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|Title:||Leibniz's Law and Identity|
|Authors:||Dowling, William Keith|
|Advisor:||Wilson, N. L.|
|Abstract:||<p>In this essay I consider various alleged exceptions to the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals -- Leibniz's Law. There are two major difficulties. First, the apparent antinomy that arises when Leibniz's rule combines with the modalities. I argue that there are a number of ways of dealing with this problem and we are not therefore obliged-to abandon or modify Leibniz's rule. Second, the unacceptable inference which results when Leibniz's rule is applied in contexts expressing mental attitudes. Here, I show how Leibniz's rule and intentional attitudes combine in a perfectly acceptable way.</p> <p>I also deal with a number of other minor objections to this rule, from the current literature on the topic, all of which I hope to show present no difficulties. In fine, despite the many apparent counter-examples considered, I hope to show Leibniz' s Law, which permits the unrestricted interchange of the terms of an identity sentence, has not been falsified.</p>|
|Appears in Collections:||Open Access Dissertations and Theses|
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