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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11375/32244
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DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.advisorLapointe, Sandra-
dc.contributor.advisorStotts, Megan-
dc.contributor.authorKayssi, Lucas-
dc.date.accessioned2025-08-26T18:20:43Z-
dc.date.available2025-08-26T18:20:43Z-
dc.date.issued2025-11-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11375/32244-
dc.description.abstractMindreading is one popular account of social cognition which suggests that we generally understand others by attributing mental states like thoughts, beliefs, desires, etc. to them. Accordingly, this thesis accomplishes three things. First, it reveals how the mindreading literature bears the implicit but erroneous assumption that observing behaviour is somehow necessary for mindreading processes. Second, after showing how this assumption is false, it argues that Edith Stein’s phenomenological account of empathy offers a true necessary—and as is later argued, also sufficient—condition for mindreading. This means that we cannot successfully attribute mental states to others without enduring empathy at some point throughout the process; and that we may do this with empathy alone. Third, it positions this argument as an explicit attempt to promote phenomenology as a relevant and important discipline for the philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and psychology in general. To accomplish everything mentioned, I start by presenting and comparing the 4E theories of cognition in chapter one. Later in this chapter, I briefly reveal how phenomenology has influenced the development of these 4E theories. In chapter two, I lean on these findings to present and compare how the Theory Theory and Simulation Theory accounts of social cognition compare to phenomenological approaches. Finally, in chapter three I argue that combining 4E and phenomenological approaches to studying social cognition can offer a more fruitful account of mindreading versus the standard accounts alone. Whereas studying social cognition is typically considered to be a task for scientists and philosophers of mind, I argue that Edith Stein’s concept of empathy can contribute to these efforts by providing a robust necessary and sufficient condition for mindreading to occur. Moreover, this provides one clear example of how phenomenology can support research in cognitive science, psychology, and philosophy of mind in general.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.subjectPhilosophy of minden_US
dc.subjectPhenomenologyen_US
dc.subjectsocial cognitionen_US
dc.subject4E cognitionen_US
dc.titleA Phenomenological Contribution to Social Cognition: Empathy as Mindreadingen_US
dc.title.alternativeA Phenomenological Contribution to Social Cognitionen_US
dc.title.alternativeEmpathy as Mindreadingen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.departmentPhilosophyen_US
dc.description.degreetypeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreeMaster of Arts (MA)en_US
dc.description.layabstractIn this thesis I reveal the implicit, baseline assumption made by scientists and philosophers in the mindreading literature that observing behaviour is a necessary condition for understanding the mental life of other people. I then argue that this assumption is erroneous by showcasing how we sometimes understand the metal life of others without observing behaviour. If observing behaviour is not a true necessary condition for understanding the metal life of others, then, what is? I present Edith Stein’s account of empathy and suggest that it is a necessary condition for mindreading. The basic argument for this starts with the fact that we cannot successfully understand the mental life of others without eventually thinking consciously about them in some way at some point. When we do think of them, empathy—as Stein presents it—is present. Therefore, empathy is a necessary condition for understanding the mental life of others.en_US
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