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http://hdl.handle.net/11375/11999
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.advisor | Parlar, Mahmut | en_US |
dc.contributor.advisor | Prakash Abad, Dr. Elkafi Hassini | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Wu, Sandy Huyu | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-06-18T16:57:53Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2014-06-18T16:57:53Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2012-04-24 | en_US |
dc.date.issued | 2012-04 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | opendissertations/6921 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | 7962 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | 2795945 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11375/11999 | - |
dc.description.abstract | <p>The last two decades witnessed an increasing emphasis on reverse logistics (RL). Our thesis attempts to investigate two research problems in RL and explore game theoretic applications in this field.</p> <p>In Chapter 1, we introduce SCM, RL, relevant game theoretic applications, and the organizational structure of this thesis.</p> <p>In Chapter 2, we address a newsvendor problem with resalable returns. We develop a basic model with order quantity as the single decision variable and conduct concavity analysis. We also develop a general model in which the retailer determines both order quantity and two inter-period inventory thresholds. We use simulation to investigate the timing effect of both customer demands and returns on the retailer's decision making.</p> <p>In Chapter 3, we explore the application of game theoretic models with incomplete information in inventory management. Games with incomplete information may provide a more realistic modeling framework. We hope this exposition be helpful to researchers interested in applying game theoretic models and computing equilibriums in their specific problems in SCM and RL.</p> <p>In Chapter 4 we consider a remanufacturing competition problem between an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a pure remanufacturer (REM) with the OEM's incomplete information on the REM's unit cost. We apply the type-III model in Chapter 3 for formulation and derive the closed-form Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We use sensitivity analysis to investigate the effect of such incomplete information on both competitors' decision making.</p> <p>We summarize in Chapter 5 and provide a general direction for future research on game theoretic applications in RL.</p> | en_US |
dc.subject | Reverse logistics | en_US |
dc.subject | inventory management with resalable returns | en_US |
dc.subject | competition in remanufacturing | en_US |
dc.subject | game theory | en_US |
dc.subject | game theoretic applications with incomplete information | en_US |
dc.subject | Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods | en_US |
dc.subject | Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods | en_US |
dc.title | Contributions to Reverse Logistics with Game theoretic Applications | en_US |
dc.type | thesis | en_US |
dc.contributor.department | Business | en_US |
dc.description.degree | Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) | en_US |
Appears in Collections: | Open Access Dissertations and Theses |
Files in This Item:
File | Size | Format | |
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fulltext.pdf | 1.32 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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