophical endeavour from the sort of theorizing about nature that aims at "explaining ultimate principles" (T. xviii) and seeks to get to the essence of things. It is far from Hume's intention to articulate a metaphysical theory of mind along these lines (and, indeed, his philosophy precludes one) precisely because of the attitude that he adopts towards metaphysics and because of the principles that he holds to in his empiricist program. Keeping these last points in mind, let us turn now to Hume's writings in order to illustrate why the commentators' efforts to extrapolate a theory from Hume's divergent assertions about mind are quite in vain.

The first thing that should lead us to be suspicious of the commentators' search for a theory of mind in Hume's philosophy is his adamant criticism of metaphysical theories designed to explain ultimate realities. This includes any theory whatsoever that is designed to uncover "the secret springs and principles" (E. 14) of nature. What colours Hume's thinking and, in effect, delineates the overall character of his work is the rejection of "abstruse thought", "profound reasonings" or "what is commonly called metaphysics." (E. 9) It is evident from his own remarks that he wished to "undermine the foundations of an abstruse philosophy", one that consists largely of attempts to explain "the ultimate principles of the soul", (T. xviii) to say what constitutes the "essence of mind". In fact, all metaphysical theories having ultimate explanation of things as their aim are fundamentally misguided according to Hume since they

carry reasoning into regions unknown and inaccessible to human understanding. We find Hume stressing this point again and again throughout the Treatise and the Enquiries.

In the "Introduction" to the Treatise where Hume sets out his project, his objection to 'abstruse' metaphysics is evident from such claims as "any hypothesis, that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical." (T. xvii) He condemns those philosophers who are engaged in "explaining the ultimate principles of the soul..." on the grounds that such an endeavour is a pretense that must surely be undermined when we recognize the limits of human reason. We are, to be sure, endowed with curiosity by nature, according to Hume. While it is true that he by no means denies that we are able to "regard human nature as a subject of speculation", (E. p. 6) he does, nevertheless, object to the possibility of arriving at original principles, or absolute truths. A "false and adulterate" metaphysic, in Hume's estimation, has the latter as its objective. Consequently, it is plagued by obscurity which is "the inevitable source of uncertainty and error." (E. 11) In Hume's own words:

...the justest and most plausible objection against a considerable part of metaphysics, (is) that they are not properly a science; but arise either from the fruitless efforts of human vanity, which would penetrate into subjects utterly inaccessible to the understanding, or from the craft of popular superstitions, which, being unable to defend themselves on fair ground, raise these intangling brambles to cover and protect their weakness. (E. p. 11)

Hume's antipathy to metaphysics, then, is motivated by two fundamental views that he holds: (1) that it is vain to ask about or examine what is inaccessible to the understanding, and (2) that reasoning must be grounded upon experience if it is not to result in superstition and obscurity. We find both of these premises exemplified clearly in the Enquiries, where

Hume considers the idea of necessary connexion and is lead to address the problem of the divine creator; i.e., what we can say about the nature and power of the Supreme Being. It is sufficient for our purposes to note, here, that Hume attacks those philosophers who postulate "some invisible intelligent principle" in order to explain the operations of nature, and in particular the power, force, energy that is thought to be the source of a necessary causal nexus. What is important at this point is Hume's criticism of "this theory of the universal energy and operation of the Supreme Being." (It is the theory of Divine intervention, that Hume refers to, whereby not only is everything full of God but as well the Deity adjusts at every moment the parts of the universe. Such an explanation of natural events is on equal footing with the view that "the very force or energy of the cause, by which it is connected with its effect... (E. 69) can be perceived.) Any such theoretical construction that attempts to explain natural events by postulating some unknown (i.e. unexperienced) being or unperceived power is, according to Hume, "too bold ever to carry conviction with it to a man, sufficiently apprized of the weakness of human reason, and the narrow limits to which it is confined in all its operations." (E. 72) Hume remarks, and this is instructive from the perspective of the limits of logic and reason, that "though the chain of arguments which conduct to it were ever so logical, there must arise a strong suspicion, if not an absolute assurance, that it has carried us quite beyond the reach of our faculties, when it leads to conclusions so extraordinary, and so remote from common life and experience." Hume's point is that even logic (a logical chain of arguments) is not sufficient to guarantee the legitimacy of metaphysical assertions or theories if it is the case that the object of our reasoning

extends quite beyond our experience. What Hume says next is equally relevant in terms of the claim that he took the limits of the understanding very seriously and held to this position in his attack upon metaphysics.

He writes:

We are got into a fairy land, long ere we have reached the last step of our theory; and there we have no reason to trust our common methods of argument, or to think that our usual analogies and probabilities have any authority. Our lines are too short to fathom such immense abysses. And however we may flatter ourselves that we are guided, in every step which we take, by a kind of versimillitude and experience, we may be assured that this fancied experience has no authority when we thus apply it to subjects that lie entirely out of the sphere of experience.
(E. 7)

(Hume intimates at the end of this comment that he will return elsewhere to the problem of theories. He does so in "Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy" (E. 149-165) which, although a condensed and less detailed version of Part IV, Book I of the Treatise, parallels the latter in its sceptical attack upon 'false' metaphysics.)

