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http://hdl.handle.net/11375/29713
Title: | Essays in Information and Privacy Economics |
Authors: | Sam, Alex |
Advisor: | Han, Seungjin |
Department: | Economics |
Keywords: | Strategic Communication;Information Economics;Privacy Economics |
Publication Date: | 2024 |
Abstract: | This thesis consists of three chapters in microeconomic theory concerning strategic interactions among parties with asymmetric information. The first chapter, ''Cheap Talk with Private Signal Structure" (co-authored with Maxim Ivanov) and published in Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 132 (2022), pages 288-304, addresses the question of how a designer of information --- which is privately observed by other players --- can benefit from designing it privately. The second chapter, ''Multidimensional Signaling with a Resource Constraint" (co-authored with Seungjin Han), studies competitive monotone equilibria in a multidimensional signaling economy where senders invest in their multidimensional signals (cognitive and non-cognitive) while facing a resource constraint. The third chapter, ''Consumer Privacy Disclosure in Competitive Markets", studies how competition among multi-product sellers with market power shapes the implications of consumer privacy on market outcomes. |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/11375/29713 |
Appears in Collections: | Open Access Dissertations and Theses |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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Sam_Alex_K_April2024_Ph.D.pdf | 1.17 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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