Vice and Friendship in Aristotle

Abstract

This thesis will contribute to a more charitable understanding of Aristotle’s view on friendship, as it challenges the philosophical orthodoxy which holds Aristotle as denying the possibility of genuine friendships between vicious people. Chapter 1 examines the different interpretations of Aristotle’s vicious person to determine which interpretation best captures the entirety of Aristotle’s claims regarding vice. I argue that if we wish to bring together all of his claims into a cohesive interpretation, the best interpretation is a dual account of vice. Any concern of inconsistency can be avoided by adopting this interpretation of two distinct kinds of vicious people. In Chapter 2, I consider Aristotelian incomplete friendships of utility and pleasure, and if they ought to be considered friendships in the modern sense. I argue that these friendships are instrumental, but that they also include well-wishing for the friend's own sake, and as such do count as friendship in the modern sense. Further, as all scholars agree Aristotle held vicious people can have incomplete friendships, this means vicious people can wish others well for their own sake. In Chapter 3, I distinguish between complete and character friendships by adopting John Cooper’s view. I argue that vicious people should be included in those who can have character friendships, and that they can befriend each other based on bad traits, that they mistakenly hold to be good. As such I argue that character friendships are formed on account of the apparent good, and so, some vicious people, in Aristotle’s view can have genuine friendships of all three kinds.