As it is stated, here, Hume's major objection to 'abstruse' metaphysics (for the above is an instance of what is meant) is that theoretical systems are constructed on the basis of hypothesis. This means, in the negative sense in which Hume employs the term, a proposition or argument supported solely by fancied experience (as in the case of the Supreme Being) or not at all (as in the case of the substance of the soul (T. I, IV, v)). Even if an argument is logical this is not enough to support a theory aimed at ultimate or absolute explanation of nature since the object of the theory exceeds our experience in which all philosophical claims need to be grounded, for Hume, if they are to make any sense whatsoever. Furthermore, we are unable to project our experience onto that which is unknown without falsely promoting an illusion of knowledge,

as opposed to gaining knowledge as such. The latter is confined to the strictly empirical realm, in Hume's account, and is limited both to what we immediately perceive, namely impressions and ideas and to what we infer through causal reasoning.

There is no doubt that Hume was opposed to metaphysical speculation. The very fact that he maintains both that the understanding is confined in its operations and that what we are able to say about human nature must always be founded upon experience prevents him from entertaining abstruse questions and indeed forms the basis for his attack upon philosophers that do. The method that he proposes as a way of "freeing learning, at once, from these abstruse questions" (E. 12) (by which Hume means those that are directed towards ultimate realities or essences), "is to enquire seriously into the nature of human understanding, and show, from an exact analysis of its powers and capacity, that it is by no means fitted for such remote and abstruse subjects." (E. 12) Hence, Hume does not merely accept the premise that the understanding is limited, but wishes to go about showing this, not by saying what the mind or understanding is, but by describing its aspects as we experience them. The mental geography of which Hume speaks constitutes, in his words, a "delineation of the distinct parts and powers of the mind," (E. 13) which can be accomplished alone through "careful and exact experiments, and the observation of those particular effects, which result from its different circumstances and situations." (T. xvii) It is, accordingly, impossible to approach mind or understanding from any other perspective. Moreover, the principles that we would be able to establish would only be general, and, as Hume stresses, "'tis still certain we cannot go beyond experience." (T. xvii)

Now it may be objected that Hume's criticism of metaphysical theories, along with his proposal to undermine abstruse questions and metaphysical jargon by discovering "the proper province of human reason", through an examination of the powers and qualities of mind do not necessarily imply either that his philosophy precludes a theory of mind or that his endeavour excludes the commentators' efforts to find one. After all, some might argue, if Hume proposes to show that the mind is not suited for abstruse subjects by delineating its powers and capacity, he is still saying something about the nature of essence of mind. Also, Hume does make claims about mind, e.g., that the mind is a bundle of perceptions, and these may be taken, again, as ontological propositions that when traced through his philosophy would result in a theory.

It is evident that the first line of argument is groundless for two reasons. In the first place, Hume's endeavour to describe the powers and capacities of mind falls within his broader empiricist project of founding a science of human nature upon observation and experience. His description of the understanding our ideas, how they are united together, the phenomena of belief etc.--must not be divorced from Hume's fundamental aim, viz., to "propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security." (T. xvi) Hume holds that all the sciences are related to human nature, and if we are able to make advances in the sciences we would do well to be "thoroughly acquainted with the extent and force of human understanding." (T. xv) In Hume's account, "Even Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in some measure dependent on the science of MAN; since they lie under the cognizance of men, and are judged by their powers and faculties." (T. xv)

This science involves an explanation of "the nature of the ideas we employ, and of the operations we perform in our reasonings." (T. xv) Of course, by explanation Hume does not mean anything absolute. He envisions, rather, an "experimental philosophy" which relies upon experience and observation as a basis for philosophical conclusions. If Hume intended to present a theory of mind, one would expect him to have stated this as his aim at the outset of the Treatise (and the Enquiries). His project, however, in so far as it involves an examination of the understanding, is motivated by a concern for moral philosophy. The experimental approach is essentially aimed at psychology, as we are able to gather when Hume says that it is imperative that we "glean our experiments in this science from cautious observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common course of the world, by men's behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures." (T. xix) There is no hint, here of Hume's making a theory of mind a matter of ultimate concern. Nor can we say that he is presenting an ontology. The very fact that he wishes to draw conclusions about moral phenomena from human life and behaviour is sufficient to discourage this suggestion. (Whether Hume is always correct in his description of morality or the operations of the understanding is another question, one which we can only answer, in keeping with Hume's own procedure, by having recourse to our own experience.) Furthermore, Hume stresses in the Enquiries that his philosophy "endeavours to limit our enquiries to common life." (E. p. 41) This, accordingly, does not mean that it "should ever undermine the reasonings of common life, and carry its doubts so far as to destroy all action, as well as speculation." (E. p. 41) He cautions that nature will "prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning whatsoever." (E. p. 41) Empirical reasonings upon

which knowledge depends cannot be affected by the discovery that such reasonings do not proceed by argument. So Hume writes:

Though we should conclude,..., that, in all reasonings from experience, there is a step taken by the mind which is not supported by any argument or process of the understanding; there is no danger that these reasonings, on which almost all knowledge depends, will ever be affected by such a discovery. (E. p. 41)

In other words, our recognition that reasoning proceeds in a natural way cannot change the process of reasoning from experience or make us sceptical of the knowledge that we gain in this way. This, of course, gives weight to Hume's sceptical stance regarding abstract philosophy in so far as his appeal to nature is designed to limit speculation. According to Hume, "we assent to our faculties, and employ our reason only because we cannot help it. Philosophy would render us entirely Pyrrhonian, were not nature too strong for it." (T. p. 657)

