Friendship and Goodness of Character

Abstract

This project will contribute to our understanding of both Aristotle’s theory of friendship in particular and friendship as a philosophical topic in general. Chapter 1 focuses on explaining what Aristotle means when he says that friendship either is a virtue or is similar to virtue. Specifically, he claims that friendship is like a hexis prohairetikē (a state which chooses). This phrasing is remarkably similar to his description of the character virtues, and it invites comparison between the two kinds of states. In Chapter 2 I examine the common scholarly suggestion that Aristotle’s taxonomy of pleasure- utility- and virtue-based friendships is closely linked to the motivations that individuals have when they pursue friendship. By focusing on Aristotle’s remarks on the time it takes to properly establish a friendship, I develop a view of Aristotle on which the motivations that a person has for pursuing a friendship often uncouple from the kind of friendship they succeed in forming. In Chapter 3 I defend Aristotle’s account of friendship from three common contemporary objections. Some scholars believe that Aristotle is too strict in his account of friendship, that only truly good people can be friends, that many friendships on Aristotle’s account are not truly friendship, and that Aristotle is wrong about vicious peoples’ ability to form friendships. I reply to each objection. In chapter 4 I follow Aristotle in arguing that we should understand goodness of character as a necessary, grounding feature of friendship. In so doing, I disagree with those contemporary scholars who do not follow Aristotle on this point, insisting instead that two individuals can be friends without being good, and their friendship can be about bad or immoral things and activities.