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http://hdl.handle.net/11375/26337
Title: | Incentives, Rules, Power, and Discretion: A Comparative Analysis of Local Financial Autonomy Building in The Cities of Accra And Nairobi |
Authors: | Nyirakamana, Colette |
Advisor: | Huque, Shafiq |
Department: | Political Science |
Publication Date: | 2021 |
Abstract: | This doctoral thesis attempts to answer the following questions: 1) Why do local governments fail to meet their revenue targets; 2) How do local actors mitigate the challenges of building strong financial autonomy through revenue mobilization activities? This study employs a qualitative comparative analysis of Accra, Ghana, and Nairobi, Kenya, to investigate these questions. Drawing on institutionalist theories and political economy studies, this thesis shows how institutional rules, powers, incentives and discretion structure the actions and strategies of local bureaucrats and local political elites. In turn, these actions and strategies shape revenue mobilization administration and outcomes. Additionally, the political context in which fiscal decentralization takes place conditions the willingness of local political elites to support or undermine the efforts to mobilize more revenue. These claims are supported by empirical data (interviews, primary source documents, and observations) gathered during two times four-month field research in Accra and Nairobi. Research findings show that from the period studied (2013 and 2017), revenue collection performance was low and did not allow Accra and Nairobi to achieve substantial financial autonomy. The revenue performance did not decrease the dependence of the two cities on external grants and revenue transfers. Poor revenue collection performance is caused by the ambiguity of fiscal decentralization rules, which opens up space for target adjustments and spending at source a portion of the revenue mobilized. Moreover, research findings show that revenue mobilization is administered by strong and weak bureaucratic capacity. In situations where the bureaucratic capacity is strong, it is not used optimally due to inadequate organizational capacity. Finally, research findings reveal that political elites use their institutional powers and discretion to undermine the implementation of strategies designed by bureaucrats to mobilize more revenue when these strategies threaten their interests. Ultimately, although local elected officials have been transferred the power to build financial autonomy, they fail to take ownership of this power because the political and institutional context in which they interact, compels them to resist innovative strategies that could enable the conditions for greater revenue mobilization in Accra and Nairobi. |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/11375/26337 |
Appears in Collections: | Open Access Dissertations and Theses |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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Nyirakamana_Colette_202104_PhD.pdf | 2.15 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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