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http://hdl.handle.net/11375/5645
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Hitchcock, David | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-06-17T19:50:22Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2014-06-17T19:50:22Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2009-09-26 | en_US |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | philosophy_coll/1 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | 1000 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | 1017724 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11375/5645 | - |
dc.description.abstract | <p>Contemporary philosophers generally conceive of consequence as necessary truth-preservation. They generally construe this necessity as logical, and operationalize it in substitutional, formal or model-theoretic terms as the absence of a counter-example. A minority tradition allows for grounding truth-preservation also on non-logical necessities, especially on the semantics of extra-logical constants. The present article reviews and updates the author’s previous proposals to modify the received conception of consequence so as to require truth-preservation to be non-trivial (i.e. not a mere consequence of a necessarily true implicatum or a necessarily untrue implicans) and to allow variants of the substitutional, formal and model-theoretic realizations of the received conception where the condition underwriting truth-preservation is not purely formal. Indeed, the condition may be contingent rather than necessary. Allowing contingent non-trivial truth-preservation as a consequence relation fits our inferential practices, but turns out to be subject to counter-examples. We are left with an unhappy choice between an overly strict requirement that non-trivial truth-preservation be underwritten by a necessary truth and an overly loose recognition of non-trivial truth-preservation wherever some truth underwrites it. We need to look for a principled intermediate position between these alter- natives.</p> | en_US |
dc.subject | consequence | en_US |
dc.subject | logical consequence | en_US |
dc.subject | non-logical consequence | en_US |
dc.subject | Alfred Tarski | en_US |
dc.subject | truth-preservation | en_US |
dc.subject | necessity | en_US |
dc.subject | substitutional | en_US |
dc.subject | formal | en_US |
dc.subject | model-theoretic | en_US |
dc.subject | Other Philosophy | en_US |
dc.subject | Philosophy | en_US |
dc.subject | Other Philosophy | en_US |
dc.title | Non-logical Consequence | en_US |
dc.type | article | en_US |
Appears in Collections: | Philosophy Publications |
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fulltext.pdf | 161.93 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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