Adickes and Kant's Thing-in-Itself: A Preliminary Investigation

Abstract

<p>The purpose of this thesis was to investigate Erich Adickes' view of the problem of the existence of the thing-in-itself and of the question of whether or not some of the categorial concepts, including that of existence, apply to the things-in-themselves in Kant's philosophy. In chapter one I dealt with the·former of these two questions and I concluded, in agreement tvith Adickes, that Kant held the view that the things-in-themselves do exist in some sense of the term 'to be'. In chapter two I came to the tentative conclusion, this time disagreeing with Adickes, that the categories were not meant by Kant to apply to the in-itself. In the third chapter I briefly discussed George Schrader's views of the above outlined problems as well as some other possible alternate accounts of the matter at hand.</p>