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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11375/8997
Title: Causality in Advaita Metaphysics
Authors: Gadsden, Lomas Stephen
Advisor: Arapura, J. G.
Department: Religion
Keywords: Religion;Religion
Publication Date: 1976
Abstract: <p>Throughout Śaṁkara's bhāșyas on the Upanișads, Bhagvad Gītā, and Brahma Sūtra, we are entreated to oft elaborate discussions on the principle of causality. These latter discussions are metaphysical in flavour and seem to have as their intent the establishment of a transcendental ground, Brahman. However, on the other hand, there are arguments adopted and utilized by Śaṁkara tat deny the causality principle ultimately. This thesis is an attempt to place these seemingly antithetical positions in proper perspective , and to illustrate that the principle of casuuality, for the Advaita, is no real hermeutical principle of Being (Brahman), but only a tentative proposition adopted within the structure of māyā and avidyā. At most causality is a tentative proposition utilized in a endeavour to appease the gods of reason, and not Brahman.</p>
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11375/8997
Identifier: opendissertations/4159
5177
2027408
Appears in Collections:Open Access Dissertations and Theses

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