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http://hdl.handle.net/11375/9477
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.advisor | Garrett, Brian J. | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Wright, Mattew Ian | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-06-18T16:47:16Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2014-06-18T16:47:16Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2011-06-07 | en_US |
dc.date.issued | 2009-09 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | opendissertations/4598 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | 5616 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | 2049795 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11375/9477 | - |
dc.description.abstract | <p>This project is a response to recent criticisms against the use of intuitions in analytic philosophy, raised by adherents of experimental restrictionism. I begin by discussing and eventually rejecting the restrictionist characterization of analytic philosophy, which I take to be inaccurate and unfair. I examine several accounts of the nature of intuitions in the history of philosophy, in contemporary discourse and as they are understood by restrictionism. I reject these accounts in favour of a more modest characterization of intuitions. I conclude with an overview of the restrictionist methodology. After considering some of its past criticisms, I offer my own critique based on the restrictionists' false presupposition that intuition is a natural kind.</p> | en_US |
dc.subject | Philosophy | en_US |
dc.subject | Philosophy | en_US |
dc.title | The Mother-in-Law of Philosophy: Intuition & Experimental Restrictionism Ian Matthew Wright, B.A. | en_US |
dc.type | thesis | en_US |
dc.contributor.department | Philosophy | en_US |
dc.description.degree | Master of Arts (MA) | en_US |
Appears in Collections: | Open Access Dissertations and Theses |
Files in This Item:
File | Size | Format | |
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fulltext.pdf | 4.34 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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