Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/11375/13770
Title: | Nietzsche's Rejection of Transcendent Truth |
Authors: | Blackwood, Stephen |
Advisor: | Ajzenstat, S. |
Department: | Philosophy |
Keywords: | Philosophy;Philosophy |
Publication Date: | Sep-2002 |
Abstract: | <p>In this thesis I address Nietzsche's seemingly paradoxical claim that all truth is in fact illusion. I begin with an examination of the claims in On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense, where the transcendent truth is rejected on the grounds that it is self-contradictory impossibility. However, if this is the case, then how is it possible for Nietzsche to make such a claim? Docs he not implicitly exclude his own account from this critique? To investigate this matter, I offer an interpretation of his critique of the history of Western morality since the time of Socrates and how it relates to what he terms the human, all-too-human origins of the concept of truth. This leads to a discussion of his claims concerning the essentially perspectival and interpretive nature of human knowing. I argue that this view of knowledge. in which truth and life are viewed as one and the same, saves Nietzsche from the charge of internal inconsistency.</p> |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/11375/13770 |
Identifier: | opendissertations/8599 9673 4893467 |
Appears in Collections: | Open Access Dissertations and Theses |
Files in This Item:
File | Size | Format | |
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fulltext.pdf | 2.93 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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