It is easy to see, secondly, that Hume does not engage in theorizing about ultimate realities, and in this case, mind, precisely because his is an empirical description of the understanding based upon what is immediately given to consciousness, namely, "impressions" and "ideas". While he might make claims about the operations of the understanding, these are empirical generalizations about psychology rather than "original qualities of human nature." (T. p. 13) We find instances of such generalizations in his description of the association of ideas, of custom and habit, and causal inference. The principles of association are the source of union among impressions and ideas (the essential components of consciousness). It is through association, which Hume describes as a natural "gentle force, which commonly prevails", (T. p. that these simple perceptions are united together to form complex ideas. This is, of course, to say nothing of its ultimate nature, i.e., the

cause of association, whether material or otherwise. Instead we find that Hume repeatedly refers to the principles of "understanding or Imagination" (T., p. 104) (he often makes alternate use of these terms) as qualities that we observe in the course of our thinking. He distinguishes three principles, "viz., Resemblance; a picture naturally makes us think of the man it was drawn for. Contiguity; when St. Denis is mentioned, the idea of Paris naturally occurs. Causation; when we think of the son, we are apt to carry out attention to the father." (T., p. 662) The very way in which Hume exemplifies these principles is enough to indicate that he is not talking in absolute terms, but is rather referring to psychological propensities. We see this, further, in his comments about the principle of custom or habit, which allows us to draw conclusions from experience. In Hume's words:

Custom...is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone which renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past. Without the influence of custom, we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact beyond what is immediately present to the memory and senses. (E., p. 44-5)

Custom, as Hume describes it, is based upon a frequent repetition of experiences which become infixed in the imagination as ideas. If we find, for instance, "that in all past experience we have found two objects to have been always conjoin'd together, 'tis evident, that upon the appearance of one of these objects in an impression, we must from custom make an easy transition to the idea of that object, which usually attends it." (T., p. 115-6) Such a customary transition which is founded upon a repetition of a number of instances, allows us to make a generalization which cannot be other than empirical in nature. When, for instance, I repeatedly press a button at different moments in time and find that my

room is illuminated I will automatically infer that there is a connection between (1) pressing the light switch and (2) the light in the room. On the basis of a few instances like this I will be led to making a generalization about the event, namely, "When I hit the switch, the light will come on." Of course, if this is confirmed time and again we will continue to expect the two events to be connected and as Hume notes "The custom operates before we have time for reflexion," (T., p. 104) as is its very nature. This is exemplified, in the reverse, in such instances cited by Hume as "a person, that has lost a leg or an arm by amputation, endeavours for a long time afterwards to serve himself with them." (T., p. 117)

Now, our reasonings from causes and effects are, likewise, founded upon a customary transition that allows us to make inductive inferences about events. Hume maintains that we can only observe a constant conjunction of objects, one which we called cause, and the other effect. Heat, for example, is constantly conjoined with fire, as we gather from a repetition of experiences. The conclusions we draw about matters of fact, and in particular, predictions concerning future events, are all based upon such inductive inferences, and the customary transitions which we make in thought, without reflexion, which hold our experiences together in Hume's account. In all this it must be remembered that Hume does not seek to explain the ultimate essence of inference, i.e., from where, besides custom, our ability to make predictions comes. Indeed, what he concerns himself most with is both how we do in fact gain knowledge from experience and how we come to believe in events (e.g., that the future will resemble the past). We can do no more than generalize from specific, repeated instances, and all our empirical claims have as their foundation, custom, which in the long run is no more than a psychological propensity.

All this should support the view that Hume is not concerned to formulate a theory of mind, but is rather, as an epistemologist, engaged in describing human nature in psychological terms.

We have yet to address, here, the proposition that because Hume makes claims about mind, e.g., that the mind is a bundle of perceptions, he does, as a result, commit himself to a theory that could be discovered were we to draw these together from various places in his philosophy and form them into a coherent system. Of course, this is the mistake that the commentators make when they attempt to deduce from Hume's claims in Part IV, Book I of the Treatise which theory Hume holds. I have noted already in the concluding remarks of Part I that the commentators rely heavily upon Part IV for evidence to support their interpretations. But it is not the case that they merely assess Hume's claims and outline a system from his numerous, yet ambiguous, assertions. Theirs is an approach that is deductive in a way described by Charles W. Hendel in his "Introduction" to An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Although Hendel's remark is made with reference to Hume's "first proposition concerning 'perceptions'" (H. xxii), (T., p. 1-7, E., p. 18-22) viz., "That all our ideas, or weak perceptions, are derived from our impressions or strong perceptions." (T., p. 647) his comment is equally instructive in the present context, since a similar criticism can be directed against the way in which the commentators proceed to discern Hume's preferred doctrine of mind. Hendel makes the following observation in connection with Hume's proposal concerning perceptions:

Much capital has been made by subsequent critics of this "first proposition". They see it as a principle which commits Hume inevitably to an "atomism" in epistemology, as well as to his avowed scepticism. The whole "system" of Hume follows deductively, (emph. mine),

they seem to say, from this initial concept of original perceptions as the sole source of ideas. (H. xxii)

This view, according to Hendel, is a "prejudiced" one since, in his words, "it makes Hume a systematic metaphysician in spite of his own contrary intentions." (H. xxii) Hendel goes on to say, and this is significant as a response to the deductive approach, that Hume's proposition is "only a proposal, something to be tried out experimentally..."--it "claims only to be a 'general maxim'" (H. xxiii) for testing the clarity and precision of ideas.³³ What is relevant for this discussion is Hendel's claim that one cannot legitimately deduce Hume's system from his first proposition because this would make Hume out to be, contrary to his intentions, a systematic philosopher. While Hendel does not elaborate upon this last assertion, his observation is applicable, nevertheless, to the procedure followed by those commentators who wish to say definitively what view of mind Hume advocates.

