LIVING DISABILITY: WAYS FORWARD FROM DECONTEXTUAL MODELS OF DISABILITY

Abstract

Living Disability: Ways Forward from Decontextual Models of Disability consists of six articles that provide both theoretical and pragmatic commentaries on decontextual approaches to vulnerability and disability. In What Contemporary Models of Disability Miss: The Case for a Phenomenological Hermeneutic Analysis I argue many commonly accepted models for understanding disability use a vertical method in which disability is defined as a category into which people are slotted based on whether or not they fit its definitional criteria. This method inevitably homogenizes the experiences of disabled people. A hermeneutic investigation of commonly accepted models for understanding disability will provide an epistemological tool to critique and to augment contemporary models of disability. In A Phenomenological Hermeneutic Resolution to the Principlist- Narrative Bioethics Debate Narrative, I note narrative approaches to bioethics and principlist approaches to bioethics have often been presented in fundamental opposition to each other. I argue that a phenomenological hermeneutic approach to the debate finds a compromise between both positions that maintains what is valuable in each of them. Justifying an Adequate Response to the Vulnerable Other examines the possibility of endorsing the position that I, as a moral agent, ought to do my best to respond adequately to the other’s vulnerability. I contend that, insofar as I value my personal identity, it is consistent to work toward responding adequately to the vulnerability of the other both ontologically and ethically. Who Can Make a Yes?: Disability, Gender, Sexual Consent and ‘Yes Means Yes’ examines the ‘yes means yes’ model of sexual consent, and the political and ethical commitments that underpin this model, noting three fundamental Ph.D. Thesis – C. Kavanagh; McMaster University - Philosophy v disadvantages. This position unfairly polices the sexual expression of participants, particularly vulnerable participants such as disabled people, it demands an unreasonably high standard for defining sexual interaction as consensual, and allows perpetrators of sexual violence to define consent. In Craving Sameness, Accepting Difference: The Possibility of Solidarity and Social Justice I note realist accounts typically define solidarity on the basis of a static feature of human nature. We stand in solidarity with some other person, or group of people, because we share important features in common. In opposition to such realist accounts, Richard Rorty defines solidarity as a practical tool, within which there is always an ‘us’, with whom we stand in solidarity, and a ‘them’, with whom we are contrasted. I argue that by understanding Rorty’s pragmatic solidarity in terms of the relational view of solidarity offered by Alexis Shotwell, it is possible to conceptualise solidarity in a manner that allows for extending the boundaries of the community with whom we stand in solidarity. In Translating Non-Human Actors I examine Bruno Latour’s position that nonhuman things can be made to leave interpretable statements, and have a place in democracy. With the right types of mediators, the scientist can translate for non-humans, and those voices will allow for nonhuman political representation. I wish to suggest that, like scientists, people with disabilities are particularly capable of building networks that facilitate translation between humans and non-humans.