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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11375/12876
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dc.contributor.advisorKarakostas, Georgeen_US
dc.contributor.advisorRyan Leduc, Douglas Downen_US
dc.contributor.authorYu, Heen_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-06-18T17:01:03Z-
dc.date.available2014-06-18T17:01:03Z-
dc.date.created2013-03-04en_US
dc.date.issued2013-04en_US
dc.identifier.otheropendissertations/7725en_US
dc.identifier.other8787en_US
dc.identifier.other3831460en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11375/12876-
dc.description.abstract<p>Selfish routing is frequently discussed. The general framework of a system of non-cooperative users can be used to model many different optimization problems such as network routing, traffic or transportation problems.</p> <p>It is well known that the Wardrop user equilibria (i.e. the user optima) generally do not optimize the overall system cost in a traffic routing problem.</p> <p>In order to induce the equilibrium flow to be as close to the optimal flow as possible, the term “toll” is introduced. With the addition of tolls, a traffic system does not show the actual cost to the users but the displayed cost of users, which is the summation of the actual cost and the toll. A common behavioral assumption in traffic network modeling is that every user chooses a path which is perceived as the shortest path, then the whole system achieves the equilibrium of the displayed cost. It is proved that there exists an optimal toll which can induce the equilibrium flow under displayed cost to be the optimal flow in reality.</p> <p>However, this conclusion holds only if the selfish routing executes only once. If the game is played repeatedly, the users will detect the difference between the actual and displayed costs. Then, they will not completely trust the information given by the system and calculate the cost. The purpose of this thesis is to find out the optimal strategy given by the system–how to set tolls in order to maintain the flow as close to the optimal flow as possible.</p>en_US
dc.subjectSelfish Routingen_US
dc.subjectRepeated Gameen_US
dc.subjectTollen_US
dc.subjectDigital Communications and Networkingen_US
dc.subjectOther Computer Engineeringen_US
dc.subjectDigital Communications and Networkingen_US
dc.titleRepeated Selfish Routing with Incomplete Informationen_US
dc.typethesisen_US
dc.contributor.departmentComputing and Softwareen_US
dc.description.degreeMaster of Science (MSc)en_US
Appears in Collections:Open Access Dissertations and Theses

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