The Epistemic Validity Of Empathic Knowledge Claims

Abstract

Obama once spoke of his desire to see empathetic individuals appointed to the position of Supreme Court Justice of the United States. His desire was met by many with resistance as people voiced concerns regarding the unreliability of beliefs founded on empathy and possible negative consequences that may come about. Concerns regarding unreliability are the product of our inability to access the ‘privileged information’ or the actual thoughts and perspectives of those we intend to empathize with. Attempts to form empathic beliefs, in the absence of this information, could lead to various harms to the very groups we intend to empathize with. Stereotyping, bias, and claims of sincerely ‘knowing’ the unique circumstances of those very different from ourselves can all lead to the justification of actions with harmful consequences. In my thesis I wish to address these concerns by acknowledging that most practical sources of knowledge (those we make use of and depend on regularly), such as those predicated on notions of cause and effect, have similar risks associated with them. Theories such as gravity and evolution remain theories and yet via the establishment of best practices and diligent communities, we are able to minimize the dissemination of false knowledge claims and their respective harms. In my paper I acknowledge this and explain how empathy can be dealt with in a similar fashion, while also reducing potential harms to others and allowing us to take advantage of the many benefits empathic knowledge has to offer. In the same way that we still continue to make use of our understanding of gravity to improve our lives and society by building aircrafts, we can make use of empathy to improve the ability of individual social and moral agents, as well as society as a whole. Under this pragmatic approach even the legal system can reap the benefits of empathic knowledge claims, so long as we, moving forward, work to collectively discern how to best ensure the validity of empathic knowledge claims.