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|Title:||The Mother-in-Law of Philosophy: Intuition & Experimental Restrictionism Ian Matthew Wright, B.A.|
|Authors:||Wright, Mattew Ian|
|Advisor:||Garrett, Brian J.|
|Abstract:||<p>This project is a response to recent criticisms against the use of intuitions in analytic philosophy, raised by adherents of experimental restrictionism. I begin by discussing and eventually rejecting the restrictionist characterization of analytic philosophy, which I take to be inaccurate and unfair. I examine several accounts of the nature of intuitions in the history of philosophy, in contemporary discourse and as they are understood by restrictionism. I reject these accounts in favour of a more modest characterization of intuitions. I conclude with an overview of the restrictionist methodology. After considering some of its past criticisms, I offer my own critique based on the restrictionists' false presupposition that intuition is a natural kind.</p>|
|Appears in Collections:||Open Access Dissertations and Theses|
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