The error that the commentators make is quite evident when we recognize that Part IV of the Treatise (cf. Enquiries, "Of The Academical or Sceptical Philosophy") only serves to strengthen Hume's case against 'false' metaphysics, and thereby, any endeavours to construct a theoretical system revealing the nature of mind. That entire part of the Treatise consists of a "sceptical critique of metaphysical concepts and doctrines", and as such is by no means intended as a presentation of Hume's own philosophical doctrine. This we see most clearly in that section entitled "Of the Immateriality of the Soul" (Part IV, Book I, p. 232-251) where Hume attacks metaphysical theories of mind. It is imperative that we regard Hume's discussion in the context of Part IV as a sceptical critique. We find Hume, here repudiating metaphysical theories of mind. He takes no theoretical stand of his own, apart from acknowledging there to be a

causal connection between body and thought, although this is only a limited concession for the causal inference is understood only in so far as we experience it, viz., as a constant conjunction. Instead he is found either to undermine false notions by employing his criterion of meaning which is instrumental in his attack upon theories expounded regarding the essence of mind, or to show what each theory is unable to account for by reference to the character of our perceptions.

He begins that section by maintaining that we are deceived if we expect "greater difficulties and contradictions in every hypothesis concerning our internal perceptions, and the nature of mind, which we are apt to imagine so much more obscure, and uncertain." (T., p. 2) According to Hume, "what is known concerning it, agrees with itself; and what is unknown, we must be contented to leave so." (T., p. 232) Rather than proceeding to elaborate upon what is known about mind, which amounts, for Hume, to what we are able to experience and observe regarding consciousness, namely, perceptions, Hume devotes his attention entirely to criticism of theories intended to "diminish our ignorance" concerning the nature of mind. These theories are of the speculative sort to which Hume is so adamantly opposed. What he shows, in effect, is that metaphysical doctrines of mind do in fact venture into the unknown and, hence, exceed the empirical limits to which we must be confined in philosophical discourse.

This is precisely the line of reasoning that Hume employs in his criticism of the material and immaterial substances in which philosophers suppose our perceptions to inhere. "In order to put a stop to these endless cavils on both sides," Hume writes, "I know no better method, than to ask these philosophers in a few words, What they mean by substance

and inhesion?" (T., p. 232) As it turns out, both "substance" and "inhesion" are devoid of meaning, according to Hume, and the question "Whether perceptions inhere in a material or immaterial substance" (T., p. 234) is, likewise, unintelligible. It is against these concepts that Hume applies his empirical criterion of meaning, viz., the copy-principle of which we spoke above, in order to discern the legitimacy of terminology that is employed in philosophical theories. In the Enquiries Hume succinctly states his proposition which is, as he emphasizes, designed both to "render every dispute equally intelligible", and to "banish all that jargon which has so long taken possession of metaphysical reasonings and drawn disgrace upon them." (E., p. 21) Hume's maxim is as follows:

When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived? And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion. (E., p. 22)

Far from simply stating his aversion to metaphysics, Hume actively goes about showing the emptiness of concepts via recourse to this method of testing the meaningfulness of philosophical terms. When applied relentlessly to the notions of substance and inhesion, Hume draws the inevitable conclusion that we are unable to have any idea of substance since we can have no impression of it, and as Hume stresses repeatedly "every idea is derived from a precedent impression." (T., p. 232) To have an impression of substance would mean that the two resemble one another. This is impossible in Hume's estimation precisely because (1) impressions and substances are different, and (2) we are unable to point out the impression that produces the idea of the substance of our minds. Even if we say that a substance is "something which may exist by itself" (T., p. 233) this cannot be very enlightening when it comes to uncovering

the essence of mind as we have ideas of perceptions alone, and substances are not perceptions. In a similar fashion Hume undermines the notion of inherence by noting both that there is nothing requisite to support the existence of perceptions--they are immediate data of consciousness--and that we have no idea of inherence because we lack an impression of it. Hume's major point is that we cannot experience the mind as a substance in which perceptions inhere. Therefore, as far as shedding light upon the immaterial or material nature of the mind goes, these concepts fail in their explanatory power. Not only the concepts but the question itself is meaningless, according to Hume.

Hume goes to greater lengths in elaborating the problem of the local conjunction of the soul with matter, (T., p. 235) one which involves arguments against "the materialists, who conjoin all thought with extension" and "their antagonists" (the theologians) "who conjoin all thought with a simple and indivisible substance." (T., p. 23) Hume considers the arguments on either side, and it is appropriate for our purposes to outline, if only briefly, the essential features of each position, and the grounds upon which Hume rejects them. In addition, something need be said about the conclusion that Hume draws from his evaluation of these metaphysical theories, viz., that the mind/body relation is a causal one. While this may be taken to imply that he is ultimately a dualist interactionist, this suggestion will hold no weight in terms of attributing a theory to Hume, for reasons that are to be noted shortly.

