The Constitution of Theseus: The Metaphysics of Constitutional Precommitment

Abstract

Constitutions and bills of rights have previously been argued to be non-democratic. To justify the entrenched nature of constitutions, some theorists have argued that constitutions represent a type of rational precommitment. However, this precommitment understanding of constitutions is not without its own problems. In this work, I will argue the prominent understanding of constitutional precommitment used by its proponents seems to rely upon a definition of commitment to which their arguments do not stay true. However, when I try to amend their arguments and apply a proper example of commitment, it leads to some problems with other tenets of the constitutional debate, especially the fact of constitutional entrenchment. In an attempt to determine just what it would take to save the rational precommitment understanding of constitutions, while maintaining a proper definition of commitment, I turn to metaphysical puzzles about change, persistence, and the possibility of a mereological understanding of our constitution. I conclude that 1) current debates do not have a proper conception of commitment and are thus failing to accomplish their ends, and 2) if proponents of the rational precommitment view do not buy into my analysis, then it is going to prove quite difficult to keep their account afloat once we properly define commitment.