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|Title:||Material Consequence and Counter-Factuals|
|Keywords:||associated conditional;closest-world semantics;consequence;counter-factuals;covering generalization;David Lewis;Judea Pearl;law-like generalization;material consequence;structural model semantics;Philosophy;Philosophy|
|Abstract:||<p>A conclusion is a “material consequence” of reasons if it follows necessarily from them in accordance with a valid form of argument with content. The corresponding universal generalization of the argument’s associated conditional must be true, must be a covering generalization, and must be true of counter-factual instances. But it need not be law-like. Pearl’s structural model semantics is easier to apply to such counter-factual instances than Lewis’s closest-worlds semantics, and gives intuitively correct results.</p>|
|Description:||<p>This paper was presented at a conference, Virtues of Argumentation, sponsored by the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation, and held at the University of Windsor from May 23-25. It is expected to be published in a CD of the proceedings.</p>|
|Appears in Collections:||Philosophy Publications|
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