Let us turn, first, to Hume's refutation of both materialism and immaterialism. The materialists, as was already mentioned, hold that all thought is conjoined with extension. This implies in Hume's analysis of the theory, that thought is spatially localizable, and is, therefore,

extended in matter. Of course, such a theory leads to manifestly absurd views, according to Hume, which he demonstrates to be so on the basis of his maxim "that an object may exist, and yet be nowhere." (T., p. 235) There are some beings, according to Hume, that do not have a 'real' or material existence. Among these, Hume classifies the passions and all other perceptions with the exception of sight and touch. In his own words:

An object may be said to be nowhere, when its parts are not so situated with respect to each other, as to, form any figure or quantity; nor the whole with respect to other bodies so as to answer to our notions of contiguity or distance. Now this is evidently the case with all our perceptions and objects, except those of sight and feeling. (T., p. 236)

Such perceptions, as Hume describes them here, cannot, because of their nature, be conjoined with matter or body--contrary to what the materialists believe to be the case. He condemns their theory on the grounds that it leads to absurdities and contradictions. They would be committed to the position, for instance, that a moral reflection "could be plac'd on the right or on the left hand of a passion" (T., p. 236) or that "a smell or sound be either of a circular or square figure." (T., p. 236) which are impossibilities, as it is also unintelligible to maintain that desires can be added or that they possess "a determinate length, breadth and thickness." (T., p. 235) The downfall of the materialist theory is precisely that it attempts to bestow a place upon that which cannot possibly have one.

On the other side, Hume maintains that "a little reflection will show us equal reason for blaming their antagonists, who conjoin all thought with a simple and indivisible substance." (T., p. 239) The line of argument that Hume takes against the theologians is essentially the

reverse of his reasonings regarding materialism. He founds his attack upon the premise that there are some perceptions, i.e., those of sight and touch, that are really extended. This being the case, it is not clear how they can be conjoined with a simple and indivisible substance, precisely because what is extended consists of parts that "are so situated, as to afford us the notion of distance and contiguity; of length, breadth, and thickness." (T., p. 239) An extended perception, e.g., a table, has three dimensions which delimit it as a figure that is "moveable, separable, and divisible." (T., p. 239) According to Hume, "Mobility, and separability are the distinguishing properties of extended objects." (T., p. 239) While it is easy to become confused with Hume's terminology, i.e., his alternate use of perceptions and objects, there is no doubt (1) that Hume is speaking about the objects that we encounter when we move about in the world, and of which we are conscious as external to ourselves in an ordinary sense, and (2) that he employs as his argument those attributes that we commonly assign to objects, without saying anything whatsoever about their ultimate nature. Indeed, the very ingenuity of Hume's criticism of both materialism and immaterialism is that he argues from what, in his estimation, is given in consciousness, namely perceptions and our experience of them.

Having stated his major objection to the immaterialists, Hume is lead to reconsider the problem of substance (although he has previously dismissed the question as being unintelligible). He directs his attack against Spinoza's "doctrine of the immateriality, simplicity, and indivisibility of a thinking substance, in which he supposes both thought and matter to inhere," (T., p. 240) This neutral monist position is captured succinctly by Hume in the following passage:

There is only one substance, says he, in the world: and that substance is perfectly simple and indivisible, and exists everywhere, without any local presence. Whatever we discover externally by sensation; whatever we feel internally by reflection; all these are nothing but modifications of that one, simple, and necessarily existent being, and are not possest of any separate or distinct existence. Every passion of the soul; every configuration of matter, however different and various, inhere in the same substance, and preserve in themselves their characters of distinction, without communicating them to that subject, in which they inhere. (T., p. 241)

No modification in our perception can alter in the least this substratum. Hume calls the Spinozistic view a "hideous hypothesis" (T. 24) and proceeds to argue against it by an appeal to the multiplicity of two universes, viz., (1) "the universe of objects or body", and (2) "the universe of thought, or...impressions and ideas." (T., p. 242) In one we observe all the objects (impressions and objects cannot be conceived as distinct however we suppose them to be) that we observe as ideas in the other, and there is no ground upon which we are able to infer beyond our experience of these 'universes' an indivisible substratum. All we are aware of are perceivable relations. Granted, Hume's distinction between objects on one hand, and impressions/ideas (thought) on the other seems problematic (as already noted previously). He cannot really be speaking of two mutually exclusive universes if objects and impressions are not separate at all. The object would be on the side of thought, and this appears, albeit falsely so, to imply idealism. The difficulty is easily clarified if we take Hume to be distinguishing, as he does at the outset of the Treatise, between feeling which belongs to the realm of sight and touch and thinking (or imaging). Hume might certainly have allayed all confusion had he noted in his examination of consciousness both that we move around in the world and that having impressions is not merely a passive occurrence. All this is implicit in his consideration of the origins of ideas when

he says such things as "To give a child an idea of scarlet or orange, of sweet or bitter, I present the objects, or in other words, convey to him these impressions..." (T., p. 5) Presenting or encountering an object is the same as giving or having impressions for Hume. The point, for our present purposes is that Hume argues against the Spinozistic view (as well as the other theoretical perspectives addressed) from the vantage point of experience, and in this, holds true to his empirical principles. Hume's argument against neutral monism is certainly consistent with the stand that we cannot proceed to draw conclusions beyond experience. An indivisible substratum falls outside the realm of what we are able to experience, namely, the world as we feel or think about it. If we are only aware of perceivable relations and a multiplicity of objects (either real or in thought) then it is surely impossible to infer from these either an indivisible substance or a connection between the diversity that we experience and such a substratum without venturing far into mere speculation. It is upon such grounds that Hume dismisses the monist theory.

Hume has by no means completed his consideration of metaphysical theories regarding the nature of mind with his critique of the materialists, immaterialists, and the neutral monists. Upon stating his objection to Spinoza's 'hypothesis' he proceeds to consider another hypothesis which he deems 'more intelligible' (T. 246) than that of substance and 'more important' than the local conjunction of our perceptions, 'viz., concerning the cause of our perceptions.' (T., p. 246) As to the legitimacy of the proposition that matter and motion are the cause of thought, Hume writes that we find:

...that thought and motion are different from each

other, and by experience, that they are constantly united; which being all the circumstances, that enter into the idea of cause and effect, when apply'd to the operations of matter, we may certainly conclude, that motion may be, and actually is, the cause of thought and perception. (T., p. 248)

This is not something we are able to grant a priori, according to Hume. We actually do experience a connection between the different dispositions of our body and our thoughts/sentiments. There could be no other way of accounting for such alterations as, for example, "betwixt a person in the morning walking in the garden with company, agreeable to him; and a person in the afternoon inclos'd in a dungeon, and full of terror, despair, and resentment" (T., p. 245) than by reference to causality. Hume maintains that we observe a constant conjunction between bodily dispositions and our thinking which amounts, in his estimation, to a union of causes and effects. His acknowledgement of a causal relation between body and mind constitutes the sole concession that he makes with respect to theorizing about mind, as is clear from his final pronouncement upon the matter:

...the question concerning the substance of the soul is absolutely unintelligible: All our perceptions are not susceptible of a local union, either with what is extended or unextended; there being some of them of the one kind, and some of the other: And as the constant conjunction of objects constitutes the very essence of cause and effect, matter and motion may often be regarded as the causes of thought, as far as we have any notion of that relation. (T., p. 250)

It is to be noted that Hume's last remark about the causal relation between thought and body is neither an unverifiable 'hypothesis' (mere speculation) nor a proposition that runs contrary, again, to his empiricism. After all, there is evidence upon which we are able to infer such a relation as in the case of a correlation between altered bodily dispositions and what we are thinking. Nevertheless, we have

no insight whatsoever into the essence of the causal nexus. Our understanding cannot extend beyond what is given to us in a series of experiences, namely, a constant conjunction of phenomena. Because Hume is willing to admit no more than this when it comes to the mind/body relation, we would not be justified in attributing a 'theory' of interaction to him, since the relation, as he describes it, is founded upon an inference that we draw from experience and does not, thereby, allow us to speak in ontological terms. Granted, the very fact that he does believe there to be a connection between body as cause and mind as effect and vice versa--Hume writes of the will, for instance, that it is "the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind. (T., p. 399))--in addition to the fact that he refers to consciousness in dualistic terms, implies that he considered dualist interactionism as the most legitimate 'hypothesis' regarding the nature of mind. While it may be so that Hume believed this to be the only perspective that could be taken on the issue, it is evident, all same, that he was in no position to defend such a proposition by articulating a metaphysical theory. This follows from his adamant rejection of speculative metaphysics, his sceptical stance towards any ultimate explanations of human nature, and lastly, from his empirical, epistemological concerns. Hume does primarily not deny that we can say something about mind. His own verdict regarding the causal connection between body and thought is a testimony of this. However, as a sceptic he stresses that these claims can only be moderate, and indeed this means for Hume that they be confirmed always by empirical evidence. There can be little doubt that Hume's sceptical attitude towards metaphysics is intimately bound up with his empirical viewpoint, as may be gathered

from his summary of the conclusions reached in Book I of the Treatise:

By all that has been said the reader will easily perceive that the philosophy contain'd in this book is very sceptical, and tends to give us a notion of the imperfections and narrow limits of human understanding. Almost all reasoning is there reduced to experience; and belief, which attends experience, is explain'd to be nothing but a particular sentiment, or lively conception produced by habit. Nor is this all, where we believe anything of external existence, or suppose an object to exist a moment after it is no longer perceived, this belief is nothing but a sentiment of the same kind. (T., p. 657)

Here we find Hume drawing an explicit connection between (1) scepticism which is a limiting position when it comes to the understanding, and (2) his empiricist conclusions, viz., that reasoning must be grounded in experience and that our belief in events is governed primarily by custom. All this, to repeat, is in opposition to 'abstruse' metaphysics and the building of what he calls, 'chimerical systems.' (T., p. 273) Now Hume's final observations concerning philosophy (as they appear in the conclusion to Book I of the Treatise) along with his statement, there, of what it means to be truly sceptical are instructive not only in general (as a way of reinforcing the views that Hume presents) but as well, specific in the context of my claim, viz., that Hume was not prepared to defend his belief in a causal connection between mind and body as a metaphysical theory. Indeed, it is his scepticism that prevents this.

According to Hume, a sceptical disposition, and sceptical principle are attained by yielding "to the current of nature", to the senses and the understanding. While we have a natural propensity to engage in reasoning about consciousness, the world, and so on, this cannot become our ultimate concern, otherwise we would be lead into obscure regions of speculation. We are bound by common affairs and

ordinary pursuits which ultimately keep profound reasonings in check. "In all the incidents of life", Hume observes, "we ought still to preserve our scepticism. If we believe, that fire warms, or water refreshes 'tis only because it costs us too much pain to think otherwise. Nay if we are philosophers it ought only to be upon sceptical principles." We are at once reminded of Hume's famous pronouncement: (T., p. 27) "Be a philosopher; but amidst all your philosophy, be still a man." (E., p. 9). While it is true that we should "in general indulge our inclination in the most elaborate philosophical researches" (T., p. 273) according to Hume, such indulgence can only be moderate, and is dependent largely upon a multiplicity of perspectives that may be taken regarding an object of inquiry at different times, "which inclines us to be positive and certain in particular points according to the light, in which we survey them in any particular instant. He even observes of his own language (employment of such (T., p. 2) terms as 'tis evident, 'tis certain, 'tis undeniable), that "such expressions were extorted from me by the present view of the object, and imply no dogmatical spirit..." (T., p. 274)

Hume's conviction that we can offer only moderate philosophic claims which depend upon the present view of an object makes it abundantly clear for what reason, besides his condemnation of metaphysics and his empiricism, Hume could articulate no theory of mind, even if he did believe, as noted already, in a causal link between bodily dispositions and thought. Implicit in Hume's statement is the premise that we are unable to get to the essence of mind (its ultimate nature) via a theory precisely because we are confined above to the perspective of the subject. This is in keeping with Hume's overall attitude towards philosophizing,

in addition to his view that our reasoning is confined largely to causal influence arising from custom (the fundamental premise of his empirical psychology). Two things are worth emphasizing at this point, in order to highlight the character of Hume's philosophy, and in doing so, to offer one final reason why we ought not to search for Hume's theory of mind. The first has to do with what is a major concern for Hume, as evidenced in Part IV of the Treatise, namely, that while we are by nature compelled to believe that objects exist, that there is a self for which we have concern in our ordinary commerce with the world, we expect for the future what occurred in the past, and so on, theoretical systems must fail to vindicate these beliefs.

This is the force behind his conclusions regarding the causes of our belief in body ("Of Scepticism With Regard to the Senses") (T., p. 187-218) In Hume's words, it is legitimate to consider the question "What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings." (T., p. 187) However, the theoretical systems that Hume considers as explanations of the causes of our belief in the external world, leave much to be desired, and indeed Hume finds them to be entirely unsatisfactory. Neither common opinion which would explain the continued and distinct existence of body upon the premise that "our perceptions are our only objects, and continue to exist even when not perceiv'd." (T., p. 213) nor the philosophical hypothesis "of the double existence of perceptions and objects." (T., p. 215) can account for a belief that is so naturally ingrained in us. The problem resolves itself into the faith that we repose in our senses, which cannot be justified philosophically. So, Hume has recourse to "sceptical doubt" with regard to the theories

designed to vindicate our belief, which overrides "this sceptical doubt, both with respect to reason and the senses..." (T., p. 218) Against the attitude of reflection (in this case, theorizing about belief in the external world), the natural attitude prevails. As Hume writes:

Carelessness and in-attention alone can afford us any remedy. For this reason I rely entirely upon them; and take it for granted, whatever may be the reader's opinion at this present moment, that an hour hence he will be persuaded there is both an external and internal world...

Hume's sceptical stance, here, along with the difficulty that he notes regarding theorist in general, i.e., their incommensurability with experience, is further exemplified in his examination of the question regarding personal identity, and the continued, distinct existence of "what we call our Self." (T., p. 251) Hume by no means denies that we have a feeling of SELF, at least in so far as this feeling is in regard to "our passions or the concern we take in ourselves." (T. p. 253) However, a justification of this personal identity is not forthcoming from a metaphysical standpoint, as is evident from two of Hume's conclusions namely (1) that the mind is a bundle of perceptions, and (2) "that all the nice and subtle questions concerning personal identity can never possibly be decided, and are to be regarded rather as grammatical than as philosophical difficulties." (T., p. 262) The first claim may appear to be an ontological proposition. However, it is clear that Hume argues from experience, and, furthermore, consistently denies that we are able to say any more about mind or consciousness than that it involves perceiving. "They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place, where these scenes are represented, or of the materials, of which it is compos'd." (T., p. 253) Hume later, in the appendix to the

the Treatise (T., p. 636) notes that he has not solved the problem of personal identity for he is unable to render consistent two principles, "viz., that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences." (T., p. 636) In all this he pleads "the privilege of a sceptic", maintaining as he does "that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding." Rather than saying that Hume has failed in presenting his 'theory', it is clear that he abandons his own 'hypothesis' which indicates that even his own thinking on the question does not explain identity--he is here being moderate in his philosophical claims and in fact recognizes, in keeping with his general view, that any amount of theorizing will not alter our experience. So it is that he presents his final verdict upon the issue of personal identity by noting that the question of personal identity leads us into verbal disputes. It cannot change the experience we have of ourselves and the concern we take thereof.

Hume's critique of metaphysical theories, along with his academic scepticism do, in the final analysis, provide us with good reason for claiming both that Hume intended no metaphysical theory of mind, and that his is not a systematic philosophy. Both contentions would run counter to the spirit in which we must understand Hume's work. In this connection we are reminded of a comment made by John Passmore, one that is very instructive in this connection. He writes:

Hume's achievement...must be diversely described; his philosophy will not fit neatly with any of the ordinary categories. He is pre-eminently a breaker of new ground: a philosopher, who opens new lines of thought, who suggests to us an endless variety of philosophical explorations. No one could be a Humean, in the sense in which he could be a Hegelian; to be a Humean,

precisely is to take no system as final, nothing as ultimate except the spirit of enquiry.

(Hume's Intentions, p. 159
emphasis mine)

Passmore's remark, I believe, appropriately characterizes Hume's endeavour, and in fact, provides the note upon which we may conclude the present examination. In all, Hume's empiricism leaves open the possibility of enquiry, although we would be confused in our thinking to experience and what is given in it. All philosophical conclusions, in the long run must be grounded empirically. While he is emphatically critical of 'metaphysics' this, nevertheless does not prevent us from making claims about the world provided that we adopt, as Hume himself does, a moderate, sceptical attitude towards all of our theoretical researches. Ultimately, for Hume, a theoretical vindication of experience and belief must give way to the strong force of nature.

It should be apparent from all that has been considered in this part of the examination, that Hume intended no theory of mind. His critique of abstruse metaphysics, his endeavours as an empirical psychologist, his emphasis upon the limits of the understanding, along with his scepticism, all work against any attempts to categorize Hume's views, as the commentators have aimed at doing, into a theory of mind. The fact that they cannot render Hume's views consistent in terms of one or another theory pinpointed a problem, the resolution of which comes when we recognize that Hume's work is diametrically opposed to such theorizing and system building. Hence, we conclude that the commentators are unjustified in their endeavours, and furthermore we have reemphasized some fundamental aspects of Hume's philosophy, that will, hopefully, allow us in the future to approach his thought in the undogmatic spirit in which it was intended.

FOOTNOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. L.A. Selby-Bigge, "Introduction" to David Hume's Enquiries Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. by P.H. Nidditch (4th ed.; Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975), p. vii.
2. Ibid.
3. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. with text revised and notes by P.H. Nidditch. Analytical Index by L.A. Selby-Bigge (2nd ed.; Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 240-1). Hereafter, all references to the Treatise will be indicated by the abbreviation T. followed by the page(s) from which the quotation has been taken. Likewise, I shall refer to passages in the Enquiries by noting the text E. and citing the appropriate page number(s).

FOOTNOTES

PART I

1. John Bricke, Hume's Philosophy of Mind (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 25.
2. Ibid., p. 1.
3. Ibid., p. 37.
4. Ibid., p. 25.
5. Ibid., p. 32.
6. R.F. Anderson, Hume's First Principles, (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1966), p. 2.
7. R.F. Anderson, "The Location, Extension, Shape, and Size of Hume's Perceptions," in Hume: A Re-evaluation, ed. by Donald W. Livingston and James T. King, (New York, Fordham University Press, 1976), p.
8. Ibid., p. 167.
9. Ibid., p. 169. cf. (T., p. 60).
10. Christopher, Verney Salmon, The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy: An Essay towards a Phenomenological Interpretation of the First Book of the Treatise of Human Nature, (Halle, Max Miemeyer Verlag, 1929), p. 300.

[Offprint at: "gahrbuch fur Philosophie und phanomenologische Forschung", Vol. X. edited by E. Husserl, Freiburg i. Br.]
11. Ibid., p. 306.
12. Ibid., p. 301. (Some comment about Husserl's work).
13. Ibid., p. 302.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p.
16. D.M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of Mind, (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul/New York, Humanities Press, 1968), p. 9.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., p. 7.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. R.F. Anderson, "In Defense of Section V: A Reply to Professor Yolton." In Hume Studies, Volume VI, #1, April 1980, p. 26-31.
24. Ibid., p. 26-27.
25. R.f. Anderson, Hume's First Principles, (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1966), p. 163. All references to Anderson's work in the remainder of this discussion will be noted by the abbreviation of the title, H.F.P., followed by the page number--(H.F.P., p. x).
26. R.F. Anderson, "The Location, Extension, Shape, and Size of Hume's Perceptions," in Hume: A Re-Evaluation, ed., by Donald W. Livingston and James T. King, (New York, Fordham University Press, 1976), p. 166. I shall refer to Anderson's paper, in the future, by citing the following abbreviation, (H.P.,) along with the appropriate page number--(H.P., p. x).
27. Christopher Verney Salmon, The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy: An Essay Towards a Phenomenological Interpretation of the First Book of the Treatise of Human Nature, (Halle, Max Meimeyer Verlag, 1929), p. 300. Future references to Salmon's text will, for the sake of economy, be made by citing C.P. (for "Central Problem..."), succeeded by the page being referred to--(C.P., p. x).
28. John Bricke, Hume's Philosophy of Mind, (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 40. Bricke distinguishes between epistemological idealism and subjective idealism; the former is based upon the problem of how we come to know of an objective, 'external' world, while the latter, as Bricke rightly observes, is a metaphysical doctrine. Salmon's view is to be distinguished from the latter.
29. Salmon equates human nature and consciousness--the former is understood as the latter. This is a contrast with Anderson's view in that his materialist stance regarding Hume's theory of mind requires that human nature be construed as material nature.
30. John Bricke, Hume's Philosophy of Mind, (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 25. Future references to Bricke's text will be made by citing PM (for "Philosophy of Mind") to be followed by the page referred to--(PM., p. x).
31. James Noxon, Hume's Philosophical Development, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 19.

32. We find that the sceptical character of Hume's examination is much more explicitly and forcibly portrayed in the Enquiries. Indeed there is an essential link between Hume's claims about the limits of human understanding in the discussion "of the Idea of Necessary Connexion" (E., p. 72) and philosophy. (E., p. 148-165).
33. A more extensive and illuminating treatment of Hume's first proposition is to be found in James Noxon's Hume's Philosophical Development, Part IV, section 3, "Logical Status of the Copy Principle", p. 138-48. Professor Noxon argues that "Hume presents his 'first principle...in the science of human nature' (T. 7), the copy principle, as an empirical proposition," one that Hume discovers "by observing his own perceptions" and one that is easily verified by others "by consulting their own experience." Against such critics as A.H. Basson who sees Hume's principle not as "an empirical proposition at all but a definition", (p. 140) Anthony Flew who refers to it as "a 'pretentious tautology'", and a "contingent generalization", among others, Noxon maintains, and I believe rightly so, that "The copy principle is a rule of procedure. It prescribes a technique for investigating terms which are suspected of not having the meanings imputed to them in philosophical theories. It is a methodological instrument devised for semantic analysis.", a maxim or guide for "testing terms by attempting to locate their referents amongst experienced ideas." (p. 144) This remark confirms with greater clarity what Hendel only alludes briefly to and does not develop in his discussion of Hume's first principle.

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